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CONFIDENTIAL.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO.

FRANCE—December 1839 to September 1844; and
August 1857 to October 1859.

SPAIN—September 1858 to October 1859.

WITH AN APPENDIX.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Correspondence respecting the Relations between France and Morocco.

No.		No.		Subject.	Page
1.	To Earl Granville ..	397	Dec 13, 1839	To remind French Minister for Foreign Affairs of pledges given by France not to attack Tunis or Morocco	1
2.	Earl Granville	16	Jan. 13, 1840	No truth in report that French fleet is about to make a demonstration on coast of Morocco ..	1
3.	Mr. Bulwer	Private and Confidential	July 12, 1841	Conversation with King of the French as to expected attack on Tunis by the Porte	2
4.	To Mr. Bulwer . ..	Separate & Confidential	22,	French Government has already pledged itself not to attack Tunis or Morocco	3
5.	Mr. Bulwer	Private and Confidential	30,	King of French cannot suffer Turks to interfere in Barbary . ..	3
6.	To Mr. Bulwer . ..	127	Aug. 4,	Approves language in "Private and Confidential" of July 30, 1841	4
7.	Mr. Bulwer	305	Sept. 27,	Conversation with M. Guizot ..	4
8.	Lord Cowley	Secret and Confidential	Apr. 15, 1842	Protection of Abd-el-Kader by Emperor of Morocco	5
9.	„ „ .. .	298	June 14, 1844	Marshal Bugeaud to remain on defensive in Algeria	5
10.	„ „	302	17,	French force to be sent to Morocco under Prince de Joinville ..	6
11.	To Lord Cowley ..	186	July 2,	Satisfaction at M. Guizot's assurances	8
12.	Lord Cowley	337	5,	Answer of M. Guizot to questions respecting Morocco, in Chamber of Deputies	9
13.	„ „	339	7,	Has expressed to M. Guizot satisfaction at his replies	10
14.	„ „	347	11,	Discussion in Chamber of Peers .	11
15.	„ „	350	12,	Note to M. Guizot	13
16.	„ „	352	14,	Answer to above note	14
17.	„ „	Secret and Confidential	Aug. 2,	Conversation with the King ..	14
18.	„ „	Secret and Confidential	19,	Attack by Prince de Joinville on Tangier	15
19.	To Lord Cowley ..	241	23,	Concern of Her Majesty's Government at attack on Tangier ..	15
20.	Lord Cowley	442	28,	Bombardment of Mogador by the French	16
21.	„ „	446 Confidential	30,	French intention of making fresh overtures of peace to Morocco .	17

Correspondence respecting the Relations between Spain and Morocco.

22.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	114	Sept. 4, 1858	Rumour of intended Spanish expedition to Morocco	19
23.	„ „ . ..	115 Confidential	4,	Spanish Government intend to strengthen fortress of Melilla ..	19
24.	„ „ . ..	121	7,	Asks instructions as to representations to Spanish Government ..	20
25.	„ „ . ..	122 Secret and Confidential	7,	Demand of Spain for compensation for boat plundered by Reefians in 1856	21
26.	Mr. Hay	38	Aug. 25,	Capture of two Reef vessels by Spaniards	21
27.	„ „	39 Confidential	26,	Renewal of hostilities between Reefians and Melilla	28
28.	„ „	41	28,	Application for vessel of war to be sent to Reef coast	34
29.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	131 Confidential	Sept. 10,	Probability of war	35

No.	No.		Subject.	Page
30. Mr. Buchanan	134	Sept. 14, 1858	Hostilities between Melilla and neighbouring tribes	36
31. To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	22,	Discourage expedition to Morocco.	40
32. „ „ ..	66	23,	Evils of intended expedition ..	40
33. „ „ ..	Telegraphic	28,	No intention of interfering with Spanish Government as to defence of their forts	41
34. Mr. Hay	53	18,	Opinions as to Spanish expedition.	41
35. Mr. Buchanan	148	25,	Has held language as directed in telegram of the 22nd	42
36. „ „	149	25,	Foreign Minister not acquainted with punishment of pirates ..	42
37. „ „	152	25,	Capture of vessels by Reef pirates. Spain must take reparation if not granted	42
38. To Mr. Buchanan ..	73	Oct. 5,	Copy of despatch from Earl Cowley. Spanish expedition against Reef pirates	43
39. Mr. Buchanan	160	2,	Conversation with M. Calderon Collantes	43
40. Mr. Hay	61 Confidential	7,	Moorish Government has been endeavouring to restrain Reefians	44
41. „ „	64 Confidential	11,	Spanish force would be insufficient to subdue Reefians	48
42. Mr. Buchanan	206	25,	Eight Spanish steam-vessels of war about to visit Tangier	49
43. „ „	209	31,	Failure of attack on Moorish outpost at Melilla	51
44. „ „	232	Nov. 7,	As to neutral territory between Spanish and Moorish possessions	51
45. Mr. Hay	67	Oct. 27,	Moorish Government will pay 2,000 dollars as compensation for plunder of Spanish boat	52
46. „ „	68	27,	Conflict between Reefians and Melilla	54
47. Mr. Buchanan	248	Nov. 10,	Copy of despatch to Mr. Hay ..	55
48. „ „	257	20,	Capture, by Spaniards, of a Reef vessel, "Maimon," with a pass from Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.	55
49. Mr. Hay	73	6,	Capture of "Maimon"	56
50. Mr. Buchanan	269	22,	Copy of letter to Mr. Hay on above subject	57
51. To Mr. Buchanan ..	131	Dec. 4,	To remonstrate against capture of "Maimon"	58
52. Mr. Hay	84	9,	Views as to Spanish negotiations with Morocco	58
53. To Mr. Buchanan ..	145	24,	Inexpediency of pursuing discussions with Morocco. To represent to Spanish Government ..	64
54. Mr. Buchanan	318	20,	"Maimon" will be restored ..	65
55. „ „	321	20,	Spanish Government do not entertain hostile intentions towards Morocco	66
56. To Mr. Buchanan ..	147	28,	No reason to qualify statement in No. 145	67
57. To Mr. Hay	44	30,	Not to interfere any longer in discussion	67
58. Mr. Hay	85	21,	Has communicated instructions in No. 40 to Khateeb	68
59. To Mr. Buchanan ..	1	Jan. 3, 1859	To urge immediate release of Moorish prisoners	68
60. Mr. Buchanan	4	6,	Conversation with M. Collantes .	63
61. „ „	15 Confidential	10,	Respecting detention of Reefian prisoners	70
62. To Mr. Buchanan ..	14	18,	Satisfaction at explanations of M. Collantes	70
63. Mr. Buchanan	Telegraphic	28,	Moorish prisoners sent to Tangier	71
64. „ „	23	23,	Cargo of "Maimon" has been given up	71
65. Mr. Hay	2	6,	Translation of letter from Khateeb	73
65*. Mr. Buchanan ..	40	29,	Views of Spanish Government ..	76
66. Mr. Hay	5 Confidential	19,	Extract of private letter to Mr. Buchanan	78
67. „ „	6 Confidential	20,	Language of M. Blanco at variance with assurances given to Mr. Buchanan	79
68. „ „	7	21,	Message from M. Blanco to Moorish Minister	93

No.	No.		Subject.	Page
69. Mr. Hay	8 Confidential	Jan. 24, 1859	Alteration in M. Blanco's language	94
70. „ „	10	28,	Refusal of Reefians to liberate Spanish prisoners	98
71. Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private and Confidential	29,	Information from Spanish officer .	99
72. „ „	Private	24,	As to advice to Khateeb . ..	100
73. To Mr. Buchanan ..	30	Feb. 8,	Copies of despatches from Mr. Hay	101
74. Mr. Buchanan ..	46	2,	As to M. Blanco's language. Conversation with M. Collantes ..	101
75. „ „	48	3,	Article from "Epoca"	103
76. „ „	58	8,	As to non-arrival of Reefian prisoners at Tangier	106
77. „ „	Confidential 61	10,	Reefian prisoners have not yet sailed	107
78. To Mr. Buchanan ..	38	18,	Approves language to M. Collantes	107
79. Mr. Buchanan ..	65	12,	Respecting detention by Reefians of Spanish prisoners	107
80. „ „	72	18,	Spanish prisoners on their way to Tangier	108
81. Mr. Hay	15	17,	Reporting the release of the Spanish prisoners, &c.	108
82. „ „	16	17,	As to a neutral ground	111
83. Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Confidential Private	17,	Agreement of Sultan to a new boundary	112
84. Mr. Buchanan ..	78	23,	Hopes Spain will not make war on Morocco	113
85. To Mr. Buchanan ..	Confidential 40	Mar. 2,	Copies of despatches from Mr. Hay. Approval of his conduct .	114
86. „ „ ..	44	3,	To urge moderation on Spanish Government	114
87. Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	6,	Reefians have again refused to release prisoners	114
88. „ „ ..	Telegraphic	7,	Spanish Agent at Tangier threatens to break off relations if prisoners are not released..	114
89. Mr. Hay	18	Feb. 26,	Reply of Sultan respecting vessels captured by Reefians previous to 1855, and respecting neutral ground	115
90. To Mr. Buchanan ..	49	Mar. 9,	Copy of Mr. Hay's No. 18 .	119
91. Mr. Buchanan ..	90	4,	Conversation with Marshal O'Donnell	119
92. Mr. Hay	21	1,	Spanish prisoners.	120
93. „ „	23	5,	Draft of letter from Khateeb to M. Blanco	126
94. Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	1,	Proceedings of M. Blanco ..	127
95. To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	11,	Two ships will be immediately sent to Tangier	129
96. To Admiralty	..	11,	One or two vessels to be sent to Gibraltar to watch Spanish proceedings..	129
97. To War Office ..	..	11,	Possible inconvenience to Gibraltar garrison in case of blockade of Tangier by Spanish naval forces	130
98. To Mr. Hay	13	11,	Steps taken to protect British interests in Morocco	130
99. To Admiralty ..	..	12,	Naval force to proceed to Tangier to protect British interests. Instructions given to Mr. Buchanan	130
100. Mr. Buchanan ..	86 Confidential	3,	Orders given for dispatch of squadron to coast of Morocco .	131
101. Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private and Confidential	4,	Conversation between Mr. Reade and Swedish Chargé d'Affaires .	134
102. To Mr. Buchanan ..	59	12,	Any occupation of Tangier by Spain would be resisted by Her Majesty's Government . ..	137
103. Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	12,	Garrison of Melilla will attack Reefian lines	138
104. „ „ ..	Telegraphic	12,	Spain will not act against Tangier	138
105. To Mr. Buchanan ..	55	12,	Copy of despatch to Mr. Hay and two letters to Admiralty ..	138
106. Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	13,	Foreign Minister accepts support of Spanish claims	139
107. Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	7,	M. Blanco has accepted Khateeb's note	139

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No.		No.		Subject.	Page
108.	Mr. Buchanan ..	105	Mar. 11, 1859	Letter from Melilla in "Epoca" ..	141
109.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	17,	Spanish prisoners delivered to Spanish Consul at Tangier ..	141
110.	„ „ ..	112	17,	Conversations with M. Comyn and M. Collantes	142
111.	Mr. Hay	24	10,	Respecting neutral ground at Melilla	144
112.	Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	18,	Respecting demands of Spanish Government	146
113.	Mr. Hay	27 Confidential	14,	Language of M. Blanco respecting neutral ground	149
114.	„ „	28	15,	Letter from Khateeb respecting above	151
115.	„ „	36	18,	Letter from Khateeb respecting his conference with M. Blanco ..	155
116.	Mr. Buchanan ..	125	25,	Territory around Melilla.. ..	158
117.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	72	30,	To repeat apprehensions of Her Majesty's Government	160
118.	Mr. Hay	37	28,	Arrival of Reefian prisoners ..	160
119.	Mr. Buchanan ..	139	31,	Arrival of M. Blanco from Melilla	161
120.	„ „ ..	144	Apr. 7,	Conversation with M. Collantes respecting boundary of Melilla .	161
121.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	81	13,	Approves language as reported in No. 144	163
122.	Mr. Buchanan ..	160	23,	Article from "Correspondencia Autógrafa"	163
123.	„ „ .	180 Confidential	May 3,	Conversation with M. Collantes..	164
124.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	91	13,	Continue to urge that no protection be granted to Moors	167
125.	Mr. Buchanan ..	197	14,	Trusts differences will shortly be settled	167
126.	„ „ ..	215	25,	Capture of four Reef boats by Spaniards	168
127.	„ „ ..	216	25,	Spanish protection to Moorish subjects	168
128.	„ „ ..	247	June 17,	Respecting extension of Spanish lines at Melilla	169
129.	„ „ ..	257 Confidential	25,	Attack on Spanish guard-boat by Reef boats	169
130.	Mr. Reade	9	21,	Settlement of question respecting new lines of Melilla	169
131.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	26	Aug. 9,	Copy of No. 9 from Mr. Reade ..	170
132.	Mr. Buchanan ..	332	17,	Attack by Moors on garrison of Ceuta	170
133.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	27,	Spanish garrisons in Africa will be strengthened	170
134.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	30,	Spanish camp will be formed near Gibraltar for employment against Moors	170
135.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	31,	Satisfactory explanations for military preparations against Morocco	171
136.	„ „ ..	348	27,	Intended reinforcement of Spanish garrison at Ceuta and Melilla ..	171
137.	„ „ ..	350	28,	Attack by Moors on Ceuta ..	171
138.	„ „ ..	351	30,	Public opinion in Spain	172
139.	Mr. Reade	Telegraphic	Sept. 5,	Spanish ultimatum to Moorish Government	175
140.	Mr. Buchanan ..	354	1,	Spanish ships for Africa . .	175
141.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	7,	Ultimatum presented to Moorish Government	175
142.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	9,	Respecting Spanish proceedings in case of disputed succession in Morocco..	176
143.	To Admiralty ..	..	9,	As to sending ships of war to watch Spanish proceedings on Moorish coast	176
144.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	49	9,	Objections of Her Majesty's Government to Spanish occupation of any part of Morocco.. ..	176
145.	To Mr. Reade ..	Telegraphic	9,	To recommend compliance with any reasonable Spanish demand .	177
146.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	9,	Two sail of the line for Gibraltar. Will not employ force except by orders from home	177

No.		No.		Subject.	Page
147.	To Mr. Hay	7	Sept. 10, 1859	To induce Moorish Government to give satisfaction to Spain ..	178
148.	„ „ ..	8 Confidential	10,	Course to be pursued in event of Emperor's death	178
149.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	52	10,	Her Majesty's Government cannot object to an expedition to obtain redress for wrongs at Ceuta .	179
150.	„ „ ..	53	10,	Substance of telegram of 9th instant	180
151.	„ „ ..	54 Confidential	10,	Correspondence with Earl Cowley respecting Sultan's death ..	181
152.	„ „ ..	56 Confidential	10,	Copies of despatches to Mr. Hay..	181
153.	„ „ ..	57	10,	Copy of telegram from Mr. Reade of September 5	181
154.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	Telegraphic	10,	Conflicts attributable to imprudence of Governor of Ceuta	182
155.	„ „	Telegraphic	10,	Terms demanded by Spain ..	182
156.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	10,	British squadron will only watch events	182
157.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	11,	Spanish Government cannot accept good offices of England unless made to Moors to give reparation	183
158.	Mr. Reade . ..	17	Aug. 27,	Conflict at Ceuta	183
159.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	61	Sept. 12,	Copy of No. 17 from Mr. Reade .	185
160.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	Telegraphic	12,	Invasion of Algeria by Moors. Another attack on Ceuta ..	185
161.	„ „	Telegraphic	15,	Twenty days granted to Morocco for answer to Spanish ultimatum	185
162.	Mr. Reade	19	2,	Unjust proceedings on part of Governor of Ceuta	185
163.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	376	9,	Will represent to M. Collantes conduct of Governor of Ceuta .	187
164.	„ „ . ..	Telegraphic	17,	It may be necessary for Spain to occupy Tangier temporarily .	188
165.	Mr. Reade	23	10,	Delay requested of Spanish Government in consequence of the Sultan's death	188
166.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	63	20,	Requests information as to Spanish demands	191
167.	Mr. Buchanan ..	383	15,	Demands of Spanish Government .	192
168.	„ „	384	15,	Copy of despatch to Mr. Reade .	196
169.	„ „	389 Confidential	15,	Public opinion in Spain	197
170.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	69	22,	To ask for written declaration from Spanish Government that any occupation of Tangier shall be permanent	199
171.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	23,	Ask for further delay till October 15	199
172.	To Mr. Hay	11	24,	Advice respecting differences ..	199
173.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	Telegraphic	24,	Increase of African army ..	201
174.	„ „ . ..	Telegraphic	24,	Term will be extended till October 15	201
175.	„ „ . ..	Telegraphic	25,	Mr. Hay reports, from Gibraltar, arrival of fleet	202
176.	To Mr. Buchanan .	Telegraphic	26,	Message of 23rd required an immediate written answer ..	202
177.	„ „ ..	76	26,	Copies of despatches from Mr. Reade	202
178.	„ „ ..	77	26,	Copy of No. 11 to Mr. Hay ..	202
179.	„ „ ..	78	26,	Conversation with M. Isturiz ..	203
180.	Mr. Hay	2	15,	Accession of new Sultan. Opinions	203
181.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	398	20,	Conversation with Marshal O'Donnell respecting Ceuta	206
182.	„ „ . ..	399	20,	Telegram to Mr. Reade. Spanish Government anxious to avoid war	208
183.	„ „ . ..	Telegraphic	27,	Moorish Minister has acceded to Mr. Hay's requests	209
184.	„ „ . ..	Telegraphic	27,	Respecting new delimitation of lines around Ceuta	209
185.	To Mr. Buchanan .	82	29,	Opinions respecting works at Ceuta	209
186.	M. Isturiz	..	29,	Substance of his conversation ..	210
187.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	Telegraphic	30,	As to right of Spain to erect batteries on old lines around fortresses	210
188.	„ „ . ..	410	25,	Proceedings at Ceuta	210

No.		No.		Subject.	Page
189.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	411 Confidential	Sept. 25, 1859	Conversation with M. Collantes respecting extension of Spanish lines around Ceuta	211
190.	„ „ . ..	412	25,	Moorish Government inclined to accede to Spanish demands ..	212
191.	Mr. Hay	6	19,	Ultimatum given to Khateeb by Spanish Chargé d'Affaires ..	215
192.	„ „ ..	7	21,	Gun-boat "Quail" sent to Mazagan. Attack by Arabs on port of Mazagan	218
193.	Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	21,	Affairs at Mazagan. Conversation with M. Blanco respecting Ceuta	220
194.	Mr. Hay	9	23,	Appointment of new Governor of Moorish castle near Ceuta ..	221
195.	„ „ . ..	10	23,	Tranquillity of the Reef . ..	222
196.	Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	24,	Opinions respecting differences ..	223
197.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	Oct. 3,	May instruct Mr. Hay to recommend Khateeb to negotiate respecting Ceuta and Melilla ..	224
198.	To M. Isturiz ..	..	3,	Understood him to abjure intention of conquests in Morocco ..	224
199.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	Telegraphic	4,	In case of war President of Council will go to Africa with 35,000 men	225
200.	„ „ . ..	Telegraphic	5,	Unsatisfactory proposed note respecting Tangier	225
201.	„ „ . ..	Telegraphic	5,	Sultan will accede to first ultimatum	225
202.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	6,	Why is answer respecting Tangier delayed?	226
203.	To Mr. Hay .. .	Telegraphic	6,	Advise Sultan to concede new boundary at Ceuta	226
204.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	6,	Has reported dissatisfaction at answer respecting Tangier ..	226
205.	„ „ ..	T legraphic	6,	Sultan disinclined to accede to new demands of Spain	226
206.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	6,	Original ultimatum accepted yesterday	227
207.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	7,	Has directed Hay to advise Sultan to concede new boundary at Ceuta	227
208.	To Admiralty . ..	..	8,	Instructions for Admiral Fanshawe in protecting British interests in Morocco	227
209.	To Mr. Hay	Telegraphic	8,	Press on Morocco acceptance of limit at Ceuta	227
210.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	7,	Respecting new demand of Spain .	227
211.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	8,	Ask for further delay of ten days, and promise for no further demand if this demand is accepted .	228
212.	M. Isturiz	..	6,	Asks cause and object of British armament	228
213.	Mr. Hay	Telegraphic	7,	Has advised Sultan to accede to new demand	230
214.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	10,	Ceuta question might be examined without war	230
215.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	10,	As to possibility of a cross fire between Ceuta and Tarifa. Telegram to Mr. Hay	230
216.	Mr. Hay	12	Sept. 27,	Confirmation of Khateeb as Foreign Minister	231
217.	„ „	14 Confidential	28,	Revelations made by M. Blanco respecting Spanish intentions ..	234
218.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	Oct. 9,	Is assured France is encouraging Spanish pretensions	240
219.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	9,	Mr. Buchanan's note will be submitted to Cabinet	241
220.	Mr. Hay	15 Secret	Sept. 28,	Respecting French intrigues ..	241
221.	Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	28,	Opinions	242
222.	Mr. Hay	17	29,	Inadvisability of new demands ..	245
223.	Mr. Buchanan ..	418	Oct. 1,	Answer of Spanish Government to his note of September 11 ..	246
224.	„ „	428 Confidential	6,	No longer term will be granted ..	247
225.	„ „	431	7,	Note to Collantes, and answer ..	252

No.		No.		Subject.	Page
226.	Mr. Buchanan ..	432 Confidential	Oct. 7, 1859	Conversation with M. Collantes ..	254
227.	„ „	433	7,	Conversation with French Ambassador	258
228.	„ „	Telegraphic	11,	War will be immediately declared if claims are refused on the 15th	259
229.	„ „	Telegraphic	11,	President of Council has declared the 15th the last day granted to Morocco for answer to Spanish demands	259
230.	„ „	Telegraphic	12,	Hostilities will commence after the 15th, if reply is unfavourable .	260
231.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	12,	No cross fire can command Straits between Ceuta and Tarifa. All demands acceded to	260
232.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	13,	Urge Spanish Government to give time to Morocco for negotiation respecting rayon round Ceuta ..	260
233.	To Mr. Hay	Telegraphic	13,	Urge Government to give way respecting rayon round Ceuta ..	261
234.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	Telegraphic	13,	Eighty rifled guns have been sent to Tarifa	261
235.	Mr. Hay	18 Confidential	Sept. 30,	Opinions respecting Spanish demands at Ceuta	261
236.	„ „	19	Oct. 2,	Sidi Mohamed's accession saluted by Spanish steamer	263
237.	„ „	22	5,	Interview with Khateeb	263
238.	„ „	23	5,	Sultan has acceded to first ultimatum	267
239.	„ „	24	5,	Copies of telegrams to and from Mr. Buchanan	268
240.	„ „	34	7,	Respecting new demand of Spain .	269
241.	Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	4,	Opinions respecting conduct of Spain	277
242.	„ „ ..	Private	5,	As to probable occupation of Tangier	278
243.	„ „ ..	Private	7,	Fear of new Spanish demand ..	279
244.	To Mr. Hay	25	14,	Urge Moorish Government to give way respecting Ceuta	280
245.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	102	14,	Spanish answer to demand respecting evacuation of Tangier will be considered by Her Majesty's Government	280
246.	„ „ ..	103	14,	Urge Spanish Government to give time for negotiation	280
247.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	14,	Telegram from Mr. Hay. Fears Spain is bent on war	281
248.	To Admiralty . ..	..	15,	Instructions for Admiral Fanshawe in case of attack by Spain ..	281
249.	To Mr. Hay	28	15,	Copies of correspondence with Mr. Buchanan	282
250.	„ „	30	15,	Approving proceedings	282
251.	„ „	31	15,	Copy of letter to Admiralty of October 15	282
252.	„ „	32	15,	Explanation of Count Walewski respecting French fleet at Algeciras	282
253.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	110	15,	Satisfaction at Spanish assurances respecting occupation of Tangier	283
254.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	Telegraphic	15,	As to new boundary at Ceuta ..	283
255.	Mr. Hay	Telegraphic	14,	Renewal of difficulty. Moorish Minister will cede all	284
256.	Mr. Buchanan . ..	Telegraphic	15,	Telegram from Mr. Hay. Spanish Chargé d'Affaires' note to Moorish Government	284
257.	Mr. Hay	Telegraphic	15,	News from Oran	284
258.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	16,	Telegram from Mr. Hay. Spanish demand for extension of territory	285
259.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	17,	Is it true respecting demand for extension of territory? . ..	285
260.	Mr. Buchanan ..	444	12,	Declaration of Marshal O'Donnell in Congress of Deputies . ..	285
261.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	17,	Acquisition of fresh territory cannot be justified	286
262.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	17,	Forty-eight hours count from the 15th instant	286

No.		No.		Subject.	Page
263.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	Oct. 17, 1859	War will be declared if demand is not settled in forty-eight hours .	287
264.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	17,	Spain has received satisfaction necessary for her honour . .	287
265.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	17,	Morocco has granted required satisfaction	287
266.	„ „ .	Telegraphic	18,	Line of territory asked for by Spain	287
267.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	18,	Ascertain respecting Spanish troops	288
268.	„ „ ..	115	18,	Concern at demand of Spain for territory	288
269.	„ „ ..	116	18,	Leaving it to his discretion to act on other despatch sent this day .	289
270.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	18,	Telegram from Mr. Hay respecting new Spanish demand, to which Moorish Minister says he cannot accede	289
271.	„ „	Telegraphic	18,	Course Spain will take if Moors accept proposed basis	290
272.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	19,	Inquiry to be made respecting new boundary	290
273.	Mr. Buchanan .	Telegraphic	19,	Spanish forces and preparations ..	290
274.	To Mr. Hay	Telegraphic	19,	Not to give Moorish Minister any further advice without instructions	291
275.	„ „	Telegraphic	19,	To ascertain exact boundary proposed	291
276.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	19,	Force at Ceuta. Time required for army to cross	291
277.	Mr. Hammond to Mr. Hay	Private	19,	What is territorial concession required at Ceuta? What is Castellon's language? What are the French doing?	291
278.	Mr. Buchanan .	Telegraphic	20,	Telegram from Mr. Hay. Moorish Minister's reply to Spanish ultimatum. Arrival of another Plenipotentiary from the Sultan. Embarkation of Spanish and French subjects	292
279.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	20,	Observations respecting cross-fire question	292
280.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	20,	Obtain answer respecting new boundary	292
281.	Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	10,	Efforts to preserve peace. Spanish and French language and proceedings	292
282.	„ „ ..	Private	11,	Satisfactory assurances from Moorish Minister. Spanish demands, and French policy	293
283.	Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	21,	Answers to queries respecting extent of boundary demanded by Spain	295
284.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	21.	Representations to Spanish Minister to Foreign Affairs	295
285.	To Mr. Buchanan ..	Telegraphic	21,	To make formal declaration of views of Her Majesty's Government ..	296

Appendix.

1.	Mr. Hay	..	Aug. 12, 1857	Secret Memorandum	297
2.	Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private and Confidential	Apr. 7, 1858	As to probability of French aggression in Morocco	298
3.	To Mr. Hay	Secret and Confidential	May 6,	Should protest against any occupation of Tangier by France ..	300
4.	Mr. Hay	Secret and Confidential	19,	Will bear in mind instructions contained in above	300
5.	Earl Cowley	1,279	Sept. 30,	Conversation with Count Walewski respecting reported Spanish expedition against the Reefians ..	301
6.	Mr. Hay to Mr. Hammond	Private	Oct. 20,	Opinions respecting French intentions	301
7.	„ „ ..	Private	Nov. 27,	Neither Spain nor France will hoist flags on Moorish festivals ..	302
8.	To Earl Cowley ..	Private	Aug. 19, 1859	France and England should recognise same heir to throne ..	304

No.		No.		Subject.	Page
9.	Mr. Hay	Private	Aug. 15, 1859	Memorandum respecting the danger of the occupation of Tangier by France or other foreign Powers .	304
10.	To Earl Cowley ..	265	20,	As to course to be pursued by France and England in case of Sultan's death	307
11.	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	Sept. 8,	Sultan's death	308
12.	Earl Cowley	502	9,	Has spoken to Count Walewski ..	308
13.	„ „	516	15,	Despatch from Colonel Claremont respecting troubles on Algerine frontier	309
14.	„ „	529	16,	Cannot elicit any declaration from Count Walewski	309
15.	„ „	536	18,	France only intends to maintain order on frontier	309
16.	„ „	545	19,	Despatch from Colonel Claremont. Opinions of French officers ..	310
17.	To Earl Cowley ..	341	22,	France has no intention of interfering except to maintain order, and, if necessary, will concert with England	311
18.	„ „ ..	347	24,	Express to Count Walewski satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at his assurances	311
19.	Earl Cowley	590	Oct. 5,	Count Walewski's views on Mauro-Spanish question	312
20.	„ „	Telegraphic	12,	Satisfactory assurances as to advice given at Madrid by French Government	312
21.	„ „	625	12,	Conversation with Count Walewski as to new demand of Spain for fresh delineation of frontier. France will not assist Spain if hostilities ensue	313

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Relations between France and Morocco.

No. 1.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

(No. 397.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1839.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to take an opportunity of reminding the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in a friendly and inoffensive manner, of the pledges given by the Government of France to that of Great Baitain, that France has no wish or intention to make any attack or encroachment upon the territories either of Tunis or Morocco.

This precaution seems to Her Majesty's Government to be the more necessary at the present moment, because some articles which have lately appeared in the French papers seem to imply that the quarrel which has recently broken out between Abd-el-Kader and the French will be made by the latter a pretext for commencing hostilities either by sea or by land against Morocco; and public opinion in this country would readily take alarm if the French were either to invade the Empire of Morocco by land, or to apply to its coasts the vexatious system of blockade which, on the coasts of America, has caused so much injury to British trade, and has been the occasion of such loud complaints in this country.

It cannot be forgotten that, in this quarrel with Abd-el-Kader, the French were the aggressors, because the unnecessary march of the French troops from Constantia to Algiers seems to have been an unprovoked violation of the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Taffna.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 2.

Earl Granville to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 13, 1840.

IN the course of my conversation with Marshal Soult this morning upon the French naval force in the Mediterranean, some words dropped from his Excellency with respect to the introduction of arms into the dominions of Abd-el-Kader through Morocco. I told him that his mention of Morocco reminded me of a letter from Toulon, inserted yesterday in the "Journal des Débats," stating that a part of the French fleet would make a demonstration on the coast of Morocco, and that the Emperor would be called upon to declare himself either for or against France. Paragraphs of this sort, I observed, seldom escaped the attention of those who were desirous to attack the English Ministers for their alliance with

France, and I, therefore, mentioned it to him, being persuaded that he would enable Her Majesty's Ministers to deny that the French Government intended to adopt any such proceeding towards the Emperor of Morocco.

The Marshal distinctly assured me that no such intention existed. Considerable supplies of arms and ammunition, he said, reached Abd-el-Kader, from the apparent facility with which they passed through the dominions of Morocco; and, at various times, Envoys had been sent to the Emperor to complain of these facilities being afforded. The Emperor asserted that he did not connive at the passage of arms to Abd-el-Kader, but that the state of the tribes upon the frontier was such as to make it at times difficult to prevent their passing. Whether this was a mere excuse, or whether the Emperor was sincere in professing his wish and intention to put a stop to this commerce, he could not say.

His Excellency then mentioned that the French Agent at Tangier had made remonstrances regarding the interruption of all communication between the Government and the Spanish Consul, and the Marshal said that the conduct of the Spanish Consul afforded no pretence for such treatment, and his Excellency requested me to call your Lordship's attention to the matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 3.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 14)

(Private and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 12, 1841.*

I HAD some conversation with His Majesty the other evening at St. Cloud, and in talking of different matters His Majesty mentioned to me that he was under some apprehension that the Porte meditated an attack upon the Dey of Tunis. I replied that I did not myself believe this, nor imagine that Her Majesty's Government would at the present time be favourable to such an expedition.

His Majesty said that he should be very glad to think that, inasmuch as that the French Government could not permit the Dey to be carried away in the same manner as the Dey of Tripoli had been: "because," said His Majesty, "the Porte could only do that for some object hostile to France, and it is to be remarked that the Sultan has lately resumed the nominal sovereignty of Algiers."

I did not feel it necessary to discuss with His Majesty the right which the French might have to interfere on such doubtful grounds between the Porte and the Dey, though certainly it was a fair field for argument, but simply reasserted that I did not, for my own part, believe that the Turkish Government had at this time the intentions which His Majesty seemed disposed to give it.

"What I should like," observed His Majesty, "would be to keep things as they are, and I would in such case enter into any, the most solemn and binding engagements, never for my part to seek to obtain any conquests in that quarter."

I then asked His Majesty whither Captain Leroy's force was destined, and he said that Captain Leroy was to protect the Dey from the danger to which he had alluded.

I then observed to His Majesty that I was sorry when I asked M. Guizot whether Captain Leroy was being sent to Tunis or not, that he (M. Guizot) had said "No," if, after all, Captain Leroy was going there, since it might create a belief that the mission was more important than it really was.

His Majesty said, "Oh! Leroy is not going to stay at Tunis, and M. Guizot may be more cautious than myself, but do not mention the matter in any way to make mischief between me and Guizot." I said I would not; and, therefore, I take the liberty of begging your Lordship to consider His Majesty's remarks as confidential in any conversation which your Lordship may have with M. de Bourqueney on the subject.

I suppose that the real object of this naval mission is to take advantage of the Dey's fears, and impress him strongly with the notion that he is only safe

under French protection; and that as Captain Leroy is to touch at different places, M. Guizot thought that by not acknowledging Tunis as his especial and principal destination, the real object of his going there might not be detected.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 4.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(Separate and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 22, 1841.*

WITH reference to the statement contained in your confidential despatch of the 12th instant that, in the conversation which you therein report as having taken place between yourself and the King of the French upon the mission of Captain Leroy to Tunis, the King said to you that, in a given and supposed case, France would bind herself not to make any conquest in the direction of Tunis, I have to instruct you to take an early opportunity of stating to the King of the French that you have reported that conversation to your Government, and that you have been instructed respectfully to remind His Majesty that the French Government has already, and more than once, pledged itself to the British Government to that effect; and that the British Government considers France as being distinctly bound to abstain from any encroachment either upon Tunis or Morocco. You will, moreover, invariably hold this language to any member of the French Government who may make any observations to you which may seem to render such a remark on your part necessary.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 5.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 2.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 30, 1841.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I took an occasion last Wednesday evening of mentioning to the King of the French that I had reported the conversation I had had the honour of having with him on the subject of Tunis, to Her Majesty's Government, and that your Lordship had desired me to say that you had always considered the French Government as already pledged not to interfere with either Tunis or Morocco.

"I am glad of it," said His Majesty: "what have I to do with Tunis or Morocco? Only you understand, Mr. Bulwer, that, with respect to the former, I cannot suffer the Turks to interfere with the state of things at present established there."

I did not reply to this observation at the time, but in the course of conversation informed His Majesty (not, however, in such a way as that the opinions of Her Majesty's Government in this respect should seem, in any way, to countenance the claim of the French Government to interfere between the Sultan and the Bey) that I had good reasons to know that Her Majesty's Government would not approve of any attempt at this moment, on the part of the Sultan, to interfere with the privileges that have usually been accorded to the Tunisian Rulers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 6.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 127.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 4, 1841.

WITH reference to your despatch, marked Private and Confidential of the 30th ultimo, reporting the conversation which you had held with the King of the French on the subject of Tunis and Morocco, I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your language on that occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 7.

Mr. Bulwer to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 305.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 27, 1841.

I HAD a short conversation with M. Guizot this morning, and he alluded to the presence of the British and French naval force at Tunis.

"I see nothing extraordinary," said M. Guizot, "in the circumstance, some ships of ours being at that place, that some ships of yours should go to see what they are about. But directly that we are perfectly satisfied that the Porte has abandoned its intentions of attacking the Bey, our force will be recalled; for we have not any other idea, I need not tell you, than that of preventing the present state of things at Tunis from being disturbed.

"It is a pity that we could not come to some permanent agreement as to the maintenance of the *statu quo* in that Regency; for, without this, whenever the Porte gives us alarm, we shall be sending vessels to watch her, as we do now, and you, vessels to watch us, and hence a perpetual state of agitation and suspicion."

I said that I thought any permanent agreement for preventing the Porte from going to Tunis would be rather a difficult matter, considering the relative position of the two parties. M. Guizot replied: "You know what I told you the other day: Were the Sultan to be at Tunis on one side, and the Emperor of Morocco on the other, our position would be untenable, and we should be obliged to make conquests we do not wish for, in order to keep what we possess. Our determination,—and I wish you fully to understand it,—relative to Algiers, is taken; we shall keep our hold upon that portion of Africa, under all circumstances and at all events."

I answered, that Her Majesty's Government had, I believed, hitherto said that, as to Algiers, it should not interfere with the present occupation of the French; but he was aware that it had always, at the same time, stated that, were the French to extend their conquests in that part of the world, and to attempt to take either Tunis or Morocco, that this would materially alter the case, and that any such attempt to add to the French dominions in Africa would involve very serious consequences.

M. Guizot admitted this, and then added: "It is only to keep things as they are that I am anxious."

As I had conveyed to M. Guizot what I wished, in reply to his observation, "that France might be forced to conquer Tunis," viz., that Great Britain would not be disposed to see any such conquest take place, I turned the conversation, which soon after ceased.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 8.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(Received April 17.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 15, 1842.

GENERAL BUGEAUD, who has conducted the last campaign in Africa so much to the satisfaction of the French Government, lately addressed a letter to Marshal Soult, complaining of the secret assistance afforded to Abd-el-Kader by the Emperor of Morocco, and proposing that war should be declared by France against Morocco, and that hostilities should forthwith be commenced by an attack upon some of the towns upon the coast. The General's despatch was laid before the Council, the members of which were divided as to the adoption or rejection of his proposal. It was, however, successfully combated by M. Guizot, upon the ground that it would occasion a very serious misunderstanding between France and England. It was, therefore, decided that General Bugeaud should be instructed to abstain from any act of hostility against Morocco unless the Emperor became the aggressor.

General Bugeaud has been informed of the decision of the Cabinet Council, and M. Guizot (to whom he owes his appointment of Captain-General of the French Possessions in Africa) has written to him to desire that he will renounce every project which he may have entertained of a war with Morocco, since it would infallibly interrupt the good understanding which the French Government is desirous of maintaining with Great Britain.

In the course of a conversation which I had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I touched upon the subject of Morocco. He said that he had repeatedly instructed the French Consul at Tangier to warn the Emperor of Morocco of the inconveniences which might arise to himself from the protection which he afforded to Abd-el-Kader. He then observed that General Bugeaud had hitherto abstained from entering the territory of Morocco; but that the French Government could not answer for the consequences if Abd-el-Kader, upon sustaining any reverse in his contests with the French, was suffered to retreat into Morocco, to recruit his forces there, and to return into the French Possessions, with fresh troops composed of the subjects of the Emperor of Morocco.

It seemed to be the wish of M. Guizot that the British Consul at Tangier should be instructed to warn the Emperor of Morocco of the danger he incurred from his connivance in these proceedings of Abd-el-Kader.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 9.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 298.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 14, 1844.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 294 of the 12th instant, I have now the honour to inform your Lordship that soon after the arrival of the intelligence from Algiers of the affair which had taken place between the Moorish and French forces upon the frontier, the subject was brought under the consideration of a Cabinet Council, when, as it appeared from the report of General Lamoricière that the attack of the Moors upon the French forces was contrary to the express orders of the Emperor, it was determined in Council not to consider this as necessarily involving a war between France and Morocco.

Orders have consequently been sent to Marshal Bugeaud to remain on the defensive, and not to enter the Morocco territory.

The French Consul at Tangier has, however, been instructed to present an official note to the Emperor, requiring on the part of France a formal disavowal of the aggression, together with the destitution of the commander of the Moorish forces, the immediate expulsion of Abd-el-Kader from the territory of Morocco, and the withdrawal within the interior of the Moorish force assembled upon the frontier.

In the meanwhile, with the view of intimidating the Emperor of Morocco, and of proving that the French Government is in earnest in this matter, a squadron under the command of the Prince de Joinville is to proceed upon a cruize, off the coast of Morocco. The Prince is to be instructed to appear occasionally off the ports of Tangier, Tetuan, Larache, &c., but to abstain from any act of hostility unless attacked.

In the event of the Emperor's declining to afford the satisfaction required by France, the Prince de Joinville is to proceed to Tangier, there to await the reinforcements which will be sent to him from Toulon.

It is the intention, should the answer of the Emperor not be satisfactory, that the squadron should commence hostilities upon the coast, and Marshal Bugeaud upon the frontier, but the Government have no intention of retaining possession of any part of the Morocco territory.

All this was confirmed to me last night at the Château de Neuilly, in the course of a conversation with which I was honoured by the King.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 10.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 302.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 17, 1844.*

I HAD an interview yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he informed me that the Prince de Joinville was to set out for Toulon on this day; that a squadron to consist of three sail of the line and three armed steamers was preparing at that port, of which His Royal Highness was to take the command, and to proceed on his voyage to Morocco: that his first visit would be to Oran for the purpose of communicating with Marshal Bugeaud; he would then make his appearance with the squadron off some of the ports on the coast of Morocco, after which he would proceed to Gibraltar, and there await the answer of the Emperor of Morocco to the demands of the French Government: should these demands be acceded to by the Emperor, His Royal Highness would return to Toulon with his squadron; but should the answer be unfavourable, he would then concert with Marshal Bugeaud as to the measures to be pursued.

Upon my observing to M. Guizot that the force destined for this service seemed to be larger than was necessary for the object which the French Government had in view, he answered that he was not of that opinion; that an imposing force had been prepared, and the command of it given to a Prince of the Blood, for the express purpose of showing the Emperor of Morocco that France was in earnest. The French Government knew by experience that no justice was to be obtained from the Government of Morocco, excepting by the display of an armed force; and there was every reason for believing, his Excellency added, that the appearauce of so formidable a squadron upon his coasts would much contribute to the success of the negotiations with which the French Consul at Tangier was charged.

M. Guizot then showed me his instructions to the French Consul containing the demands of France, which are in substance the same as those already communicated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 298 of the 14th instant, namely:—A disavowal on the part of the Emperor of the act of aggression of the Moorish army upon the frontier in the late attack of the force under General Lamoricière; the destitution of the Moorish commander; the withdrawal of the Moorish army from the frontier; the expulsion of Abd-el-Kader from the Moorish territory.

The instruction further contains an assurance that, even in the event of France being compelled to resort to hostilities, she has no intention of appropriating to herself any portion of the Morocco territory.

M. Guizot concluded by expressing his opinion that the good offices of Her Majesty's Government with the Emperor of Morocco would derive support from the appearance of the French squadron upon the coast of Morocco; that the Prince de Joinville had received the most positive orders both from the King

and from the Government to abstain from any act of hostility until the result of the negotiation with the Government of Morocco should be known; and that he was to be guided in all his proceedings by Marshal Bugeaud, and to undertake nothing excepting in concert with that officer.

I have the honour to inclose an article which appeared in the "Journal des Débats" of this date, relative to the present state of the relations between France and Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Extract from the "Journal des Débats" of June 17, 1844.

Paris, 16 Juin.

L'ETAT de nos relations avec le Maroc étant en ce moment l'objet de beaucoup de commentaires exagérés, il importe d'exposer la situation sous son véritable jour, et de dire quel est le but des mesures que vient de prendre le Gouvernement Français. Nous devons d'abord établir un fait, c'est que la France n'est pas actuellement en guerre avec le Maroc. La guerre n'a été déclarée ni d'un côté ni de l'autre. Il est bien vrai qu'un corps de troupes du Maroc a commis une violation du territoire Français, mais il y a tout lieu de croire que cet acte d'agression sera suivi de la réparation la plus prompte. Le Chef de cet Empire, qui touche aux possessions Françaises, ne peut avoir la présomption de rechercher des hostilités dont l'issue ne saurait être douteuse. Il a devant les yeux l'exemple de ce que peut la France, et il ne commettra pas l'insigne folie de courir lui-même au-devant de sa ruine. Si, d'un autre côté, il a cru pouvoir compter sur d'autres forces que les siennes, et sur l'appui d'une Puissance étrangère, nous croyons qu'il sera promptement détrompé, et qu'il ne recevra d'aucune part des encouragements à entrer dans une lutte qui ne pourrait lui être que fatale. Quoi qu'il en soit, lors même que l'agression dont la frontière Française a été l'objet ne serait qu'un acte d'indiscipline commis par des soldats fanatiques, c'est le Gouvernement du pays qui en est responsable, et c'est lui qui doit en supporter les conséquences. Une pareille provocation ne peut demeurer impunie, et le Consul-Général de France à Tanger a reçu l'ordre d'en demander la réparation la plus complète. Nous ne doutons point que cette réparation ne soit accordée sans rétard, et que le Gouvernement du Maroc ne s'empresse de faire volontairement ce qu'il sait bien qu'on pourrait lui imposer. La France ne veut point, jusque là, entrer dans la voie des représailles; elle a assez le sentiment de sa force pour pouvoir se dispenser d'en faire un usage inutile.

En demandant la réparation d'une agression commise sur son territoire, le Gouvernement Français doit aussi prendre des mesures pour que de pareils actes ne se renouvellent pas. Il ne saurait consentir à voir sa frontière constamment exposée aux incursions de bandes fanatiques que leurs chefs même ne peuvent contenir, et il demandera que le Gouvernement du Maroc rappelle dans l'intérieur les troupes qui occupent la province limitrophe d'Oudjah. Mais le premier, le principal grief de la France, celui dont elle devra, avant tout, avoir satisfaction, c'est la sauvegarde que l'Emir Abd-el-Kader trouve sur le territoire du Maroc. La France ne saurait tolérer plus longtemps que la frontière d'un pays voisin serve de lieu d'asile à l'ennemi le plus dangereux de sa domination en Afrique; elle ne saurait souffrir, et elle ne souffrira pas qu'après chaque défaite Abd-el-Kader se réfugie, comme dans un lieu inviolable, snr un territoire neutre d'où il sort avec de nouvelles forces et avec de nouvelles ressources, sous la protection abusive d'un droit international chaque jour violé. Le Gouvernement Français exigera que le Souverain du Maroc prenne de la manière la plus formelle l'engagement de repousser l'Emir de son territoire. Le Gouvernement du Maroc comprendra sans doute que c'est le moyen le plus sûr d'éloigner de lui les chances d'un guerre que la France ne cherche pas, mais à laquelle elle peut se trouver forcée. La frontière du Maroc est, depuis trop longtemps déjà, devenue le foyer des intrigues des ennemis de la France et du fanatisme des Musulmans. Abd-el-Kader y a tellement travaillé les esprits et ranimé les passions religieuses, qu'il a établi son influence, non seulement sur les populations, mais encore sur le chef

même de l'Empire. Le Sultan du Maroc n'est plus aujourd'hui qu'un instrument entre les mains de l'Emir, qui a su lui inspirer des craintes encore fortifiées par des événements récents. L'Espagne a dû demander une réparation pour le meurtre d'un de ces Consuls, et le Gouvernement Français a été désigné comme l'instigateur des réclamations légitimes du Gouvernement Espagnol. La Suède et le Danemark ont voulu s'affranchir du tribut qu'elles payaient au Sultan du Maroc, et la manifestation de ces deux Etats Chrétiens, appuyée par la médiation officieuse des Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre, a donné une nouvelle impulsion au fanatisme des Musulmans. Le Souverain du Maroc, considéré jusqu'alors comme le Chef et le Représentant des vrais croyans, s'ést vu forcé, dans la crainte d'être supplanté par l'Emir, de céder à son tour à cette réaction des passions religieuses, et de se montrer disposé entreprendre la guerre sainte.

Voilà ce qu'il faut faire cesser; et c'est pour mettre un terme à cette situation précaire que le Gouvernement Français se détermine à faire une démonstration décisive. Nous le répétons, les deux Gouvernements ne sont pas en état de guerre; il est même fort probable qu'il ne sera pas nécessaire d'en venir à cette extrémité. La France n'a aucune idée d'agrandissement territorial, aucune pensée de conquête. Elle ne veut point prendre l'Empire du Maroc, et fût-elle forcée de le prendre, elle n'aurait aucune envie de le garder. L'espace qu'elle occupe, et qu'elle occupera toujours en Afrique, lui suffit; et elle ne veut pas ajouter un pouce de terrain à ses possessions actuelles. Mais en répudiant toute pensée d'acquérir un nouveau territoire, elle entend maintenir l'intégrité et établir la sécurité de celui qu'elle possède; et son Gouvernement est bien décidé à ne pas tolérer plus longtemps qu'un pays limitrophe serve constamment de refuge et d'arsenal aux ennemis invétérés de sa domination en Algérie. Cette sécurité à laquelle elle a droit, cette stricte neutralité qui lui est due, la France saura l'exiger, par quelques moyens que ce soit, et à quelques extrémités qu'on l'oblige à recourir. Elle préparera la guerre pour maintenir plus sûrement la paix. La seule présence des forces destinées à appuyer ses demandes suffira, nous n'en doutons pas, pour démontrer au Gouvernement du Maroc la nécessité de suivre les conseils de la sagesse et de la prudence, et pour signifier à tout le monde la ferme volonté du Gouvernement du Roi de maintenir l'intégrité et la sécurité de nos possessions d'Afrique.

No. 11.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Lord Cowley.

(No. 186.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 2, 1844.

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with great satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch No. 314, that the instructions which I addressed to Mr. Drummond Hay on the 19th ultimo, for the guidance of his conduct towards the Emperor of Morocco, with reference to France, had met with the approbation of M. Guizot, and that he appeared to be convinced that the sole object which we have in view, in offering our good offices in these matters, is to contribute to effect an honourable accommodation of the differences between France and Morocco, and thereby to assist in preserving the peace of Europe from all hazard.

Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the Government of France continue to be animated by the same honourable spirit of moderation which has characterized M. Guizot's frequently repeated declarations made to your Excellency, reported in your despatches: "that even in the event of France being compelled to resort to hostilities, she has no intention of appropriating to herself any portion of the Morocco territory," and "that all the French Government requires is security from further attacks."

The instructions to the French Consul-General at Tangier, communicated to you by M. Guizot, appear to be drawn up in accordance with this pacific spirit, and to contain the same declarations.

Your Excellency will do well to address a note to M. Guizot expressive of the great pleasure with which Her Majesty's Government have received these assurances, the words of which you will recite, and also that which they derive from knowing that their own good intentions have been so fully appreciated by

the French Government. Your Excellency will add, that Her Majesty's Government will not relax in their efforts to bring about a reconciliation, on honourable terms, between France and Morocco, and that they earnestly trust that those efforts will be attended with success.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ABERDEEN.

No. 12.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 337.)

Paris, July 5, 1844.

My Lord,

SOME questions were put this evening by M. de Larochejaquelain to M. Guizot on the subject of Morocco. I have the honour to inclose the "Messager," containing the answer of the Minister, which, as it seems to afford every pledge required by Her Majesty's Government, I have judged it advisable to suspend the delivery of the note, a copy of which is inclosed in my despatch No. 336, and to wait for further instructions from your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Speech of M. Guizot, in the Debate in the Chamber of Deputies, July 5, 1844.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.—JE saisis volontiers la première occasion de donner à la Chambre les explications que vient de demander l'honorable préopinant; il n'y a rien dans la conduite ni dans les intentions du Gouvernement du Roi que je ne sois prêt à expliquer. (Ecoutez! Ecoutez!)

Je n'ai rien à cacher sur ce point, et il ne s'est rien passé que je ne sois prêt à faire connaître à la Chambre.

Nous n'avons, avec le Maroc, aucune cause nationale de guerre. Un étranger, Abd-el-Kader, est venu se placer entre le Maroc et la France; Abd-el-Kader, chassé du territoire de l'Algérie, s'est établi sur la frontière du Maroc, il y recrute des adhérents et des individus appartenant à la population du Maroc, et il les soulève par son influence.

Dès que le fait s'est manifesté, nous avons demandé l'expulsion d'Abd-el-Kader; l'Empereur de Maroc a rencontré les résistances du fanatisme national et religieux, et n'a pu réussir à nous donner satisfaction.

Un fait nouveau s'est produit. Abd-el-Kader a élevé une question de territoire; on a soutenu que notre territoire devait s'arrêter à la Tafna. C'etait évidemment une erreur; de tout temps, le territoire compris entre la Tafna et la frontière du Maroc a fait partie de l'Algérie; cela est si vrai que toutes les cartes y indiquent l'emplacement du camp des Turcs quand ils y venaient lever les tribus.

Nous avons donc soutenu le droit de la France.

Un autre fait s'est produit; sous influence d'Abd-el-Kader, une invasion de Marocains et de partisans d'Abd-el-Kader a eu lieu sur notre territoire.

Cette témérité a été réprimée avec énergie par nos généraux, et cette répression a été pour eux l'occasion de donner une preuve de sagesse et de prudence.

La leçon a été sévère autant que méritée; mais les Généraux Lamoricière et Bedeau ne voulant pas, sans l'intervention du Gouvernement, engager la France dans une guerre contre le Maroc, se sont arrêtés à la limite même du Maroc.

L'invasion s'étant renouvelée, M. le Maréchal Bugeaud a jugé convenable d'entrer sur le territoire du Maroc; il a dispersé les partisans d'Abd-el-Kader, et s'est emparé d'Ouchda; dans cette circonstance, il a fait preuve de la même sagesse dont les deux autres généraux avaient usé précédemment, il s'est rétiré après deux jours d'occupation, et est rentré sur notre territoire.

Je suis bien aise de rendre hommage à la sage conduite de nos généraux dans cette circonstance délicate, ils ont repoussé énergiquement l'agression, et

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

ils ont laissé au Gouvernement le soin de prendre en toute liberté une détermination sur les conséquences politiques de ce fait.

Le Gouvernement du Roi n'a aucun projet sur le Maroc ; il n'a pas l'intention d'augmenter notre territoire en Afrique, il est convaincu que le territoire de l'Algérie lui suffit. (Rires ironiques à gauche.) La Chambre pourra se rappeler que je suis de ceux qui ont regardé la conquête et l'occupation de l'Algérie comme un fait immense pour l'avenir de la France. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui en ont fait fi, et qui ont soutenu qu'il y avait là pour nous plus de charges que d'avantages ; mais, je le répète, il serait insensé, à mon avis, de nourrir des rêves d'agrandissement territorial et de conquête, quand nous avons déjà l'Algérie à exploiter.

Tout ce que nous demandons à l'Empereur de Maroc c'est de maintenir la paix avec nous ; pour cela il est indispensable qu'Abd-el-Kader ne reste pas sur la frontière, toujours prêt à rallumer la guerre à nos portes ; ce que nous avions le droit d'exiger, ce que nous exigeons de l'Empereur de Maroc, c'est la dissolution du corps formé à la frontière, le rappel et la punition des agents qui ont méconnu ses ordres ; ce que nous exigeons, c'est qu'Abd-el-Kader, si le Maroc veut continuer à lui donner asile, soit renvoyé sur les côtes de l'océan, qu'on fasse pour lui ce que nous avons toujours fait pour les réfugiés étrangers.

Voilà la politique du Gouvernement du Roi à l'égard du Maroc, voilà dans quel but il a pris les mesures nécessaires pour obtenir satisfaction.

L'Honorable M. Mauguin, dans un discours dont je regrette de n'avoir entendu que les derniers mots, a parlé de la nécessité de faire sentir au Maroc et aux partisans d'Abd-el-Kader les effets de la résolution de la France.

Ce résultat sera obtenu ; il faut que le Maroc sache que l'état actuel de ses relations avec la France ne peut continuer.

Toutes les mesures sont prises, par terre et par mer, pour arriver à ce résultat ; des renforts ont été ou seront envoyés à M. le Maréchal Bugeaud ; les forces navales ont été placées sous le commandement d'un de nos Princes, et je n'hésite pas à dire, à l'honneur du Prince, que le Cabinet a conseillé ce choix à Sa Majesté.

Il a eu la confiance que dans cette circonstance il déploierait autant de prudence que de valeur.

Sans cette double conviction, le Cabinet n'aurait pas donné ce conseil au Roi ; il n'ignore pas combien il est grave de confier à un Prince un commandement dans les armées de terre ou de mer, il sait qu'alors il doit accepter la responsabilité des Princes ; mais dans cette circonstance il a la confiance que ses instructions politiques seront suivies aussi exactement que ses instructions militaires, et c'est pour cela qu'il a confié au noble Prince la mission dont on a parlé.

Les instructions sont conformes à ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de dire à la Chambre ; elles n'ont rien de secret, elles n'ont rien que nous ne puissons avouer à nos alliés et à la Chambre.

Sans aucun doute, l'Angleterre a le droit de veiller à ce qu'aucun de ses intérêts ne soit compromis dans cette circonstance : nous lui avons fait connaître nos intentions générales en lui disant toute la vérité et en lui prouvant que nous n'avions pas d'autre but que d'obtenir justice.

Voilà, Messieurs, la vérité sur nos intentions politiques, sur les instructions donnée à M. le Prince de Joinville et sur nos rapports avec l'Angleterre à l'occasion des affaires du Maroc. (Très-bien.)

No. 13.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(*Received July* 10.)

(No. 339.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 7, 1844.

I HAD not time to do more, before the departure of the messenger who left Paris on Friday night, than to forward to your Lordship the report of the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the questions which were put to him in the Chamber of Deputies on the subject of Morocco. I stated shortly, at the same time, that the answer of M. Guizot appeared to me to be so satisfactory as to induce me to suspend the presentation of the note which I had

been directed to address to his Excellency, and to wait for further instructions from your Lordship. In fact, in his speech upon that occasion, he repeats the declaration before made to me that the French Commanders, by sea and land, had positive orders to refrain from hostilities until the answer of the Emperor of Morocco to the demands of France should be known, and also that, in the event of France being compelled to resort to hostilities, she would not seek for any extension of territory, having no other object than to secure the integrity and tranquillity of her own possessions. According, indeed, to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the French Government will be satisfied with less than was at first required ; for he is silent as to the demand at first made for the expulsion of Abd-el-Kader from the Morocco territory, and merely requires that he should be sent to some place upon the coast remote from the frontier.

Upon my calling upon M. Guizot to express the satisfaction with which I had read his speech, and which, I was sure, would be read with equal pleasure by your Lordship, he said he thought it better to take that opportunity of, at once removing all doubt respecting the intentions of the French Government, and that he believed the majority of the Chamber were satisfied, since no attempt had been made to reply to his speech, or to object in any manner to the line of conduct which he had announced it to be the intention of the French Government to pursue.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 14.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 347.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 11, 1844.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the "Messager" of this date, containing a report of the discussion which took place yesterday in the Chamber of Peers upon the subject of Morocco.

M. Guizot, in a very able reply to the interpellations of the Prince de la Moskowa, made the same declaration, with respect to the intentions of France, as he had before made in the Chamber of Deputies. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to some misrepresentation of the Prince de la Moskowa, in regard to the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government, spoke in terms of praise of the conduct which they had observed in this affair.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—No confirmation of the intelligence of the 23rd instant from Ceuta, or of the 26th instant from Tangier, as reported in my despatch No. 345, has been received here.

C.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Speech of M. Guizot, in the Debate in the Chamber of Peers, July 10, 1844.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.—Je dois, avant tout, remercier la Chambre d'avoir bien voulu changer son ordre du jour et d'avoir remis à aujourd'hui les interpellations qui étaient fixées pour avant-hier. Je n'aurais pu me dispenser de demander cette remise ; l'ordre du jour de l'autre Chambre était fixé antérieurement, et la Chambre des Pairs sait d'ailleurs que, dans l'intérêt de ses propres travaux, il importe que la discussion du budget n'éprouve aucune interruption. Je remercie la Chambre, je le répète, d'avoir, dans cette occasion, conservé la courtoisie qui doit exister dans les rapports qu'ont entre eux les grands pouvoirs de l'Etat.

Je me hâterai aussi, comme l'a fait déjà M. le Ministre de la Marine, de rassurer M. le Prince de la Moskowa par un fait. Le Cabinet n'a compromis en aucune façon, auprès d'un Gouvernement étranger, ni les instructions maritimes

données à notre Amiral, ni la liberté du Gouvernement du Roi. Quand Sir Robert Peel a parlé comme il l'a fait, il a voulu dire, je n'en doute pas, qu'il avait connaissance des intentions politiques, des instructions politiques que nous avons données à nos Généraux et à nos Amiraux. Ses paroles ne pouvaient avoir un autre sens, car aucune communication d'instructions navales ou militaires n'a eu lieu.

Quant à notre politique générale, quant à nos instructions politiques, nous les avons proclamées et nous les proclamons tous les jours. Notre politique dans l'affaire du Maroc est bien simple: elle est étrangère à toute agression, à toute vue de conquête; et nous nous n'avons pas de raison de ne pas donner communication de cette politique à un Gouvernement ami.

C'est l'à tout ce qui a été fait, et j'ai la parfaite conviction que Sir Robert Peel n'a pas voulu dire autre chose que ce que je dis en ce moment. Que l'Angleterre ait dans le Maroc des intérêts graves pour elle, rien de plus simple: mais cela ne veut pas dire que l'Angleterre méconnaisse les droits de la politique Française; et je n'hésite pas à dire que les intérêts qui nécessitent notre conduite dans le Maroc ont été sincèrement et loyalement reconnus par le Gouvernement Anglais dans les communications auxquelles cette affaire a donné lieu; il ne conteste ni nos droits ni nos intérêts.

J'ai déjà dit à l'autre Tribune qu'il n'y avait en réalité aucune cause de conflit avec le Maroc. Tant que nous avons eu la guerre avec Abd-el-Kader dans l'Algérie, nous avons eu l'occasion de croire qu'il recevait des secours du Maroc. Nous avons réclamé, et, toutes les fois que nous l'avons fait, l'Empereur a fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour nous satisfaire.

Mais quand Abd-el-Kader, chassé de l'Algérie, s'est réfugié dans le Maroc, la situation a changé; la situation de l'Empereur est devenue plus difficile. Abd-el-Kader, par ses prédications, a pris une influence véritable sur les populations Marocaines; il a menacé de les soulever; il les a soulevées quelquefois. Nous avons donc été obligés de recourir aux moyens que nous employons en ce moment pour donner à l'Empereur même la force de résister à l'influence de l'Emir.

Qu'avons-nous le droit de demander à l'Empereur? D'abord, évidemment, qu'aucun rassemblement n'ait lieu sur notre frontière, et que les soulèvements provoqués soit par Abd-el-Kader, soit par d'autres Chefs, soient interdits. En second lieu, il y a eu violation de notre territoire: nous devons demander que ceux qui l'ont dirigée soient punis. Telle est notre seconde demande, et à ce sujet, je dois dire qu'une dépêche dont je ne puis encore avoir la certitude, nous annonce que le Prince Héréditaire du Maroc a donné l'ordre que les Chefs qui ont provoqué cette violation soient mis aux fers et remplacés dans leurs emplois. Le Consul de France à Tanger nous dit qu'il croit cette nouvelle probable, mais que cependant elle mérite confirmation.

Ainsi, nous demandons ces deux points: la dispersion des rassemblements sur nos frontières, et le rappel et la punition des agents qui ont violé notre territoire.

Le troisième point sur lequel portent nos réclamations, c'est qu'Abd-el-Kader soit éloigné de nos possessions. Cela est difficile sans doute à l'Empereur; mais s'il n'est pas en son pouvoir de le faire, nous sommes là pour nous en charger: car nous n'avons pas dit que nous nous contenterions d'une sommation inefficace; nous avons demandé qu'Abd-el-Kader fût retenu loin de nos frontières. Si le pouvoir de l'Empereur ne peut y suffire, nous sommes en état le faire nous-mêmes.

On s'étonne que nous n'ayons pas demandé davantage; que nous n'ayons pas exigé, par exemple, qu'Abd-el-Kader fût renvoyé complètement du Maroc. Mais avons-nous jamais souffert qu'une pareille demande nous fût adressée chez nous pour aucun proscrit? Non; nous nous sommes chargés de réprimer leurs tentatives contre les autres Gouvernements; mais jamais nous ne nous sommes engagés à les expulser de notre territoire; nous avons toujours respecté le droit d'asile envers les proscrits; et nous aurions mauvaise grâce à demander à d'autres ce que nous ne souffririons pas qu'on nous demandât à nous-mêmes.

Nous demandons dont tout ce que notre droit et la nécessité nous obligent à demander, et nous n'avons renoncé à aucun des moyens dont nous pourrions avoir besoin pour l'obtenir. Il est vrai que nous avons annoncé que notre politique était de ne pas faire de nouvelles conquêtes. Sous ce rapport, je crois

que ce que disait tout à l'heure M. le Prince de la Moskowa de l'occupation de Fez, de Tanger, et de Tétouan, ne serait pas un moyen de diminuer nos difficultés en Afrique——

M. le Prince de la Moskowa.—Je vous demande pardon, je n'ai pas parlé de Fez.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.—Eh bien! en réduisant l'occupation à Tétouan et Tanger, je suis convaincu que ce fait créerait pour nous plus de difficultés et nécessiterait plus d'efforts que la présence d'Abd-el-Kader sur notre frontière ne l'a fait jusqu'à présent. Ce n'est donc pas un bon moyen de mettre un terme à nos difficultés; et, pour mon compte, je suis bien décidé à ne pas employer ce moyen.

J'ai dit ce que nous demandons; nous le réclamons par la voie des négociations; car la guerre n'est pas encore déclarée par le fait; et l'on raisonne ici en vérité en dehors de la réalité; c'est là de la politique de conversation qui se fonde sur des événements qui ne se réaliseront point.

Si l'Empereur reconnait notre droit et qu'il est de son intérêt de nous accorder ce que nous lui demandons, la question tombera d'elle-même. Si, au contraire, nous n'obtenions rien, alors nous poursuivrons notre but par les moyens que j'ai indiqués à la Chambre, dans les limites que la prudence et la politique nous imposeront, mais dont le droit sera reconnu par tout le monde, dans le Maroc comme à Londres, et la question sera résolue sans recourir aux moyens extraordinaires que le préopinant nous conseillait tout à l'heure.

No. 15.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 350.)

Paris, July 12, 1844.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a note which, in compliance with your Lordship's instructions, under date the 2nd instant, I have addressed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the affairs of Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 15.

Lord Cowley to M. Guizot.

Paris, July 11, 1844.

M. le Ministre,

I HAVE received instructions from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to express to your Excellency the great satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government have received from the assurances which I have been enabled to afford from my conferences with your Excellency, that the instructions which Lord Aberdeen has addressed to Mr. Drummond Hay for the guidance of his conduct towards the Emperor of Morocco, had met with the approbation of the French Government. The sole object, indeed, which Her Majesty's Government have in view in offering their good offices upon this occasion, is to endeavour to obtain the acquiescence of the Emperor of Morocco in the demands of France, and thereby to assist in preserving the peace of Europe from all hazards.

Her Majesty's Government likewise entertain a just sense of the honourable spirit of moderation which has characterized your Excellency's declarations to me, that, in the event of France being compelled to resort to hostilities, she has no intention of appropriating to herself any portion of the Morocco territory.

Fully confiding in these assurances, and in the desire of the Government of France to come to an amicable understanding with Morocco, I am further directed to assure your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government will not relax in their efforts with a view to the attainment of that object, and that they earnestly trust that these efforts will be attended with success.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 16.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 352.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 14, 1844.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the answer I have received to the note on the subject of Morocco which, conformably to your Lordship's instructions, I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 350 of the 12th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 16.

M. Guizot to Lord Cowley.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le* 13 *Juillet*, 1844.

J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 11 de ce mois, au sujet des affaires de Maroc. Vous m'y annoncez que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, rendant pleine justice aux sentiments conciliants dont le Gouvernement du Roi se montre animé dans sa querelle avec la Cour de Fez, employera tous ses bons offices pour déterminer cette Cour à nous donner les satisfactions que nous réclamons, et pour maintenir ainsi la paix entre les deux Etats.

Je vous prie de remercier Lord Aberdeen de cette promesse bienveillante et spontanée; et je me plais à vous donner l'assurance que le Gouvernement du Roi, bien décidé à ne point se relâcher de ses justes réclamations, persiste d'ailleurs dans les intentions si modérées que je vous avais exprimées verbalement, et que j'ai manifestées à la tribune des deux Chambres.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) GUIZOT.

No. 17.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(*Received August* 4.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 2, 1844.

AFTER the conversation upon the proceedings at Tahiti, in the case of Mr. Pritchard, had terminated, the King began to talk upon the affairs of Morocco, expressing his apprehension, as I informed your Lordship in my despatch by Mr. Paget's messenger, that the intelligence from Morocco was not satisfactory; to which I observed that no correct opinion could be formed upon the subject until we could hear something respecting the negotiations of Mr. Drummond Hay.

His Majesty then said that his reliance upon the prudence of the Prince de Joinville was fully justified by His Royal Highness' conduct, from the moment he had assumed the command of the French squadron up to the present moment. That he was much more easily kept in order than Marshal Bugeaud, who was all for active hostilities against Morocco, and for penetrating into that country, and that he had demanded a reinforcement of Cavalry to enable him to pursue his operations more successfully. But that the heat of the climate and the scarcity of water must prevent all forward movements, if they should unfortunately become necessary, until the great heats had subsided; and as horses consume more water than men, it had been represented to Marshal Bugeaud that a reinforcement of Cavalry was unnecessary at the present moment.

The King concluded the conversation by saying that Her Majesty's Government ought to be assured that should France be forced into more active operations against Morocco, she would not retain a foot of the Morocco territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 18.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(*Received August* 21.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 19, 1844.

I WENT, on Saturday evening, to the Château de Neuilly, when the King immediately began to speak to me of the affair of Mr. Pritchard, saying, that M. Guizot had laid before him the substance of the conversation which had passed between his Excellency and me on that affair.

That it was intended to send such an answer to your Lordship's representation as he hoped would satisfy Her Majesty's Government, but that M. Guizot could not take all this upon his own responsibility: the affair must be submitted to the Cabinet Council, and it was, therefore, necessary to await the arrival of three of the Ministers who were absent, but who were ordered to repair to Paris without delay.

I replied that M. Guizot had already put me in possession of the intentions of His Majesty's Government, and that I trusted the answer would not be delayed, as it was of the highest importance that an end should be put to the irritation and excitement to which this affair had given rise in both countries.

The King then turned the conversation to the Prince de Joinville, and to the attack upon the fortifications of Tangiers, which he said he was sorry for, but for which no blame could attach to His Royal Highness, who had shown the greatest forbearance, and had abstained from hostilities, until it had been made clear to him that the Emperor of Morocco had no intention of acceding to the just demands of France, but was endeavouring to gain time, in the hope of reaching a more advanced season of the year, when operations upon the coast of Morocco would be difficult, if not impracticable.

I said I hoped the attack upon Tangiers would convince the Emperor that his best policy would be to come to an amicable settlement of his differences with France.

The King answered that he should be glad if it were so, but that let what would happen, France would derive no advantage from the war, for she would not take a foot of the Morocco territory.

His Majesty then spoke of Tunis, and of the necessity he had been under of sending a French squadron to protect that State from the reported designs of the Porte.

It was known, His Majesty said, that the Turkish fleet, when off the coast of Syria, were looking out for pilots acquainted with the navigation of the Tunisian coast. That the French Government could not allow of the interference of the Porte with Tunis, but that they desired nothing more than that that State should be allowed to continue in its present condition.

His Majesty, adverting to the abdication of Mehemet Ali, said he considered it to be an act of madness, and that he could assign no other cause for it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 19.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Lord Cowley.

(No. 241.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1844.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a despatch which I have this day addressed to Mr. Drummond Hay, for the guidance of his conduct under the present aspect of the question between France and Morocco. From that despatch your Excellency will collect, generally, the course which Her Majesty's Government propose, under present circumstances, to pursue with regard to that matter.

In making this communication to you I will not dissemble the feelings of concern with which Her Majesty's Government received the intelligence of the attack on Tangier by the French squadron, under the Prince de Joinville, after

the repeated assurances given them, on the part of the French Government, that no attack on Tangier was intended or would be made.

In those assurances it did not appear that any distinction was taken between the defences of the town and the town itself.

The concern with which Her Majesty's Government received the report of that attack was greatly enhanced by the circumstance that it took place at the very moment when Mr. Hay was known to have come down to the coast, and was actually on his way to Tangier, where, in fact, he arrived in the afternoon of the day of the attack.

Her Majesty's Government do full justice to the considerate regard which induced the Prince de Joinville to ascertain the personal safety of Mr. Hay; nor do they in any way mean to assert that His Royal Highness was bound to await the arrival of the British Consul before he commenced the attack; but considering that Mr. Hay had been dispatched in the sole interest of peace by the British Government to the Emperor's Court, with the ready consent of the Government of France, it certainly does appear that it would have been on all accounts more prudent, on the part of the French Admiral, to have ascertained clearly, and without the possibility of mistake, the full results of that pacific mission from the negotiator himself, than to have assumed its failure in consequence of a communication of earlier date from the French Consul, and on that ground to have precipitated hostilities which the presence of Mr. Hay might not impossibly have enabled His Royal Highness to avoid.

Her Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction the assurances of the Government of France that it is not the intention of the French force to take possession of any part of the Morocco territory; and they rejoice that, in accordance with that declaration, the Prince de Joinville abstained from landing at Tangier and seeking to occupy that place.

Her Majesty's Government have admitted, and still willingly recognize, the just claim of France to require that the Morocco territory shall not be made a place of refuge for her enemies, from whence they may at their convenience issue forth and attack the French troops.

Her Majesty's Government will still apply their efforts to induce the Emperor to concede to the just demands of France. But Her Majesty's Government would not feel themselves justified if they abstained from declaring frankly and openly that any occupation of the coast of Morocco, on the part of France, could not be viewed otherwise than in a very serious light by Great Britain, and could scarcely fail to lead to evils of great magnitude.

In communicating these sentiments, your Excellency will not fail at the same time to assure M. Guizot of the unabated desire and determination of Her Majesty's Government to maintain, by every means in their power, the friendly relations and good understanding which are so necessary to the well-being of both countries.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ABERDEEN.

No. 20.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(*Received August* 29.)

(No. 442.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 28, 1844.

AFTER the termination of our conference upon the Tahiti affair, M. Guizot spoke of the bombardment of Mogador, and upon my observing that the Prince de Joinville had landed some troops, he said, not upon the continent, but upon a rocky islet at the entrance of the harbour, which it was necessary to occupy in order to secure the blockade they had established of Mogador. That as this was the great mart for trade with Morocco they had determined upon the blockade; their intention being to press as severely as possible upon the Emperor of Morocco by sea before the season was too far advanced for the continuance of naval operations, their sole object being to obtain his acquiescence in the four demands which we ourselves had admitted to be perfectly just and reasonable. That it might so happen, his Excellency

continued, that the operations of the war, if prolonged, might render necessary the temporary occupation of some points on the coast, but that they had no intention of forming any permanent establishment either upon the coast or upon the land frontier. If, indeed, the war were to be prolonged, they might require some pecuniary indemnification for their expenses, but they had no such intention at present.

M. Guizot that Marshal Bugeaud's success upon the frontier would make a deeper impression upon the Emperor than the bombardment of his ports, and that the loss of the guns, camp equipage, baggage, &c., of the Moorish army would be severely felt. As yet no details of the action have been received.

Great disgust is felt and expressed by all moderate persons at the term "écrasé," used by the Prince de Joinville in the telegraphic despatch announcing the bombardment of Mogador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 21.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 446. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 30, 1844.

I TOOK an opportunity yesterday of communicating to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of your Lordship's despatch No. 241.

M. Guizot passed over that part of the despatch which relates to Tangier having been attacked, notwithstanding the repeated assurances afforded that that town would be respected. In fact it is an awkward question for him, for he not only gave those assurances to me and to several of my colleagues, but he likewise made a declaration to the same effect from the Tribune, in the Chamber of Peers.

Upon the subject of Mr. Drummond Hay's negotiation, he confined himself to saying that our Consul was really charged with no communication which could be deemed satisfactory by the French Government, and that the Prince de Joinville was aware of this before his arrival on the day of attack.

He desired me to return your Lordship his acknowledgments for the assurance that Her Majesty's Government will still apply their efforts to induce the Emperor of Morocco to concede to the just demands of France, and that instructions with that view had been sent to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then, adverting to the present state of affairs in Morocco, said that Mogador had been entirely destroyed by an irruption of the Kabyles, who had descended from the mountains, and had first plundered and afterwards set fire to the town; that Her Majesty's Vice-Consul and several British residents at Mogador had been brought off by the French boats and carried on board Her Majesty's ship the "Warspite;" that the French were in temporary occupation of the island at the mouth of the harbour, which was necessary to the complete enforcement of the blockade of the port; that a brig and another small vessel were left at Mogador, and that the Prince de Joinville, with the squadron under his command, had returned to Cadiz, where he would wait for further orders.

He then mentioned the intention of making a fresh overture to the Morocco Government, with a view to the restoration of peace, but without entering into all the particulars which are stated in my secret and confidential despatch of this date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Correspondence respecting the Relations between Spain and Morocco.

No. 22.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 114.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September* 4, 1858.

RUMOURS have been for some time in circulation, which are encouraged by articles in the public journals, of its being the intention of the Spanish Government to send an expedition to Africa in the course of the autumn.

According to the fancy of the reporters, this expedition is reduced to a small squadron, which will be sent to demand satisfaction for injuries received, and, in the event of a refusal, to punish them by the bombardment of some town upon the coast; or it rises to the proportions of an army of 50,000 men, whose mission will not be confined to recovering the old Spanish lines occupied by the Moors, near the fortress of Melilla, but will have for its object the conquest of Morocco!

The latter idea, though it is not considered impracticable by influential men in Madrid, your Lordship will probably agree with me, is not likely to be immediately realized; but I am assured that General O'Donnell may possibly endeavour to do something on a small scale, to satisfy the national feeling with regard to Moorish insults. A series of articles also promised in the "España," the organ of the Moderado party, of which one has appeared, advocating the expediency of Spain undertaking the conquest of Morocco, may, perhaps, be preparatory to an attempt to ridicule some measure of a more moderate character which Marshal O'Donnell is believed by the editor to have in contemplation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 23.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 115. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September* 4, 1858.

I HAVE endeavoured to ascertain, from a person likely to be well informed, whether there is any foundation for the rumour in circulation, of an intention on the part of this Government to send a military and naval force to the coast of Africa, to act against the Moors, and as he has professed ignorance on the subject, his answer may be taken in some degree as a proof that the measure has been under consideration.

This person observed, with respect to the probable object of such an expedition, that the conduct of the Reef population could no longer be submitted to; the garrison of Melilla being often so completely blockaded that one of its amusements was to raise a hat above the wall to be shot at by the besiegers. He said the Spanish Government consequently felt that it would be highly desirable that the position of the fortress should be so improved as to render it less exposed to such insults.

He also stated that the habitual capture of Spanish coasting craft by the Reef pirates would render it necessary for the Government to take measures to prevent such acts in future.

With reference to this subject, I understand that it has long been a favourite idea of Marshall O'Donnell, that Spain should strengthen and extend her hold upon Africa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 24.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 121.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September* 7, 1858.

SINCE addressing your Lordship on the 4th instant, in my despatches Nos. 114 and 115, Confidential, respecting reports in circulation of the alleged intention of the Spanish Government to have recourse to force for the redress of their grievances against the Government of Morocco, I have received, under flying seal, Mr. Drummond Hay's despatches to your Lordship Nos. 38, 39, and 41, which I have the honour to forward herewith.*

Although these despatches show that the Spanish Government have no good grounds at present for a rupture with the Government of Morocco, their contents give much importance to the rumours of its probability. I have, therefore, taken large extracts from them with a view to using them, as a means of inducing the Spanish Government to act with moderation on the questions to which they relate; but I shall do little until the return of Señor Calderon Collantes, on the 20th instant; and in the interval, perhaps your Lordship may think it expedient to send me instructions by telegraph, which would give weight to any representations it may be deemed advisable for me to make on the subject.

In the meanwhile I have addressed an answer to Mr. Drummond Hay, of which I inclose a copy for your Lordship's information, which I hope may strengthen any advice which he may offer to the Government of Morocco, with a view to prevent their incurring the dangers of a rupture with Spain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 24.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, September* 6, 1858.

I HAVE received your private letters of the 29th and 30th ultimo, inclosing, under flying seal for my perusal, your despatches to the Earl of Malmesbury, marked Nos. 38, 39, and 41, which I shall forward to his Lordship by a Queen's messenger who leaves Madrid to-morrow.

I had prepared, for the same opportunity, a report to his Lordship on the rumours in circulation here of an intention of the Government to send an expedition to the coast of Africa, as I had been unable to obtain any satisfactory explanation to inquiries which I had made respecting them.

I have been positively assured that a most influential person connected with the army has lately spoken of the expediency and practicability of employing 50,000 men in any measures which may be adopted against Morocco; and though I am not disposed to give credit to so exaggerated a view of the case, there is still, doubtless, sufficient cause for apprehension, more particularly as it is well known to have been always a favourite idea of Marshal O'Donnell that Spain should employ force to improve her position in Africa.

Under these circumstances it will surely be wise in the Government of Morocco to settle, without further delay, the long-pending question of the indemnity for the boat plundered in 1856, without mixing it up with the present

* Nos. 26, 27, and 28.

grievance of the Reefians against the garrison of Peñon, which, in my confidential communications with this Government, I shall not fail to bring before their notice, in the manner in which you have represented them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 25.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 122. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September* 7, 1858.

WITH reference to Mr. Drummond Hay's despatches Nos. 38, 39, and 41, forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 121 of this date, I have the honour to state that I received from him at the same time a private and confidential letter, written subsequently to these despatches, and dated the 30th ultimo, informing me that he has been shown, secretly, a despatch from Señor Calderon Collantes to the Acting Spanish Consul-General in Morocco, instructing him to renew the demand for a compensation of 2,000 dollars for losses incurred in the case of a Spanish boat, plundered by the Reefians in 1856; and to state that, in the event of its being refused, the Spanish Government will resort to force.

Mr. Hay does not mention whether he has had an opportunity of conveying this important information directly to Her Majesty's Government; and I have, therefore, thought it my duty to avail myself of the present opportunity to transmit it to your Lordship, accompanied by Mr. Hay's request that it may be considered strictly secret.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 26.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord, *Tangier, August* 25, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a correspondence which has taken place between me and Seid Mohamed Khateeb, relative to the capture of two Reef vessels, laden with merchandize, by the authorities of the Spanish African garrison of Peñon, as also a copy of the letter of the Governor of Melilla, to which Khateeb alludes in his letter to me. I know not upon what grounds the Spanish authorities have captured the second Reef vessel mentioned by Khateeb, but it would appear the first vessel was captured because a small quantity of gun-flints were found on board. These Reef vessels are row-boats with small sails, and of the measurement of about ten tons each, and, except when it is very calm weather, they generally navigate close to the shore. They are consequently compelled often to pass between the Spanish garrisons and the mainland; and the Spanish authorities, I suppose, on that account, or on account of the state of hostility which formerly existed between them and the Reefians, assume the right of searching these boats, though I do not think any agreement or stipulation has ever been come to between the Spanish and Moorish Governments, whereby the right of the former to search the coasting vessels of the latter, or to capture them in the event of any ammunition of war being found on board, is admitted. The waters separating the Spanish fortresses of Alhucemas and Peñon from the mainland being less than half a mile in breadth, I conclude they are as much Moorish as Spanish. The proceedings of the Spaniards may, however, be justified by the fact that the Sultan has hitherto always refused to give satisfaction to the Spanish Government when the garrisons of the latter have been attacked, or to indemnify Spanish subjects for any losses they may have incurred in consequence of the capture, by the Reefians, of a vessel of their nation; His Majesty justifying his refusal by saying that such demands have

never been acceded to by the Moorish Government from the most ancient times, and by referring to Article XV of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco (of which I herewith inclose a copy), where it is set forth the Spaniards and Reefians can enter upon hostilities with each other without affecting the peaceful relations that subsist between their respective Governments.

Khateeb, in his letter of the 18th instant, alludes to the good offices I had on various occasions used in endeavouring to bring about a settlement of differences which had arisen between the Spanish and Moorish Governments in consequence of the hostilities that had, for many years, continued between the Spanish garrisons and the Reefians; and he is, I suppose, on that account desirous that I should bear witness, in case of need, that on the present occasion it is the Spaniards who have provoked hostilities.

In order that your Lordship may better understand what Khateeb alludes to, and with a view to avoid, as far as it is possible to do so, lengthened explanations, I further transmit translations of the following documents:—A private letter which I addressed to Khateeb on the 10th of March, 1856, and of his letter to me of the 11th July of the same year.

The Moorish Government did not follow the advice I then so strongly urged upon them, that they should assume for the future a responsibility for the acts of the Reefians, and indemnify the Spaniards for a small vessel which had been captured from them, in the same way as the Sultan had agreed to indemnify the owners of the British and French vessels which had been plundered by the Reefians in the beginning of 1856. The grounds upon which the Moorish Government refused to indemnify the Spaniards are to be found in the article of the Spanish Treaty above quoted, and the circumstance of the Spaniards having, about the same time their vessel was captured, seized upon, sunk, or destroyed by fire several Reef vessels, one of which I saw still lying under water near to the fortress of Melilla when I visited that place in 1856; but my representations to the Sultan resulted in the sending to Reef, on two occasions, an army to chastise the lawless inhabitants of the coast of that province, to repress their outrages upon European vessels, and to check their hostile operations against the Spanish garrisons. From the letter of the Governor of Melilla to the Chief of Beniboogaffir, which tribe had up to the last two years been almost constantly engaged in hostilities with the garrison of Melilla, it would appear friendly relations between the Reefians and that garrison have for some time past been maintained.

With regard to the present complaint of Seid Mohamed Khateeb against the Spaniards, it may be urged by the latter, that as the Sultan has refused to compensate the Spanish subjects for the loss of their vessel which had been wrecked on the Reef coast, and plundered by the Reefians, and as His Majesty has further declared that the Spaniards and Reefians "might settle the matter between themselves," or words to that effect, that the Moors would have no right to complain in case they, the Spaniards, chose to make reprisals; but, I must observe, on the other hand, that, if what the Governor of Melilla states is correct, and no just cause for the resumption of hostilities has been given by the Reefians, these reprisals on the peaceful trading-boats of the Reefians are much to be deplored, even though the boats had gun-flints, or even gunpowder, on board.

Ever since the Reefians were chastised in 1856, they have not committed a single act of piracy, and it is the first time since my arrival in Morocco that upwards of two years have elapsed without the occurrence of a piratical outrage on the Reef coast. It can hardly be expected that the wild people of Reef, who, I may observe, are by nature an industrious race, and disposed to engage in commerce, will respect Christian vessels approaching their shores, if they should themselves be molested in their peaceful coasting traffic by Europeans. If they find that their boats are not allowed to carry on their coasting trade, they will again take to plunder; and what makes the matter especially interesting to us and to other nations is, that the Reefians are not likely to respect one Christian flag more than another, should they recommence their privateering expeditions against the Spaniards.

A deputation of Reefians waited upon the British Vice-Consul at Tetuan a few days ago, and asked whether it was to be suffered that their boats should be captured in this way, and otherwise molested. "If so," said the Reefians, "we will again become pirates, and as our Government cannot obtain justice for us from the Spaniards, and you do not take any interest in the matter, you cannot

expect that we should respect your vessels." I believe Khateb is aware of this, and as I suppose he apprehends further trouble from the Reefians, he has addressed these letters to me, endeavouring thereby to show that if the Reefians capture Spanish or other vessels, they have received, in the present instance, from the Spaniards, provocation to do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 26.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 7 *Moharrem*, 1275 (*August* 18, 1858).

WE have to acquaint you that the Spanish Governor of Peñon is acting in a manner calculated to create differences and disputes between the two Governments (Spain and Morocco), as well as provoke the Reef people. You are a person of judgment, and are ever seeking to promote a good understanding, and to prevent disputes between us and foreign Governments; it was on that account that you, some time ago, made a representation to the Sultan regarding the Reef couutry. His Majesty acted upon your advice, and sent an army to Reef in order to repress the disorderly conduct of its inhabitants. The Reefians, from that time forth, altered their conduct, and discontinued to commit lawless acts and outrages.

Now, the Reefians are wont to excuse their past conduct by declaring that the Spaniards were the first to act in a spirit of hostility towards them, and that it was in consequence of the injury they suffered from the Spaniards that they made reprisals on the vessels of Christian nations. Nevertheless, the Sultan, in deference to your representations, sent an army to Reef, and punished the evildoers, so that the Reefians engaged to reform their conduct, and make, in the first place, a formal complaint against the Spaniards, whenever the latter should in future injure them, so that due reparation might be afforded them.

Now, we have written to you this letter, in order that you may know who it is that has given rise to fresh disturbances. Know that, about two months ago, a boat left Tetuan with Mussulman and Jew passengers, men and women, and a cargo of British manufactures of cotton goods, and Moorish manufactures for sale in the Reef country. When the boat arrived near to Peñon, the Spaniards came out, seized it, and took it into their port, where they found, in the possession of one man in the boat, about 200 flints. The Spaniards said that this was ammunition of war, and took possession of the boat.

Now, this is a most arbitrary and unjust proceeding, to take possession of a boat proceeding from a port of the Sultan to another part of His Majesty's dominions, laden with British cotton goods, handkerchiefs, and Moorish manufactures, and having on board Moorish and Jewish passengers. How is it that the Spaniards can seize a boat in this way? We wrote on this subject to the Spanish Consul-General, who has now left Tangier, and he sent us a verbal message, when we were at Tangier, through his interpreter, Yahia Siesu, promising that he would write to the Spanish authorities to give up the boat, and gave us a letter to forward to the Governor of Reef, which letter the latter was to deliver to the Governor of Melilla; but, although this letter was duly delivered, the promise made to us by the Consul has not been acted upon, and we consequently conclude the latter must have been written in a different sense from that in which he declared to us he would do. The answer of the Governor of Melilla to the Kaid of Reef we send to you inclosed herewith; from it you will learn that the Spanish Governor states that, ever since the present good understanding was established by the Sultan, there have been no acts of hostility, but that friendly relations have subsisted between Spaniards and Reefians. We wish you, however, to bear witness that the Spaniards have, on this occasion, acted in a hostile manner, and given cause for provocation to the Reefians.

Whilst writing this letter, some Jews and Moors, who were passengers on board a boat that was proceeding to Reef, on the 28th of the last preceding month (Doolhedjat), inform me that the Spaniards of Peñon took possession of their boat, laden with merchandize and wheat, and having passengers, men and women, in her.

We make this known to you in order that you may bear in mind who are the aggressors in this instance, and who it is that gives rise to acts of hostility on the part of the Reefians.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 26.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) *August* 19, 1858.

WE have received your letter regarding the Reef boats, which you say have been seized by the Spanish authorities at Peñon; and we have made ourselves acquainted with the contents of the letter addressed by the Governor of Melilla to the Chief of the Beniboogaffir tribe, which we herewith return.

We agree with you in thinking that the conduct of the Spanish authorities, as represented by you, that is to say, in seizing a Reef boat conveying passengers and merchandize on a peaceful errand from a port of Morocco to another part of the Moorish dominions, is an unjustifiable act, if there were no arms or ammunition of war on board the boat, and the Reefians were not engaged in hostilities by land with the Spaniards.

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires lately appointed may be daily expected at Tangier, so that if, as we understand, you will also arrive here about the end of the month for the purpose of meeting the Moorish Princes, we trust you will then be able to come to an understanding with him about this matter, and also to enter into arrangements for the prevention hereafter of such occurrences as those you complain of, and for maintaining, on the part of the Reef tribes, a more friendly disposition towards the Spanish garrisons in Africa.

As to the promises made by the late Consul-General, we have, both of us, reason to know the value which was to be attached to any engagement entered into by that officer, and it is not the first time that he has failed to fulfil a promise made by him.

Peace. (Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—We think it right to add, that the Spanish newspapers have lately reported an attack by the Reefians on the fortress Melilla. It is, perhaps, on that account that reprisals on the Reef boats have been made by the Spanish garrisons.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure 3 in No. 26.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 12 *Moharrem*, 1275 (*August* 22, 1858).

WE have received your letter, in reply to the one which we wrote to you respecting the proceedings of the Governor of Peñon in taking possession, in an unjustifiable and irregular manner, and in defiance of the Law of Nations, of two Reef boats cruizing along the coast of this empire. You inform us that the Spanish newspapers report that the Reefians have been attacking Melilla, and you say that this was probably the reason why the Spaniards took possession of the boats. You are—God be praised for it!—a person of discernment, and God has endowed you with the soundest judgment.

Now the letter of the Governor of Melilla, which we sent you, and which is signed by him, states that ever since the day on which peace was restored in Reef, between Spaniards and Reefians (that is, in 1856), no injury or offence has been committed by the latter. This the Governor of Melilla bears witness to in his own handwriting; but newspapers, as you are well aware, are ever filled with falsehoods that are inserted for the mere purpose of covering the sheets. How could the said Governor make such a declaration if the gazettes state

the truth? As we have already said, your good judgment will not lead you to refuse credence to the formal declaration of the Governor, and to put faith in the statements of a newspaper.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 4 in No. 26.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(Extract.) *August* 23, 1858.

WE have received your letter of the 12th of Moharrem. Nothing of what you have submitted for our consideration had been overlooked by us when we wrote to you; but you must bear in mind that the Governor of Melilla only speaks in his letter of the tribe of Beniboogaffir having kept the peace; he does not speak of other tribes who may have been engaged in hostilities with the Spaniards. Moreover, the letter of the Governor of Melilla bears date the 14th July, whilst the Spanish newspapers reporting the hostilities between the Spaniards and Reefians are of a later date. We shall, however, soon receive tidings overland, and the truth will be learnt.

Some understanding should be come to by you with the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires on all these matters. If we find he is a prudent man, and one who desires to promote a good understanding between the two Governments, and he chooses to ask our opinion on the subject, we shall ever be ready to use our good offices, and do all in our power to bring about a satisfactory settlement of any differences between you, particularly as it is the interest of Spain and Morocco to remain on terms of amity and goodwill.

Inclosure 5 in No. 26.

The Governor of Melilla to the Chief of Beniboogaffir.

Al cabo de Benibuykaffar, *Melilla*, 14 *de Julio*, 1858.

HE recibido el recado que mando Vd. relativo al carabo que se ha aprendido en el Peñon, pero siendo este un asunto sometido á la autoridad del Capitan-General, por mas que la buena amistad en que estoy con la Kavila de Benibuykaffar me haga desear intervenir en este asunto, no puedo tomar parte alguna en el.

En los momentos de dejar el mando de esta plaza no puedo menos de decir á Vd. que desde que estamos en paz su Kavila toda no ha faltado á ella, y que ha sido consequente, y asi he tenido ocasion de hacerlo presente, mas de una vez, al Excelentisimo Señor Capitan-General de Granada, especialmente al tratar de devolucion del carabo aprendido en la ensenada de Botoya por un Guarda Costa, cuyo carabo se devolvio porque el caso permitia obrar de esta manera.

Reitero á Vd. que dije siempre la consequencia de los de Benibuykaffar han tenido con la plaza, y que no han quebrantado la paz desde que me lo prometieron, celebrando yo mucho que esta sea duradera para siempre.

El Brigadier Gobernador,

(Firmado) JOSE MARIA MORILLO.

Inclosure 6 in No. 26.

Article XV of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco, concluded in 1799, *and confirmed in* 1845.

LOS limites del campo de Ceuta y extension de terreno para el pasto del ganado de aquella plaza quedarán en los mismos términos que se demarcaron y fizaron en el año de 1782.

Al paso que ha habido la mejor armonia entre dicha plaza y los Moros fronterizos, es bien notorio cuan inquietos y molestos son los de Melilla,

Alhucemas, y el Peñon, que apesar de las reiteradas ordenes de Sua Magestad Marroqui para que conserven la misma buena correspondencia con las espresadas plazas, no han dejado de incomodarlas continuamente; y aunque esto parece una contravencion á la paz general contratada por mar y tierra, no deberá entenderse asi, por cuanto es contrario á las buenas y amistosas intenciones de las dos Altas Partes Contractantes, y sí effecto de la mala indole de aquellos naturales: por tanto, ofrece Sua Magestad Marroqui valerse de cuantos medios le dicte su prudencia y autoridad para obligar á dichos fronterizos á que guarden la mejor correspondencia, y se eviten las desgracias que acaecen, tanto en las guarniciones de dichas plazas, como en los campos Moros, por los escesos de estos. Pero si los continuasen sin embargo, lo que no es de esperar, como ademas de ser injusto, ofenderian al decoro de la soberania de Sua Magestad Catolica, que no debe disimular ni tolerar tales insultos, cuando sus mismas plazas pueden por si contenerlos, queda acordado por este nuevo Tratado que las fortalezas Españolas usen del cañon y mortero en los casos en que se vean ofendidas, pues la esperiencia ha demostrado que no basta el fuego de fusil para escarmentar dicha clase de gentes.

Inclosure 7 in No. 26.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) *March* 10, 1856.

I ADDRESS you this private and confidential letter, in order to repeat, for your better recollection, the friendly counsels I offered to you and to the Governor of Reef, yesterday, with respect to the constant state of hostilities which exists between the natives and the Spanish garrisons on the coast of Reef. I told you that these frequent conflicts might, unless energetic measures be taken to prevent their occurrence, bring about very serious differences between the Governments of Spain and Morocco, and more especially whenever, as in the present instance, the Spanish authorities considered they had just grounds for accusing the Sultan's officers of having been the instigators of these attacks on the part of the lawless inhabitants of Reef.

Spain and Morocco are neighbours, and are, naturally, allies; they ought, therefore, to do all in their power to maintain, the one with the other, the most friendly relations. God has ordained* that the Spaniards, from ancient times, should possess fortresses on the rocky coast of the wild district of Reef. I consider that the Spanish occupation of these fortresses has been of the greatest advantage to the Moorish Government; for, in the first place, had these fortresses not been held by the Spaniards, they would have been either occupied by the rebellious and piratical subjects of the Sultan, who would thus have been enabled to defy the Sultan's power, seize and plunder vessels engaged in lawful trade, and murder subjects of His Majesty's allies (in consequence of which proceedings the Sultan's Government would have been engaged perpetually in differences of the gravest nature with other Governments), or they would have been taken possession of by some one of the more powerful nations, who might not, perhaps, have the same interest in the maintenance of the integrity and independence of this Empire, and who would not, probably, have submitted tamely to the attacks and inroads of the Reefians, but might, whilst repressing these outrages, have found it also expedient to extend their conquests in that territory.

The Spanish Government have long desired, I believe, to come to some friendly understanding with the Moorish Government, regarding the state of things at Reef, but hitherto the Sultan's authority had not, I conclude, been sufficiently established in that district to justify or enable the Moorish Government to propose any settlement whereby a stop might be put to the constant conflicts that arise between the two people.

The Spanish Government on hearing of the late successful expedition of the Pasha of Reef against the pirates of Beniboogaffir, would naturally expect

* I used this expression not to wound Moorish vanity when speaking of the Christian possession of Mohamedan territory.

that after the pirates had been so severely chastised, and that the Sultan's authority in the above district was re-established, the Pasha would also have done all in his power to suppress aggressions against the Spanish fortresses; but the Spanish Government have, I understand, declared that the result of the Pasha's expedition to Reef has had a contrary effect to that which they had expected, with reference to the tranquillity of the garrisons. Moreover, if the Reef people perceive that such outrages can be perpetrated with impunity on the Spaniards, it could hardly be expected that those lawless people would act in a friendly manner towards the vessels and subjects of other nations, driven by stress of weather on that coast.

It would be a subject of considerable satisfaction to the British Government to see the Sultan's authority firmly established throughout the Reef country, and I have no doubt that if another expedition is sent this year to that province, under the command of the present Pasha, much will be done towards effecting its complete subjugation. The Moorish Government would thus ward off most serious questions which menace the tranquillity, and, I may even say, the integrity of this Empire, and such measures will indeed be requisite if the Sultan still desires to hold Reef as part of his dominions.

I conclude the Spanish Government would likewise be well satisfied to learn that the Sultan had placed under his complete control the Reef country, as they would then have a right to expect perfect tranquillity in their African garrisons. If, on the other hand, these conflicts are allowed to continue, the Spanish Government has, I believe, determined—and the Moorish Government cannot be surprised at their determination—to send such a force as will impose respect on these lawless people, whilst they (the Spaniards) will be justified in expecting that the Moorish Government will, if they cannot control their own subjects, at least in no way encourage or assist them in their aggressions or resistance.

Such a state of things would, however, be very undesirable on many accounts, for should the Spaniards be successful in their expeditions, it will be proved that troops sent from a distance by a foreign Government are able to effect that which the Sultan has not been able to do in his own territory. If, on the other hand, the Reefians are successful in repelling the troops of the Spaniards, and causing them defeat, I will ask you, confidentially, whether such an event might not possibly prove even more disastrous to the Sultan's interest than the former contingency? It might give rise to the question whether it would not be expedient for the Spanish Government to accept the proffered assistance of another nation or nations, or (though I will only put forward this supposition as a fancy of my own, which might be possible, though not very probable), it might cause the Spaniards to take into consideration a proposition of another nation for the transfer to them of one or more of these fortresses, and this nation might be disposed, and have the power, to deal summarily with the pirates. Either of these results would be most deplorable and even disastrous to the true interests of the Moorish Government, and would be viewed in the same light by the British Government. I do therefore most earnestly recommend that instructions be given to the Pasha of Reef to do his utmost to put a stop to these conflicts, and to enter into some friendly arrangement with the authorities of the Spanish garrisons, and cause, at the same time, the Reefian guards on the Moorish territory to be placed at such a distance from the possessions of the Spaniards that the two parties may not be within range of musket-shot from each other.

With reference to the conversation which took place in yesterday's conference regarding the illicit trade in various articles of export and import carried on at Reef with the Spanish garrisons, I admit that this may affect injuriously the Sultan's revenue; but this only shows the necessity for His Majesty's establishing his authority in the Reef country, and sending thither proper officers and troops to ensure obedience to his commands.

The Spanish Government and the authorities at the African garrisons would, no doubt, be ready to meet any reasonable proposition of the Moorish Government, which would have for its object the suppression of this illicit traffic, if the tranquillity of their African possessions were properly guaranteed, and would be glad to co-operate with the Moorish Government in maintaining a friendly intercourse hereafter between the inhabitants of Reef and the garrisons in question. In matters of such a nature both parties should be disposed to

make reasonable and friendly concessions; otherwise these differences will never be settled.

The counsels I have offered in this unofficial form are, I believe, in accordance with the views of the British Government, who, as the Sultan and his Government must know, would never urge them to act contrary to their true interests.

I will conclude this letter by repeating almost the same words as those I used at its commencement, that Morocco and Spain as neighbours ought always to seek to arrange, promptly and in an amicable manner, their differences, and to cement the amity and alliance that subsists between them with the strongest ties.

Peace. (Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 8 in No. 26.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(Extract.) *July* 11, 1856.

AT the time we received these letters, we dispatched another courier to the Sultan, and inclosed your further letters on the Reef affair, and we told the Sultan that you have ever shown the same interest in this country as though it had been your own; that you are always exerting yourself for our welfare and prosperity; that you point out to us the road by which we may move safely; and that, in this matter, it is expedient that the Sultan should send a royal letter to us in the sense you indicate, stating that His Majesty will engage to pay all that has been robbed from your vessel, and also pay compensation for the French vessel, and also pay for what was lost with the Spanish boat; and that His Majesty will further declare that he will become responsible for all the future acts of the Reefians. We have urged this in the strongest manner, and have told His Majesty that you always give us sound advice regarding matters which are calculated to injure our interests, and that you are authorized to speak and write as you do. We repeat that you take a deep interest in our welfare, and that you desire to avert all things injurious to us. In conclusion, we can assure you that we have done our best, and that, with God's help, the answer will come in conformity with our desires, and soon.

The Sultan has ordered the Governor Ben Abd-el-Malech to make the Reefians pay the compensation; but His Majesty says he will not pay the amount from his treasury. Ben Abd-el-Malech will not be wanting in this business.

No. 27.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 39. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Tangier, August* 26, 1858.

IN my despatch No. 38 of the 25th instant, I transmitted to your Lordship copies of a correspondence that has passed between Seid Mohamed Khateeb and myself, relative to the capture of two Reefian vessels by the authorities of the Spanish garrison of Peñon on the Reef coast. Since I addressed your Lordship that despatch, I have heard that several articles have appeared in the Spanish newspapers reporting the renewal of hostilities between the Reefians and the Spanish fortress of Melilla; and I am told the editors of the Spanish newspapers in question are urging their Government to adopt energetic measures, and to send an expedition to Reef to chastise the inhabitants and take possession of territory adjacent to the Spanish garrisons in Africa.

About four months before M. España was recalled by his Government from his post as Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General, I heard he had received an order from the Spanish Government to renew the demand upon the Moorish Government of the sum of 2,000 dollars, as compensation for a Spanish boat that had been wrecked on the Reef coast and plundered by the natives in 1856;

but M. España did not, as far as I can learn from this Government, act upon this instruction, but wrote to his Government to say that it was useless for him to make any further representation, unless a hostile demonstration were made against Morocco. I am not surprised M. España should have endeavoured to bring about a rupture between his Government and Morocco, for he was himself accused, at that time, by the Moorish Government of having been an accomplice in a fraud upon the Sultan's Customs, whilst serious charges of the same nature had also been brought against him by a British subject; and he would naturally be desirous, if those accusations were not unfounded, of bringing about complications between the Spanish and Moorish Governments, in the hope that the complaints made against him by the Moorish Government would be lost sight of, or be attributed to ill-will towards him on the part of this Government.

I have not heard whether it is the intention of the present Spanish Ministry to press this claim of 2,000 dollars upon the Moorish Government; but I suppose they intend to do so, unless the late capture of the two Reef trading boats, laden with merchandize, is intended as a reprisal for the amount demanded.

In order that your Lordship may be fully informed of what has taken place on this subject, and the active part which I at one time took in endeavouring to bring about an arrangement of this claim, it is necessary that I should relate to your Lordship at some length what passed between M. España and myself, and between M. España and Khateeb in 1856 and 1857, and I think it will be admitted by the Spanish Government, if the facts are brought to their knowledge, that it has been chiefly owing to the conduct of their Representative in this country, that their claim was not long ago settled, and that had M. España played an honest part in the negotiation, and not misled both myself and the Moorish Government by his assurances, arrangements might have been entered upon, not only for settling this claim, but also for placing the Spanish garrisons on a better footing, in as far as regards their relations with the inhabitants of the Reef country.

Before I proceed to the proposed relation, I think it my duty to explain why I have taken, and why I still continue to take, so active a part in these affairs. My views are, firstly, that Great Britain's best policy is to promote friendly relations between Spain and Morocco; for Spain, like Great Britain, has a deep and vital interest in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Moorish dominions. Secondly, when the Spaniards and Reefians are engaged in hostilities, the Reefians cruize against Spanish vessels, and, as might be expected, capture other vessels besides those navigating under the Spanish flag. Thirdly, if the Spaniards continue to be molested in their African garrisons by the Reefians, and it be eventually proved they have not the power to repress those attacks, the Spanish Government might some day be tempted to cede their African garrisons to another nation, perhaps France, which contingency would not only deeply affect the interests of Morocco, but also those of Great Britain, from the vicinity of the said garrisons to the Straits of Gibraltar; or if, on the other hand, the Spaniards were to invade the Reef territory, I do not think that, unless they were to send an overwhelming force, they could obtain any successful result, but, under any circumstances, they would set a most dangerous example to the French, as that Power would probably, if a Spanish invasion of Reef took place, send an army of observation to the Algerine frontier, and there would be no foreseeing the untoward results which might finally be brought about, and the consequences of which, if ultimately Reef or Morocco were invaded by France, would be deplored, I should think, by Spain more than by any other country. Neither could Great Britain remain a tranquil spectator of events which might affect the integrity and independence of the Moorish dominions.

When M. España arrived in this country, he requested me on various occasions to accompany him in his visits to Seid Mohamed Khateeb, and to use my good offices in urging upon the Moorish Government to take active steps to check the hostilities between the Spanish garrisons in Africa and the Reefians, and also to pay the compensation to the proprietor of the Spanish boat that had been plundered by the Reefians.

The inclosed translation of a letter I addressed to Khateeb on the 24th of September, 1856, will best make known to your Lordship the advice I had given to the Moorish Government, and to which allusion was made in a despatch

marked No. 66 of 25th September, 1856, which I addressed to the Earl of Clarendon. The Moorish Government did not, however, then follow my advice.

In 1856, Colonel Buceta, the Governor of Melilla, visited Tangier, and demanded from Seid Mohamed Khateeb the payment of the 2,000 dollars in question. It was refused on the grounds which have already been stated to your Lordship. M. España and Colonel Buceta then requested that Khateeb should give his consent that the form of paying the money should be gone through in the presence of certain Reefians who had been brought to Tangier prisoners by Colonel Buceta, so that an impression might be left in the minds of the Reefians, who were to be allowed to return to their country, that the Moorish Government had given satisfaction to the Spaniards. For this purpose M. España sent the money to the Governor of Reef, who was also Governor of Tangier at the same time, and, I was told, the form was gone through, at the Governor's residence at Tangier, of paying the money in the presence of the Reef prisoners, but which I frankly avowed at the time to M. España, appeared to me to be a very foolish proceeding.

Shortly after the conclusion of the new Treaty stipulations between Great Britain and Morocco, M. España informed Seid Mohamed Khateeb and myself that his Government intended also to enter into a new Treaty with Morocco, as several of the stipulations of the old Treaty had become obsolete, whilst the English stipulations were just as advantageous as the Spanish, except in as far as regards the duties on some few articles of exportation, which Spain had never been able to enforce, and which M. España then declared were of no importance to Spain, as those articles were of a similar quality to those produced in Spain. M. España enlarged upon the advantage of their abrogating Article XV of the Treaty, and of requiring this Government to enter into similar engagements regarding the Reef pirates as those contained in Article XXXIV of the English Treaty. M. España went so far, in upholding the British Treaty, as to tell my Sardinian and Neapolitan colleagues that he regarded the new stipulations as being of greater benefit to Spain than to British interests; and communicated to them confidentially that he had mainly contributed to bring the negotiation to a successful result, which latter statement, however, was devoid of truth.

M. España also assured Seid Mohamed Khateeb and myself that the Spanish Government would readily concur in the measures about to be adopted by the Sultan for repressing smuggling in his dominions, and that it was their interest to set the example by checking any illicit trade being conducted by Spanish subjects.

In a private letter I wrote to Mr. Hammond, dated the 14th of November, 1856, I reported the language M. España declared he had held to my French colleague on the subject. After a lapse of some weeks, M. España informed me his Government had sent him private letters giving him full authority to come to an arrangement with regard to the new Treaty, and that it would be almost identic with the British Treaty, except as regards their Spanish-African garrisons, for which it was desirable some special stipulations should be negotiated, and he asked if I would have any objection to use my good offices in urging upon this Government to come to a friendly arrangement regarding the Spanish garrisons in Africa. I consented to do so. Subsequently M. España took an opportunity of informing me his Government had written confidentially to him to say that they were disposed to send him full powers in due form to negotiate and sign the new Treaty, but that it would not be decorous for them to enter upon the negotiations until the compensation of 2,000 dollars demanded in 1856 be paid. M. España entreated me to endeavour to persuade this Government to accede to the demand.

In pursuance of M. España's request, I had several conferences with Khateeb on this subject; and, having pointed out to him the advantage of keeping on friendly terms with the Spaniards, and of entering upon new Treaty stipulations with them regarding the Reef, and of abrogating Article XV, which authorises, as it were, hostilities upon the Sultan's territory, and which might prove very injurious to His Majesty's interests hereafter as regards a more formidable Power, he consented to my demand, but on the condition that the compensation should not be paid until the preliminaries of the new Treaty were entered upon, and an assurance was given by the Spanish Representative that the old Treaty would be abrogated, and no further claims for past outrages committed by the Reefians on the Spaniards be put forward. Upon these conditions, he told me I might

guarantee to M. España that the compensation would be paid, with a suitable letter stating that the Sultan had resolved upon paying this compensation to the proprietors of the Spanish vessel which had been wrecked and plundered by the Reefians, as a proof of his goodwill, without raising the question as to the exception to which His Majesty considered he was entitled by their former Treaty engagements. Khateeb shortly afterwards went to Tetuan, and M. España, to whom I communicated the result of my good offices, assured me he would immediately commence the negotiation.

About this time circumstances led me to apprehend a want of good faith on the part of M. España, and that he was in the habit of holding different language to me from that which he held to others. I was also informed by Khateeb that, contrary to the promises he had made to the Moorish Government, he was the only Agent, except the French, who had not readily consented to assist in checking infringements of the Sultan's fiscal laws, and frauds on the Custom-house by Spanish subjects, and that he had even boasted to others he had written to Madrid to say that the trade between Gibraltar and Morocco would soon be transferred to Spanish vessels, from the fact of his not having adhered to the measures promulgated by the Moorish Government for the repression of smuggling at the Moorish ports, as British Consuls would enforce the fiscal laws upon British vessels, and Spanish Consuls would not do so with regard to their own vessels, so that the Moorish merchants would give the preference to Spanish vessels—a prediction, however, which I remark has not been realized, the tonnage of British vessels having greatly increased at Tangier since the conclusion of the new Treaty.

M. España informed me, about the end of 1857, that he was about to go to Tetuan to negotiate the Treaty, and he wished me to ask Khateeb to pay him, at once, the 2,000 dollars. This I declined to do, saying, "When you have delivered your full powers and discussed the preliminary arrangements, and the negotiation is progressing, I will require Khateeb, if you so desire it, to fulfil the engagement he had entered upon with me on certain conditions." M. España having thus failed to make me his dupe in misleading this Government, I heard nothing further of this negotiation; but I have reason to believe he had never received instructions from Madrid of the nature he chose, on various occasions, to declare had been sent to him.

Fortunately, all that M. España had said to me about his full powers, the negotiation of the new stipulations, the intention of the Spanish Government to abrogate the old Treaty, to check smuggling on the part of Spanish subjects in Morocco, &c., he stated to Khateeb, on various occasions, in my presence; therefore the Moorish Government was satisfied that I had only faithfully conveyed to them the language of M. España.

I inclose copy of a letter I had addressed this Government, urging them to pay the Spanish indemnity, and extracts of subsequent private correspondence I had at the time with Lord Howden upon the subject, which I think will be good evidence of the faithfulness of all I have related.

In conclusion, I beg to say that my object in giving such lengthened explanations, is to show that, if the Spanish Government have cause to complain of inattention on the part of the Moorish Government, or of non-compliance with their demands, it must be attributed to the fact of their not having been honestly represented in this country; and that M. Espana, having been engaged, as it would appear, in his own private commercial transactions of an illicit character, may have deemed it to be his interest not to enlighten his Government upon the true and proper policy to be pursued by them in Morocco.

I have no doubt that, if the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, who has lately been appointed, adopts a friendly and firm line of policy in his communications with this Government, all pending questions may be brought to an amicable settlement; but I beg to repeat that the capture of the peaceful trading boats of Reef, or the invasion of Reef by a Spanish force, instead of tending to bring about a settlement of existing differences, will only be conducive towards complicating them and rendering them more difficult of solution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Inclosure 1 in No. 27.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *September* 24, 1856.

AS soon as I received your letter regarding the payment of the indemnity for the captured vessel, I dispatched a courier to Gibraltar with a request to our Minister at Madrid to telegraph the reply of the Sultan to Paris and London.

I most sincerely regret to learn from you that the Sultan has not consented to pay the small demand of the Spaniards for 2,000 dollars, for the compensation of the vessel which was wrecked and plundered on the Reef coast. It would have been an act of justice and courtesy to a friendly nation which has at heart the integrity and independence of the Sultan's dominions, for the Spaniards are, by their position as a neighbouring State, the natural allies of Morocco. I am aware that there is an Article in the Treaty between Spain and Morocco which stipulates that the outrages committed by the Reefians on the Spanish garrisons are not to occasion any interruption of the friendly relations between the two Governments, and that the Spaniards are justified in repelling the attacks of the Reefians by force. This Article I consider to be a stain on the Government of the Sultan, and ought to be erased: for, in the first place, it is an acknowledgment of the Sultan's want of power to control His Majesty's subjects; and, in the next, it authorizes the Spaniards, or any other nation who might claim the same rights, to invade the Reef territory without the Sultan having any right to make thereupon any remonstrance.

Though the Spaniards are not, at the present time, one of the more powerful nations, I have no doubt they will feel themselves called upon, on the present occasion, to vindicate their honour and wounded pride, and to send an expedition to Reef. If the Sultan desires to follow the counsels of a true friend, he will give immediate orders to you to pay the 2,000 dollars, that it may not be said that the Sultan is ready to do justice to the strong, but refuses justice to those who he supposes have not the power to enforce their demands.

Write without delay on the subject to the Moorish Court. In the mean time if you receive any note from the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, asking for the indemnity for their vessel, be careful in your reply not to give offence, as he naturally must feel deeply wounded.

Inclosure 2 in No. 27.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord Howden.

(Extract.) *Tangier, April* 12, 1857.

I AM surprised the Spanish Government has turned such a cold shoulder to your Excellency's communications about the Treaty and Melilla. The Spanish Treaty with Morocco has never been in force, and is not so good on the whole as our own, though there are one or two Articles regarding navigation and exports which are more favourable. My Spanish colleague had told me his Government would gladly enter into the new stipulations and abrogate the old, and I was very anxious they should do so, as the French will, probably, as "one of the most favoured nations," demand the execution of the obsolete Spanish Articles. The Sultan will not agree to it, and the Spaniards may thus get the Moors into hot water with the French; whilst it ought to be, I think, Spanish policy to avoid giving any excuse to the French to quarrel with Morocco, or some day the Spaniards may find the French frowning at them from Ape's Hill, as well as from the Pyrenees.

Don Carlos has assured me, within the last two days, that his Government is disposed to enter upon the new stipulations. They should lose no time in doing so.

With regard to Melilla and the Vice-Consulate, it was my Spanish colleague who assured me his Government would he highly pleased to make that port a free port, if traffic could be established with the Reefians.

As the Spaniards do not appear to understand their own interests, I shall push the Sultan to build a castle, or castles, and custom-houses on the coast, without reference to the Spaniards, and I think, ere long, it will be done. The

Spaniards have had the advantage of getting provisions from the Reefians, and making also a large profit by the trade passing through their ports; whereas they are now blockaded and in constant warfare. The only advantage to us would have been the surety of our shipping and subjects at first starting in those lawless lands.

My object in recommending that the Sultan should open the Reef country to trade is, in the first place, to check the contraband trade overland, viâ Algeria, and the relations they are establishing in Reef, which may hereafter be turned into a protectorate.

Secondly, to establish the Sultan's authority in Reef, and have his flag flying on castles along the coast, with properly instituted authorities, and thus prevent the French finding an excuse for invasion on the plea that the Sultan's authority does not extend to the Reef; and last, but not least, to check piracy, by giving another vent to the enterprizing spirit of the Reefians, who, like the old Sea Kings of the north, and their lawless subjects, are a fine gallant race, industrious, and the best bulwark against the French, if they found it their interest to be loyal towards the Sultan.

The Spaniards ought, I think, to have exactly the same policy as ourselves in Morocco, and that is, to maintain its integrity and independence, and develop its resources, and also to prevent the French finding any excuse to invade the country. Just now, the French Emperor's finances may not be in such a state to permit him to turn his attention to conquest in Morocco; but the day must come, sooner or later, and there is no time to be lost.

If the French get possession of Morocco, and hold the northern coast—the very gut of Mediterranean commerce—we had better shut up shop at once, and hoist the tri-colour at Gibraltar.

I am writing in great haste, as the boat is about to start. Your Lordship will be heartily tired, I fear, of my long stories about this country; but once I get on my hobby, it runs away with me.

I perhaps attach undue importance to what is passing, or is likely to pass, here; but I fancy that if we were now only to try, in right good earnest, to patch up Morocco and secure its integrity, we may save ourselves hereafter another war like that we have just concluded; or that we shall have to consent to the Mediterranean becoming a French lake.

Inclosure 3 in No. 27.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord Howden.

Tangier, December 2, 1857.

Dear Lord Howden,

AS the accompanying despatch relates to an incident which concerns the Spaniards, I send it to the Foreign Office, under flying-seal to your Excellency. Though I have remonstrated in strong language, in my letter to the Moorish Minister regarding this reported piracy,* I have recommended our Senior Naval Officer at Gibraltar not to interfere, for I think the Spaniards are almost as much to blame as the Reefians, in keeping up a constant state of hostilities between their garrisons and the neighbouring inhabitants. Last summer the authorities at Peñon, or Alhucemas, captured a peaceful Reef trader, and confiscated the cargo, imprisoning the passengers. One of them was a Moor of Tangier, formerly in my service.

The Sultan has hitherto always refused to indemnify the Spaniards for property plundered in the Reef, as he considers that Article XV of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco takes all responsibility off his shoulders.

Your Excellency may remember I had recommended that the Spaniards should have made a new Treaty with Morocco, something similar to our own, as the advantageous Articles in their Treaty have become obsolete, *i.e.*, they have not been enforced for the last fifty years, and I had suggested to my Spanish colleague that he should obtain, from this Government, Articles more adapted

* Though the Spaniards had accused the Reefians of capturing a Spanish vessel, it was subsequently discovered that the Spanish master had abandoned his vessel from panic on seeing some pacific fishing-boat. The vessel was found by the Spanish authorities, some days after, on the seas, abandoned, but no part of the cargo or of the tackle of the ship were missing.

to the exigencies of their African garrisons than those inserted in the existing stipulations; and I offered to aid him.

Don Carlos de España was full of promises, but "nada mas," and, as I have since discovered, wanted on this occasion to make use of me as a cat's paw for extracting from this Government certain privileges to benefit himself in certain private commercial speculations.

When Don Carlos informed me his Government was disposed to enter upon a new Treaty with the Sultan, I had prepared the Moorish Minister to facilitate the negotiations, and had even obtained from him a secret promise that the demand put forward by the Spanish Government for compensation of a vessel plundered by the Reefians in 1856, at the same time that a British barque and French vessel were captured, and for which the Governments of Great Britain and France received full compensation, should be conceded, as Don Carlos had told me his Government attached great importance to the indemnity being paid, as a point of honour.

Up to the present day, Don Carlos has done nothing about the Treaty, though he had assured me and the Moorish Minister he had received orders to enter upon the negotiations; but, on the contrary, he has followed in the wake of the Frenchman, who has refused to admit the fiscal laws established by the Sultan for the prevention of smuggling.

Don Carlos himself has been engaged in a contraband transaction of wheat at Cadiz, which has occasioned considerable scandal. He is associated with a certain Spaniard named Vidal, who, on plea of "average," took a vessel laden with wheat, bound from Dar-el-baida to Laraiche, and sold the cargo at Cadiz or Puerto Santa Maria. A British subject of the name of Porro, owner of the cargo, prosecuted Vidal at Cadiz for barratry, but the affair was compromised for some 11,000 dollars. Porro has shown me letters which convince me my colleague has been engaged in this dirty transaction.

I mention all this to your Excellency, as I have lately turned a cold shoulder to my colleague when he has asked my support in any Spanish affair, and I was obliged to tell him clearly, the other day, I could have nothing to do with him in any affair with this Government, as I found that his acts did not correspond with the language he had held to me, for he had misled me, as also the Moorish Government. Since then, he has been making up to the Frenchman, who, I believe, is urging him to recommend to the Spanish Government to send an expedition to Reef, and, I dare say, may have offered French aid.

Don Carlos may possibly tell his Government of the alteration of my conduct, so, if anything was said to your Excellency, I should be glad that you be prepared at least to show, by my letter to Khateeb, that though I may turn a cold shoulder to their Representative, I have urged this Government to do justice to the claims of the Spanish Government.

The Spaniards are mad if they unite with France in any proceedings against the Reef or this Government. The progress of the French towards the Pillars of Hercules will be sufficiently rapid without Spain abetting them, and thus helping in the end to cut her own throat.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 28.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 41.)
My Lord, *Tangier, August* 28, 1858.

SINCE I addressed your Lordship in my despatch No. 30 of the 25th instant, I have received from Seid Mohamed Khateeb, a letter of which I have the honour to inclose an extract.

Khateeb, as your Lordship will learn from this letter, states clearly his apprehension that the Reefians may again cruize against the Spaniards; and from the language he uses, he is evidently desirous that I should infer there is considerable apprehension to be entertained on account of European vessels in general, if the Reefians resume their piratical expeditions. Knowing the very

slender control this Government has over their subjects in the Reef country, and convinced that unless a large army is dispatched to support the administration of this Government there, it is useless, as Khateeb says, to "reason with the Reefians, or to recommend them to be prudent," I have decided upon making an immediate application to the Senior Naval Officer at Gibraltar to send the vessel of war on the station to the coast of Reef; and have also applied for a passage in that vessel for the British Vice-Consul, Mr. Reade, who from his knowledge of the Spanish and Arabic languages, and from his past acquaintance with the Reef country and its inhabitants, will be enabled to communicate with both Spanish authorities and Reefians, and more especially with the friendly Chief, Seid Mohamed al Hadary, who exercises great influence in that country.

Mr. Reade will be instructed to warn the Reefians that, whatever the grievances they may have against the Spaniards, if any British vessel or British subject is molested by them, we shall compel the Sultan to chastise them, and levy upon them a heavy fine, or we shall take the matter into our own hands. Mr. Reade will also be directed to endeavour to acquire information as to the cause why the Spaniards captured the Reef boats.

Under the circumstances of the case, I thought it prudent to lose no time in taking an active step to secure the safety of our vessels passing that part of the Mediterranean coast, and I trust your Lordship will not disapprove my conduct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 28.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)
(Extract.) *August* 26, 1858.

WITH regard to what you say concerning the expected arrival of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, and the settlement of the pending question about the boats that have been captured by the Spaniards, we must confess to you that we are under considerable apprehension that all the labour and trouble you and we took upon ourselves in the Reef affairs, and the good results we had obtained in bringing matters to a satisfactory settlement—so satisfactory that the Reefians have behaved in a more orderly manner ever since, and have not molested any one—will turn to no account, for the Spaniards are now provoking the Reefians and exciting them to evil, by seizing their boats. The Reefians are thus encouraged to commit outrages again. You know the Reefians, and are aware of the fact that, if provoked by the Spaniards, they will retaliate and endeavour to make reprisals. Great evils will thus be produced, for it is useless to reason with the Reefians, or recommend them to be prudent. The authorities at the garrisons will be the authors of all the evil.

We shall send your letter off to the Sultan.

No. 29.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 16.

(No. 131. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Madrid, September* 10, 1858.

SINCE the departure of the messenger Townley, the rumours of a war with Morocco have assumed a more definite character. The nomination of a Captain-General of the Spanish possessions in Africa is spoken of; and Malaga is named as the point at which an expeditionary force will, probably, be embarked.

I have had some conversation on the subject with M. Antonio Gonzalez, who though not officially connected with the Government, has apparently good confidential sources of information.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

He is himself a partizan of the measure, believing that it will not only render the position of Spain in Africa respectable, but also prove highly beneficial to the country by enabling the Government to give a useful direction to the energies of the restless and turbulent part of the population of Madrid and other great towns.

He believes that a force of from 15,000 to 20,000 men will be required to begin operations, if the Government carry out their present plans, and that they will, at least, endeavour to make themselves entirely masters of the Reef.

He observed, however, that three preliminary essentials to Spain's undertaking so important a war have yet to be attained: first, the necessary funds; secondly, the consent of the Court; and, thirdly, that of the Cortes. The first and most important must be a matter of difficulty; but if it can be shown satisfactorily how the war can be supported, and that it will have a fair prospect of success, the national feeling would be, I believe, fully shared by the Queen and the Legislature.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 30.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 134.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September* 14, 1858.

THE public journals state, though not apparently on authority, that a Royal Order will soon be published granting permission to officers of the army who have retired from the service to return to it, if they wish to be employed in the proposed expedition to Africa.

A Liberal paper of this morning states, "that accounts to the 6th instant have been received from Melilla, which place continued to be invested by the barbarous Reefians with much tenacity. That a small vessel, a 16-pounder gun, and a large quantity of ammunition, had been taken from them, losses which only appeared to increase the audacity of these savages. On the night of the 30th ultimo, the tribe of Benisidel opened a fire of artillery against the fortress, and continued it during all the day, although the Governor had in his power twenty-two men of the tribe of Benisicar.

"It is evident, therefore, that it becomes more urgent every day that we should deal once for all with these treacherous hordes, from whom the Spanish flag has received so many outrages."

I also inclose the copy and translation of a letter published last night in another Spanish newspaper, giving an account of the hostilities in which the garrison appears to have been lately engaged with the neighbouring tribes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 30.

Extract from a Spanish Newspaper of September 13, 1859.

Melilla, 30 *de Agosto.*

DESPUES de los mil y un disparos de cañon, obús y mortero, y de los treinta mil de fusil y carabina Minié que la plaza hizo sobre los parapetos y caserío de nuestros irreconciliables vecinos, de que impuse á V. últimamente, no ha tenido lugar hecho alguno de armas, si bien en su defecto se ha verificado de estrategia y sorpresa uno que por su naturaleza, sumamente arriesgado, exigia las mayores precauciones, y lo cual tengo la satisfaccion de communicar á usted, pues que los valientes que se encargaron de llevarlo á cabo merecen el mas justo elogio por el buen desempeño de la comision.

Hace dias que sabia en la plaza que las Kábilas tenian preparados algunos cárabos para verificar sus piraterías y asaltar con ellos los buques de todas las naciones que tienen la adversidad de quedar en calma ó barades sobre los inhospitalarias costas del Riff. Entre el número de los cárabos de estos, se veia uno mas próximo que los demas, acabado de votar al agua, puede decirse, y de la propiedad de la Kábila de Benisicar, nuestro mas terrible enemigo, con cuyo motivo dispuso en la noche del 25 el Gobernador interino de esta plaza, que treinta hombres de la compañía de Granaderos del primer batallon del Regimiento Infantería de Murcia, mandados por el Capitan de la misma, Don Antonio Donegaray, el Teniente Don Francisco Alonzo, y veinte y cuatro confinados de la mayor confianza, con el tercer Ayudante de Plaza Don Francisco Alvarez Tardon, todos á las órdenes del referido capitan, saliesen al campo infiel con el objeto de apresar el indicado cárabo.

La fuerza verificó su salida por el Mauldéte, quedando en este punto cincuenta hombres de la compañiia Cazadores de dicho batallon para proteger la retirada en caso de urgencia, hallándose asimismo al pie del referido punto el Señor Gobernador Interino, Don Francisco Ceballos, Don Mariano Salcedo, Jefe del Batallon, y los Capitanes Don Emilio Ayllon, Don Juan Semedo y Don Carmelo Borjas. La fuerza, al mando de Donegaray, se internó sobre media legua en el campo, atravesando los puntos enemigos del Ataque de la Leña, Tarára y la cañonera de San Lorenzo, hasta llegar al sitio llamado el camino de los Camellos, dejando á la derecha el cuartel de Santiago, con el objeto de apoderarse igualmente de los proyectiles que, de los disparados de la plaza tenia el enemigo arrimados para arreglarlos al calibre de su artilleria, debiéndose á las acertadas medidas del Comandante de la fuerza y al valor de este puñado de Españoles la adquisicion del indicado cárabo y la de quarenta y dos proyectiles entre bombas, balas y granadas, que se se hallan ya en la plaza, y que cuenta de menos el enemigo para hostilizarlos.

Hechos de esta naturaleza enaltecen sombremanera el buen nombre del ejército Español y el valor nunca desmentido de los Señores Jefes, oficiales y soldados que le componen, probandose una vez mas de lo que es capaz el arrojo de un peloton do Españoles decididos y dignos de la consideracion del Gobierno para mayores empresas.

Tenemos delante de las murallas de Melilla un enemigo traidor, un enemigo odioso, ó mejor dicho, unas tribus de salvajes que no respetan pabellon, clase, ni color; que solo si alimenta de su desenfrenada piratería, y por último, unas Kabilas de canibales, á quienes por nuestro propio honor é interés y por la dignidad de la nacion Española debíamos, hache mucho tiempo, haber internado ó esterminado, apoderándonos de estas costas y abriéndonos paso hasta tocar las puertas de Ceuta, llave del estrecho, en obsequio de las naciones civilizadas y aun de estos mismos semi-salvajes, que bien pronto bendecirian la hora feliz en que el estandarte Español atravesara sus playas para ofrecerles una seguridad individual que no conocen, y ponerlos á la altura de las naciones cultas y civilizadas de Europa.

Aun no es tarde, si el Gobierno de Sua Magestad volviese la vista hácia estas costas, y enviaso una espedicion que nos ayudase á esplorar esta mina, virgen é inagotable de recursos, para estraer de ella el provecho que nos ofrece. Interin esto sucede, debe legarse al Gobierno de esta plaza omnímodas facultades, destinando de los fondos del tesoro lo que crea conveniente para tener bien pagados los confidentes, quienes, sin derramar sangre, que es lo que el Gobierno trata de evitar, nos procurarán y harán faciles cuantos elementos cuenta la Morisma para hostilizar la plaza, pudiendo asegurare que, una vez bien pagados, hasta las cinco cabezas de los jefes de las Kabilas que gobiernan el campo infiel vendrian á la plaza.

Los guarda-costas, que á guisa de relámpagos suelen allá de vez en cuando aparecer por aqui, son otro objeto que no debe perder de vista el Gobierno para la seguridad de las costas y de estos puntos: digo esto, porque el dia 19 del actual, cuando nos hallábamos en lo mas critico del fuego, se apareció uno que nos alargó una poca de correspondencia, y sin echar el ancla ni menos hacer alto en el fuego en que se hallaba empeñada la plaza, defendiendo la dignidad del pabellon Español y la integridad del territorio donde manda la Reina Doña Isabel II, se hizo á la mar con viento de proa, y no ha vuelto á versele por aquí, pudiendo, sin que esta observacion lastime lo mas mínimo el distinguido, honroso y bien merecido crédito de nuestra marina real, dejarse ver mas á menudo por esta ensenada, siquiera no fuese con otro fin que el de dar el alto ó echar el quién vive á los cárabos que ce acercan á las famosas salinas que se hallan á la vista de la plaza para hacer sus cargamentos, cuyo producto mercantil cambian despues nuestros vecinos por artículos de sus mayores necesidades como todos

los dias que se ha hecho fuego á los Moros, sirviendo una batería de piezas de á 24, con el mismo desembarazo y serenidad que pudieran hacerlo los artilleros mas veteranos, y precisamente en uno de aquellos fueron heridos, de bala de espingarda, un granadero que estaba en la batería con el espeque en la mano, y otro soldado que se hallaba de centinela.

Al propio tiempo que suplico á V. se sirva dar cabida á este articulo en uno de los primeros números del periódico, como justa reparacion debida á un batallon que, lejos de quedar olvidado, debe enaltecérsele como al que mas, asi por su sobresaliente instruccion y disciplina como por lo bien que conduce en la plaza, ruego á V. tambien que haga se inserte en el periódico "Gaceta Militar," como se copió el anterior, para que los que leyeron aquel no estrañen el silencio que se guardó respecto al batallon de Murcia.

Idem, 6 *de Setiembre.*

Anoche, despues de las nueve, han salido varias compañías de Ceuta y Murcia de la guarnicion de esta plaza á apoderarse de un cañon que tenian los Moros enterrado en el ataque de la Horca. Tambien acompañaron á las tropas unos sesenta confinados de este presidio. La operacion de escavacion y conduccion de la pieza á esta plaza se ha verificado con el mejor éxito, sin quemar un cartucho, contribuyendo á tan importante hecho las acertadas disposiciones del gobernador y oficialidad de la guarnicion.

Los jefes y oficiales que han tomado parte en esta operacion tan gloriosa merecen la consideracion del Gobierno de Sua Magestad. El cañon es del calibre de á 16.

(Translation.)

Melilla, August 30, 1858.

AFTER the 1,001 gun, howitzer, and mortar-shot, and the 30,000 musket and minié-rifle cartridges consumed by this fortress against the parapets and habitations of our irreconcileable neighbours, of which I lately informed you, no further act of hostility has taken place, although another one of strategy and surprise, highly dangerous from its nature, and which required the greatest precautions, has been carried into effect, and I have the satisfaction of communicating it to you, since the gallant soldiers who undertook it are deserving of the greatest praise for the good discharge of their commission.

Intelligence had been received in this fortress for some days past that the Kabyles had prepared some launches for the purpose of carrying on their acts of piracy, and attacking the vessels of all nations which have the misfortune of being becalmed or stranded on the inhospitable coasts of the Riff. Amongst the aforesaid launches there was one to be seen at a less distance from this fortress than the others, and which appeared to be quite new, and belonging to the Kabila of Benisicar, our most terrible enemy; wherefore, on the evening of the 25th, the Acting Governor of this fortress gave orders for thirty men of the company of Grenadiers of the 1st Battalion of the Infantry Regiment of Murcia, under the command of the Captain of the same Company, Don Antonio Donegaray, Lieutenant Don Francisco Alonso, with twenty-four convicts on whom full reliance can be placed, and the 3rd Adjutant of the fortress, Don Francisco Alvarez Tardon, all under the command of the aforesaid Captain, to make a sally to the camp of the infidels, and to seize the above-mentioned launch.

The troops sallied out through the Mauldete, at which place fifty men of the Company of Chasseurs of the aforesaid battalion remained stationed, for the purpose of protecting the retreat in case of emergency. There were also below the aforesaid point the Acting Governor, Don Francisco Ceballos, the Chef de Bataillon, Don Mariano Salcedo, and the Captains, Don Emilio Ayllon, Don Juan Semedo, and Don Carmelo Borjas. The troops, under Donegaray's orders, penetrated into the camp to the distance of about half a league, across the enemy's positions of the Ataque de la Leña, Tarára, and the Cañonera de San Lorenzo, until they reach the place called the Camino de Camellos, leaving the Cuartel de Santiago to the right, for the purpose of seizing also the cannon-balls and shells which had been fired from the fortress, and afterwards picked up and collected by the enemy, for the purpose of arranging them to fit the calibre of their artillery; and to the wise measures of the Commandant of the troops,

and to the bravery of this handful of Spaniards is owing the seizure of the aforesaid launch, and of forty-two cannon-balls, bombs, and shells, which are already in this fortress, and by which the enemy's stores for its hostilities against us have been diminished.

Facts of this kind greatly enhance the reputation of the Spanish army, and the well-known valour of the Chiefs, officers, and soldiers who compose the same, thus affording a further proof of what a handful of Spaniards, who are deserving to be distinguished by the Government for more important achievements, are capable of doing.

We have, before the walls of Melilla, a treacherous and odious enemy, or better said, some tribes of savages who respect no flag, no class, no colour; who only live by their unbridled piracy; and finally, some Kabilas of cannibals, whom we ought, for the sake of our own honour and interest, and of the dignity of the Spanish nation, long since to have repulsed far inland or exterminated, taking possession of these coasts, and opening for us the way as far as Ceuta, which is the key of the Straits, which would be advantageous to civilized nations, and even to these half-savages themselves, who would soon bless the happy hour in which the Spanish flag should float over their coasts, offering to them a security for their persons, which is unknown to them, and placing them on the level of the polished and civilized nations of Europe.

It is not yet too late; if Her Majesty's Government should cast their eyes upon these coasts, and send out an expedition which should assist us in exploring this mine, hitherto untouched, and which offers inexhaustible resources, in order to obtain from it the profit it offers to us. Meanwhile this takes place; the Governor of this fortress ought to be vested with unlimited powers, and allowed to spend from the public treasury what he might think proper for a liberal retribution to spies, who, without any bloodshed, which the Government wishes to prevent, would afford us the means of getting possession of all the elements which the Moors now have for committing hostilities against this fortress, and it can be affirmed that, if the spies were well paid, even the five heads of the Chiefs of the Kabyles, which rule over the camp of the infidels, would be brought to this fortress.

The "Guarda Costas," which from time to time make their lightning-wise appearance in these waters, are another object which the Government ought not to lose sight of for the security of these coasts and establishments; I say this, because on the 19th instant, when we were in the most critical moments of the firing, one of the aforesaid vessels made her appearance, and only furnished us with a few letters, and without casting her anchor, nor taking any notice of the firing in which the fortress was engaged, defending the dignity of the Spanish flag and the integrity of the territory belonging to the jurisdiction of the Queen Donna Isabella II, put again to sea with a contrary wind, and she has never been seen again, whilst, and without intending to give with this observation the slightest offence to the distinguished, honourable, and well-deserved reputation of our royal navy, those vessels might appear with more frequency in this creek, if it were only for the purpose of keeping in respect the Moorish boats which repair to the famous salt depôts which exist within sight of this fortress, and there take in their cargoes of salt, which commodity they afterwards barter for other articles of which they are in want, as is the case every day of our firing against the Moors when they have been working the guns in a battery of 24-pounders, with the same ease and coolness as if they had been the most veteran gunners; and it was precisely one of those days when a grenadier, who was at the battery with the rammer in his hand, and another soldier who was on duty as sentry, were wounded by a musket-ball.

At the same time that I request you to have the goodness to publish this article in one of the first numbers of your journal, as a just reparation due to a battalion which, far from being left in oblivion, ought to be extolled as the most deserving one, as well on account of its extraordinary instruction and discipline, as for its good behaviour in this fortress, I also request you will cause it to be also published in the newspaper "Gaceta Militar," as was the case with my former article, in order that those who read it may not be astonished at the battalion of Murcia not being mentioned therein.

Idem, September 6, 1858.

Last night, after nine o'clock, several companies of the Ceuta and Murcia regiments of the garrison of this fortress sallied out for the purpose of seizing

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

a gun which the Moors had buried at the "Ataque de la Horca." The troops were accompanied by about 60 convicts of this penal establishment. The operation of the excavation and conveyance of the gun to this fortress has taken place with full success without firing a shot; the wise measures adopted by the Governor and by the officers of the garrison having contributed to so important a result.

The Chiefs and officers who have taken part in this so glorious an operation deserve the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. The gun is a 16-pounder.

No. 31.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 22, 1858.

CONTINUE to discourage expedition to Morocco. Remind that in 1852, England, France, and Spain, agreed to join in punishing the Reefians.

State to Spanish Government that I can make no further explanation on my speech. I must repeat that I honour the nation, but will prove my words against the Spanish Government.

No. 32.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 66.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 23, 1858.

I FORWARDED to you yesterday a telegram instructing you to discourage any hostile expedition from Spain against Morocco, and I trust that you may have been able to impress upon the Spanish Government the danger and impolicy of any such movement at the present moment.

The alleged object of the expedition is the punishment of the inhabitants of Reef; but as, since the year 1852, when Spain agreed to join England and France in any measures to be adopted against the Reefians, those tribes have given much less cause for complaint, and seem to have preferred legitimate trade to piracy, Her Majesty's Government would greatly regret that any action now undertaken by Spain against the Reef coast, should indispose the Reefians to persevere in their legitimate pursuits, and to resume their original habits. Her Majesty's Government have also reason to think that the immediate acts of hostility of which the Spanish Government complain, may, in some measure, be attributed to the conduct of the commanders of the Spanish forts on that coast.

Independently of these reasons, the Government of Her Catholic Majesty should well calculate the course of events that might result from any hostile demonstration on her part. The forces of the Emperor of the French in Algeria, might, in consequence, be advanced to the frontiers of Morocco. Collisions, or questions of frontier delimitation might ensue; and complications, in which England could not be an uninterested party, might arise between the various Powers, and might lead to serious results.

Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere with the undoubted right of the Spanish Government to defend and maintain their African possessions against any attack from any quarter; but if it should contemplate the acquisition of new territory to be obtained by a considerable military expedition, you will urge these views strongly upon them.

You will not fail to keep me fully informed of any movements of their troops, or of any decision on their part in this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 33.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 28, 1858.

I HAVE read your account of the attacks on Melilla. My intention is not to interfere with the Spanish Government in defence of their forts, but to discourage a large and dangerous expedition against the country, without further consultation with France and England.

No. 34.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 18, 1858.

SINCE my recovery I have perused Mr. Reade's report, which was transmitted to your Lordship in Mr. Reade's despatch marked No. 51, and dated the 8th instant.

This report confirms my apprehensions that the provocation to hostilities originated with the Spaniards, when they captured at Peñon a peaceful Reef trading-boat laden with merchandize, on the plea of its having gun-flints on board.

Shortly after the capture of this boat, the attack on Melilla was commenced by the Reefians, though the Spaniards appear to desire to stifle the fact that they brought down upon themselves the hostilities of the Reefians after two years and a half of friendly relations, as acknowledged in the Governor of Melilla's letter to the Chief of Beniboogaffir.

What may render the Reefians more daring and desperate than usual is the fact that the crops have failed in that province this year, and the greatest destitution prevails.

I learn through Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, that the Spaniards are bent upon sending an expedition to Reef, and that they talk of being able to send 50,000 men. The Spanish Government may, with even a force of 5,000 or 6,000 men, if these were properly led, succeed in destroying the villages and boats in the neighbourhood of Melilla, but I do not think they could do more; neither do I suppose they could send, or rather provide for, a force of 10,000 men, and, therefore, the expedition will probably be a complete failure, and, as Spanish expeditions too frequently do, end in a waste of ammunition without loss of lives; whilst the Reefians, unless their chastisement be most complete, will never lose an opportunity of avenging, when possible, an invasion of their hearths; and I should not be surprised even to learn that the Reefians had in the end succeeded in driving the Spaniards back into their fortresses with disaster.

All this, however, should it take place, is much to be deplored, for we cannot foresee what other contingencies may arise, both as regards this and other Governments.

If a large Spanish force is sent to Melilla, I shall send down confidential messengers to the seat of war, who will keep me informed of what is passing.

The senior naval officer at Gibraltar wrote to me during my illness, suggesting that it might be advisable to send the "Curlew" to Reef now and then, as long as the present state of things continued; and to put a notice in the "Gibraltar Chronicle," warning vessels not to approach the Reef coast. Mr. Reade, by my direction, has informed the senior naval officer that I entirely approve of his suggestions, and recommend that they should be carried out.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 35.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 148.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September 25, 1858.*

AT an interview which I had last night with M. Calderon Collantes, I held language to his Excellency in conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd instant on the subjects therein referred to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 36.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 149.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September 25, 1858.*

WITH respect to my despatch No. 148, the Foreign Minister was not acquainted with the agreement referred to in your message by wire of the 22nd instant, respecting the punishment of the African pirates; but did not seem to consider it unreasonable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 37.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 152.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September 25, 1858.*

I HAVE spoken to M. Calderon Collantes on the alleged intention of the Spanish Government to send an expedition to Morocco, to chastise the inhabitants of the Reef, observing that I had received information from thence, according to which it would appear that the annoyance lately experienced by the garrisons of the Spanish fortresses from the neighbouring Moorish tribes had been occasioned, in a great degree, if not entirely, by the capture of Reef coasting vessels by Spanish "Guarda Costas;" the late Governor of Melilla having left the coast in a state of unexampled tranquillity, as shown by his own letter to the Chief of the Beniboogaffir Tribe.

His Excellency said that no complaints of that kind had reached him, and if the Government of Morocco had any to make, they ought to have addressed them to the Spanish Representative; but, in the meanwhile, as Spain had demanded satisfaction from the Government of the Sultan for the capture of Spanish vessels by Reef pirates, if it was not granted she would be obliged to take it. I replied that I was aware that the late Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier had urged such a claim some time ago on the attention of the Government, and I said that, as Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had exerted himself to forward an arrangement, I was sure he would now recommend the acceptance of any reasonable demands which his present Spanish colleague might have been instructed to make. M. Collantes replied that he trusted Mr. Hay would do so, as Spain must insist upon obtaining the satisfaction which was due to her; and he assured me that, as no immediate measures of a coercive character had been decided upon by the Spanish Government, there would be ample time for discussion and negotiation before a final resolution would be taken on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 38.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 73.)

Foreign Office, October 5, 1858.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 151 of the 25th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris respecting the expedition proposed to be undertaken by the Spanish Government against the Reef pirates.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 39.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 160.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 2, 1858.*

YOUR Lordship will have learnt from my despatch No. 143 of the 25th ultimo, that I took an early opportunity, after the return of M. Calderon Collantes to Madrid, to acquaint his Excellency with the opinions of Her Majesty's Government as to the expediency and impolicy of Spain embarking in a serious war with the Empire of Morocco or the people of Reef; and I reminded his Excellency of the arrangement come to in 1852, for the adoption of combined measures by England, France, and Spain, with a view to the future suppression of piracy on the coast of Africa. M. Calderon Collantes was entirely ignorant on that occasion of the agreement to which I referred; but when, after the arrival of the messenger Fendall, I made him acquainted with the opinions of Her Majesty's Government, as set forth in your Lordship's despatch No. 66 of the 23rd ultimo, he said, which I could not deny, that the agreement was only of a temporary character, and that it had been set aside as inexpedient in the following year by Her Majesty's Government, when Lord Howden, by the instructions of Lord John Russell, of the 6th of January, 1853, notified to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that they intended to act alone, in seeking redress from the inhabitants of the Reef for acts of piracy on British commerce.

I replied that Her Majesty's Government had, nevertheless, considered themselves called upon to make that communication before acting in contravention of the previous understanding, and that they had adduced reasons for the course which they proposed to adopt, which were acknowledged to be satisfactory by the Cabinets of Madrid and Paris. Your Lordship was, therefore, I said, justified in your opinion that Spain ought to communicate with England and France before deciding on any important measure with regard to the Reef. His Excellency, however, seemed to be under an apprehension that your Lordship was unwilling to see the position of Spain improved in Africa; and I was, therefore, glad to be able to assure him, as your Lordship's telegram of the 28th ultimo authorized me to do, that Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere with such measures as may be absolutely necessary for securing the Spanish fortresses in Africa against aggression; and that their representations against the policy of more extended operations are dictated by a conviction that it is the common interest of Spain and England to do nothing which can endanger the maintenance of existing territorial arrangements in that portion of Africa; and I added that no one was more sensible of the advantages of Spain strengthening her possessions on the coast of Africa than Mr. Drummond Hay, Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco; but that he was so well aware, at the same time, of the dangers to which any action on the part of Spain, not of a purely defensive character, might give rise, that he considered it would be most impolitic in the Spanish Government to incur them. M. Collantes said that he must repeat what he had said before, as reported in my despatch No. 152 of the 25th ultimo, that Spain must insist on being treated as favourably by Morocco as England and France; and that if compensation, demanded for acts of piracy on the part of the Reefians was not granted, the Spanish Government would use the means at their disposal to cause their country to be respected; adding, however, that I might assure your

* See Appendix, No. 5.

F.O. 13/1
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON PERMISSION OF THE ALLY WITHOUT

Lordship that they would not be wanting in due deference and courtesy to Her Majesty's Government when their views respecting the Reef assume a more definite shape.

He then said, as he was convinced my representations were of a friendly character, and as he wished to maintain relations of confidence with me, he would mention that the question of an expedition to the Reef was laid aside for the present, and that the Government had determined, in the first place, to settle their differences with Mexico; for, as Spain had long been accustomed to her humiliating position in Africa, a little further endurance was unimportant, while the honour of the country required the immediate redress of her grievances against Mexico.

I expressed some surprise at this communication, after what his Excellency had told me at an interview a few days before, reported in my despatch No. 153 of the 25th ultimo, of the overtures which had been made to the Spanish Government by General Almonte; and he replied that, if General Almonte could fulfil his assurances, all would be well; but that there were doubts on that point and he was therefore about to address a note to him, with a view to ascertain the extent of his powers, and whether he was duly authorized to grant the just demands of Spain.

I said that I hoped one of her grievances was already redressed; and I read to him Mr. Otway's despatch No. 76 of August 26, of which a copy was transmitted to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 63 of the 22nd ultimo, mentioning the promised execution, between the 15th and 20th of last month, of the assassins of San Vicente.

I fear, however, that act of justice alone will have little influence in preventing this Government from having recourse to acts of hostility against Mexico; and the fulfilment of the provisions of the Convention of the 12th November, 1855, will, doubtless, be a *sine qud non* of an amicable arrangement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 40.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received October* 21.)

(No. 61. Confidential)

My Lord, *Tangier, October* 7, 1858.

SEID MOHAMED KHATEEB has communicated to me a letter from the Sultan, containing a letter from the Governor of Reef, and also a letter from the Oozeer, transmitting a letter from the Chief Alhadary, of which the inclosed are translations.

Your Lordship will learn from these documents that the Moorish Government has been doing all in its power to prevent the Reefians from cruizing against vessels approaching their shores; and, as far as I can judge from the letters of the Governor and the Chief Alhadary, the Sultan's orders will be obeyed. It was at my demand that the Moorish Government has taken these steps.

I further beg to submit the copy of a despatch I have received from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, and the translation of a letter I have addressed the Moorish Government, urging them to pay, without further demur, the claim of the Spanish Government for 2,000 dollars, as a compensation to the proprietors of the Spanish falucho which was wrecked on the Reef coast, and pillaged by the inhabitants, in 1856.

On the receipt of my letter, Khateeb dispatched a messenger to the Sultan, urging His Majesty to follow my advice. Khateeb has also communicated to me confidentially the draft of the letter he has addressed the Spanish Government, in reply to the demand for the claim of the 2,000 dollars, whilst awaiting the Sultan's reply. The inclosed translation of this letter will best explain to your Lordship the grounds upon which the Moorish Government has hitherto opposed the claim.

If the Moorish Government settles the claim for the 2,000 dollars, I trust the Spanish Government will be induced to give up their present idea of invading

the Reef country, and endeavour to come to an amicable understanding with this Government for checking hostilities between the Reefians and the Spanish-African garrisons, and also that the authorities of the latter places will desist from interfering with the Reef boats engaged in a licit and peaceful traffic with the Moorish ports of Tangier and Tetuan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 40.

The Sultan of Morocco to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 19 *Sefar*, 1275. (*September* 27, 1858.)

YOU will receive herewith the reply of Kaid Abbas (Governor of Reef) to what we wrote to him regarding the people of Reef, and of the language he held to them about their cruizing against the vessels of the Christians; and he has replied, that they will desist from doing so, but they beg for protection against the Spaniards, when their boats are carrying on their traffic with Tetuan, as you will see by the inclosed letter. Now, put a stop to this, and arrange that they may freely carry on their traffic as before, and that the boats be returned.

Inform the foreign Agents of the proceedings of the Spaniards, and let them know that the Reefians do not distinguish between one Christian nation and another.

Peace.

Inclosure 2 in No. 40.

Kaid Abbas to the Sultan of Morocco.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 10 *Sefar*, 1275. (*September* 18, 1858.)

YOUR humble slave received your Royal Order at the time he was in the Kabila of Akkalaya, and we sent for the chiefs and seniors of them; and when they were assembled, we read to them the Order of our Lord the Sultan. We reprimanded and rebuked them, and warned them against cruizing after the vessels of the Christians, and they declare they will submit to the orders of our Lord, and that they desire our Lord will be pleased with us and with them.

We told them also that, if they did not desist from their misdeeds, they will only injure their own interests, and a severe chastisement will be inflicted upon them. They engaged never to cruize against any vessels of the Christians, but they beg of our Lord to secure to them the coasting-trade in their boats with Tetuan, and the conveyance to and fro of their families; and they beg of our Lord to assure them that the Spaniards shall not interfere with them, for the Spaniards have taken four of their vessels, but have since restored one, and three remain. Our Lord the Sultan will best decide what is to be done.

Peace.

(Signed) ABBAS BEN ABDESLAM EMKESHID.

Inclosure 3 in No. 40.

Seid Mohamed Sefar to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 20 *Sefar*, 1275. (*September* 28, 1858.)

WE inclose the answer of the Marabout Seid Mohamed Alhadary to what we wrote to him on the subject of the Reefians cruizing against the ships of the Christians.

Take note of it. Peace.

(Signed) MOHAMED SEFAR.

Inclosure 4 in No. 40.

Seid Mohamed Alhadary to Seid Mohamed Sefar.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 10 *Sefar*, 1275. (*September* 18, 1858.)

WE have received your favoured letter, and have understood its contents, and have observed all you say regarding the people of Reef who cruize against the Christian vessels. When we received your letter we were visiting the Governor of Reef in the tribe of Akkalaya, who sent for the Chiefs and for the seniors, and read to them the Sultan's orders, and reprimanded and warned them, and was not backward in doing his best with them. We also harangued and warned them. We pray God for the welfare of all.

Now, the Reefians have asked that the Governor of Reef should beg the Sultan to arrange about their carrying on their coasting trade with Tetuan in their boats, and to arrange that the Spaniards dwelling in the neighbourhood should not molest them, for they (the Spaniards) have lately captured four of their boats full of merchandize, one of which has been liberated, whilst the other three remain.

Your friend,

(Signed) MOHAMED ALHADARY ESEIDY.

Inclosure 5 in No. 40.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, September* 25, 1858.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatch of the 19th instant, communicating to me copies of your despatch of the 18th instant to the Earl of Malmesbury, and of Mr. Reade's report of his cruize in Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Curlew." I shall not fail to use the information they contain in furtherance of peaceful counsels here; but from the language which has been held to me by the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, this Government appears to me to have decided on seeking redress by force for the injuries they complain of, unless the satisfaction they have asked for is immediately granted by the Government of Morocco. If Spain embarks in a war with Morocco in consequence of her quarrels with the people of Reef, she will have to make every sacrifice to insure success; for whatever may be the difficulties attending such a war, the disgrace of a possible failure will oblige her to provide ample means to overcome them, and if a large Spanish force were to obtain important successes in the Reef, the Government of Morocco cannot be blind to the probability of their endeavouring to maintain permanently the territory in which they may establish themselves.

I feel assured, therefore, that you cannot render a more important service to the Sultan than by inducing him to act with prudence and conciliation in the very serious question which is now awaiting His Imperial Majesty's decision.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 6 in No. 40.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) *October* 5, 1858.

IN the interview we had with you a few days ago, we urged upon you the policy of satisfying, without further demur, the demand of the Spanish Government for 2,000 dollars, on account of the plunder, by the Reefians, of the Spanish falucho "San Joachim," in 1856; and we then told you that, whatever grounds His Majesty may consider himself to have had to reject this claim on any former occasion, and whatever interpretation or construction it might be supposed could be put on the terms of Article XV of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco, we considered the 2,000 dollars ought to be paid at once, though

the Moorish Government might, if they thought proper to do so, declare that the money was paid, without further discussion, as it was a small matter, and they wished to give a proof of their desire to remove any cause of dissension between the two Governments, and you might also explain why the demand has hitherto been rejected. This morning we received information from our Minister at Madrid, which confirms our apprehensions that, if the Moorish Government does not act with extreme caution and conciliation in this question, and settle the demand, an expedition of 30,000 men will be sent to Reef, and the garrisons of all the fortresses, including Ceuta, augmented; and we do not conceal from you our apprehension that not only will hostilities be entered upon in Reef, but also a rupture may be finally brought about between the two Governments. The results which might ensue from such a conflict would be most disastrous, especially between two Powers like Spain and Morocco, which have a mutual interest in maintaining the most friendly relations, and even in supporting one another. The fortune of war is, as you have observed to us, in the hands of God, but on whatever side the victory declare itself, such a war would be equally calamitous to both nations. It should also be borne in mind by the Moorish Government that when two nations are engaged in a serious conflict, circumstances may arise which would give a pretext to, or render it necessary for, another nation or other nations to take an active part. The Sultan in his wisdom will never, we are persuaded, allow that any collision should take place with Spain, his ancient ally, on account of so small a claim as 2,000 dollars, which His Majesty can compel the Reefians, who committed the robbery, to pay whenever His Majesty pleases.

We have received instructions from Her Majesty's Government to urge the Moorish Government to arrange, without delay, this claim, and you may feel assured this advice would not be given unless Her Majesty's Government felt assured it was for the true interests of the Sultan.

Peace. (Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 7 in No. 40.

Draft of a Letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

(After the usual preamble.) *October* 7, 1858.

WE have received your letter dated the 4th of Sefar (September 12), by which you renew the claim put forward by your Government for the sum of 2,000 Spanish dollars, as an indemnity to the proprietor of the falucho "San Joachim," which vessel was driven ashore on the Reef coast, in the month of May of the year 1856, in consequence of bad weather, and was subsequently plundered by the inhabitants of Reef; and you observe to us that the Sultan paid an indemnity, in the same year, for the English and French vessels that had been pillaged by the Reefians.

Before entering into a discussion upon your demand, we have to express our satisfaction at the friendly terms in which your letter was couched, and to assure you that the Sultan is equally animated by the most friendly sentiments towards the Spanish Government, his old ally, and desires that those amicable relations which have always subsisted between the two nations shall be for ever permanent, and that all questions between them may be adjusted in good harmony.

If we have delayed until now in replying to your letter, it was that we wished to wait until our return to this place, when we hoped, in the first place, to have the pleasure of making your acquaintance, and have some conversation with you regarding the matter in question, as we think we can convince you that, in this affair, our Lord the Sultan (whom God preserve!) has shown throughout a very good disposition to come to a fair understanding with the Spanish Government, and that if, with reference to this question, no such result has been obtained, it is owing to the fault of your predecessor, Don Carlos d'España, who had, by his language respecting Spanish affairs, completely taken us in, and made promises which he has never fulfilled, of all which the Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain, who, at the request of the above gentleman, was present at various interviews we had with him, and who, in the character of

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

friend to both parties, has used his good offices to bring about a settlement of these affairs, can bear testimony. When we meet we will be happy to explain to you, *in extenso*, all that has passed.

You quote in your letter to us the words which the Sultan used in replying to the demand put forward in 1856, for the 2,000 dollars.

If His Majesty answered so, he based his remarks on the precedents that had existed from the earliest times, that is to say, that neither nation had put forward claims for compensation for injuries which may have been committed by one or other party in Reef, but that each party (Reefians and Spaniards) should take the satisfaction they required with their own hands. The XVth Article appeared to the Moorish Government to confirm this way of viewing the question, and to bear this interpretation; but the case was different with the English and French. Such stipulations with those Powers do not exist. We have also to remark that these nations had taken no satisfaction with their own hands for the French and English ships pillaged by the Reefians, for which they demanded compensation. But it was not so with the Spaniards at Melilla, who, to avenge the plunder of the "San Joachim," have burnt one or two Reefian "carabos," and also sunk another near Melilla, which they had taken, so that they have taken satisfaction with their own hands. Moreover, although good harmony and peace had reigned for a long time, as is confirmed by the inclosed copy of a letter from the Governor of Melilla to the Chief of Beniboogaffir, and no European vessel had been attacked or taken by the Reefians since 1856, the Spaniards of Peñon captured a Reefian carabo laden with merchandize, and with passengers, men and women, under the pretext that there was ammunition of war on board. Irritated by this attack upon their peaceably-trading brethren, the tribes in the vicinity of Melilla attacked that fortress, and a fight has ensued between the two parties. The Spaniards afterwards seized three other peaceful carabos, laden with merchandize, and detained the crews of them in prison, with the exception of one boat, which they have since set at liberty. We beg you to inform us, now, how it is that, under these circumstances, the Spanish Government wishes the Sultan to pay them for the injuries the Reefians have done to the Spaniards, when the latter have taken satisfaction with their own hands. The Sultan has never admitted the right of the Spanish authorities capturing the peaceful boats of the Reefians laden with merchandize from Tetuan, whenever they pass the Spanish garrisons navigating the waters which separate the Spanish islands from the Moorish coast, and are considered Moorish inasmuch as they (*i.e.*, the waters between the mainland and the Spanish fortresses) extend to less than gun-shot distance from the mainland. If the Sultan has put forward no formal demand for restitution of the captured boats, or compensation for the injury done to their owners, but has merely made a friendly request on their behalf through us, it was on account of what he had already written about the Reef.

We are sure that the Spanish Government, which is ever distinguished for its justice, and is animated with friendly feelings towards the Moorish Government, will take into consideration what we have here represented. By speaking frankly we may hope to come to a better understanding with each other for the future.

Since our arrival we have forwarded to the Sultan your letter, and His Majesty will decide upon this affair; but you can be assured that His Majesty is animated always by the most friendly sentiments towards your nation, and that he is ever desirous that peace and harmony should exist between the two Governments.

Peace.

No. 41.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Tangier, October* 11, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 29, transmitting to me the copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's

Minister at Madrid, regarding a rumoured expedition against the Reef, and of No. 30, instructing me to continue to urge the Moorish Government to carry out the scheme of building a fort in the Reef country.

With regard to the language held by M. Gonzalez to Mr. Buchanan, respecting the invasion of Reef by an army of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and the proposed plan of the Spanish Government for making themselves complete masters of the Reef conntry, I beg to say, from my knowledge of the warlike character of the people of Reef, the mountainous and almost inaccessible territory they inhabit, except a portion of the district of Akkalaya, and from the experience we have had of the results that have been obtained by the French army in Algeria, that it would require a sacrifice of many millions of dollars, and of 20,000 men, and a war of many years, before the Spanish Government could attain the object they have in view; and they would have to incur the danger of finding themselves involved ultimately in a war with the Sultan, the Sovereign of Reef.

A large disciplined force of Europeans would, I have no doubt, succeed in driving before them an army of barbarians in the plains and open country, and a Spanish force of 10,000 men, if properly provisioned, might march several miles into the level country of Akkalaya; but my belief is, that before two months elapsed, the Spaniards would be forced to retire before the brave mountaineers of Reef, who are trained to the hardships of war, and who would harass the invading force day and night; and the only result that could be obtained, after the shedding of much blood and the loss of millions of dollars, would be, perhaps, the re-establishment of the old lines under the guns of the Spanish fortress of Melilla, an arrangement which might perhaps be attained by peaceful negotiation.

A war between the Reefians and Spaniards would, I should imagine, be a matter of indifference to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, even if the Spaniards remained in possession of some portion of the Reef country, if we could feel a certitude that such a result alone were likely to be brought about by the rumoured expedition of the Spaniards; but if, on the other hand, the French Government were to place, as I suppose they would do, an army of observation on the frontier, and circumstances were to arise involving Spain in a war also with Morocco, and the former of these Powers were to suffer defeat, and disasters which might cause them to seek, or obtain without asking for, aid from the French troops assembled on the frontier—or if the Reefians and Moorish troops were defeated, and the Sultan's Government were overthrown, which I fear it would be under such circumstances, and a general revolution took place throughout Morocco, accompanied, as I apprehend it would be, by disturbances and aggressions on the Algerine frontier, the Spanish Government would then discover, perhaps, when too late, that it had entered precipitately into a rash and unprofitable war, which would lead to complications over which the Spanish Government could have little or no control, and by which Spain herself might ultimately be involved in a serious difference with France, unless the Spanish Government considers that it would be advantageous to their interests that the former Power should occupy the African coast which borders the Mediterranean, and that portion of the Straits of Gibraltar which confronts the southern shores of the Spanish Peninsula.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 42.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received October* 30.)

(No. 206.)

My Lord, *Madrid, October* 25, 1858.

AT an interview which I had yesterday with M. Calderon Collantes, I ascertained from his Excellency that eight steam-vessels-of-war are about to visit Tangier, and to cruise on the coast of Morocco, for the protection of Spanish commerce, and as a support to the representations lately addressed by his Excellency to the Government of that country.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

The Spanish Government do not appear, as yet, to have received any satisfactory intelligence from their Mission at Tangier; but I am glad to learn from M. Calderon Collantes that a newly appointed Vice-Consul, who is about to proceed thither, will carry instructions to the Spanish Mission to cultivate the most friendly and confidential relations with Mr. Drummond Hay; Her Catholic Majesty's Government being convinced that the interests of England and Spain in Morocco are the same.

I assured M. Calderon Collantes that Mr. Hay would be found ready to contribute, to the best of his ability, to the establishmnnt of satisfactory relations between Spain and Morocco, and that he had already recommended the Morocco Government to remove all just cause of complaint against them on the part of Spain, for which he had received the approval of your Lordship.

I have communicated this intelligence to Mr. Drummond Hay in a letter, of which I have the honour to transmit a copy herewith, for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 42.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, October* 24, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have reason to believe a Spanish squadron of eight ships of war will shortly visit Tangier, and remain on the coast of Morocco during the negotiations now pending between Spain and that country.

I am happy to say that the Spanish Mission at Tangier will be instructed to cultivate the most friendly and confidential relations with that of Her Majesty; and I have assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs that you will be found ready and anxious to contribute, as far as you can, to an amiable and equitable adjustment of the differences at present unfortunately existing between the Spanish and Moorish Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 43.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received November* 5.)

No. 209.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October* 31, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, a translated extract from a letter published in the "Epoca" newspaper, dated Melilla of the 6th instant, giving an account of the failure of an attack on a Moorish outpost by an officer and twenty convicts of the garrison of Melilla, which took place on the 30th September, and in which the Spaniards had seven men killed and several wounded, six of whom, together with the officer, were taken prisoners, and are still in the hands of the Moors.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 43.

Extract from a Letter published in the "Epoca" of October , 1858.

(Translation.) *Melilla, October* 6, 1858.

ON the evening of the 30th of September last, the troops of the garrison of this fortress were under arms and ready to make a sally into the Moorish

camp, for the purpose of setting fire to the building called "Cuartel de Santiago," the only place of shelter in rainy or cold weather which the five Kabilas of hostile Moors have in the vicinity of this fortress.

The Governor of the fortress had been induced to select that evening for such an expedition by the reports of two Moorish spies whom he had in his pay, and who assured him that there was nobody in the camp at the time, and that the expedition might be effected with no danger whatever. Some of the principal officers of the garrison, however, distrusting the good faith of the spies, made very strong observations to the Governor on the subject, and succeeded in dissuading him from his purpose, and inducing him to put off the expedition until more reliable information might be obtained.

However, one of the spies having urgently pressed the good opportunity of the expedition taking place that evening, when there were only five Moors on guard at the aforesaid cuartel, an officer, named Alvarez, presented himself to the Governor, and requested his permission to proceed to the spot in question at the head of twenty convicts, and with the two spies for his guides, merely to verify the truth of their report.

The permission having been granted by the Governor, the aforesaid officer sallied out with his twenty men and the two Moorish guides, and, having found nobody on his march through the camp, formed the project of carrying into effect, by himself, the destruction of the Cuartel del Santiago; but he had scarcely reached that place when his two guides fired two pistol-shots, evidently a preconcerted signal, which was immediately followed by a volley from at least 500 muskets, whereby seven of our convicts were killed and the remainder wounded or taken prisoners, with the exception of seven men who succeeded in returning to this fortress early in the morning of the following day. Somewhat later, on the same morning, the Moors hoisted a flag of truce, which, having been accepted by the fortress, a great crowd of Moors was soon perceived coming towards the fortress with the wounded officer, Alvarez, and six of our convicts, whose delivery they proposed in exchange for 300 dollars, and the three boats and the gun which we had lately taken from them, but the Governor would not consent to give back the gun, and consequently the exchange did not take place; but, knowing that a Moorish boat, with 28 Moors on board, was lying at Chafarinas, the Governor sent one of our armed boats to capture the former, which was successfully effected, and the 28 Moors are now prisoners in this fortress, which will, perhaps, cause our enemies to refrain from murdering our seven men now in their hands.

No. 44.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 232.)
My Lord, *Madrid, November* 7, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith two despatches addressed to your Lordship, which have been forwarded to me, under flying seal, by Mr. Drummond Hay.*

As I considered it highly expedient that M. Calderon Collantes should be made acquainted, without delay, with Mr. Hay's despatch No. 67 of the 27th ultimo, I read a copy of it to his Excellency, and as I found he was much pleased with its contents, I left the copy with him for communication to his colleagues. His Excellency stated that he was, personally, as anxious as Mr. Hay could be that the relations of Spain and Morocco should be placed on a satisfactory footing, and that he was much pleased with an idea mentioned to him by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires as being under consideration in Morocco: that a neutral territory should be established between the Spanish fortress and the advanced posts of the Reefians.

As he assured me also that the Spanish Government would enter readily into an arrangement of the kind, I expressed a hope that he would, therefore, instruct the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to support Mr. Drummond Hay in urging on the Moroccan Government the expediency of building a fort in the Reef

* Nos. 45 and 46.

territory, where they could establish a sufficient garrison to control its lawless inhabitants.

M. Calderon Collantes replied that he would not fail to comply with my wishes on this point; and as he evinced much interest in an extract from Mr. Drummond Hay's despatch to your Lordship No. 64, Confidential, of the 11th ultimo, which I had also read to him, and desired to have a copy of it, I said I would willingly leave one with him, in the hope that it would enable him to check the ardour of the more warlike members of the Cabinet.

His Excellency ordered both documents to be translated immediately, in order that he might take them with him to a Cabinet Council, which was to be held after my interview with him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 45.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord, *Tangier, October 27, 1858.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of a letter addressed to me by Seid Mohamed Khateeb informing me that the Sultan has consented, in consequence of the advice I had given to the Moorish Government, to pay the sum of 2,000 dollars in compensation for the plunder of the Spanish falucho "San Joaquim" by the Reef people in 1856, but "on condition" that the boats and merchandize seized by the Spanish authorities from the Reefians, and now in their possession, be restored. I further transmit the translation of a letter addressed by Seid Mohamed Khateeb to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, which the former has communicated confidentially to me. I recommended Khateeb to withdraw the words, "on condition," which he had made use of in his communication to me, as instructed by the Sultan, and to couch his letter to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in the most friendly terms. He has followed my advice.

It is to be hoped that the Spanish Government will not object to what appears to me to be the reasonable request and proposition of the Moorish Government, and that all existing differences may be now arranged in an amicable and satisfactory manner. The Spanish Government ought, however, to consider the peculiar position of the Sultan as Sovereign of the semi-independent and barbarous tribes of Reef, and bear in mind the fact that it would be impolitic to demand of the Sultan engagements for the future, which may be of too stringent a character, and which, if His Majesty could not fulfil them, might bring about between the two Governments a more serious difference than the present.

From the confidential communications made to me by Seid Mohamed Khateeb of the letters of the Sultan and the Chief Vizier, I have learnt that though the Sultan was much opposed, for the reasons already given in my despatch No. 61 of the 7th instant, to admit the right of the Spanish Government to demand compensation for the Spanish vessel, yet, in deference to the advice which has been proffered to him, His Majesty has conceded the point, being convinced that it would not have been urged upon his attention if I had not been equally convinced that it was right and politic that he should give way. Under these circumstances I shall be glad to learn that the conciliatory conduct of the Moorish Government is duly appreciated at Madrid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 15 *Rebiul-awal*, 1275 (*October* 24, 1858).

WE have received a letter from the Sultan in answer to what we had written to His Majesty, and to what you had written to us regarding the 2,000 dollars demanded by the Spaniards, in compensation for the falucho "San Joaquim," plundered by the Reefians about two and a half years ago, and His Majesty has been pleased to accept the counsels offered him by your Government in this matter, and has ordered us to pay the 2,000 dollars, but on the condition that the Spaniards restore the boats of the Reefians and the merchandize, as well as liberate the sailors and passengers captured with the boats, for the aforesaid boats were engaged in conveying merchandize along the coast of these dominions, and therefore passed between the Spanish garrison and the mainland; moreover, the Moorish Government has never admitted the right of the Spanish authorities to capture or detain the boats of the Reefians, or those of other subjects of these realms engaged in trade. If the Spanish Government is justified in demanding from the Moorish Government compensation for the losses incurred by the Spaniards from the Reefians, they cannot demand, at the same time, compensation, and take it with their own hands. We should mention, also, that the goods in the boats seized by the Spanish authorities belonged in great part to the merchants of Tetuan. In a day or two we shall have an interview with you, if it please God, when we may confer upon all we have now stated to you, before we address a reply to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 15 *Rebiul-awal*, 1275 (*October* 27, 1858).

KNOW, that we have received the answer of our Lord to the letter you sent us, asking for 2,000 dollars, on account of the falucho "San Joaquim," which was plundered by the Reefians about two years and a-half ago. In the last letter we addressed you on this subject, we made known to you the reason why this demand had been opposed, and repetition, on the present occasion, is, therefore, unnecessary; but as the Spanish nation is a neighbour of these realms, and as friendship has, from ancient times, existed between the two Governments, we are desirous that no trouble or misunderstanding should be occasioned on account of such a trivial matter as this; moreover, the Sultan does not wish that any loss should be suffered, by any one of your subjects, in this affair. He has, therefore, ordered us to pay the 2,000 dollars, and this is a proof of the friendly feelings he entertained towards your Government; but our Lord has ordered us to write to you regarding the Reef boats which the authorities of the Spanish garrison captured, though those boats were engaged in conveying merchandize from Tetuan to the coast of Reef, your authorities saying there were gun-flints, &c., on board. Now, the goods in these boats were, in great part, the property of respectable merchants of Tetuan, and the boats were captured by your authorities when passing through the waters near the Moorish coast, for your fortresses are within musket-shot of the mainland. We are, therefore, persuaded the Spanish Government will order that the said boats be returned with the goods in them, and that the sailors and passengers who were captured be released. You, from your excellent judgment, will admit that if the Spanish Government thinks it is justified in claiming from the Sultan the losses suffered by Spanish subjects on account of the acts of the Reefians, it is not proper that your authorities in the fortresses should capture or put an embargo on the vessels of Moorish subjects or others. The Moorish Government, up to the present time, has never acknowledged the right of the Spanish authorities to search the merchant-vessels of their subjects that approach your fortresses (on the coast of Reef), as we neither search nor interfere with

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Spanish vessels that approach our ports or coast, whatever articles be on board of them.

Upon these matters, and also regarding the boats, we are disposed, as we often said to the Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General Don Carlos de España, to come to an arrangement with you in conformity with the friendly relations existing between the two Governments. We will soon send you a list of the boats and merchandize that have been seized by your authorities.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

No. 46.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 68.)

My Lord, *Tangier, October 27, 1858.*

SEID MOHAMED KHATEEB has informed me that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has addressed him a letter, stating that a party of military men, who had gone into the territory adjacent to the Spanish garrison of Melilla to purchase cattle, had fallen into an ambush, and that seven of them were killed, and seven more taken prisoners, by the Reefians, whilst the others escaped. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, it appears, based his representation on information which he received, some days ago, from an unauthentic source.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb, on the other hand, showed me a letter from the Governor of Reef, informing him that the Reef tribe of Farkhanats had, when they were on guard on the lines of Melilla, delivered over to the Spaniards, for the sum of 100 dollars, a cannon which belonged to the Reefians in common; that the other tribes attacked the Farkhanats; that the parties, who had sold the cannon, after suffering many losses, then took refuge in Melilla; that the Spanish General at Melilla dispatched by night a body of 300 troops to a place called Ajuada, for the purpose of avenging the attack upon the Farkhanats; that the Spanish force fell into an ambuscade, and had seven men killed and seven more wounded, whilst the others escaped, and that one Reefian was killed and one wounded. The Governor, who was at the time residing at some distance from the scene of the conflict, and whose authority in Reef is of a dubious character, says he will do all in his power to get the Spanish captives into his own hands, and will treat them well, until he receives the Sultan's orders as to how he is to dispose of them The Governor says the Spanish authorities of Melilla have offered to the Reefians to restore the cannon, and to pay 1,000 dollars as a ransom for the Spanish captives, if the latter are delivered over to them; but I believe the Reefians further demand the restoration of the boats, &c.

The Governor's version of this conflict, as reported to him by the Reefians, may not be altogether correct; but I believe the sale by the Farkhanats of the cannon to be true, though the cannon was not the property of the latter.

Melilla, as all the Spanish garrisons in North Africa, have been for the last 100 years in a state of blockade from the inland side, the Moorish Government and the Reefians not permitting any person, except when a flag of truce is hoisted, to pass out of the Spanish garrisons, nor any person to pass through the lines. The act, therefore, of the Spanish soldiers leaving the garrison to purchase cattle, was an irregularity, if that version of the story be correct; and they can hardly complain if they have suffered for their own imprudence, especially during the present state of irritation on the part of the Reefians against the Spaniards.

Khateeb has, at my recommendation, sent an express to the Governor of Reef, with a direction to do all in his power to recover the Spanish prisoners, and to treat them well until the Moorish Government can restore them to the Spanish authorities. If the latter have still in their possession any Reefiian captives, the Governor of Reef will not, I should imagine, venture to deliver up the Spaniards, except upon the condition that the Reefians also be released, or he would endanger his own position as the chief authority in Reef.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 47.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 248.)

My Lord, *Madrid, November 10, 1858.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. Drummond Hay, conveying to him a copy of my despatch to your Lordship No. 232 of the 7th instant, on the subject of the differences between Spain and the Empire of Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 47.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, November 9, 1858.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatches Nos. 67 and 68 to the Earl of Malmesbury, which you addressed to me under flying seal, and I forwarded them yesterday by a Queen's messenger to London.

The copy of a despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, which I inclose herewith, will acquaint you with the satisfaction with which the Spanish Government have learnt that the Government of Morocco have consented to pay the indemnity which they had demanded for the "San Joaquim," and also with the disposition which they have evinced to place their relations with the Empire of Morocco on a satisfactory and amicable footing.

I ought to mention, however, at the same time, that Marshal O'Donnell has lately expressed to a gentleman in his confidence a determination to act energetically against the Reef, as soon as circumstances will enable him to do so, if all cause of complaint on the part of Spain against the mountaineers is not in the meanwhile removed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 48.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 257.)

My Lord, *Madrid, November 20, 1858.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, herewith, a despatch which I received yesterday from Mr. Drummond Hay, under flying seal,* to your Lordship's address, reporting the capture, by the Governor of Peñon, of a Reef vessel belonging to the Chief of the Benisaid tribe, on her voyage from Tangier, provided with a pass from the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires; and as I met Marshal O'Donnell and M. Calderon Collantes in the evening, I spoke to them of this event, which I said had, with reason, caused much surprise and dissatisfaction at Tangier. Both Ministers told me that the Moorish vessel had been taken as a guarantee for the safety of the Spanish officer and soldiers whose capture by the Reefians was reported in my despatch No. 209 of the 31st ultimo, with a view to inducing the Moorish authorities to consent to their exchange.

The vessel, with her cargo and crew, they said, had been sent to Malaga, and would be detained there until an arrangement was made for the exchange of the Spanish prisoners.

M. Calderon Collantes also stated that he had sent instructions, by telegraph, to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier to insist, in the strongest terms, upon such an arrangement being immediately entered into.

I am happy to say, however, that both Ministers expressed themselves

* No. 49.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

disposed to enter into negotiations with Morocco for the adoption of measures to prevent acts of irregularity in future on the part of the lawless inhabitants of the Reef, if the Morocco Government will consent to do what may be considered necessary for that purpose.

The Spanish squadron, which I mentioned to your Lordship in my despatch No. 201 of the 24th ultimo, as being under orders to proceed to the coast of Morocco, has not yet sailed, but is about to do so immediately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

P.S.—I shall send a copy of this despatch to Mr. Drummond Hay.

A. B.

No. 49.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received November* 26.)

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Tangier, November* 6, 1858.

I AM informed that the Spanish authorities at Peñon have captured another Reef boat, laden with merchandise, of the supposed value of about 80*l.* or more. The boat, named "Maimon," is the property, I believe, of the friendly Chief of Benisaid, Seid Mohamed Alhadary, who saved, in 1856, the lives of the British sailors who were in the hands of the Reefian pirates, and who, subsequently, at my request, assisted in redeeming Spanish captives similarly situated. The master of the boat, with whom I am acquainted, is an honest Reefian, and one who has never been engaged in piracy. He was the bearer of a pass from the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier. This pass was given, I believe, to the Reefian, in consequence of the friendly and humane conduct to all Europeans of Alhadary the Benisaid Chief, and of his having presented a pass at the Spanish Mission, of which the inclosed documents are a copy and translation.

The property on board the "Maimon" belongs to respectable Moorish merchants at Tetuan. Seid Mohamed Khateeb has informed me he has addressed a note to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, complaining of this fresh outrage on the Reefian boats engaged in the coasting traffic, and to express his surprise that, at a moment when the Moorish Government has shown such goodwill in arranging the claim of the Spanish Government for the acts of the Reefians, the Spanish authorities on the Reef coast should be capturing the boats of that district engaged in lawful traffic with the Moorish ports.

I may be allowed to remark, that if the Spanish authorities at Peñon were ordered by the Government at Madrid (as the Commandant of that garrison informed Mr. Reade) to capture the Reef trading-boats, at the same time that they instructed their Representative at Tangier to demand compensation for the past acts of the Reefians, it appears to me the Moorish Government have just grounds for complaint.

The tribe of Benisaid have never been known to engage in piracy, but the hostile conduct of the Spanish authorities may now cause them to seek revenge for the breach of faith which has been practised upon them, by the capture of the vessel of their Chief, though its master was provided with a pass from the Spanish authorities at Alhucemas, and from the Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 49.

Pass issued by the Governor of Alhucemas to the Master of a Reef boat.

Don Manuel Longuet y Gerona, Governador Militar de la Plaza de Alhucemas.

CERTIFICO que el Moro Jamet Tagar, dueño del carabo "Maimon," se entretiene en el comercio de cabotaje y que no se ejercita en la pirateria, perteneciendo á la Cabila de Benisaid, que es partido amigo de la plaza á la que esta proximo; acompañandole ocho Moros de tripulacion, siendo entre todos nueve, y ademas llena algunos pasageros. Y para los efectos prevenidos en el Articulo VI del Reglamento aprobado por su Magestad el Real Orden de 5 de Mayo ultimo, le espido la presente en la referida plaza de Alhucemas á 17 de Agosto, 1858.

(Firmado) MANUEL LONGUET Y GERONA.

(Translation.)

Don Manuel Longuet y Gerona, Military Governor of the Fortress of Alhucemas.

I HEREBY certify that the Moor, Hamet Tagar, master of the boat "Maimon," is engaged in the coasting traffic, and that he has never been engaged in piracy; he belongs to the Kabila of Benisaid, which is a friendly and neighbouring tribe of this fortress. Eight Moors form the crew, being nine in all; besides, he carries some passengers.

In accordance with Article VI of the Regulations, approved of by Her Majesty, viz., the Royal Order of the 5th of May last, I issue this document, in the above-mentioned fortress of Alhucemas, the 17th August, 1858.

(Signed) MANUEL LONGUET Y GERONA.

No. 50.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received December* 1.)

(No. 269.)

My Lord, *Madrid, November* 22, 1858.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 257 of the 20th instant, acquainting your Lordship with the conversations which I had held with Marshal O'Donnell and M. Calderon Collantes, respecting the capture of a Reef boat by the Governor of Peñon, reported in Mr. Drummond Hay's despatch No. 73 of the 6th instant, I have now the honour to forward, herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a letter which I have addressed to Mr. Drummond Hay on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, November* 20, 1858.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th instant, inclosing your despatch No. 73 of that date, under flying seal, to the Earl of Malmesbury, reporting the capture of a Moorish vessel by the Governor of Peñon, though provided with a pass from the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier.

I had an opportunity yesterday of speaking on the subject of its contents to Marshal O'Donnell and M. Calderon Collantes, and you will find in the inclosed copy of a despatch which I have addressed this day to the Earl of Malmesbury the explanations which they have given to me.

The squadron about to sail for the coast of Morocco will, I fear, occasion further complications of this kind; and from what I learn, confidentially, of Marshal O'Donnell's views, I believe that he will act with energy against the Government of Morocco as soon as the present question between Spain and Mexico is brought to a solution, unless some means are devised, in the meanwhile, to place the relations of the two countries on a footing of permanent tranquillity.

If the old lines around the Spanish fortresses could be re-established, and such a fort as you recommend constructed in the Reef, and garrisoned by a Moorish force, great dangers to the Empire of Morocco might be prevented;

and ideas of conquest on the part of Spain be laid aside, if not for ever, at least for many years to come.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN

No. 51.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 131.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1858.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 257 of the 20th ultimo, transmitting a despatch (No. 73) from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, reporting the capture, by Spanish officers, of the Reefian boat "Maimon."

It appears from Mr. D. Hay's despatch, that the boat in question was the property of a friendly Chief, whose proceedings on the occasion alluded to by Mr. Hay were praiseworthy, and deserving of the thanks both of the British and of the Spanish Governments; and the testimony borne by Mr. Hay to the character of the master of the boat seems to place his vessel beyond the character of a suspicious craft. But the fact that he was the bearer of a pass from the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier renders the capture not only questionable under international usage, but compels other maritime nations to protest against it, as equally unjustifiable and impolitic.

I have to instruct you to remonstrate, in the strongest terms, against this act, which is calculated to have the worst effect on legitimate commerce, and to expose merchant-vessels of all flags to retaliation from the hands of the inhabitants of a coast formerly addicted to piracy; but whose recent proceedings have shown that they are disposed to abandon their evil pursuits, and to act in accordance with civilized habits.

It seems to Her Majesty's Government to be imperative, in the interest of all nations, that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty should lose no time in qualifying the capture, and in setting the vessel free, and you will urge this course, without delay, upon the Spanish Govenment.

I shall consider it my duty to desire Mr. D. Hay to inform the Government of Morocco that I have furnished you with these instructions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 52.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord, *Tangier, December* 9, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the copy of a despatch I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, submitting my views regarding the manner in which the Spanish Government is conducting the negotiation for the settlement of its differences with the Morocco Government, and expressing my conviction that, unless the Spanish Ministry adopts a more prudent course, it will lead to a rupture of their relations with this country.

I will not encroach upon your Lordship's time by recapitulating in this despatch what I have stated to Mr. Buchanan; but I beg to assure your Lordship that if the Moorish Government has shown, since the commencement of the negotiation, a conciliatory and friendly disposition to make all reasonable concessions to the Spaniards, it has been owing to the counsels offered by the British Government through me, and to my assuring the Sultan that he would find the Spanish Government would reciprocate his friendly disposition.

It would appear, however, from information I have obtained, that the Spanish Government intends to pursue a dictatorial tone in the settlement of its demands; whilst it ignores, and, I am told, intends to reject the representations of the Moorish Government, under the impression, I suppose, that as it has obtained with such facility the payment of the 2,000 dollars' claim, similar

success will attend the advancement of other and obsolete claims which have long ago been abandoned.

The Moorish Government has, fortunately, not yet received any formal notification of the intention of the Spanish Ministers, for I am persuaded that there would then be an end to all negotiation, and that the Sultan would rather submit to have all his ports bombarded, and Reef invaded, than concede the demands of Spain, as long as that Power turns a deaf ear to the grievances of his subjects.

As my position would be a very false one with the Moorish Government, if I continued to urge upon them the concession of all Spanish demands, and the withdrawal of their own claims, I shall abstain from further interference until I receive your Lordship's instructions on the subject.

If a war between Spain and Morocco could be carried on without affecting in any way the relations between either of those Powers and other foreign Governments, it would be a matter of comparatively small importance to the interests of Great Britain; but, as I am convinced that complications of a most serious nature would certainly arise, I have thought it my duty, up to the present time, to take a very active part in endeavouring to ward off a rupture between the two Governments.

In the Queen of Spain's speech there is a paragraph regarding the differences with Morocco, to which I beg to call your Lordship's attention. Her Majesty states that the "Sultan of Morocco has recognized a principle established in his Treaties with Spain not before acknowledged, and consented, in consequence, to pay an indemnity for the vessel taken by the Moors of Reef two years ago." On a reference to Article XV of the existing stipulations between Spain and Morocco, I think it will be found that the spirit of that Article is totally at variance with the words that have been put into the Queen of Spain's speech.

A copy of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco was sent by me to the Foreign Office in the year 1854 or 1855.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 52.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Sir, *Tangier, December* 8, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 20th ultimo, transmitting me a copy of a despatch No. 257 of that date, addressed by your Excellency to the Earl of Malmesbury.

The Moorish Minister informs me that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has lately addressed him a note respecting his demand for the immediate release of the seven Spanish soldiers now in the hands of the Reefians, and Khateeb has replied, that although the Moorish Government has done all in its power to obtain their release, the Reefians have refused to deliver up their prisoners, declaring that they will not release them until their brethren who are now in the hands of the Spanish authorities are set at liberty.

The Spanish Government appears to lose sight of the fact that the Sultan's authority in Reef is of a very doubtful character, and that His Majesty's orders are very rarely obeyed there. The Governor of Reef proceeds every year to that Province to collect the tithes due to the Sultan as their spiritual Chief; and a very small sum of money, barely sufficient to defray the expenses of the Governor and the troops which accompany him, is collected. The Governor remains in Reef only a few months, and rarely ventures to interfere with the government of the inhabitants. This functionary returned, a few days ago, to Tangier, where he resides during the greater part of the year.

When a British vessel in 1855 was captured by Reefian pirates, and the crew made prisoners, the Moorish Government sent, at my demand, repeated orders to the Chiefs for the release of the British mariners, and to my perfect knowledge acted with the greatest good faith in endeavouring to persuade the Chiefs to restore the captives to liberty, but without any success. The Governor of Gibraltar and the authorities of the Spanish garrisons offered the Reefian

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Chiefs considerable sums of money as a ransom for the Englishmen; but the Reefians would not consent to deliver up the captives to the Commander of the British vessel sent to receive them, whilst the fact of their having been offered a ransom thwarted the efforts made by the Moorish Government to effect their liberty through another channel; and their release was not obtained until after a delay of several weeks, and until I had requested the authorities at Gibraltar and the Spanish garrisons to desist from further interference, and I had made known to the Reefians that I would not pay a farthing for the ransom of my countrymen. It was then only through the interference of a friendly Reefian Chief, and the good offices of the Moorish Government, that the Englishmen were liberated without any ransom money being paid.

I mention this to your Excellency, not as a parallel case, but merely to show that, even with the greatest goodwill on the part of this Government towards a friendly ally, it does not suffice that the Sultan should send orders to the Reefians. Moreover, it is not surprising that the Reefians should be still more disinclined to obey the Sultan's orders in the present instance, regarding the release of the captive Spaniards, when the former have been receiving very advantageous offers from the Governor of Melilla for an exchange of prisoners and the restoration of boats, and, as I also understand, the payment of a ransom. It is natural, therefore, to suppose that the semi-independent tribes of Reef should turn a deaf ear to the orders of the Sultan, especially as they will no doubt have discovered ere this that, notwithstanding the representations of the Moorish Government, their peacefully trading vessels continue to remain prizes in the hands of the Spaniards, and the passengers and crews are still incarcerated at the Spanish garrisons, even though the master of one of those boats was the bearer of a passport which was given to him by the Spanish authorities, and which requested and required that the boat should not be interfered with, and the boat itself belong to the Chief who saved the lives of the British and Spanish captives in 1855 and 1856.

Moreover, the Spanish Government ought not to lose sight of the fact that the Spanish soldiers now in the hands of the Reefians were taken prisoners in the act of invading the Moorish territory for hostile purposes, whereas the Reefians who are detained in the Spanish garrisons were engaged in a peaceful traffic with the Moorish ports. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the Reefians should consider themselves the aggrieved parties.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb has, in accordance with the counsels I have given him, addressed a further letter to the Sultan requesting His Majesty to make every exertion to obtain the release of the Spanish prisoners. He read to me the letter at the moment he was dispatching it to the Court; and I am of opinion that, if the Governor of Melilla has not already obtained the release of the Spanish prisoners, and is directed by his Government to desist from further negotiation with the Reefians, informing them that the matter will for the future be left entirely in the hands of the Moorish Government and the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, the captives will be liberated and sent to Tangier for delivery to the Spanish Government.

During the negotiation of the claim of 2,000 dollars, as well as that for the release of the Spanish prisoners, this Government, as counselled by me, very properly avoided giving rise to any feelings of irritation on the part of the Spanish Government, by putting forward counter claims, in opposition to the Spanish demands; and I took upon myself to assure Khateeb, at that time, that I felt confident the Spanish Government would be incapable of taking advantage of any concessions made by the Moors in the settlement of their claims or demands by resisting, hereafter, the just representations which the Moorish Government might have to make on its part, and that I could not suppose the boats of unoffending Reefians engaged in trade, and the property of respectable merchants of Tetuan which had been embarked in them, and which consisted principally of British-manufactured goods, would be confiscated by the Spanish Government, and that the passengers and sailors of those boats would be detained in custody after that the claim of the "San Joachim" was settled and the Spanish prisoners were released.

I regret to say, however, that it is reported that the cargoes of all the boats, and even that of the boat that possessed the Spanish pass, has been sold at Malaga; whilst, as far as I can judge from the tenour of the language lately held by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to the Moorish Government, no attention will

be paid to the representations of the latter, however just and reasonable their pretensions may be.

If I am right in my supposition, I shall regret extremely that I ever used my friendly offices in persuading this Government to settle, without demur, the Spanish claim, for it will place me in a false position with the Sultan, who will naturally point to the attitude of the Spanish Government, as being at total variance with the assurances I had given His Majesty that he would meet with a reciprocal desire, on their part, to adjust all differences in an amicable and equitable manner.

I must also take this opportunity of mentioning to your Excellency that though the Spanish Minister had expressed to your Excellency his satisfaction at the results already obtained, in part by our good offices, and had informed your Excellency that the Spanish Mission at Tangier would be instructed to cultivate the most friendly and confidential relations with that of Her Majesty, I regret to say I have found that when conversing with my Spanish colleague, Don Juan Blanco, on matters connected with the differences between Spain and Morocco, he avoids discussion and speaks with the greatest reserve, although I have acted towards him with entire frankness, and have placed in his hands such correspondence as I thought might enlighten him as to the very friendly policy pursued hitherto by the Diplomatic Agents of Great Britain in all questions between this country and Spain. This extreme reserve, I feel assured, does not proceed from any personal or unfriendly feelings towards myself, for, on the contrary, Don Juan Blanco and I are on the best of terms in our private relations. It appears to me, therefore, that the Spanish Government have other aims in view than those which they would appear to have led your Excellency to believe, and that they are desirous, for some unaccountable reason or other, of finding an excuse to go to war with the Government of Morocco.

The Moorish Government cannot, in the present negotiation, be accused of ill-will or backwardness in meeting in a friendly manner the demands or representations of the Spanish Government. The claim for the "San Joachim," of 2,000 dollars, is the only claim for compensation that has been put forward by them against this Government, now or during the last three years. If the Sultan did not agree to pay this claim in 1855, his refusal was based on the tenour of Article XV of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco; and no further representation on the subject was made by the late Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, Don Carlos de España, although I should not be surprised that he may have chosen to mislead his Government regarding the sentiments of the Sultan, as he misled Khateeb and myself by his mis-statements and perversion of facts.

It has been supposed by some persons here that the Spanish Government intends, now that it has obtained compensation for the "San Joachim," which, as I have observed, is the sole claim it has advanced during the last three years, to put forward older and obsolete claims, which were never previously advanced, and which I am persuaded would be met by the Sultan with a flat refusal, as His Majesty would feel that, if he consented to compensate Spain for claims on account of piracies committed in Reef before the year 1855, when he sent an army to Reef to chastise the Reefians, he would be compelled also to compensate all other nations, Great Britain included, for similar depredations on the part of the Reefians, which would involve the satisfaction of such exorbitant demands that His Majesty would certainly consider war with Spain preferable to paying them. Great Britain and France alone demanded the payment of compensation for vessels plundered since 1855, and Great Britain required that the Sultan should be held responsible for the future acts of the Reefians on the high seas, and stipulated that if His Majesty withdrew from that responsibility, the British Government would take the matter into their own hands.

If the Spanish Government considers that its representations in past years have not been met by the Moorish Government in a friendly spirit, I regret to state that I am convinced the fault lies at their own door, and they should not, therefore, visit the sins of their agents on the heads of the Moors. Until Don Juan Blanco del Valle, the actual Representative, was appointed (and I believe him to be an honourable and patriotic servant of his Government), Spain was represented here by persons like Don Carlos de España, who were so much occupied in conducting their own mercantile transactions, of smuggling or of an irregular nature, that they could not and dared not uphold the interests of their Government, for fear of being exposed by the Moorish Government, to

whom their irregularities were not altogether unknown. I could cite to your Excellency, in proof of this, a strong case in point, when I acted as mediator for the settlement of the Spanish differences with Morocco in 1845, when I discovered that whilst I was urging upon this Government certain important concessions regarding the territorial limits of Ceuta, the Spanish Plenipotentiary was negotiating for himself certain licenses for the exportation of grain and oxen.

Your Excellency tells me, in your despatch, you have been confidentially informed that General O'Donnell will act with energy against the Government of Morocco as soon as the present question between Spain and Mexico is brought to a solution, unless some means are devised in the meanwhile for placing the relations of the two countries on a footing of permanent tranquillity.

Now, the Spanish Government has not yet informed the Moorish Government what its demands are, beyond the claim for the 2,000 dollars which has been settled, and the release of the captives. It could hardly, therefore, be expected that the Moorish Government should forestall their wishes, which are yet unknown. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the power of the Sultan to give directions about the demarkation of the frontier lines, or of a neutral ground at Melilla, will be null, if the Spanish Government continues to act as it now does, and that his hands will be weakened by the refusal of the Spanish Government to listen to the just representations of the Moorish Government on behalf of its Reef subjects; for the latter will naturally reply to their Sovereign, when the time comes for him to propose a settlement of any question connected with the Spanish garrisons, that, as His Majesty could get no justice for them, they will not obey his directions nor make any concession whatever to the Spaniards.

An attack by a Spanish force on a Moorish town, or a war between this country and Spain, would not alter the question, nor produce any beneficial result; for if the Spaniards were successful in the war the effect would either be revolution in the country, entailing consequences and complications the ultimate results of which cannot be foreseen, or the Sultan's power would be weakened to such a degree in the eyes of his subjects that he would, after the war, be still more incapable than before to control his unruly subjects of the Reef.

The course which it appears to me it would be reasonable for the Spanish Government to adopt, if they desire a peaceful and satisfactory solution of their present differences with Morocco, would be to enter, through the medium of their Chargé d'Affaires, into an amicable negotiation with the Moorish Government regarding their African garrisons, giving strict directions that all negotiations between the authorities at the Spanish garrisons and the Reefians should cease. They would thus put to the test the sincerity of this Government; and, should it hereafter be proved that it is the Moorish Government that has acted in opposition to the just and reasonable expectations of the Spanish Government, the Sultan might then be held responsible, and treated accordingly, but, if it is discovered that such opposition proceeds solely from the Reef people, the latter should alone, if necessary, be dealt with.

At the same time that this negotiation is proceeding, every attention should be shown to the representations of the Moorish Government, and proof be thus afforded to them that Spain is acting a friendly part, and that it is by an appeal to what is right, and not to might, that she desires to have the existing differences settled.

Khateeb has put into my hands the draft of a letter he was about to address to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation, regarding the Reef boats and the Reefians in captivity at the Spanish garrisons: but I have asked him to wait a few days before he presents it to Don Juan Blanco, in order that it may not appear to be a set-off against the late Spanish demand, which it is not. There is nothing in this note that appears to me to be unfriendly or unreasonable, for I presume Spain does not desire to treat Morocco otherwise than as an independent Government.

Should I learn from Khateeb that my Spanish colleague does not give due attention to this representation, I shall think it my duty to abstain from continuing to counsel this Government to act in the same spirit of conciliation and concession as I have hitherto done; for the Moorish Government will naturally accuse me of having led them to expect they would meet with that reciprocal goodwill and justice from the Spanish Government, which, from the tenour of

the first letter that was addressed to Khateeb by my Spanish colleague, and from the language of the Spanish Minister to your Excellency, I had been led to expect. The good offices of the Agent of a friendly Power can no longer be called for in questions between two Governments, when one of the latter adopts the course of disavowing the right of the other to enter into discussion regarding the claims it may have to put forward. A negotiation, under such circumstances, would assume the character of dictation on the one side and concession on the other; and, should such be the case in the present instance, I shall, as I said before, deplore that, in my capacity of British Representative, I had taken any part in persuading this Government to accede to the claims of the Spanish Government; for had not the Sultan been assured by me that I felt convinced the Spanish Government was not animated with any unfriendly feeling, and that it would reciprocate the conciliatory and friendly conduct of the Moorish Government, he would not have so readily listened to my counsels.

I shall transmit a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Government, and, unless I see an alteration in the policy of my Spanish colleague, shall await instructions from Lord Malmesbury, and a further communication from your Excellency, before I continue to urge upon this Government the necessity of their acceding to any further demands on the part of the Spanish Government, though it will of course be understood that, in case my advice be asked, I shall in no way oppose them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 52.

Draft of a Letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.)

WE have delayed writing to you regarding the boats of the Reefians, and the property seized by the authorities of your garrisons, as also regarding the passengers and sailors who were taken prisoners, as we had not received until now an exact account, such as that which is noted in the accompanying list.

It appears that the first of the captured boats was seized by the authorities of Peñon on the plea, as they stated, of having ammunition of war on board, which, we are informed, consisted of a few muskets that belonged to the passengers returning from Tetuan to their native country with manufactured goods; but be that as it may, if the Spanish Government expect that the Moorish Government is to be responsible for the acts of the Reefians, the Spanish authorities ought not to take the law into their own hands and detain or seize the boats of the Reefians engaged in the traffic with the ports of our Lord; neither can we admit that the waters between Spanish garrisons and the mainland belong entirely to the Spaniards; but we maintain that the waters near the mainland belong to us, and if the waters, as at Peñon, occupy a very narrow channel between us, they should be considered as being divided between us, and thus the Reef boats that keep in the waters near the mainland ought not to be impeded in their passage.

The Spanish Government, with its well known wisdom and justice, will acknowledge that this is reasonable; and in like manner the Sultan would never desire to detain or interfere with the Spanish vessels passing his forts or coast. Moreover, one of the boats that was captured was provided with a pass from the Governor of Alhucemas, as well as a pass from the Spanish Consulate-General. The capture of the latter boat caused us the greatest surprise.

We have further to say that the capture of these boats was not effected, from the first, in consequence of any late act of piracy of the Reefians, or on account of hostilities on the part of the Reefians towards the Spanish garrisons; for it is well known and acknowledged that no piracy has been committed by the Reefians during the last three years, when the Sultan took measures to chastise them, and that the Reefians have not since that time interfered with vessels on the high seas.

With regard to the hostilities at Melilla, they were brought about by the

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

capture of the first boat, the imprisonment of the crew, and refusal to liberate them. The letter of the Governor of Melilla to the Reefian Chief, of which we send you a copy, written before hostilities were entered upon, alludes to the peaceful conduct of the tribes around the Spanish garrison. The Sultan will do all in his power to prevent acts of aggression towards you in Reef, and also to obtain, as we have said in our letter, the release of the Spaniards in the hands of the Reefians, even though those prisoners had entered the Reef territory with a hostile object; but you are not ignorant of the rebellious state of the Reef, and now that the inhabitants see that their boats have been captured and their property seized, and not restored to them through the representation of the Moorish Government, whilst, on the other hand, they are offered advantageous terms in money for the release of the captives by the Governor of Melilla, how can you, under these circumstances, expect they will obey the Sultan's orders to give them up? The Moorish Government is prepared for the future to issue passes to their boats, but would then require that Reef boats navigating with such passes, and engaged in peaceful traffic, be not interfered with, in the same manner as the Moorish Government does not interfere with Spanish vessels passing its coast.

The Spanish Government will, with its well known justice, we feel persuaded, give directions that the Reef boats, subjects, and property enumerated in the accompanying list be restored and sent to Tangier; on our part we are ready to show goodwill in all matters that may tend to promote a good understanding and be right.

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

No. 53.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 145.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 24, 1858.

HER Majesty's Government desire that you will again earnestly press upon the Government of Her Catholic Majesty the inexpediency of pursuing any further the discussions with Morocco, which it was hoped would have been finally settled by the consent of the Moorish Government to pay the compensation demanded for the capture of the Spanish vessel by the Reef people in the year 1856.

Her Majesty's Government would have been confirmed in this hope by the subsequent surrender of the Moorish boat captured by a Spanish cruizer, notwithstanding that it was provided with a regular pass from a Spanish authority, if it had not been for the more recent intelligence which they have received of its being contemplated by the Cabinet of Madrid to revive and press upon Morocco claims which, from lapse of time, might justly be considered obsolete.

It seems, however, to Her Majesty's Government that such a course, while it would probably lead to no satisfactory conclusion, might be productive of much mischief, not only to Spain herself, but to the commerce of all nations passing in and out of the Mediterranean. If claims are peremptorily advanced, Spain must, for her honour's sake, pursue the matter at whatever cost; but where would be the advantage to Spain if she were compelled to have recourse to hostile operations against the Moorish territory? Such operations would be costly, difficult of execution, and uncertain of success. They would involve the descent on the coasts of Morocco of a large Spanish force, to operate in a country ill-adapted for military movements, and inhabited by a race of men eminently qualified, by inclination and habits of life, for carrying on a destructive guerilla warfare against an invading enemy; and, however successful might be the operations, the result would be wholly incommensurate with the expense, loss of life, and risks of every kind, present and prospective, which they would entail.

On the other hand, the disturbance which any hostile operations on the coast of Morocco would occasion among the warlike tribes inhabiting that coast, would be calculated to stimulate a hatred of all Christians, and to encourage piracy, from which all commercial nations would suffer; for the half-civilized people would not recognize the distinction between neutrals and enemies, but

would class indiscriminately with the latter, Christians of every nation and every creed, and would assume to see in the peaceful merchant-vessel, a foe equally open to attack as a Spanish ship of war.

Her Majesty's Government trust, therefore, that the Court of Madrid will rest satisfied with the redress which it has already obtained for the specific grievance which it, in the first instance, assigned as calling for armed interference with Morocco, and that whatever warning it may think right, for its own dignity or for the security of its material interests, to address to the Moorish Court, it will make that warning prospective in its effect, and apply it as a check against future aggression, rather than as a means of obtaining reparation for wrongs which, whatever may be their extent, were not thought of sufficient importance to be insisted upon when it demanded pecuniary compensation for the attack on the Spanish vessel, for which atonement has now been made by Morocco.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 54.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 318.)

My Lord, *Madrid, December* 20, 1858.

ON receiving your Lordship's despatch No. 131 of the 4th instant, instructing me to remonstrate against the capture of the Moorish vessel "Maimon," and to urge her immediate release, I addressed a note to M. Calderon Collantes, in conformity with the language of your Lordship's despatch.

Two days subsequently I called at the Foreign Office, and, in the absence of M. Collantes, I had some conversation with M. Comyn on the subject, when he expressed regret that I should have addressed an official remonstrance to the Spanish Government, without some previous communication with M. Calderon Collantes, as I should have been informed that no ground existed for my representations, as orders had been already sent for the restoration of the vessel.

I stated to him, however, that I had every reason to believe that the Spanish Government had approved of the act of their officers, as Marshal O'Donnell had explained to me, when the intelligence first arrived, that the vessel had been taken merely as a guarantee for the safety of the Spaniards who had been made prisoners by the Reefians; and on my repeating his Excellency's explanations to M. Collantes, he had apparently adopted them as his own. I said, that under these circumstances, as some days would probably have elapsed before I could have seen M. Calderon Collantes, I had felt it to be my duty to lose no time in urging the views of my Government upon his Excellency's serious consideration, but that I was now glad to learn that the Spanish Government had spontaneously adopted the course which my note recommended.

M. Comyn, however, having suggested that I should now withdraw the note, and having satisfied me that orders had been forwarded to the Captain-General of Granada to restore the vessel to her owners, and to instruct the Commandant at Peñon to be more careful in future, and more attentive to existing regulations, I agreed to do so. As I thought, also, that it would conduce to the amicable arrangement of the question pending between Spain and Morocco, that the Spanish Government should appear to have acted in this matter spontaneously from their own sense of justice and their respect for international obligations, I addressed a letter to Mr. Drummond Hay, of which a copy is inclosed, informing him that the instructions forwarded to me by your Lordship had proved to be unnecessary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Inclosure in No. 54.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Madrid, December 15, 1858.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch of the 6th ultimo to the Earl of Malmesbury, reporting the capture of the Moorish vessel "Maimon," though provided with a pass from the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangiers, you will have learnt from his Lordship that I have been instructed to remonstrate against this act of the Spanish authorities.

I have much pleasure, however, in acquainting you that these instructions were unnecessary, as the Spanish Government, after inquiring into the facts of the case, in consideration of the character of the vessel, and the peaceful voyage on which she was engaged, had themselves sent orders for her release, with an instruction to the Governor of Peñon, cautioning him to act with more circumspection in future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 55.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 321. Confidential.)

Madrid, December 20, 1858.

My Lord,

I HAVE received a despatch from Mr. Drummond Hay, dated the 8th instant, respecting the questions pending between Spain and Morocco, of which he informs me he has forwarded a copy to your Lordship.

Although I have not been able to obtain an interview with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs before the departure of the gentleman who will be charged with this despatch, I believe that I may assure your Lordship that the Spanish Government do not entertain at the present moment, whatever change of policy they may adopt, the hostile intentions which Mr. Hay has been induced, by appearances, to attribute to them.

I have therefore addressed an answer to him, of which I inclose a copy for your Lordship's information, acquainting him that I have reason to believe the Moorish boat and prisoners in the hands of the Spanish authorities will be restored as soon as the Spaniards who have been captured by the Reefians are given up; and that any claims of dates anterior to 1855 which Spain may bring forward, will be merely used with a view to obtaining from the Morocco Government a cession of the valley of Melilla, and of territorial zones around the other fortresses of sufficient extent to secure them against the insults of the neighbouring tribes.

I am not aware of the extent of the valley of Melilla, or whether its cession may not prove too great a sacrifice to be expected from the Government of Morocco, for the purpose of preventing collisions in future between the garrisons of the Spanish fortresses and the people of the Reef.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 55.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Madrid, December 20, 1858.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 8th instant, on the subject of the differences between Spain and Morocco. You will have already learnt by my official letter of the 15th instant, that the Spanish Government have sent orders for the release of the Moorish boat "Maimon," which was captured, though provided with a pass from the Spanish Legation at Tangier, and I believe I can assure you that orders have

been sent to Malaga, for the liberation of the Moorish prisoners there as soon as it shall be known to the Captain-General that the Spanish prisoners taken by the Reefians have been given up to the Spanish authorities. I have reason to believe, also, that the other Moorish boat in the possession of the Spaniards will be restored at the same time.

I am also assured that the Spanish Government are quite aware of the expediency of keeping their negotiations with Morocco even on questions respecting the Reef, entirely in the hands of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, who will, I trust, be recommended to act with more frankness towards you than he has hitherto done.

I have not yet been able to see M. Collantes himself, but I have every reason to believe that, whatever claims for injuries sustained previously to 1855 may be put forward by Don Juan Blanco, they will be ultimately merely used for the purpose of obtaining the cession of the valley of Melilla, and a more extended zone around the other fortresses.

I understand that orders have been given for breaking up the squadron which has been lately cruizing on the coast of Morocco, and that if this measure is countermanded, which it may perhaps be, it will be on account of the continued detention of the Spanish prisoners in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 56.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 147.)

Foreign Office, December 28, 1858.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatches Nos. 318 and 321 of the 20th instant, respecting the disposition shown by the Spanish Government to surrender the vessel and boat captured from the Reefians, together with the Moorish prisoners, in return, as regards the boat and prisoners, for the surrender of the Spanish prisoners now in the hands of the Reefians, and stating also the motive which has induced the Spanish Government to bring forward obsolete claims against the Moorish Government.

You add also in your letter to Mr. Drummond Hay, of the 20th, that if the orders for breaking up the Spanish squadron are not carried out, it will be in consequence of the continued detention of the Spanish prisoners.

I have already, in my despatch No. 145 of 24th instant, directed you to press upon the Spanish Government the expediency of not pushing matters to extremity with Morocco, and I see no reason now to qualify what I have stated in that despatch. There is no very material difference between bringing forward obsolete claims with the view of obtaining, as a settlement, a cession of territory, and bringing them forward for the sake of obtaining pecuniary satisfaction.

Her Majesty's Government cannot allow their Representative in Morocco to be in any way a party to such a proceeding, and I have accordingly instructed Mr. Hay to keep himself aloof from the discussions in which the Spanish Representative in Morocco may be engaged, and to refrain from offering advice to either party, beyond the general counsel to close and avoid all irritating discussions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 57.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 44.)

Foreign Office, December 30, 1858.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 84 of the 9th instant, respecting the discussion still pending between the Spanish and Moorish Governments.

The view which Her Majesty's Government take of the course pursued in these matters by the Cabinet of Madrid will be sufficiently explained to you

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

by my despatches to Mr. Buchanan of which I inclose copies;* and I have only further to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that under all the circumstances of the case it would not be proper for you to interfere any longer in the discussion in which the Spanish Consul may be engaged with the Moorish Government; but that, on the contrary, you should remain perfectly neutral as between the litigant parties, and offer no advice to either beyond the general counsel to close and avoid all irritating discussions.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 58.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received January* 2, 1859.)

(No. 85.)

My Lord, *Tangier, December* 21, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 40 of the 6th instant, transmitting, for my information, the copy of an instruction addressed by your Lordship to Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, directing him to remonstrate with the Spanish Government against the seizure of the Reefian boat "Maimon," the property of Seid Mohamed Alhadary, the Chief of Benisaid.

In pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, I have communicated to Seid Mohamed Khateeb the substance of your Lordship's despatch, and he requested me to express his most grateful acknowledgments for the interest taken by the British Government in this matter, and that he trusted the remonstrance of the British Government would have a very beneficial effect on the minds of the Spanish Government, and induce them to adopt a more conciliatory and juster line of conduct in regard to the representations the Moorish Government had made, or might have to make, in behalf of Moorish subjects and interests.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 59.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 3, 1859.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 318 of the 20th ultimo, and Nos. 145 and 147 of the 24th and 28th ultimo, I have to instruct you, in case the crew of the Moorish boat should not have been released, to urge upon the Spanish Government the immediate release of these persons.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 60.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord, *Madrid, January* 6, 1859.

I TOOK an opportunity, yesterday, to execute the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatches Nos. 145 and 147 of the 24th and 28th ultimo, on the subject of the late proceedings of the Spanish Government in Morocco; and I read your Lordship's despatch No. 145, *in extenso*, to M. Calderon Collantes, in order, I said, that he might better understand the importance which Her Majesty's Government attached to the question, than if I had merely repeated your Lordship's observations to him from memory.

I stated, also, that the new demands of the Spanish Government would

* Nos. 53 and 56.

have placed Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier in a most disagreeable position towards the Government of Morocco, as he had used his well-known influence to induce them to grant compensation for the Spanish vessel plundered in 1856, which was the subject of the first representation of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, and which Mr. Hay was entitled to consider the only grievance for which satisfaction was required; and I also observed, that Her Majesty's Government merely recommended the Spanish Government to act as France and England had done, who, in making the Emperor of Morocco responsible for the outrages of his Reefian subjects, had not raked up a number of old acts of piracy as cases for compensation, but had more wisely endeavoured to ensure the safety of the sea prospectively.

M. Calderon Collantes assured me that the sole desire of the Spanish Government was, to secure tranquillity in future; and that the claims objected to by your Lordship had been put forward for that object alone; and that they would be employed with the greatest prudence, and in a manner which could not possibly give rise to any misunderstanding between the two Governments.

In the meanwhile, however, he said, Melilla had again been attacked by the people of the Reef, and the Government had been obliged to send a regiment to Africa to assist in its defence. There was no wish, however, on their part to do more than secure their fortresses against insult; and all they asked, therefore, from the Government of Morocco, was that a zone should be established around them, from which the people of the Reef should be excluded, and that a small force of Moorish troops should be maintained in a neutral camp, to prevent hostile acts on the part of the Reefians within the Spanish lines. He said the lines which Spain now wished to re-establish had been formerly occupied by her troops, and had never been ceded by Treaty to Morocco. They had, however, been abandoned through the weakness of the Spanish garrisons, and occupied, through sufferance, by the Reefians; and that, until they were restored to Spain, and a sufficient force of Moorish troops established in the neighbourhood to control the Reefians, conflicts between the tribes and the garrisons could not be prevented. He mentioned that the tribes had refused to give up the Spanish prisoners; and that, according to his last reports from Tangier, a superior officer, with a body of troops, was about to enter the Reef country to enforce the Sultan's orders for their release.

I replied that the construction of a fort, and the maintenance of a Moorish garrison in the Reef country, had, long since, been recommended by Her Majesty's Government to the Sultan as a measure calculated to ensure good relations between his Government and those of other Powers; and that it might be hoped some measure of the kind would be adopted. It was not probable, however, I said, that a conciliatory spirit would be cultivated in the mind of the Sultan by bringing forward obsolete claims against his Government; and representations as to the expediency of taking precautionary measures to prevent conflicts between the tribes and the garrisons of the fortresses would have had a better chance of success if they had not been accompanied by a threat to enforce claims to compensation for old injuries. Besides, with respect to the Spanish prisoners, I said Mr. Hay considered the detention of the Reef boats as having greatly influenced the refusal of the people to give them up.

M. Calderon Collantes, however, insisted that the true cause of the delay which had occurred in the release of the Spanish prisoners was a hope on the part of the tribes that a cannon, taken from them by the garrison of Melilla, might be restored to them; and he concluded his observations by stating that the Spanish squadron had been broken up; and that I might rest assured he would do nothing which was likely to bring on the conflict which was apprehended by Her Majesty's Government.

I understand that two more Reef boats are said to have been taken by the Commandant of one of the Spanish fortresses; but that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had given positive assurances that he would cause them to be immediately restored, if it should appear that they had been improperly captured.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 61.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)

Madrid, January 10, 1859.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED last night your Lordship's despatch No. 1 of the 3rd instant, instructing me to urge the Spanish Government to liberate the Reef prisoners referred to in my despatch No. 321 of the 20th ultimo.

I therefore called this morning at the Foreign Office, in the hope of finding M. Calderon Collantes, but his Excellency was not expected until after the sitting of the Cortes.

I, however, waited upon M. Comyn, and after making him acquainted with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, requested him to take the earliest possible opportunity of communicating them to M. Calderon Collantes.

He said that the prisoners in question consisted of twenty-eight persons, who had been seized off the Chaffarine Islands, and sent to Malaga, after the capture of a Spanish officer and six soldiers by the people of the Reef, and that until the Spaniards were released, he felt assured the Government would not give them up, as their families would doubtless exert their influence to induce the authorities of the Reef to fulfil the condition necessary to their release. Instructions, however, as he had already informed me, were in the possession of the Governor of Malaga to send them to Africa as soon as the Spaniards were liberated; and he also explained that orders are about to be forwarded to the Governors of the different Spanish fortresses in Africa, to limit themselves henceforth to defensive measures, and to abstain from endeavouring to obtain redress for injuries which they may receive, except through the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier.

I urged that the detention of the Reefian prisoners in the present case rendered it more difficult for the authorities of Morocco to induce the tribes to liberate the Spaniards; but M. Comyn did not seem disposed to adopt this view of the case. He promised, however, to report my observations to M. Calderon Collantes, and I shall take an early opportunity of pressing them myself upon his Excellency's attention.

With reference to this subject, I may mention that I had some conversasation a few days ago with Marshal O'Donnell at a dinner at the Palace, when his Excellency observed, on receiving my congratulations on the settlement of the Mexican question, that he would now turn his attention to that of the Reef. I therefore stated to him, that the proceedings of the Spanish Government in that country had caused much concern to Her Majesty's Government; for that while Great Britain and France had been endeavouring to secure tranquillity in Morocco, and to guarantee the sea against piracy, the policy of the Spanish Government was calculated to create suspicion against themselves, and endanger the interests of all other Christian nations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 62.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 14.)

Foreign Office, January 18, 1859.

Sir,

I HAVE to instruct you to express to M. Calderon Collantes the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the explanations regarding Spanish policy towards Morocco, which his Excellency made to you in the conversation reported by you in your despatch No. 4 of the 6th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 63.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received January* .)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, January 28, 1859.

THE Moorish prisoners have been sent to Tangier. Spanish officer from Melilla reports that Reefians have refused to give up Spanish prisoners to Sultan's officer.

I have read to Foreign Minister his assurances in my despatch No. 4, and expressed surprise at note of Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to Moorish Minister of the 13th instant, which I believe has been approved.

His Excellency admitted that I had reported him correctly, but his language to-day, though pacific, is not satisfactory; and he speaks of our conversations being quite unofficial.

I understand that the claims are all posterior to 1845, except one, which has been withdrawn.

No. 64.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received January* 30.)

(No. 23.)

Madrid, January 23, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith, a despatch which I received some days ago from Mr. Drummond Hay, under flying seal to your Lordship's address, relative to the negotiations at present pending between the Governments of Spain and Morocco.

I received, at the same time, a despatch from Mr. Hay, addressed to myself, expressing a strong opinion against the policy of the means by which Her Catholic Majesty's Government are endeavouring to obtain a rectification of the present lines around the Spanish fortresses in Africa; and also a private letter, in which he expresses these opinions more freely. As I have read the former to M. Calderon Collantes, I inclose a copy of it for your Lordship's information, together with a copy of some extracts from the latter, which I also read to his Excellency.

With regard to the cargo of the "Maimon," I am glad to have it in my power to acquaint your Lordship that it was given up simultaneously with that vessel, to the Moroccan authorities, for transmission to its owners; and as the two other boats mentioned in the inclosure of Mr. Hay's despatch to your Lordship are those which I stated, in my despatch No. 18 of the 16th instant, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had assured the Moorish Minister would be restored if it were shown that they had been improperly captured, I trust that justice will soon be done to their owners, and that the ill feeling excited in the Reef by the capture of these boats will gradually subside.

M. Collantes did not admit that the inconvenient claims from other Powers, to which the Moroccan Government would be liable if they granted those at present put forward by Spain, were a sufficient reason for his withdrawing the Spanish claims; but I have no doubt he feels the full force of Khateeb's arguments upon the subject, though he may possibly still endeavour to use these claims as a means of supporting the purposes of Spain for a rectification of the lines around the fortresses.

Nothing further, however, will be done until after Don Juan Blanco has been to Madrid, who, M. Collantes informs me, has been instructed to visit, in the first place, the different fortresses, and to ascertain the opinions and views of their respective Governors on the question which is to form the subject of his future negotiations.

I quite understand the Spanish Government being anxious that some efficient measure should be adopted to prevent a recurrence of hostilities between the people of the Reef and the fortresses, as such hostilities are not only extremely irksome to the garrisons, but excite public opinion in Spain, and occasion calls upon the Government to send an expedition to Africa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Inclosure 1 in No. 64.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Extract.) *Tangier, January 7*, 1859.

YOU will have learnt how the old claims put forward by Spain have been met by Khateeb. In fact, he could not do otherwise; for if the Sultan consented to indemnify the Spaniards for vessels taken by the Reefians before the year 1855, he would be compelled to pay the claims of other nations of a similar nature, ourselves included; and he would rather have a quarrel with Spain alone than with half the nations of Europe.

I observe that you believe these claims are only brought forward to help on the Spanish negotiations for the arrangement of the frontier lines; but I think the Spanish Government are defeating their own object, for, unless the Sultan is prepared to show the Reefians he has been enabled to get justice done to them for the detention of their boats, &c., they will not obey his orders, if he is induced to take active measures to establish a neutral ground, &c., near to the Spanish African garrisons. I hope the Spaniards do not intend to bring forward these old claims to avoid refunding the property they have confiscated of the honest folk of Tetuan, and the poor sailors of Reef. I suspect, ere long, there will be foreign claimants for such compensation, as a French subject and a Neapolitan had property on board the Reef boats.

As to the restoration of the old limits which Spain possessed some 150 years ago, I do not think the Spanish Government will ever attain that object unless they enter upon a long and disastrous war; for, if I remember rightly, there are the ruins of old castles which belonged formerly to the Spaniards several miles distant from the town of Melilla. I have touched upon this subject with Khateeb in confidence, and his reply was, "Why don't they ask for the restoration of Oran which they (the Spaniards) possessed about the same time? whilst," he added, "we will ask for Algeciras, Granada, and Andalusia." It appears to me that the Spaniards might fairly insist upon the destruction of all Reefian works for attack in front of Melilla, and that a neutral ground be established, upon which the guards of neither party should encroach, except for a "parley." They might also demand that the Sultan should establish a guard-house, in the new Spanish lines, and place there an officer, with half a dozen Moorish soldiers, to superintend the placing of the Reef guards day and night, and that this officer be responsible to the Sultan for preserving the peace. This is what was arranged at Ceuta in 1855, and it has worked well.

Inclosure 2 in No. 64.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Sir, *Tangier, January 7*, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatches of the 8th and 20th ultimo, informing me that orders had been given for the release of the Reef boat "Maimon." The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has also communicated this circumstance to the Moorish Minister; but no distinct assurance appears to have been given about the restoration of the cargo, the value of which amounts, I believe, to about 950*l.*, while the boat itself is not, I suppose, worth more than 15*l.*

I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a despatch, under flying seal, which I have addressed to Lord Malmesbury, and which I request may be forwarded to its destination.

I am of opinion that the Spanish Government has acted unwisely in bringing forward these old claims, which had long been abandoned, for the Sultan would never agree to pay them, even at the risk of having his ports bombarded; and instead of facilitating future negotiation, the Sultan will probably declare that he adheres to the spirit of the XVth Article of the existing stipulations between Spain and Morocco, and will not interfere between the Spaniards and Reefians, even if the former declare they will send an expedition into Reef.

If the Spanish Government desires to strengthen the hands of the Sultan

in dealing with his refractory subjects of the Reef, regarding the limits of Melilla and other questions, it is of the greatest importance that, not only the boats, but their cargoes and crews, should be restored, and that they should all be delivered over to the Moorish Government in Tangier, and not in Reef.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 65.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 2.) *Tangier, January 6*, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a confidential letter addressed to me by Seid Mohamed Khateeb, and inclosing the draft of a note he is about to transmit to Don Juan Blanco, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in reply to a communication he received from that functionary on the 3rd instant, putting forward a claim for indemnity for five vessels taken by the Reef pirates during the last twenty years. Seid Mohamed Khateeb has also put into my hands the letter of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, which, in the Arabic language, is so badly expressed, as to be scarcely intelligible either to Khateeb or to myself. As far, however, as I could collect, it was couched generally in friendly terms, and Don Juan Blanco laid great stress upon the restoration of the boat "Maimon" as being a proof of the justice of the Spanish Government, and of their desire to act in a friendly manner towards the Moorish Government. Don Juan Blanco then puts forward in his letter the claim for five vessels taken by the Reef pirates since 1837, the value of which he estimates at about 30,000 dollars, intimating, as far as I could understand from the confused phraseology of the Arabic letter, that the reason why these claims have never been pressed before, proceeded from the remissness of his predecessors. Don Juan goes on to say, that if proofs were given that the capture, by the Spanish authorities at Peñon, of the two Reef boats was not justifiable, the boats would be restored; and he requests that the claim for the "Maimon" may be erased from the list of Moorish claims, as orders have been given for its release.

I will not encroach on your Lordship's time by recapitulating the arguments of the Moorish Government for resisting the claims for vessels captured by the Reefians prior to 1855, which arguments, however, do not appear to me to be unreasonable, as they are stated in the inclosed translation of the draft of Khateeb's letter. I have not attempted to counsel Seid Mohamed to alter his language, for I am thoroughly convinced the Sultan would rather go to war than accede to these claims, after the manner in which they have been put forward, and the inattention which has been hitherto shown to the representations of his Minister regarding the claims of the Reefians, and another claim for a fraud committed upon the Moorish Custom-house by Spanish subjects.

I suppose the object of the Spanish Government in bringing forward these obsolete claims is to produce a counter claim, and thus evade the restoration to the Moorish Government of the merchandize belonging to Moorish and foreign merchants captured on board the Reef boats, and amounting, I believe, in value to about 14,000 dollars, as will be seen on a reference to the inclosed list, which was communicated to me by Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

Should the Spanish Government continue to refuse to restore the boats of the Reefians, or pay the value of the property that was confiscated by the Spanish authorities, and sold, I believe, at Malaga, it will tend still further to weaken the position of the Sultan in the eyes of his unruly subjects of the Reef; and should the Spanish Government enter into discussion hereafter regarding the limits of Melilla, as I am told it is their intention to do, they can hardly expect the Moorish Government will pay the same attention as formerly to their wishes, or that, if the Sultan should even agree to alter the present frontier line round Melilla, the Reefians will be disposed to make any concession of territory to the Spaniards, when they have fresh in their memory the fact that their just demands have been lately rejected, notwithstanding the representations that have been repeatedly made by the Moorish Minister to the Government at

Moreover, if the boats of the Reefians engaged in peaceful trade can be seized and confiscated by the Spanish authorities at a moment of peace, without any declaration of war, and without any act of piracy having been committed by any Reefian boat during the last three years, a very dangerous precedent will be established, by which Moorish interests may, at any time, be most materially affected, as indeed the interests of other nations would be equally affected, if the Moorish Government were to consider that this is the admitted law of nations, and that, therefore, they would be justified in adopting a similar course when they have a claim, even of long standing, to put forward against an European Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Seid Mahomed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)
(After the usual preamble.) *January* 5, 1859.

WE transmit to you confidentially the copy of a letter we are about to address the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, in reply to the letter he lately addressed us. We wish you to be made acquainted with our letter, in order that you may know we are acting with good faith, and keeping in the straight path.

You are a man of discernment, and will be able to judge whether we are proceeding in a judicious manner.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

Draft of a Letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

(Translation.)
(After the usual compliments.) *January* 7, 1859.

WE have received your letter of the 31st December, and we have informed ourselves of its contents, and reciprocate all your expressions regarding the wishes of your Government to cement the bonds of friendship between the two Powers. Such is also the desire of our Lord, who wishes for peace and justice to all the world.

We have been surprised not a little at the demands for indemnity which you now put forward on account of certain vessels, captured by Reefians during the last twenty years, the date of the latest capture being more than five years ago, as this is the first time they have been made upon us; and it appears to us that it would have been more regular to have advanced and insisted upon the satisfaction of those claims (supposing that they were considered just) previously to 1855, and to have renewed your demand at the time that compensation was first applied for, for the loss of the "San Joachim," both by your predecessor and by yourself, but no mention was made of them.

His Majesty the Sultan cannot be held in any way responsible for acts committed by his lawless subjects of Reef previously to the year 1855. This answer has on several occasions been given to the Agents of other nations who have had ships taken from them by the Reefians before the year 1855; and the Sultan has ever declared that he could not pay for ships captured by the Reefians, inasmuch as the latter were at that time rebellious subjects, and acted in opposition to his will. In the year 1855 the Sultan sent an expeditionary army to Reef at a considerable expense, and inflicted a chastisement upon the pirates, namely, those of Akkalaya, there being no other piratical tribe: whereupon all the tribes promised to be guarantees that the Akkalayans should no longer commit piracies, and they have fulfilled their promises, but the Sultan cannot be responsible for the past, as he has declared to the Agents of other nations; for if he were to admit such a precedent, he would have to account to all nations for the conduct of his rebellious subjects from the most ancient times, and this he could never admit. You are not ignorant of the tenour of Article XV of the

Treaty between Spain and Morocco, which stipulates that the acts of the Reefians ought not to disturb the good relations between the two Powers, and that the Spaniards at the garrisons can repel the attacks of the Reefians with the fire of cannon.

Founding himself upon this stipulation, the Sultan refused, in 1855, to pay an indemnity for the "San Joachim," particularly as the Spanish Government had acted differently from the other nations, and had made reprisals upon the Reefians before the year 1855, taking, destroying, and burning their boats. The Moorish Government never claimed any indemnity for these acts of the officers of the Spanish garrisons in consequence of the wording of the above-mentioned Treaty; but on your renewing the claim on account of the vessel "San Joachim," captured in 1855, the Sultan satisfied it in order to give your Government a proof of friendship, as it was a matter of minor importance, and as he wished to show you that he was desirous of not doing less for Spain than he had accorded to France and Great Britain, and that he was prepared to take upon himself the responsibility for all the piracies which the Reefians might commit after the year 1855.

The capture of the "San Joachim," and other ships you mention, took place, as you know, much against the wishes of the Sultan, and those who took those vessels were pirates and rebellious subjects of Reef; but those acts were very different from the capture, this year, of three Reef boats, laden with the goods of peaceful merchants of the city of Tetuan, some of whom were Moorish subjects, and others the subjects of other nations; for these boats were taken by officers of the garrison of Peñon, whilst the poor Reefians were engaged in lawful traffic and navigating with ports of these dominions. The said boats had never been employed in piracy, and belonged to peaceful people who were seeking their livelihood in carrying on this traffic. Moreover, no piratical act had been committed in any part of Reef for three years prior to the capture of these mercantile boats.

The acts of your officers in capturing boats engaged in commerce, and in time of peace, can only be compared with what our conduct would be if we were to capture Spanish vessels trading with, entering, or passing by our ports: of all this you will, in your wisdom, be persuaded; and we are convinced that your Government, which would never approve of any unjust act, has been misinformed, and has thought that the boats lately captured belonged to pirates, which is not the case.

If the Reefians see that they cannot, with confidence, employ their boats in honest traffic, and that the Sultan cannot obtain justice for them when they are molested, it is not surprising that they should apply themselves to evil practices and disobey the orders of the Sultan, and they would not understand how your nation, which is a just one, allows to suffer poor Reefians, navigating with peacefully trading boats, laden with goods belonging to honest merchants of this Empire, because, many years ago, some other tribes, with whom they had nothing to do, molested the ships of your nation.

As for the "Maimon" and the cargo of her loading, we withdraw them from our demand, inasmuch as you have promised to give them up to us; but we request you to deliver them over to us here, with the crew and the merchandize, or the value of the latter; and we make the same demand with regard to the other boats.

We doubt not the wisdom of your Government, in seeing the justness of this demand, as soon as they know the true character of these boats. The latter are of the same character as the "Maimon," and, like her, were engaged in peaceful traffic, and were seized at a time when the Reefians had reason to trust that the vessels so employed would not be interfered with.

We hope you will lose no time in making your Government acquainted with all this; and that you will take steps to get the poor Reefian sailors and passengers sent here in the same way as we are doing all in our power to satisfy your wishes with regard to the Spaniards, captives in the hands of the Reefians.

I shall now forward a copy of your letter to the Sultan; but I have to inform you we understand very few words of it, as the scribe who translated it has not expressed himself in an intelligible manner in the Arabic.

Peace.

Inclosure 3 in No. 65.

List of Goods belonging to Merchants of Tetuan, and other persons, embarked on board three Reefian boats that were lately seized by the Spaniards.

(Translation from the Arabic.)

1st. In the month of Hedja 1274 (July 1858), one Reefian boat, name of the master Aisa. The goods embarked on board were the property of the agent of the merchant Mimon Coriat, of Tetuan, and consisted of brown cottons, calicoes, muslins, of all sorts, raw cotton, hardware, slippers, ploughshares, wheat, oil, Moorish cloth dresses, silk sashes, and iron for horse-shoes. Value of the whole 4,722 dollars 9 reals.

2nd. In the first month of the year 1275 (August 1858), one Reef boat, name of master Mohamed Ben Capem Saidy. Her cargo consisted of 66 bales of brown cottons, 1,654 pieces; 1 bale of mersayas, 196 pieces; 1 bale of muslins of different kinds; 1 bale of slippers; 19 baskets of hardware, henna, and slippers; 150 ploughshares.

3rd. Reef boat "Maimon," belonging to the Marabout, Sid Mohamed El Hadary, captured in the month of Rabia the First, 1275 (October 1858), name of master Hamoo and Taher Saidy, cargo 2,000 pieces of brown cottons, 1 basket of indigo (weight 50 lbs.), and 1 basket of hardware. Master's property, brown cottons, mersayas, muslins, ploughshares, clothes of master and crew. The list of all these goods and their value can be declared by the said master.

No. 65*.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 40.)

My Lord, *Madrid, January 29, 1859.*

HAVING been informed by Mr. Drummond Hay that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier had pressed the claims of Spain for compensation for vessels plundered by Reef pirates, referred to in your Lordship's despatch No. 145 of the 24th December, upon the attention of the Morocco Government in a menacing note dated the 13th instant, of which, I understand, a copy has been sent to your Lordship, I called, yesterday, upon M. Calderon Collantes, and read to his Excellency the assurances which he gave to me on this subject, and which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 4 of the 6th instant.

His Excellency said that I had reported his language correctly; though I was sorry to find that he spoke in a more decided manner as to the right of Spain to enforce the claims complained of than in my former conversations with him.

I have, therefore, addressed a despatch to Mr. Drummond Hay, acquainting him with the views of the Spanish Government, as far as they are known to me, of which I inclose a copy for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 65*.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, January 29, 1859.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 19th instant, together with its inclosures, on the subject of the claims against Morocco for compensation to the owners of vessels plundered some years ago by the Reef pirates, which have been lately presented to the Sultan's Minister by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

I have felt equal surprise and regret with yourself at the arrogant and menacing tone of the note addressed to Khateeb by the Spanish Chargé

d'Affaires on the 13th instant, and I congratulate you on having induced his Excellency to answer it in moderate language. Some time previously I had a conversation with M. Calderon Collantes, in which I received assurances from his Excellency which left me entirely unprepared for the course which things appear to be taking at Tangier, and I inclose, for your information, the copy of a report of these assurances, which I read yesterday to M. Collantes, and which he acknowledged to describe correctly the language which he had held to me. I observed, therefore, to his Excellency that I feared Her Majesty's Government would not be able to reconcile such language with the copy of Don Juan Blanco's note of the 13th instant, which is probably now in their possession, and he replied that no change had taken place in the views or intentions of the Spanish Government, and that by pressing the claims complained of upon the attention of the Government of Morocco, and endeavouring to effect some territorial arrangements which would secure their fortresses in future against insult, they were only actuated by an earnest desire to place their relations with the Sultan's Government on a satisfactory footing, and to remove every cause of misunderstanding between them, so that the Spanish Government might hereafter direct their undivided attention to the development of the resources of the country, and the amelioration of its institutions. Were they anxious, however, he said, to seek aggrandizement in Africa, they had ample means at their disposal for doing so; and that men, at all events, would not be wanting who would be ready to seek their fortunes in an enterprise against the Moors, as 5,000 applicants from Madrid alone had within the last month presented themselves, desirous of being sent as colonists to Fernando Po.

I urged upon M. Collantes' favourable consideration the arguments which had been advanced by Khateeb against the claims, but he maintained that the claims are all for acts of piracy committed subsequently to 1845; and this is probably the case, as I have reason to believe that one has been withdrawn since the presentation of Don Juan Blanco's note, as being of an earlier date than 1845.

I regret to say that he did not seem disposed to admit that the door which would be opened to claims from other countries, if those of Spain were granted, was a reason why she should desist from the prosecution of hers; and he endeavoured to show that the other Powers, who had made arrangements with Morocco in 1856, could have no right to bring forward old claims now; but I maintained that their position was entirely identical with that of Spain after she obtained redress for the "San Joachim." I regret to add, also, that M. Collantes did not confirm what I had been formerly given to understand as to the claims being merely used for the purpose of obtaining the territorial arrangements desired by the Spanish Government. I told him, however, that I had not only understood him to say so, but that M. Comyn had on repeated occasions assured me that this was the case.

You will be aware, before this time, that the Reef prisoners have been sent to Tangier, but I regret to say that intelligence has reached M. Collantes, from Melilla, which I trust may not prove correct, that the Reefians had treated with contempt the Sultan's order to give up the Spanish prisoners; and he said Spain would, in that case, be obliged to take immediately decided measures for obtaining their release, though he felt that such measures could not be taken without increasing the risk of war.

From these details you will learn that the Spanish Government appear quite determined to obtain from Morocco either compensation for the plundered vessels, or the acquisition of territory around the fortresses, if not both—influenced, perhaps, in some degree, by a hope that they may thus confirm their position at home, and strengthen their hold of office; and there are not wanting also other evidences, such as articles in Government newspapers, and observations of Marshal O'Donnell to his friends, which tend to prove that they are far from having abandoned the idea of sending an expedition to the Reef, if they have a fair pretext for doing so.

M. Collantes professed to be, and I believe is, honestly desirous of avoiding a collision with Morocco. He also speaks with respect of the Government of the Emperor, and acknowledges its good intentions; but though he says the mission of the present Spanish Government is to maintain peace, and to devote all their energies to home affairs, he may find that the policy which he is pursuing towards Morocco can only end in war, and that he may impose a drag-

chain on the resources of his country, which will effectually arrest her for many years in the progressive course of national prosperity upon which her friends have hoped that she had entered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 66.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)
Tangier, January 19, 1859.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the confidential despatch addressed to your Lordship by Mr. Buchanan, and marked No. 15 of the 10th instant, of which despatch his Excellency has been good enough to send me some extracts, relative to the Reef prisoners in the hands of the Spaniards, I have the honour to inclose, herewith, an extract from a private letter I have addressed this day to Mr. Buchanan, pointing out to him the discrepancies of M. Comyn's statements, from the facts of the case.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 66.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Extract.)
Tangier, January 20, 1859.

I HAVE to thank your Excellency for your kind wishes on the new year. It has not begun well, as far as the prospect of an amicable adjustment of the Mauro-Spanish differences is concerned, as you will learn by my other despatch of this date.

With reference to the information given to your Excellency by M. Comyn, reported in your despatch to Lord Malmesbury of the 10th instant, regarding the twenty-eight Reefians now in captivity in the hands of the Spaniards, stating that they "had been seized off the Zaffarine Islands and sent to Malaga after the capture of a Spanish officer and six soldiers by the people of Reef," it is not correct; the prisoners are the crews and passengers of the three trading-vessels taken by the Governor of Peñon from the Reefians several weeks before the seven Spaniards were made prisoners, on their invasion of the Reef territory to spike a gun; and, moreover, I understand that even the crew of the "Maimon" are still detained at Malaga by the Spanish authorities, though the boat and cargo have been given up. Amongst the twenty-eight Reefians, however, there are some persons who were captured near the Zaffarines, I believe, in a fourth boat, which was returning from a trading expedition to Oran, but for which boat or crew the Moorish Government has hitherto made no claim, as it is not with the consent of the Moorish Government that any Reef or Moorish boats should, without papers, extend their voyages beyond the Moorish coast.

The Moorish Government has acted with perfect good faith in endeavouring to obtain the liberation of the Spaniards, and they are now daily expected, and will be delivered up at once to Don Juan.

I have had, as you may suppose, considerable trouble in preventing Khateeb from retorting in a more angry tone to Don Juan's letter, but I am not sanguine about the prudence of the Sultan. I have told Khateeb, however, confidentially, that, should the Sultan be disposed to reject, in an angry manner, the present demands of the Spanish Government, it would be advisable that no further reply should be sent, for the present, to Don Juan on that subject, as I said I had hopes Don Juan had perhaps exceeded the tenour of his instructions in using such menacing language.

With regard to the query put to me by your Excellency about the two other boats claimed besides the "Maimon," they are the two first boats captured by the Spanish Governor at Peñon, before any conflict had taken place at Melilla, and, therefore, before the Spaniards were captured, and even before the "Maimon" was taken. Those two boats were laden, like the "Maimon," with merchandize, and were bound from Tetuan to the Reef Coast. The friendly Chief and owner of the "Maimon" has a share in one of them.

My Spanish colleague, for the last fortnight, has kept clear of me, except in friendly visits between our families, and then he has never opened his lips upon their differences with the Moors. As he appeared, from the first, to be very friendly disposed to me, and, I know, was personally anxious to settle all questions in an amicable manner, I conclude he has received instructions from Madrid to keep aloof. Of course I cannot impose upon him my counsels or views, and, unless he seeks me, I shall be silent; but if he gives me an opportunity to tell him my mind, I shall do so, and let him know that, as long as the demands put forward by his Government were fair and reasonable, I was most happy to give him my aid by counselling this Government to yield with a good grace, but that, as an Englishman, I could take no part in a dispute where there was not fair play.

I fear my colleague has, like most of his countrymen, a good deal of the character of Don Bombastes.

No. 67.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received February* 5.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)
Tangier, January 20, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, copies of the two despatches which I have addressed to Mr. Buchanan, transmitting to his Excellency translations of the correspondence which has taken place between Don Juan Blanco and Seid Mohamed Khateeb, as well as that between the latter functionary and myself, regarding the pending differences between Spain and Morocco, together with a copy and translation of Article XVI of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco, alluded to in the correspondence.

The tone and language adopted by Don Juan Blanco, regarding the claims now put forward by the Spanish Government, for vessels pillaged by the Reefians before the year 1855, appear to me to be totally at variance with the assurances given to Mr. Buchanan by the Spanish Minister at Madrid, that they were merely brought forward to facilitate the negotiation for a cession of territory at Melilla; for, as I have told Mr. Buchanan, in my secret despatch of yesterday's date, I do not see how the Spanish Government can, with dignity, withdraw the claims after its Representative has indulged in such imperative declarations.

My humble opinion is, that either the Spanish Government has been wilfully misleading Mr. Buchanan as to its intentions and views on Morocco, or that the tidings lately received that their differences with Mexico were about to be settled, has caused them to alter their policy towards this Government; and that General O'Donnell, setting aside all other considerations of the consequences which might ensue from disturbing the *status quo* of this country, has determined to seek for popularity in Spain by entering upon a war with Morocco.

If the Spanish Government were sincere in their desire for a peaceful and satisfactory arrangement, they would have fulfilled their repeated promises to Mr. Buchanan of sending instructions to Don Juan Blanco to place himself in confidential relations with me, knowing the active part which I had already taken in obtaining a successful issue to their first demand. It almost appears to me that the Spanish Government is now dissatisfied that that claim was ever settled, and that, therefore, they have raked up, in a most irregular manner, claims long ago dropped, of which good proof appears to be given by the fact stated in Seid Mohamed Khateeb's letter to me, and which is perfectly correct, that in 1845, when the relations between Spain and Morocco were broken off, and several demands put forward which were finally adjusted, when peaceful relations were restored and a Convention concluded, no question was ever raised about the Reef piracies. As I happened to act as mediator, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, for the arrangement of those differences, I can certify the truth of Seid Mohamed Khateeb's statement. It appears to me, therefore, most strange that these claims should now be brought forward; whilst the

special pleading of Don Juan in his letter, that a nation is justified in giving the precedence it thinks proper to any particular claim, and after its settlement bringing forward other and older claims, may, or may not, be correct according to international law, but, under any circumstances, it is not dignified, and it does not appear just.

When discussing the matter over with Khateeb, whom I have warned repeatedly that hostilities may ensue if the indemnity claimed is refused by the Sultan, he replied, he was persuaded His Majesty will never pay such a claim, especially after the vain-glorious and offensive language of the Spanish Representative. Moreover, he asked me what security would they have, even if the Sultan were to consent to pay such an unjust demand; for others still more ancient and obsolete might be brought forward in succession. And then again he said, "You have told me the Spanish Government intends to bring on a still more difficult and delicate question, regarding the arrangement of the frontier in front of Melilla;" and added that he did not foresee how the Moorish Government could avoid a conflict with Spain, unless the Sultan is prepared to make concessions which the Reef people would never grant, and which, he said, might endanger the position of His Majesty. Khateeb assured me, on the other hand, that the Moorish Government was disposed to do all that is reasonable and just, and would gladly enter into any feasible arrangement which might check the conflicts between the Reef people and the Spanish African garrisons.

I will now venture to submit to your Lordship some suggestions with regard to the manner in which, perhaps, a settlement of the claims might be effected, if, as I apprehend, the Spaniards are not disposed to withdraw them, and also with regard to the arrangement of the frontier line in front of Melilla.

I wish to mention, beforehand, that I could not engage the Moorish Government would accede to the arrangements I have now to propose, though I think it probable that if some satisfactory and reliable assurances were given by the Spanish Government, they would be accepted; and, if I were instructed to urge their acceptance upon Khateeb, and, in case of obstacles being offered here, in consequence of the natural timidity and indecision of that Minister, to proceed at once to the Moorish Court, and arrange the question with the Sultan himself, I believe the results I have to propose would be finally attained.

The claim of the Spanish Government for the five vessels captured by the Reefians during the last twenty years is 30,000 dollars. The claim of the Moorish Government, now that the cargo of the "Maimon" has been delivered, is, according to the account of property seized by the Spaniards, fully worth 10,000 dollars. The Spanish claim for five vessels, most of them, I believe, not exceeding 50 tons in burthen, is greatly exaggerated, and, I dare say, 10,000 or 15,000 dollars would more than compensate the proprietors. I would suggest, therefore, that both Governments should agree to withdraw their claims as balancing one another, but that the boats of the Reefians should be restored. The principal sufferers by such an arrangement would be the Moorish merchants of Tetuan, and not the Reefians.

With regard to the actual cession of territory at Melilla, I fear it would be out of the question, even if the Sultan were to send the most peremptory orders; for the Reef people, barbarians and outlaws as they are, have a great love of their country, and, I do not believe, would ever cede voluntarily any territory to the Spanish nation, even though it were bought by weight of gold, and that a long and bloody war would alone compel them to submit to the disgrace of making a grant of territory to the Christian.

The Spanish authorities at Melilla have, I believe, recommended their Government that they should demand from the Moors the old forts possessed by the Spaniards at the period they held Oran; some of these outworks, if I remember right, being upwards of two miles from the fortress. This could never be effected by peaceful negotiaon; and Seid Mohamed Khateeb replied to me humorously, when I spoke of these old forts, that the Sultan would send orders for them to be restored to the Spaniards as soon as the French gave up Oran to the Spanish nation, and we English gave up Gibraltar to the Moors, the ancient possessors of that fortress.

I must avow, however, the present position of the Spaniards at Melilla is intolerable; and I am only surprised they have so long allowed such a state of things to continue, for some of the outworks of the Reefians are almost within stone-throw of the town; and any wild Reefian who wishes to amuse himself by

shooting a Christian, even whilst the most peaceful relations are prevailing, crawls up to an eminence about a hundred yards from the walls of Melilla, whence he can peer into the town, and, after taking quiet aim, shoots down a soldier or citizen, as he may fancy to be the most convenient target for his long musket. The Spaniards have, on the other hand, from time to time retaliated such barbarities on the Reefians.

My idea of what would be feasible to arrange, without recourse to a long and disastrous war between the Reefians and Spaniards, would be the establishment of a reasonable neutral ground between the forts and the Reefian lines, the destruction of all the places of attack near the town, and their removal to beyond the range of cannon-shot. The Sultan should, at the same time, cause a guard-house or fort to be built on the Reefian lines, and have it tenanted by a Kaid or superior officer, who should be selected from the Kaids appointed by the Sultan, and be an inhabitant of Tangier, and on that account better disposed towards Christians than the officers at the Moorish Court generally are. He should also have under his command a few subalterns, and appoint the necessary guards on the lines, not allowing the Reef chieftains to interfere, as they have hitherto done, when each tribe, according to its turn, supplied a guard.

The Reefians could then be made to understand that there is no cession of territory, but that there is a neutral ground belonging to neither party, and that the Spanish Government engages henceforth to allow all Reef boats engaged in peaceful traffic to pass unmolested their African garrisons, and that they would continue to do so as long as the Reefians act in a peaceful manner towards the inhabitants of the said garrisons.

As the Reefians attach great importance to their coasting trade with Tetuan, the latter arrangement would be a great inducement to them to agree to all the others, especially if they were distinctly assured that their boats would be captured, without distinction, if the pact were broken. Thus, also, the peaceably-disposed tribes who have boats would be interested in compelling the more warlike not to enter upon hostilities which would be injurious to their interests.

The Spanish authorities of the garrisons have never carried out this method of securing the goodwill of the Reefians, for I fear, from what I have heard of the proceedings of the Spanish officers appointed to the command of these fortresses, that they have been engaged with the Reefians in smuggling transactions, bribing, and receiving bribes from the Reefians, without regard to the interests or honour of their country.

With regard to the question of provisioning the Spanish garrisons from the mainland, I fear that would never be acceded to. Even at Ceuta, where the most friendly relations exist, not a loaf of bread, with the consent of the Moorish Government, is allowed to pass, and the Spanish African forts have been, as it were, from time immemorial in a state of blockade; but as it is the interest of the Moorish officers who command the guard to secure the goodwill of the Spanish Governors, and to receive every now and then a small present, it has always been the custom to allow tacitly that fresh provisions should pass the Moorish lines; and the Moorish Government, though cognizant of the fact, have taken no steps to prevent the provisioning of the garrison by land, as long as they are not called upon to declare, in a formal manner, that they authorize the provisioning of a fort held by a Christian Power on the land of the Mussulman.

These, my Lord, are the propositions I beg to submit for a peaceful solution of the differences between Spain and Morocco; but if, as I apprehend, the Spanish Government is bent upon having an opportunity of making a display of its power in Morocco, I would beg to observe, that it would be far more desirable, of the two evils, that the Spanish Government should send an expedition to Reef, and confine the war to that portion of the Sultan's territory, than to break off relations with the Sultan, and bombard his ports, though, as I have said before, if hostilities were engaged in on a large scale in Reef; if the war were prolonged; if an attempt were made to retain, after conquest, any portion of the Reef territory, and success attended the Spanish arms, the Sultan would finally be compelled to take part in the war against the Spaniards, or he would become so unpopular amongst the fanatical portion of his subjects, that the security of his Throne and dynasty would be endangered, and a state of anarchy and revolution would follow throughout the whole country; but if the Spaniards

confined themselves solely to a razzia in Akkalaya, and to taking possession of the ground within cannon-shot of the fortress, and this was effected in a prompt and successful manner, their Chargé d'Affaires might, possibly, continue to carry on his relations with the Moorish Government, after notifying to the Sultan that, as the Spanish Government had received an assurance from His Majesty that he could not be responsible for the past acts of violence of his subjects; as His Majesty could not enter into any arrangement regarding the cession of territory round Melilla; and as his rebellious subjects were not disposed to listen to the commands of their Sovereign on such a subject, Spain would take the matter into her own hands, but continue to remain on friendly terms with the Moorish Government, as long as it did not aid its rebellious subjects of Reef in resisting her arms.

Such a course would certainly place matters on the brink of a precipice, but this would be better than that Spain should take a headlong leap, and rush into a war with Morocco; for I am persuaded that, even if every port were bombarded, the question of the Melilla frontier would not be altered thereby, but, on the contrary, the disposition of the Reefians to resist any concession, as well as the orders of their humiliated Sultan, would be greater than ever.

In conclusion, I may add, as connected with this subject, that though the Moorish Government has not, I believe, abandoned the scheme of building a town or port on the Reef coast, yet such is the backwardness of the Sultan to adopt any vigorous measures in Reef, from a fear, I suppose, it might possibly create further opposition to his will on the part of his lawless subjects of that district, that the undertaking has been put off from summer to summer, and now, again, as the Moorish expression goes, "till God pleases." I will not repeat here the arguments I submitted to Her Majesty's Government in my despatch No. 5 of the 28th January, 1857, when I recommended the building of the town should be urged on the attention of this Government; but I am convinced that if it could be effected, it will afford the best means of preventing questions like the present—one between Spain and Morocco, and, hereafter, perhaps, with France—being raised. As directed by your Lordship, I have repeatedly urged, both verbally and by letter, on Khateeb's attention, the advisability of building the town in Reef, but, as yet, no result has been obtained. If, however, Her Majesty's Government should think it expedient that I should go, this spring, or sooner, to the Moorish Court, I might possibly be enabled, by a personal communication with the Sultan, to effect that which has not been attained by a written correspondence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 67.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Sir, *Tangier, January* 19, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Excellency's information, the translation of a further correspondence that has taken place between the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires and the Moorish Minister; as, also, translations of the letters which have passed between Seid Mohamed Khateeb and myself regarding the present differences existing between the Spanish and Moorish Governments.

It is with extreme regret that I have observed the tone adopted by Don Juan Blanco in the communication which he addressed to Seid Mahomed Khateeb, on the 13th instant, in reply to the note he had received from the latter, of which a translation was forwarded to your Excellency on the 7th instant.

Lord Malmesbury had already informed your Excellency that I have been instructed not to interfere any longer in the discussions which my Spanish colleague may be engaged in with the Moorish Government regarding these old claims on behalf of Spanish vessels plundered by the Reefians.

The fact alluded to by Seid Mohamed Khateeb, in his letter to Don Juan Blanco, that when, in 1845, relations were broken off between Spain and

Morocco, and several claims and demands put forward by the former Power, which were finally adjusted, no mention was made of any claim for vessels plundered by Reefian pirates, is perfectly correct, and is, I think, a sufficient argument to show that the Spanish Government did not consider, at that time, they would be justified in putting forward any such claim, and that they ought not, therefore, to raise any question upon this point now, after the lapse of so many years.

I regret to add, I do not think there is the slightest hope that the Sultan will consent to liquidate these claims, even though I were instructed by the British Government to urge upon this Government the necessity of their making such a concession.

I must add, in conclusion, that the tone of Don Juan Blanco's letter is the more surprising, as he knows the praiseworthy exertions which have been made by this Government to effect the release of the captive Spaniards, who are daily expected from the Reef country.

I have counselled Khateeb to continue to act in the same conciliatory spirit as he has hitherto done, and deliver up the Spaniards on their arrival. He has promised me he will do so, though he is extremely displeased with the language and conduct of Don Juan Blanco; and, if the Spanish Government does not deliver up the Moorish prisoners when the Spaniards are restored, I think your Excellency will agree with me in thinking they will have broken faith with regard to the assurances they have made, through your Excellency, to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I further inclose, for your Excellency's information, the copy of Article XVI of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco, alluded to in the accompanying correspondence.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure 2 in No. 67.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Secret.) *Tangier, January* 19, 1859.

Sir,

THE arrogant letter addressed by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to the Moorish Minister on the 13th instant, and the menacing language he has held, precludes, I fear, all prospect of an amicable settlement; for Spain could not, with dignity, retire from the false position which has been assumed by her Representative. The obsolete claims are no longer put forward, it would appear, with the view of obtaining, as a settlement, a cession of territory, for the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires declares, in his letter, Spain will enter upon hostilities if they are not liquidated. I have pointed all this out to the Moorish Minister, and have told him clearly that, if the indemnity is not paid, I feared the Spanish Government was anxious to have an opportunity of going to war with this country, as their differences with Mexico were on the point of being arranged.

He replied, he was convinced the Sultan would never pay the indemnity.

I shall submit to Lord Malmesbury more fully my views on this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 67.

Don Juan Blanco to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

13 *de Enero de* 1859.

HE recibido la nota que en respuesta á la que os dirijí en 31 de Diciembre ultimo, me habeis enviado en 8 del actual.

Su lectura ha producido en mi animo gran sorpreza y no menor disgusto, porque el espiritu de vuestro escrito está bien lejos de corresponder á los nobles

y conciliadores propósitos de Gabinete de Madrid, fielmente espresados en el mio. Os lo digo con franqueza y lealtad. No esperaba del claro talento, ni de la prudencia que tanto os han distinguido, hubierais tratandose de un asunto en estremo grave, como lo son siempre los que se versan entre naciones, echado sobre vos solo, sin esperar la decision Cherifiana, la inmensa responsabilidad de la negativa que implicitamente envuelven vuestras palabras, á las justisimas demandas que, cumpliendo con las órdenes mas energicas y terminantes, he estado en el deber de haceros. Confesad que no lo habeis meditado bien.

En mi reclamacion, no habeis visto á lo que parece, mas que una pequeña question de intereses, una cantidad de ducados mas ó menos crecida; pero nada mas.

Si asi lo habeis pensado siento, decíros lo, habeis incurrido en un error lastimoso. La altiva nacion Española es sobrado rica y poderosa para descender de su magestuosa altura á demandar unos cuantos miles de reales por solo el placer de llenar con ellos algun vacio imperceptible en las arcas de su Erario.

Para el pueblo Hispanol generoso é hidalgo por escelencia, para el Govierno de mi augusta Soberana, que tan sabiamente lo dirije, esa insignificante suma, esos treinta mil duros á que esciende la indemnizacion aproximada de los cinco buques apresados, saqueados y destruidos por los piratas del Reef, representan una cosa mas grande, mas elevada, mas estimable. Representan su dignidad ultrajada, su pabellon menos cabado por miserables bandidos que no por serlo, que no por haber sido rebeldes al Emperador, vuestro amo, cuya magestad impensadamente amenguais afreciendola á mis ojos hasta época no remota en el humillante estado de la impotencia, dejaban ni dejaron, de ser sus vasallos.

Las ofensas y frequentes alaques á la honra y propiedades Españolas, en Marruccos se perpetraron, por subditos del Sultan se cometieron. A este corresponde pues, el desagravio, la satisfaccion, la subnacion completa de los daños y perjuicios con este motivo ocasionados.

Vuestro amo y Señor no puede negarse á cosa tan justa y no se negará, seguro estoy de ello, porque la paz y la tranquilidad de sus Estados, porque su propia dignidad y la amistad que á la España su vecina y antigua aliada le une, pesan demasiado en la balanza de su sano criterio y de su fria razon para no proceder segun los justos deseos de mi ilustrado Gobierno.

Escusable seria, si escusa mereciese lo que es injusto, vuestra inesperada negativa, si en razones, siquiera sofisticas, la apoyaseis.

Comenzais por estrañar, que os reclame la indemnizacion de cinco buques cuyos valores sirvieron de pasto á los instuitos vandalicos de los Moros del Reef, porque mi demanda se funda en hechos piráticos, que ocurrieron hace algunos años.

Al espresaros así, al demostrar vuestra estrañeza, basada en fundamentos tan deleznables, aparentais ignorar, que no prescribe, así entre naciones, como entre particulares, la accion legal para pedir el resarcimiento de daños causados por agresiones injustas, y que la antiguedad de las reclamaciones no destruye el principio que la obligacion subsiste, si se reclamó contra el hecho, que la motiva, al tiempo que este hecho tuvo lugar.

En este caso nos encontramos. La indemnizacion por las perdidas de los espresados buques fué exigida cuando estas ocurrieron. Esto debeis saberlo, aunque no acaecio en vuestro tiempo, de la misma manera que á mi me consta; pues asi como en el archivo de esta Mision existen las notas de los que os precedíeron en vuestro puesto oficial, en respuesta á las que les dirijieron mis antecesores así mismo deben hallarse estas en el vuestro. Si lo dudais os facilitare copias de ellas.

Pero vuestra estrañeza no se funda en esto solo; reconoce otras causas. La circunstancia de no haberse entablado dichas demandas in durante lo cinco años en que dirijis los negocios estericres de vuestro pais, ni al iniciarse la del falucho "San Joaquim," ni cuando renové esta en Setiembre último, son para nos motivos mas que suficientes para producirosla y para poner en duda su legitimidad.

Pues qué ¿la representacion aislada de la reclamacion del falucho "San Joaquim" puede ser motivo para suponer el abandono por parte del Gobierno Español de todas las reclamaciones anteriores á ella? Los Gobiernos, su casos á este semejantes, pueden establecer el órden de prelacion que mas convenga á sus intereses, sin que de esto pueda sacarsé argumento alguno en contra de la validez de sus demandas.

Las reclamaciones del "Caiman," "Nerja," "Emilia," "Santo Cristo," y "Carmen," se encuentren en las mismas condiciones que la del falucho "San Joaquim," y el Gobierno de Sua Magestad Catolica se cree con sobradisima razon, en la obligacion imprescindible de alcanzar para los dueños de aquellos, como ha alcanzado para los de este, la debida indemnizacion.

El Gabinete de Madrid, por benevolos que sean sus sentimientos hacia el Emperador vuestro Amo, no puede prescindir de atender, como debe, las reclamaciones harto justas de los dueños del caseo y cargamentos de las cinco mencionadas embarcaciones, y está resuelto, sabedlo bien, á obtener por ellas la debida reparacion.

Si haci no lo hiciera, si desistiese por su propia voluntad de su firme y deliberado propósito, hariase implicitamente responsable al resarcimiento de daños por vosotros ocasionados.

Un Gobierno justo y equitativo, un Gobierno que esta en la obligacion de velar por los intereses de sus subordinados, un Gobierno en suma, que estima, como el de España, en grado tan alto su dignidad, y que no quiere esponerse á perder el prestigio y la consideracion de que disfruta merecidamente en su pais y en toda Europa, no puede ni debe abandonar por mas tiempo la terminacion de un asunto para él tan importante. Si el Sultan vuestro amo no se ha hecho cargo, como decis, de los malos procederes de sus rebeldes vasallos los Rifeños, ni responde de nada de cuanto han hecho en la funesta via de las depredaciones y de las rapiñas, anteriormente al año de 1855, si en tan poco estimase, lo que me permito dudar, la paz de su pueblo, pronto vera llover sobre él desastres y desventuras, porque para la nacion Española ha sonado ya la hora de hacerse por su propia mano, si por medios pacificos no puede conseguirlo, cumplidisima justicia.

Si otras naciones, que no tienen cerca de vosotros los grandes e inmediatos intereses que nuestra vecindad establece, ni has recibido agravios, ni ultrajes, tan enormes, ni en tan crecido numero, se conformaron como asegurais, con semejante respuesta, la España, ni su Govierno, piensan del mismo modo, ni pueden prestar la misma conformidad. Si vuestro amo no pudo ó no quiso hacer entrar en razon á sus vasallos del Riff hasta el año de 1855, culpa sera suya y no de la España, y de esa culpa, como vuestra ilustracion no desconocerá, no es esta la que ha de sufrir las consequencias; pues la indemnizacion de daños corresponde con arreglo al derecho de gentes al Soberano del pais, cuyos habitantes faltaron á la ley de las naciones.

Si los Rifeños fueron, como decis, rebeldes á los preceptos del Sultan, si Kabilas enteras se ejercitaron, durante una larga y no interrumpida seria de años, en el defando y repugnante trafico de la pirateria y en saquear y asesinar bárbaramente á navegantes indefensos, si el Emperador vuestro amo, ya que incurrio en la deplorable flaqueza de no castigarlas tan severamente, como sus atentados y sus crimenes merecian, exigales, en cambio al menos, para satisfacernos, y reintegrarse el resarcimiento de los daños que premeditamente ocasionaron, pues por penoso que esto pueda serle, debe preferirlo á malquistarse con una nacion á la que le ligan aun antiguos lazos de amistad.

Llegamos a vuestro argumento capital, al Articulo XV del Tratado entre las dos Potencias, tras del cual os abroquelais, como tras de inexpugnable baluarte.

Escudado con lo que en dicho Articulo se prescribe, rechazais como inadmissible mi reclamacion, fundandoos para ello, "en que no seran causas para altear las buenas relaciones de amistad entre ambas partes los malos procederes que cometan los Rifeños contra las plazas Españolas, porque estas estan por el mismo autorizados á repelerlos con la fuerza."

Al trascribirme estas palabras no habeis tenido presente que en mi demanda no se trata de agresiones á las espresadas fortalezas, sino á los buques que navegan pacificamente é inermes por aquellos mares, á los que vuestros compatriotas del Riff, violando el derecho de gentes, atacaban, saqueaban, y apresaban, matando alevosamente á sus indefensos tripulantes.

Pero aunque el precitado Articulo tuviese, que no la tiene ciertamente, aplicacion al caso presente, puesto que por él si bien se le concede á mi Govierno el derecho de castigar á los culpables, no renuncio ni renunciar podía á la indemnizacion de los daños ocasionados á su comercio maritimo, ni por ello se disminuyo en manera alguna la responsabilidad del Sultan.

Al convenir los dos Goviernos en el mencionado Articulo, no tuvieron ni

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pudieron tener la intencion de renunciar uno y otro al derecho de exijir la justa reparacion del detrimento originado à sus súbditos, y esta es la que se pide al Emperador, como Señor de los Rifeños y Soberano legitimo de aquellos territorios.

Una prueba clara de mi incontrovertible aserto la encontrareis, sin ir mas lejos, en las palabras mismas de vuestra nota.

¿ En que os fundais para pedir la delucion ó indemnizacion de los carabos apresados en el Peñon ?

" En que navegaban confiados en la paz y en el lícito comercio que ejercian en los puertos de estos dominios :" esto es en los mismos argumentos, que aduzco para demandar el resarcimiento de las perdidas de los cinco buques, que os he reclamado, los cuales navegaban, come aquellos, pácificamente. Y sin embargo vuestros carabos se encuentran en caso bien distinto, puesto que caminaban sin pasaporte, requisito indispensable al tenor del Articulo XVI, que dice: " Que los buques que naveguen por aquellos mares sin el pasaporte conveniente, serán detenidos, conducidos al puerto mas cercano, y entregador al Governador de aquel ;" ó lo que es lo mismo, que los buques que se consideren sospechosos, por carecer de los requisitos necesarios, debian ser apresados con arreglo á las disposiciones del comercio.

Como veis vuestros mismos argumentos se vuelven contra vos, á la vez que fortalecen los mios, sì de tal fortaleza necesitacen, que de seguro no la necesitan.

Al insistir en vuestra demanda a pesar de haberos asgurado en mi anterior escrito que, si razon teniais, se os haria prontamente justicia, de la misma manera, que se os habia dispensado cumplida con la devolucion del carabo " Maimon," dejais entrever, con el son de amenaza, que si los Rifeños no recobran sus embarcaciones, no debera estranarze que vuelvan á sus piraterías é incurran de nuevo en la disobediencia á las disposiciones del Emperador vuestro amo.

Si así aconteciera, si el Sultan lo tolerase ó prefiriese que la España se encargase de revindicar sus derechos y de castigar tales desmanes, digalo francamente, y el Gobierno de mi Reyna, que dispone, como sabeis, de no escasos medios materiales, no tardara en hacer sentir á esas tribus salvages el peso abumador de su indignacion y fiereza.

Las cosas han llegado á un punto que si el tino y la prudencia nos abandonan, consecuencias desastrosas vos esperan. Evitemoslas, que aun es tiempo. A objeto tan laudable se dirijen mis esfuerzos. Si estos fueran inutiles, porque no me prestárais vuestra ayuda eficaz, y os obstinaseis en dar frivolas escusas á mis justas demandas en vez de inclinar á vuestro Señor y amo á concederlas, la grave responsabilidad de las peligrosas eventualidades que de seguro sobrevendrán, no será ciertamente mia.

El honor de la España exije impenosamente acabar de una vez con el estado de cosas anomalo y ya insostenible en que se encuentran respectivamente ambas Potencias, y el Gobierno de mi Augusta Soberana esta resuelto, si sus justas reclamaciones son debidamente atendidas, á establecer sobre anchas y sólidas bases una situacion de cordial inteligencia y de buena é imperecedera amistad.

Meditad bien vuestra respuesta.

Y la paz.

El Encargado de Negocios y Consul-General de España,
(Firmado) J. BLANCO DEL VALLE.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) *January* 13, 1859.

I HAVE received the note which, in reply to the one which I addressed to you on the 31st of December last, you sent to me on the 8th instant. The perusal of it has produced in my mind great surprise and displeasure, for the spirit of your communication is far from corresponding with the noble and conciliatory propositions of the Cabinet of Madrid, which were faithfully expressed in my note. I state this to you with frankness and sincerity. I did not expect from the clear talent and prudence with which you are so much distinguished, that you would, while treating a question of extreme gravity, as those which pend between nations always are, have taken upon yourself alone, without waiting for the Sherifian decision, the very great reponsibility of the

negative, which your words implicitly convey, to the very just demands which, in accordance with the most energetic and final orders, it has been my duty to make upon you. Confess that you have not meditated well.

In my claim you have only discovered, as it would appear, a petty question of interest—a quantity of ducats, more or less in amount, and nothing more. If such has been your idea, I am sorry to tell you that you have fallen into a grievous error. The exalted Spanish nation is too eminently rich and powerful to descend from its majestic and elevated position and ask for a few thousand reals for the sake of filling up with them some imperceptible vacuum in the coffers of the Exchequer. In the view of the Spanish people, generous and noble *par excellence*, in the view of the Government of my august Sovereign, who has so wisely ordained it, this insignificant sum, these 30,000 dollars. which the approximate value of the indemnity of the five ships captured, pillaged, and destroyed, by the pirates of Reef amounts to, represent something greater, higher, and more important. They represent her dignity outraged, her flag lowered by miserable bandits, who, although they are, and have been, rebels to the Emperor your master, whose majesty you thoughtlessly defame when you represent it to my view as having been, up to an epoch not remote from the present, in the humiliating state of impotence, have not discontinued from being, nor will they discontinue to be, his vassals.

Insults and repeated attacks upon the honour and property of Spain have been perpetrated in Morocco, have been committed by subjects of the Sultan. To them are due, therefore, amends, satisfaction, and complete reparation, for the losses and prejudices thus occasioned.

Your Lord and Master cannot oppose himself to anything so just, and will not do so, I am convinced of it ; for the peace and tranquillity of his dominions, his own dignity, and the friendship that unites him to Spain, his neighbouring and ancient ally, weigh too heavily in the balance of his sound and discerning mind, and of his cool reason, for him not to cede to the just wishes of my illustrious Government.

Your unexpected negative would be excusable, if what is unjust is deserving of excuse, if you supported it with reasons, however sophistical.

You begin by expressing astonishment at the idea of the claim for the indemnity of the five ships, the value of which served to nourish the Vandal instincts of the Reefian Moors, being urged upon you, because my demand is based upon piratical acts committed some years ago.

In expressing yourself thus, in demonstrating your enterprize, based upon foundations so weak, you give me to understand that you are ignorant of the fact that the law, with regard to the seeking of amends for injuries caused by unjust aggressions, does not so prescribe between nations, as between private individuals, and that the antiquity of the claims does not destroy the principle that the obligation remains, if a protest was entered against the act which gave rise to it at the time such act took place. We find ourselves in this case : indemnity for the losses of the ships in question was pressed for at the time of their occurrence. This you ought to know, although the occurrences did not take place in your time, in the same way as I am informed upon the point ; for, as in the archives of this Mission exist the notes of those who preceded you in office, in reply to those which my predecessors addressed to them, so ought they to be in your archives. If you doubt the fact, I can furnish you with copies of this correspondence.

But your surprise is not based on this alone ; it has reference to other causes. The fact that the claims in question had not been brought forward, either within the period of the five years during which you have directed the foreign affairs of your country, or at the time the claim of the falucho " San Joaquim " was first advanced, or when I renewed the latter claim, in September last, is, with you, a more than sufficient motive for exhibiting it (your surprise), and questioning the legitimacy of the demand.

What ! Can the advancing of the isolated claim of the felucca " San Joaquim " be a just ground for imagining the abandonment by the Spanish Government of all claims prior to it ? Governments can, in cases analagous to the present one, establish the order of precedence that may best suit their interests, without giving rise to any argument against the validity of their demands.

The claims of the " Caiman," " Nerja," " Emilia," " Santo Cristo," and

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

"Carmen," are exactly similar in their nature and condition to that of the felucca "San Joaquim;" and the Government of Her Catholic Majesty considers itself to be, with the greatest reason, under the unavoidable obligation of obtaining for the proprietors of those vessels the indemnity due to them, in the same way as it has succeeded in obtaining compensation for the last-named vessel.

The Cabinet of Madrid, however benevolent its sentiments may be towards the Emperor, your master, cannot but pay attention to, as it ought to do, the very just claims of the proprietors of the hulls and cargoes of the five ships in question, and is determined, be assured of the fact, to obtain for them the reparation due. If it did not do so, if it departed, of its own free will, from its firm and deliberate intention, it would implicitly render itself responsible for the indemnification of injuries occasioned by you.

A just and equitable Government, a Government that is bound to watch over the interests of its subjects, a Government, in fact, which estimates so highly its dignity as does that of Spain, and which will not incur the risk of losing the well merited prestige and consideration it enjoys in its own country and all over Europe, cannot, and ought not to, abandon any longer the settlement of a question so important to it.

If the Sultan, your master, has not made himself accountable, as you say, for the evil doings of his rebellious subjects of Reef, and will not answer for anything they have done in the fatal course of depredation and rapine previously to the year 1855; if, as I permit myself to doubt, he puts so small a price upon the peace of his people, he will soon see raining down upon them misfortune and disaster, for the hour has already arrived for the Spanish nation to obtain for herself, and with her own hands, the most complete justice, if she cannot acquire it by peaceful means.

If other nations, who do not have amongst you those great and immediate interests which our proximity to each other gives us, have not received insults or outrages so enormous or so frequent as we have, and have, as you state, put up with such a reply, neither Spain nor her Government entertains their views in this matter, nor can we be equally conformable as they (the other nations) are.

If your master was not able or willing to bring his Reefian subjects to their senses, before the year 1855, the fault lay with him, and not with Spain; and of this fault, as your high intelligence will point out to you, it is not the latter (Spain) that should suffer the consequences, for the Sovereign of a country must be held responsible for the settlement of indemnities claimed on account of injuries inflicted by his subjects who have so infringed the Law of Nations.

If the Reefians were, as you say, rebels against the authority of the Sultan; if whole kabyles accustomed themselves, during a long and uninterrupted series of years, to carry on the nefarious and repugnant traffic of piracy, and rob and barbarously murder defenceless navigators; and the Emperor your Master, now that he has fallen into the deplorable weakness of not punishing them so severely as his lawless and criminal subjects deserved, were to compel them, for the sake of reciprocity at least, in order to satisfy us and restore his own integrity, to make reparation for the injuries they have premeditatedly occasioned, however painful this task might be to him, he ought to prefer it to acquiring the enmity of a nation to which he has been bound by ancient ties of friendship.

We arrive at your principal argument, Article XV of the Treaty between the two Powers, behind which you take shelter as behind an impregnable bastion. Shielded by what is laid down in that Article, you repel as inadmissible my claim, basing yourself on the statement "that the evil acts which the Reefians may commit against the Spanish garrisons shall not be deemed causes for altering the good relations of friendship between both parties, because the Spanish garrisons are, by the same stipulation, authorized to repel them by force." In addressing to me these words, you had not taken note that my demand has no reference whatever to aggressive acts against the fortresses alluded to, but merely to the ships which, whilst navigating peacefully and unarmed about those waters, your compatriots of Reef, in violation of the Law of Nations, attacked, pillaged, and captured, murdering treacherously their defenceless crews. But even if the above-cited Article applied—which it certainly does not do—to the present case, although it so clearly cedes to my Government the right of chastising the

offenders, it did not renounce, nor could it renounce, the act of indemnifying injuries occasioned to her maritime commerce, nor diminish in the least the responsibility of the Sultan. In concluding the Article above mentioned, the two Governments did not, and could not, intend that one or other of them should renounce the right of exacting a just reparation for an injury done to its subjects, and this is what is demanded of the Emperor, or Lord, of the Reefians, and legitimate Sovereign of those territories. A clear proof of my indisputable assertion you will find, without going further, in the very words of your note. On what grounds do you demand the restoration or indemnity, of the caraboes captured at Peñon? On the grounds "that they were navigating in peace, and engaged in the licit commerce which they carried on at the ports of these dominions." This is the very argument I adduce in demanding an indemnity for the loss of the five ships, which ships were navigating, like the others, peacefully. Moreover, your caraboes were found in a very different case, for they were navigating without a passport, which is required indispensable, and in conformity with the terms of Article XVI, which says, "that the ships that navigate those seas without the required passport, shall be detained, conveyed to the nearest port, and delivered over to the Governor of the latter," or, what is the same, that the ships which may be considered suspicious, in consequence of their being wanting in the formalities required of them, ought to be captured, according to the tenour of the Treaty.

As you see, your own arguments fall back against you, whilst they strengthen mine, if the latter stood in need of such strength, which assuredly they do not.

In urging your claim—notwithstanding it had been assured to you in my former communication that, if you had reason, justice would be promptly done to you, in the same way as justice was done to you by the restoration of the carabo "Maimon"—you gave me to understand that, if the Reefians do not get their boats back, it must not be wondered at that they should return to their piratical operations, and act in disobedience to the orders of the Emperor your Master.

If it should so happen, if the Sultan should tolerate it, or prefer that Spain should take upon herself to vindicate her rights, and punish such disorders, say so frankly, and the Government of my Queen, which has, as you know, at its disposition no limited means, will not be tardy in making these wild tribes to feel the oppressive weight of its indignation and fierceness.

Things have come to such a pitch that, if judgment and prudence abandon us, disastrous consequences will await us. Let us avoid them; there is yet time. To so laudable an object are my exertions directed. If these are useless, because you do not lend me your efficacious aid, and persist in giving frivolous excuses to my just demands, instead of inclining your Lord and Master to concede them, the grave responsibility of the dangerous eventualities which will assuredly happen will not certainly be mine.

The honour of Spain demands imperatively that the anomalous and unsupportable position in which both Powers find themselves shall be brought at once to a close; and the Government of my august Sovereign is determined, if her just claims are duly satisfied, to fix upon a wide and solid basis a state of cordial understanding and of good and imperishable friendship.

Meditate well your reply.

Peace.

The Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General for Spain,
(Signed) J. BLANCO DEL VALLE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 67.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 12 *Jumada*, 1275. (*January* 17, 1859.)

I SEND herewith inclosed a letter that has been addressed to me by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, and I beg of you to take cognizance of it, and to remark how he speaks with discourtesy and disrespect of our Lord the Sultan, omitting what would be proper to say when he mentions the name of our Lord, may God protect him!

We were on the point of replying as is called for to all this, but we have sent it to you, in the first place, for perusal. This person appears to have formed an erroneous opinion regarding himself, and he thinks apparently very much of his knowledge and judgment, but it has pleased God he should not know himself. We shall refrain from talking of our strength and power, but shall keep within the bounds of what is right, and not trespass upon the limits of etiquette, for, thank God, we still have life in us, and death has not yet come upon us.

He, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, is newly appointed here, and I suppose that, because he has seen this town and its vicinity, he thinks all the dominions of our Lord are like unto it; but that is not the case.

All this we tell you in confidence, and wish it to be kept between us and you, for you are a man of sound judgment, and we can disclose to you all that we have secretly in our hearts.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATIB.

Inclosure 5 in No. 67.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.) *January* 18, 1859.

I HAVE received your letter of yesterday's date, transmitting me, confidentially, an Arabic letter which was addressed to you on the 13th instant by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires. It is with extreme regret that I observe the tone which has been adopted by my colleague on this occasion, and that in mentioning the name of the Sultan of Morocco, he has made use of any expression which is considered by you as being informal and discourteous; but I am inclined to hope that these expressions may have been employed from the ignorance of my colleague of the Arabic language, and not from any intention to say anything which might be considered as derogatory to the dignity of His Shereefian Majesty.

I have lately received instructions from Her Majesty's Government not to interfere any longer in the discussion in which the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires may be engaged in with the Moorish Government. I do not offer, therefore, any further opinion upon the subject matter of his letter; but I have to repeat the counsels I have already given you, viz., to avoid, in your communications with the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, all irritating discussions, and that you should endeavour to promote, as far as it is in your power, an amicable conclusion of the difference existing between the two Governments.

Peace. (Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 6 in No. 67.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.) 15 *Jumad-el-tsani*, 1275. (*January* 19, 1859.)

(After the usual compliments.)

WE have received your letter, and have comprehended all that you say regarding the instructions received from your Government; as also the advice you give us to avoid discussions which may tend to increase the differences with the Spaniards. I send, for your information, the letter we propose to address to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, and we cannot say less. Upon other matters, the better judgment of our Lord the Sultan will decide.

With regard to the expression made use of by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, in mentioning the name of our Lord in Arabic, he has likewise employed similar expressions in the Spanish version, *i. e.*, "your Lord" and "Master." If such an expression when speaking of any Sovereign is courteous in the Spanish language, in the Arabic language it is insulting. When the Sultan reads that letter he will be greatly incensed, and it will cause him considerable displeasure. You know, as we do, that in the Spanish language you say in common parlance "Señor mio;" what is this but "my Lord?" Courteous words are becoming to all, and do not diminish the rank of the writer.

It appears to me that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires desires that something should happen which would give ground for a rupture, and therefore expresses himself in his letter in a manner which he must know is painful to our feelings, hoping that our reply may be in the same strain, so that he may have an excuse for a quarrel; but we, with God's favour, shall not be led into such a course, as I think will be found in the inclosed letter we have written him.

We are thoroughly convinced that our Lord the Sultan will never consent to acknowledge these claims, whatever may be the consequences of his refusal. You know that some fourteen years ago the Spanish nation broke off all relations with this Government, and their Agent went away, and they put forward numerous demands, which were finally arranged in an amicable manner, through the mediation of the British Government, and a Convention was then made; but never was any mention made at that time of a demand for indemnity for these vessels. If the Spanish Agents have written to my predecessors regarding vessels taken by the Reefians, I have no knowledge of the fact; but I conclude that the reply given to the Spanish Agents by the Moorish Government must have been identic to that which had been given to the British and other nations before the year 1855, viz., that the acts of the Reefians at that time were much opposed to the wishes of our Lord; but the Sultan had not then the power to restrain them from committing these acts of violence. You know, moreover, that the Spaniards at that time took the matter into their own hands, and captured, burnt, and destroyed the boats of the Reefians, and confiscated their property, and yet we never made any representation on the subject, for the reasons already given to you.

We are very grateful to your Government for all that it has done in our present differences with the Spanish nation, and I beg of you to continue to write to your Government, and make known to them the whole truth; for we have no Agent at Madrid, nor indeed in any other part of Europe, to uphold our rights: so we lean upon the support of your Government.

We have further to acquaint you, we have made extraordinary exertions to obtain the liberation of the Spanish captives from the hands of the Reefians, and, with God's aid, they will arrive soon at Tangier; and we shall deliver them up to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, without further question: for our desire is to act in a conciliatory manner, even though the conduct of the Spaniards may be different.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 7 in No. 67.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.) 15 *Jumada*, 1275. (*January* 19, 1859.)

WE have received your letter of the 13th January, together with the translation in the Spanish language, and our feelings have been pained by observing that when you speak of our Lord (the Sultan), may God assist him! you say "your Lord" and "Master," for these expressions in the Arabic language are not becoming in speaking of a Royal personage, whether he be Sovereign of these dominions, or of other countries. We suppose, however, that this has proceeded from the ignorance of the Arabic clerk, and not from you; for if it is a courteous expression in the Spanish language, it is not so in the Arabic language.

We have also been much pained in observing the contents of your letter, for it is not conceived in the same spirit of friendship and conciliation as are our communications to you. We shall not enter on the present occasion into a long discussion upon what you have said, for we desire to avoid doing anything which might create further dissensions between us, but we shall send your letter to the Court exalted by God.

With regard, however, to the surprise you express that we replied to the demands you put forward without orders from our Lord, I have to acquaint you that the answer which we sent to you was identic to that which our Lord had written to us repeatedly to reply to similar demands made by other Governments before the year 1855.

With respect to the interpretation you give of Article XVI of the Treaty, I

do not coincide with what you say in your letter regarding its sense; moreover, in the Arabic there is more said than what you have cited to us of the Article, and it is as follows, viz. :—

"Without (the ship) molesting them, and with the obligation of their being delivered intact to the Governors thereof (of the port), in order that an inquiry may be made."

It appears to us from these words, that the vessel should be delivered to the authorities of the flag to which the vessel belongs, that an inquiry be made into the character of the vessel; for how could any other party make an inquiry? Now the sailors of the Reefians' boats have been molested, for they have been kept a long time in prison. Moreover, the officers of your Government know that from ancient times the boats of the Reefians have never been provided with ship's papers, for they only coast along the shore, and none of them have decks, but are like fishing-vessels, and are chiefly navigated with oars. This has been the custom from ancient times, and they have never made voyages in any other manner.

If your authorities had made inquiry into the character of the two boats which were captured by the Governor of Peñon, they would have known that they were trading-vessels and not pirates, for they were both laden with merchandize belonging to the merchants of Tetuan. This appears to us as clear as the sun that shines in the world; and if they (the Spanish authorities) had wished to make an inquiry, they should have brought them here to us, and we would have told them the character of the vessels, as required by Treaty.

We shall now say no more, for it will remain for our Lord the Sultan to offer his decision upon all this.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 8 in No. 67.

Article XVI of the Treaty existing between Spain and Morocco.

ARTICULO XVI.—*Navigacion.*

LAS embarcaciones mercantes de ambas naciones podrán arribar á los puertos de cualesquiera de ellas, viniendo habilitadas de papeles por las oficinas que corresponde. Los pasaportes que lleven en su navigacion se dispondrán de modo que para su inteligencia no se necesite saber leer. A los que no los lleven se conducirán por el buque que los encuentre al puerto mas inmediato de su nacion, sin molestarlos y con la obligacion de presentarlos intactos al gobernador de aquel. Los pequeños barcos pescadores de una y otra Potencia no estarán obligados á la presentacion de pasaportes. Estos podrán variarse en su forma, teniéndose cuidado mutuamente de avisar de cualquiera innovacion que se ejecute para noticia de sus individuos.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE XVI.—*Navigation.*

THE merchant-vessels of both nations, coming duly provided with documents (ship's papers) from the offices appointed to issue them, shall have the right to put into the ports of either. The passports which they may carry in the course of their navigation shall be so prepared that, to understand them, it shall not be necessary to know how to read. Those which do not carry them shall be conducted by the ship that may meet them to the nearest port of their nation,* without (the ship) molesting them, and with the obligation of their being delivered intact to the Governor thereof (of the port†). Small fishing-boats of either Power shall not be obliged to present passports. These (the passports) may be altered in form, care being taken (by the Contracting Parties) mutually to give notice of any innovation which may be made (regarding them) for the information of their subjects.

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* This expression is ambiguous.—J. H. D. H.

† In the Arabic version of this Article, after the words "Governor thereof," is added, "in order that an inquiry may be made."—J. H. D. H.

No. 68.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received February 5.*)

(No. 7.) *Tangier, January* 21, 1859.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED, this morning, from the Moorish Minister, a letter, of which the inclosed document is a translation, making known to me a message which had been sent to him by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires. I cannot believe that the threat of Don Juan Blanco, that Tangier, and other ports of Morocco, will be bombarded after a period of fifteen days, if the Spanish prisoners do not arrive, will be carried into execution; for Don Juan Blanco must be aware there is not time for a courier to go by land to Melilla and to return in that time. Moreover, as Khateeb justly observes, the bombardment of the Moorish ports would not make the Reefians more disposed to obey the commands of the Sultan, but, on the contrary, they will be still less inclined to submit to the control of their Sovereign, when it is proved that he has not been successful in resisting an attack upon the ports of his empire.

The Moorish Government has acted, and is acting, with the greatest good faith about the captives; but it is very possible the Reefians are most reluctant to liberate them without the payment of a ransom, or at least in exchange for their captive brethren, still detained in Spain, especially as far more advantageous offers had been previously made to the Reefian Chiefs by the authorities at Melilla than could now be made by the Sultan. Had the Spanish Government sent the Reefians to Tangier in a steam-vessel, and delivered them over to the Moorish Government, even on the condition that they be kept in confinement until the Spaniards were brought safe to Tangier, the matter would have been long ago settled, and the Sultan's hands would have been strengthened, by his being able to show the Reefians he had obtained the liberty of their captive brethren.

I fear the remarks made by Khateeb, in the end of his letter, are too true. I have, however, sent him a verbal reply to his letter, urging him to continue to do all in his power to bring the captives promptly and safely to Tangier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 68.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.) 17 *Joomad*, 1275 (*January* 21, 1859).

WE have to acquaint you that yesterday the Spanish Vice-Consul, with the Interpreter, called and informed us that a steamer of their nation had arrived from Melilla, with the tidings that the Reefians had refused to deliver up the seven Spanish captives in their hands, and he, the Vice-Consul, said that if they did not arrive within fifteen days from the date of his visit, a squadron of vessels would be sent to bombard Tangier and all the other ports.

I replied to him, such language might be justifiable on his part if he had demanded the restoration of these Christians and the Sultan had refused to deliver them up; but His Majesty had expressly sent one of his chief officers with Royal letters to the Chiefs in Reef, with orders to deliver up immediately to that officer the seven Spaniards, who would proceed with them to Tangier, and that we would then deliver them over to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

We further said that we did not think the Reefians had refused to deliver them up, for had that been the case the officer would have reported it; but, on the other hand, should the Reefians disobey His Majesty's orders in this respect, His Majesty would send an army to Reef and compel them to deliver up the captives, and would chastise very severely the rebels.

Now, as to this language held by the Vice-Consul, that if the captives are not delivered by the Reefians in fifteen days, the Spanish vessels would attack Tangier, such a hostile proceeding would not have any effect upon the Reefians, but it would only create the greatest injury to trade and to the poor inhabitants of this town, or, indeed, to all persons.

Within an hour after the visit of the Spanish Vice-Consul, I sent off a courier to the Sultan, and urged that he should dispatch another officer to the Chiefs of the Reefians, with orders to give up the captives. I firmly believe the Reefians will have given them up to the first officer, for he ought to have written to us had they refused. I am also about to send a message direct to the Reef, but I hope, before two days elapse, to receive satisfactory tidings from Reef.

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

P.S.—It appears to us the Spanish Government desires to have an excuse to make war upon these dominions, for their language is not such as may tend to produce an amicable arrangement, but to bring on hostilities, and they are only seeking for an excuse to begin.

Peace. M. K.

No. 69.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 8. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Tangier, January* 24, 1859.

TO my surprise, Don Juan Blanco has again suddenly altered his language, and withdrawn from the menacing attitude he had assumed towards this Government, whilst the explanations offered by M. Collantes to Mr. Buchanan, accounting for the conduct pursued by the Spanish Government in demanding an indemnity for obsolete claims, have now been verified.

The arrogant and menacing language of Don Juan Blanco in his letter of the 13th instant, and the verbal message sent by his Vice-Consul, as reported in my despatch No. 7 of the 21st January, were, I think it will be admitted, justifiable grounds for my having supposed that the Spanish Government had assumed a very hostile attitude towards Morocco. I am happy, however, to find I was mistaken, and that Don Juan Blanco considers he can, with dignity, make such an unusual and sudden transition from menace to friendly assurances. This may be also explained by the late arrival of a Spanish ship with despatches, which no doubt contained fresh instructions from Madrid; and I conclude, therefore, that the language which Mr. Buchanan was instructed, by your Lordship's despatches to him of the 24th and 28th ultimo, of which copies were sent to me, to hold, has produced a very beneficial effect on the minds of the Spanish Government.

The just view, moreover, taken by your Lordship as to the impolicy of putting forward the obsolete claims as a feint, in order to facilitate a concession of territory, has also been verified, by the effect it has already produced on the mind of this Government.

I will not further encroach on your Lordship's time by my comments on the proceedings of Don Juan Blanco, but inclose herewith a translation of the report, drawn up in the Spanish language, of Mr. David Sicsu, the interpreter, of a message which Seid Mohamed Khateeb sent to me yesterday, as also of the advice I have given, and of a further message which I have received this morning through the same channel.

I further inclose a translation from the Arabic of the propositions for the arrangement of all pending questions, which Don Juan Blanco presented to Seid Mohamed Khateeb at his interview with that functionary.

In conclusion, I may add, I do not understand why Don Juan Blanco in his messages to Khateeb requires that these propositions should be kept secret from me, unless special orders have been sent from Madrid to that effect, or that he (Don J. Blanco) feels ashamed of my knowing that he has blown hot and cold within twenty-four hours without the Moorish Government having receded from the position it had assumed. The Spanish Government had been told long ago by Mr. Buchanan that I had suggested the advisability of the establishment of a neutral ground, and they ought, therefore, to have supposed I would now advocate such a concession. As to the purchase of territory in Reef, I am persuaded that the Moorish Government, sordid as it may be in other matters, has fully as high a sense of dignity as the Spanish Government, regarding the sale of territory which rightfully belongs to Morocco; and, as I have said in my despatch No. 6, I feel convinced, even if the Sultan agreed to cede a portion of the Reefian territory to the Spaniards, the lawless, but brave, inhabitants of that district would never submit to such orders from their Sovereign, unless they were compelled to succumb by force of arms, and after a long and disastrous war.

I have given to Mr. Buchanan, in a private letter, a hint of the altered tone of the Spanish Representative; but I have not thought it prudent to send him, through the overland post, a detailed account of what has taken place, for if the contents of my despatches were discovered at the Spanish post-offices, and were subsequently made known to Don Juan Blanco, he might accuse Khateeb of having betrayed his confidential communication to me, and thus create further dissension between himself and the Moorish Minister.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 69.

Report by Mr. Sicsu, the Interpreter, of an interview he had with Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation from the Spanish.) *Tangier, January* 23, 1859.

HAVING this morning received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs a message to the effect that he wished to see me, I immediately waited upon his Excellency, and received from him the following information, which he desired me to communicate to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires sent his Vice-Consul and interpreter, yesterday, to say to him that he was very desirous of seeing his Excellency, in order that he might enter with him upon some arrangement by which all the differences pending between the two Governments might be peacefully and amicably settled. The Vice-Consul added, that the Chargé d'Affaires regretted very much that he could not pay him a visit at his house, and requested his Excellency to meet him at the garden of M. Mustapha Ducally.

The Minister replied, that he could not comply with the request of the Chargé d'Affaires; that he would always be happy to receive him at his house, but that, as the Chargé d'Affaires did not wish to come to his house, and in order that his wishes might be accomplished, he offered to receive him at the Sultan's garden.

The Chargé d'Affaires accepted the Minister's offer, and waited upon his Excellency at the said garden, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of yesterday. After the customary salutations, the Chargé d'Affaires assured the Minister, that it was his desire to maintain the same friendly relations between Spain and Morocco which had existed from the most ancient times; and that the claim for the 30,000 dollars which he had put forward against the Moorish Government would be withdrawn. He then demanded that the Moorish Government would consent to have the Tariff of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco put in force.

The Minister replied, that the Tariff in question had never been put into force, and had never been insisted on by any of the Spanish Representatives who had preceded him.

To this the Chargé d'Affaires declared he would abandon that pretension also, if the Moorish Government would agree to the demand of his Government, that a line should be marked out between Melilla and Akkalia, where there should be Moorish guards on one side, and Spanish guards on the other; that a similar arrangement should be come to with regard to the other Spanish garrisons in Reef; and that, if this were effected, all other demands put forward by Spain against the Moorish Government would be annulled forthwith. The Chargé d'Affaires then delivered to the Minister a memorandum of the arrangement he proposed, and begged his Excellency not to communicate its contents to any one, for he wished to keep the negotiation secret until its conclusion, when he would convey to Madrid, in person, the intelligence of the settlement they had come to. He stated, also, that he had not yet transmitted to his Government a copy of his Excellency's last letter to him, but that he would

take it himself to Madrid, as soon as they had concluded the question of the frontier lines in front of the Spanish garrisons in Reef.

The Minister replied, that he would communicate to the Sultan all that had passed between them, and that he would do his best to arrive at a favourable issue of their differences.

The Chargé d'Affaires said, that his Excellency ought to consider that he had caused the Spanish squadron to return to Spain, in order that the people here should not be alarmed; to which the Minister replied, that all the injury the squadron could do would fall upon the poor of both parties, and that they should, therefore, mutually endeavour to arrange their differences amicably.

The Chargé d'Affaires then took his leave, after urging upon his Excellency the desirability of keeping secret all that had passed between them, and, on his return to the town, sent his Interpreter to beg him, on no account, to inform the British Chargé d'Affaires of their secret negotiation.

(Signed) DAVID SICSU.

P.S.—The Minister told me that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had begged him to withdraw the last letter he had addressed him, and that he (the Minister) had answered that, although he might with reason have said much more than he did in that letter, he did not do so, to avoid entering into a long and angry discussion with him; and that he could not withdraw what he had written: but the Minister added, to me, that he was ready to withdraw his letter, if the Chargé d'Affaires would also withdraw the letter he had written, to which his (the Minister's) was a copy.

D. S.

Inclosure 2 in No. 69.

Instructions given by Mr. D. Hay to the Interpreter, Mr. Sicsu, with regard to a Message sent by the former to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation from the Spanish.)

YOU will communicate the following information to Seid Mohamed Khateeb:—

That I am obliged to him for the secret communication he has made to me, and that I am pleased to hear that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has altered his tone, and that he no longer insists upon his former pretensions. That I am, nevertheless, surprised at the desire he, Don Juan Blanco, has expressed that these propositions should be kept secret from me, as he must be aware that I urged, not long ago, upon the Moorish Government, and on several past occasions upon his predecessors, the policy of coming to an arrangement about a neutral ground in front of Melilla, as my correspondence with him (Khateeb), and with my Government, will show.

Tell Seid Mohamed that, if the Sultan considers he can cede the extension of territory demanded, it will afford us much pleasure to learn that an adjustment of all the questions they have with Spain will thus have been effected; but that, under any circumstances, I would counsel him in the most decided way to write to the Sultan that it is His Majesty's interest to come to an arrangement with the Spaniards regarding a neutral ground in front of Melilla, and that it should extend at least to the distance of a cannon-shot from that fortress, as is the case at Gibraltar, and at every other garrison in Europe where the territories of two nations adjoin each other. That the Sultan should establish a guard-house on the frontier line, and appoint a superior officer from Tangier, with subalterns under him, to command the guard there; and that similar guard-stations be established in front of the Spanish islands off the Reef coast, and commanded by Tangier officers, who would prevent the natives from molesting the Spanish garrisons.

I repeat my counsel to the Moorish Government that they should cede this point, because it is just and reasonable, because every nation would demand that such a concession should be made, and because a continuation of these conflicts in Reef might at any moment produce the most grave consequences to Morocco. If the Sultan thinks that the Reefians would not obey his orders upon this point, it is at least His Majesty's duty to show the Spanish Government that he is disposed to do all that is reasonable, and that the opposition, if there be any, comes from his rebellious subjects, and not from him. I also think His Majesty might make the Reefians understand that the demarkation of a neutral ground is not exactly a cession of territory, and that all nations, even the most powerful, whether Christian or Mussulman, accede to arrangements so necessary as this is for the peace and tranquillity of two nations who are neighbours to each other. The Reefians might also be made to understand that, if they do not give up this point, the Spaniards are determined to put an end to their coasting trade; that they have, by means of their establishments on the Reef coast, the power to do so; and that they (the Reefians) would thus lose much more than if they were to cede a small tract of sterile ground.

It would be well that the Sultan should require that, in case the neutral ground has to be marked out, an officer appointed by His Majesty should assist the Spanish engineer officers in the survey; and that, before anything is done, a distinct understanding be come to regarding the various points at issue, in order that no question or misunderstanding should hereafter arise.

The Sultan ought also to give the Spaniards to understand, that some time should be accorded, in order that he might prepare the Reefians for so important an event; and that, with a view to the strengthening of his authority over the Reefians, the Spanish Government should, without loss of time, deliver to the authorities at Tangier the captive Reefians, with their boats and cargoes.

The Sultan can also reply that, before he can give a definitive answer, he would wish to know how much neutral territory would be required; and that it would, at all events, be advisable for him to take the preliminary step of sending his Commissioner to examine and report upon the locality.

In conclusion, I have to say that, in offering these counsels to the Sultan, I have the less hesitation, as I am persuaded it is His Majesty's interest to act in conformity with them. Times have changed; and, although the relations between the Spaniards and Reefians have been conducted for so many years on their present footing, it cannot be expected that they should continue so under existing circumstances.

The Sultan must bear in mind the proximity to the frontier of Reef and Morocco of the powerful French nation established in Algeria. A single spark is, as His Majesty is aware, enough to set fire to the strongest castle.

The Sultan, from his experience and wisdom, knows well that, in this question, as, indeed, in all others in which the interests of this Empire have been exposed to danger, the British Government have ever employed their good offices, as far as it was politic to do, with the Power in dispute with the Moorish Government, and that they have always done their best to bring about an honourable and peaceful arrangement; I am, consequently, sure His Majesty will not reject the counsels that we have offered him.

I do not go to see his Excellency to-day, in order that I may not offend the uncalled-for susceptibility of my Spanish colleague.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 69.

Report, by Mr. Sicsu, of Seid Mohamed Khateeb's Reply to Mr. D. Hay's Message of the 23rd of January, 1859.

(Translation from the Spanish.)

SEID MOHAMED KHATEEB has requested me to inform the Chargé d'Affaires that, as he has stated before, he is persuaded the Sultan would never pay the indemnity of the 30,000 dollars demanded for the obsolete claims; that this demand, though it is now withdrawn, has not tended to facilitate the solution of the question of the neutral ground in front of Melilla, but that, on the contrary, the iregular and offensive manner in which the demand was made, will have created an unfavourable impression on the mind of the Sultan; that even if the 30,000 dollars had been a just claim, and had been admitted, the money would have been paid in cash, but that not an inch of territory which God has given to the Mussulman would have been ceded in lieu of the compensation demanded, even if the amount offered were thirty millions of dollars; that the

Moorish Government had too high feelings of patriotism, and a sense of dignity, to admit for a moment such humiliating offers; that they were ready, on the other hand, to do whatever may be reasonable and proper, and, with regard to the establishment of a neutral ground, that might tend to consolidate the peace and tranquillity of the subjects of the Sultan and their relations with a friendly Power, he had strong hopes His Majesty would take the matter into consideration, more especially as he had been counselled to do so by Mr. Drummond Hay, the Agent of an ally that had always acted a friendly and disinterested part in all questions that affected the interests of the Moorish dominions.

Tangier, January 23, 1859.

(Signed) DAVID SICSU.

Inclosure 4 in No. 69.

Memorandum transmitted by Don Juan Blanco to Seid Mohamed Khateeb on the 22nd of January, 1859.

(Translation from the Arabic.)

Article I.—The Sultan of Morocco engages to grant to Spain an extension of territory near Melilla, and also to enlarge the space of ground which may be necessary to the fortresses of Spain, for the preservation of the peace and tranquillity of the inhabitants and troops. The demarkation of this territory to be effected by Spanish engineer officers, and with the consent of the officers of the Sultan.

Art. II.—The Spanish Government, when it is informed that these concessions have been made, will immediately withdraw the demands which I have presented to the Government of Morocco (which demands are most just), as well as all other demands that may be, or have been, put forward previously to the said concession.

No. 70.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Tangier, January* 28, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith, the copy of a despatch addressed to me by the British Vice-Consul at Tetuan, reporting that the officer who had been sent by the Sultan to effect the liberation of the Spaniards now in the hands of the Reefians, had failed in his mission, as the Reefians had refused to liberate the Spaniards except in exchange for their brethren, now captives in the hands of the Spanish authorities at Malaga, and on the restoration of the property which had been captured by the Spaniards from their trading-boats.

I have further the honour to inclose the translation of a Memorandum drawn up by the Interpreter, Mr. D. Sicsu, reporting the message which Seid Mohamed Khateeb had requested him to convey to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 70.

Vice-Consul Hay to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Tetuan, January* 27, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the soldiers sent by order of the Sultan to Reef to obtain possession of the Spaniards, captives in the hands of the Reefians, have this day returned from that province without having effected the object of their mission; and report that the Reefians refused to deliver up the Spanish captives until the Spanish Government should restore to them the

cannon they had taken, together with all the goods and effects that had been seized in the Spanish fortresses from the Reefian trading boats.

This information, I may add, I have obtained officially from the Governor of this town.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES DE V. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 70.

Report of Mr. Sicsu, dated January 28, 1859.

(Translation from the Spanish.)

SEID MOHAMED KHATEEB has requested me to inform Mr. Drummond Hay that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had asked him to communicate, in a letter, the tidings which had been received, that the Sultan's officer had returned from Reef and had not brought the Spanish captives; and that he, Khateeb, had therefore complied with his request, and had informed the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires he would write again to the Sultan, and that he was persuaded His Majesty would not cease to do all in his power to bring the said captives to Tangier. Seid Mohamed Khateeb also stated that he had requested Don Juan Blanco to write to his Government to request that they would send the Reef captives now detained in Spain to Tangier, and that upon their delivery he, Khateeb, would detain them at Tangier in custody until the Spaniards arrived from the Reef; that he had told Don Juan Blanco it appeared to him that such a step, when it was brought to the knowledge of the Reefians, would greatly facilitate the release of the Spaniards. Seid Mohamed Khateeb also said that Don Juan Blanco had given an assurance that no unpleasant results would be brought about from the communication made by Seid Mohamed Khateeb of his letter regarding the captives, and that he, Don Juan, would make every exertion to bring about a peaceful solution of all questions.

(Signed) DAVID SICSU.

No. 71.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received February 5.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, January* 29, 1859.

AT the moment "Himalaya" is starting I received a private letter from a friend in Madrid, who has had frequent opportunities of seeing the Ministers and Deputies of the Cortes, and conversing with them about Moorish affairs. Reade has made the inclosed hurried translation of the parts of the letter which I think may possibly throw some light on what is passing at Madrid regarding the question pending here.

My friend writes of course in the greatest secresy, for he is a Spanish officer. I think it right to add I have never written to him on public affairs, and the portion I inclose was in the form of a postscript. I shall be careful how I reply, though, as you will perceive from the language of the writer, he is a sensible man.

The Spanish Government is grossly deceived if it thinks the Sultan has urged on the Reefians to molest the Spanish African garrisons, though I know the wily Reefians always tell the Spanish officers when they attack the garrisons, or commit any hostilities, they do so by the Sultan's orders. The Sultan and Khateeb would be glad to cut the head off of every rebel in Reef, but they dare not.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 71.

Extract from a Private Letter to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.) *Madrid, January* 21, 1859.

THEY are under the impression at the War Department that the hostilities with which the Reefians are constantly assailing the garrison of Melilla, are supported by the Moorish Government, which, although apparently desirous of peace, is ever fomenting in an underhand manner, the fanaticism of the frontier tribes, and exciting them against the Spanish garrisons. If such be the case, if the Sultan plunges into a similar policy, playing a double game, complications and conflicts must inevitably arise. Although I doubt much that the Sultan is acting in the way attributed to him, for his interests are clearly in another direction, I think it is just possible, when I consider the disposition of the Moorish Government, its weakness, and the want of illustrious men to direct its administration. I have done what I could to cause to vanish, or, at any rate, I have been partly able to correct the numberless errors in circulation here regarding Morocco, and the outrages which it is supposed have been perpetrated upon us, and for which we demand reparation.

The opinion of the press and that of the political circles, is for war: and if the Governments were disposed not to go against public opinion on this point, it would have merely to allow itself to be led by the nation into the war. In the Cabinet, however, are persons of exquisite tact and of acknowledged experience, who would not undertake any expedition with a doubtful result merely to please the Opposition. But, if circumstances oblige them, if some new question arises to instigate Government to action, the Government (whether it be the present one or the one which will supersede it) will have to withdraw from the system of conciliation, and proceed to act in a way contrary to what the well-understood interests involved in our relations with foreign countries would counsel it, for the Oppositions will press the Cabinet so much in Parliament, and by means of the public press, that the feeling of national pride will be aroused, and force us to a more energetic eourse.

Much will, however, depend upon the great influence you exercise for the general good over the minds of the Moorish Government, the profound knowledge you have of the character of its men, and the clear talent which distinguishes the worthy Representative of Her Britannic Majesty in Morocco.

No. 72.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received February 5.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, January* 24, 1859.

I HOPE my adviee to Khateeb, as reported in my despatch No. 8 of this date, will not be considered by Lord Malmesbury injudicious; but Khateeb begged me to give my opinion, as he said he knew it would have great weight with the Sultan, who would be much opposed even to the concesssion of a neutral ground; and if he told His Majesty I had declined to give any opinion, the demand would probably be refused, as my silence would be construed into a disapprobation of the demand.

The Spaniards don't deserve that we should aid them in settling their differences; but as it is also our interest that hostilities should be prevented, I have not hesitated in expressing to this Government what, I trust, will be considered the views of our Government. Even if the Sultan consents to all this, we are not extricated from the entanglements, for the Reefians will, I fear, oppose any concessions; but, as I have said in my despatch No. 6, it is better that the Sultan should concede all that is reasonable, and thus remove all grounds for the Spanish Government to attack his ports, even though they may finally resort to hostilities against the Reefians.

As there is no urgent necessity for post, in communicating all this to Mr. Buchanan, and as I have not time to put it into cypher, I suppose my despatch No. 8 will be communicated to his Excellency from the Foreign Office

The "Himalaya" will be probably here the day after to-morrow, and will reach England about the end of the month.

I hope Lord Malmesbury will not think it is my fault, if one day I reported we expect to be bombarded, and the next that we are to have a glorious peace.

Don Juan, if he succeeds in nothing else, certainly succeeds in creating wrong impressions.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—The cypher has already been useful to me in a former communication to Mr. Buchanan.

J. H. D. H.

No. 73.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 8, 1859.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, respecting the discussions between the Spanish and Moorish Governments.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 74.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord, *Madrid, February* 2, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 40 of the 29th ultimo, transmitting to your Lordship the copy of a letter which I addressed to Mr. Drummond Hay, I inclose, herewith, the copy of a despatch which I received on the 26th ultimo, in cypher, from that gentleman, together with another transmitting to me copies of his correspondence with Seid Mahomed Khateeb, with respect to Don Juan Blanco's note to his Excellency of the 13th ultimo, of which I understand that copies have been forwarded, directly, to your Lordship.

I was certainly unprepared to learn that Don Juan Blanco's language and proceedings had been so entirely inconsistent with M. Calderon Collantes' late assurances to myself. I therefore sought an immediate interview with his Excellency, at which I stated that I had been instructed to acquaint him with the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had received the assurances which I had conveyed to your Lordship in my despatch No. 4 of the 6th instant; and that I would, therefore, read my report of them to his Excellency, as I thought it would be expedient to ascertain that I had not misunderstood them.

M. Collantes having replied that I had reported his explanations correctly, I observed that Her Majesty's Government, who were, probably, in possession of a copy of Don Juan Blanco's note of the 13th ultimo to Seid Mahomed Khateeb, of which a copy had also been forwarded to me by Mr. Drummond Hay, would find it difficult to reconcile it with these explanations. I said that, during the whole course of my diplomatic career, I had never read such a document addressed by a Diplomatic Agent to the Foreign Minister of the State to which he was accredited, or one of which the tone was so arrogant and offensive.

M. Collantes declared that he had not seen Don Blanco's note; but he defended his general proceedings and the policy of the Government, reiterating his former assurances that their only object was to place their relations with Morocco on a satisfactory footing, which could only be done by obtaining the settlement of the claims of Spanish subjects against the Government of the

* Nos. 67, 69, and 70.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Sultan, and by taking measures for the prevention of collisions between the Reefians and the fortresses. I replied that I understood, however, that the Government were prepared to cancel the Spanish claims, if their wishes with respect to the territory round the fortresses were complied with. But he would not allow that there was any intention of the kind; the two questions being, he said, quite distinct.

I rejoined that I had not only understood him, in a former conversation, to speak of the claims as a means of obtaining the more important object of a rectification of the lines around the fortress; but that M. Comyn had frequently assured me that the claims would not be pressed, but be merely used for that purpose. When I spoke of no mention having been made of them when the Convention of 1845 was concluded under the mediation of England; he said that they were all for acts of piracy committed subsequently to that date, and that there was no ground whatever for calling them obsolete. The question, however, with respect to them and the fortresses did not demand an immediate solution, and, therefore, had now become of secondary importance, as he had just received intelligence that the Reefians had refused to give up the Spanish prisoners; and the Government would, consequently, be obliged to take measures to force them to do so, and he indicated the capture of more prisoners in the Reef country, or on the coast, as being, probably, necessary for this purpose.

I expressed regret that his Excellency should consider it either politic or just to have recourse to violent measures, when the Sultan had undertaken to obtain the release of the Spaniards; and I said that if the Reefians had not obeyed the Sultan's orders, his Highness would, doubtless, employ sufficient means to enforce them. M. Collantes did not seem, however, to have much confidence in that view of the case, and spoke in a somewhat excited manner of the insolence of the Reefians, and of the impossibility of the Spanish Government submitting to it, or meeting public opinion in Spain, if they failed in obtaining the immediate release of the prisoners.

Our interview ended without any definite result but with my urging earnestly on his Excellency the expediency of giving the Sultan due time to fulfil his engagements.

On the following day, I received, under flying seal, the accompanying despatch from Mr. Drummond Hay to your Lordship, reporting that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had sent his Vice-Consul to Seid Mohamed Khateeb, to threaten, that if the Spanish prisoners were not given up in fifteen days, the ports of Morocco would be bombarded by a Spanish squadron.

I could not believe that so extreme a measure would be resorted to, M. Collantes having only spoken to me of the capture of Reefians as the means which it might, possibly, be necessary to adopt for obtaining the release of the Spaniards; but I, nevertheless, immediately addressed the note marked "Confidential," of which I inclose a copy for your Lordship's information, to his Excellency, as I thought it expedient to avail myself of the opportunity to place on record that Her Majesty's Government will expect the Spanish Government to abstain from violent measures, while the Sultan is evidently endeavouring to satisfy their reasonable demands for the release of the prisoners, and exerting himself to cause his authority to be respected by the Reefians. I, however, marked my note Confidential, because I found M. Calderon, on the previous day, disposed to take umbrage at my interference in the question, stating that, though he was ready to receive the councils of Her Majesty's Government in a friendly spirit, he could not make any statement to me which would be an indirect acknowledgment of their right to interfere officially in a question of a purely Spanish character. His Excellency has been, I understand, extremely sensitive on this subject, since the remonstrance I addressed to him respecting the "Maimon."

It is pretended here that no report has been received from the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, of his having addressed them enaces to the Morocco Minister for Foreign Affairs, which are repeated in the inclosures; and your Lordship will, probably before this despatch reaches you, have learnt from Mr. Drummond Hay that Don Juan Blanco had, almost immediately afterwards, reassumed a pacific tone in his communications with Khateeb. The latter intelligence was conveyed to me in a few hurried private lines by Mr. Hay; and until I know more I shall endeavour to hope that Don Juan Blanco's violence has been

unsanctioned by his instructions, and that the change in his proceedings has been occasioned by the arrival of despatches from Madrid.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 74.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Sir, *Tangier, January* 20, 1859.

THE arrogant letter addressed by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to the Moorish Minister on the 13th instant, and the menacing language he has held, preclude all possibility of an amicable settlement; for Spain could not, with dignity, retire from the false position which has been assumed by her Representative.

The obsolete claims are no longer put forward, with the view of obtaining as a settlement a cession of territory, as your Excellency had been assured, for the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires declares in his letter Spain will enter upon hostilities if these claims are not liquidated.

I have pointed out all this to the Moorish Minister, and I have told him clearly, if the indemnity is not paid, I feared the Spanish Minister was anxious to have the opportunity of going to war, as the difference with Mexico had been arranged. He replied he was convinced the Sultan would not pay the indemnity demanded.

I shall submit to Lord Malmesbury more fully my views.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 74.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Sir, *Madrid, January* 29, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received this day a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, acquainting me that he has reported to Her Majesty's Government that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had made a communication to the Morrocan Government, threatening that, if the Spanish prisoners were not liberated in fifteen days, the ports of Morocco would be bombarded by a Spanish squadron.

I have not, however, hesitated, in consequence of what your Excellency said to me yesterday, to inform the Earl of Malmesbury, by this day's post, that while the Emperor of Morocco is using the most praiseworthy endeavours to cause the immediate liberation of the Spanish prisoners in Reef, there is not the slightest probability of the threat of Don Juan Blanco being carried into execution.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 75.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 48.)

My Lord, *Madrid, February* 3, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, the copy and translation of an article which appeared, on the 25th ultimo, in the "Epoca," a semi-official paper, calling public attention to the interests of Spain in Africa, and which is not without signification under present circumstances.

There is unquestionably a general opinion throughout the country that

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Africa offers a fair field for Spanish aggrandizement, and, at the same time, a fear that, unless something is done soon, France may extend her African conquests to a degree which will not only frustrate the hopes of Spain, but may even affect injuriously her present position as an European Power.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Extract from the "Epoca" of January 25, 1859.

LA cuestion de los intereses Españoles en Africa, cuestion debatida hace tanto tiempo, reclama indudablemente una solucion pronta é inmediata. Porque España, colocada en el Occidente de Europa, dificilmente obtendrá figurar en primera línea entre las Grandes Potencias, si no tiene medios para desarrollarse en la esfera mas natural, que es sin disputa la que forma el vasto continente Africano. Todos los grandes pensadores de nuestro pais han comprendido esta verdad y han consagrado sérios y poderosos esfuerzos á su realizacion, si bien circunstancias ocasionales han venido, ó á esterilizar, ó á disminuir considerablemente la eficacia de este proyecto. Es un hecho constante, sancionado por la esperiencia de muchos siglos, que casi todas las grandes dominaciones que han afligido á nuestro pais han venido de esas regionas impetuosas como los torrentes que se desprenden de las cumbres del Atlas, ardientes como la arena que en sus vastos desiertos envuelve y quema el pie del atrevido viajero. Los hijos de la antigua Cartago, como los fanáticos secuaces del Islamismo, se precipitaron desde el Africa sobre nuestro privilegiado suelo, y vinieron aqui á deponer sus costumbres ásperas y feroces para rendir culto á las ciencias y á las artes.

Pues este hecho prueba que en los momentos de su exuberancia de vida política ó social, el Africa ha considerado á la España como la órbita mas á propósito para su desenvolvimiento, y á su vez la España he creido, en los periodos de engrandecimiento, que podia y debia estenderse por el otro lado del Estrecho. Es todavía muy problemática la utilidad que reportó á la España la conquista de América: nosotros creemos que los Españoles hicieron entonces mas por el auge de la civilizacion que por los verdaderos intereses de su pais, y lo que en nuestra opinion aparece indudable, es que si en vez de lanzar grandes flotas al través del Atlántica, se hubiesen dirigido sobre la vasta superficie del Mediterráneo, la España hubiera podido conservar durante muchos siglos el cetro de la supremacia política, industrial y mercantil. Desgraciadamente, la ambicion autocrática de Cárlos V y Felipe II, y el afan de sostener nuestra influencia en el corazon de Europo, debilitaron el nervio de nuestra fuerza y anularon el pensamiento altamente patriótico de D. Fernando, Doña Isabel, y del Cardenal Cisneros. Nuestra gloria quedó sepultada en la isla de los Gelves, y el pabellon Español, que habia brillado un momento sobre los muros de Túnez y la Goleta, vino á tierra con inmenso estrépito y sobre los cadáveres de nuestros heróicos soldados.

No obstante estos desastres y la falsa direccion dada al entusiasmo público, el pensamiento de nuestra influencia en Africa brotaba siempre que aparecia en el Trono Español un principe de eminentes cualidades. Asi se vió que Felipe V, no bien cauterizada aun la llaga abierta por la guerra dinástica, envió al Duque de Montemar á conseguir nuevos laureles al pie de los muros de Oran, y la venturosa rapidez y felicidad de esta reconquista hubieran podido ser á un tiempo garantía y présago de mayores empresas, si, por desgracia, no habiesen surgido en Italia nuevos complicaciones. El inmortal Cárlos III concibió tambien el proyecto de hacer que se respetase nuestro pabellon en las costas Africanas, y las dos espediciones que envió contra Argel constituyen una prueba de cuán ardente era su deseo de que el antiguo estandarte de Castilla tremolase sobre las altas almenas que protegian á aquel nido de piratas. Aun en tiempo de Cárlos IV se insistió en el mismo plan, y los medios que puso en juego el intrigante Abadia para servir á los intereses ó á la ambicion del Principe de la Paz, revelan que este Ministro concibió como el medio mas á propósito para obtener la aureola de la popularidad, el asegurar nuestro prestigio en Africa.

Y si tal ha sido la aspiracion de nuestros hombres mas notables en differentes

épocas de su historia, si esa ha sido la tendencia mas perseverante de nuestro pais en diversos períodos, en el dia aquella aspiracion debe reputarse como una necesidad, y aquella tendencia como un sentimiento abiertamente pronunciado. La Francia, so color de poner un término á los desmanes de los Berberiscos, se apoderó de Argel, y adelantando cada dia sus brazos de gigante, puede, comprimiendo el viejo Imperio de Marruecos, venir á desplegar sus tiendas hasta el fronte de nuestras plazas fronterizas. Es verdad que este engrandecimiento tan estraordinario suscitaria quizá los celos de algunas Potencias, y entre ellas de la Gran-Bretaña; pero la oposicion mas ó menos verosímil de esta, acaso no detendrá en su rápido vuelo á las victoriosas águilas Francesas.

Si esto llega á verificarse, la situacion de España seria eminentemente crítica; amenazada por cima del Pirineo y estrechada por las costas del Mediterráneo, si conservaba su nacionalidad, comprometeria su independencia, porque estaria condenada á vivir bajo el Protectorado de la Francia. Y aun en el caso de que esto no se realizase, aun de que nuestra proverbial é histórica hidalguía se rebelara contra toda dominacion mas ó menos rebozada, siempre, y en última consecuencia, resultaria que la España, condenada á permanecer sujeta á una porcion de territorio, sufriria los tormentos del lecho de Procusto y seria constantemente un pais pobre, sin porvenir, sin condiciones de desarrollo, sin medros posibles, sin talle, ni política ni mercantil.

Si la España quiere ser grande y próspera, si quiere arrojar su espada en la balanza política del mundo, si quiere recobrar su brillo histórico y el esplendor de su nombre, es preciso que vuelva siempre los ojos hácia el Africa; que piense siempre en Africa; que Africa sea, en una palabra, para la España, lo que Cartago fue para Caton.

(Translation.)

THE question of Spanish interests in Africa—a question which has been so long discussed—undoubtedly calls for a speedy and immediate solution: because Spain, situated, as it is, in the West of Europe, will find it very difficult to rank in the first line amongst the Great Powers if she has not the means of developing herself in her most natural sphere, which, indisputably, is the one formed by the vast African continent. All the great thinkers of our country have comprehended this truth, and have devoted their serious and powerful efforts to the attainment of this object, although the efficiency of this project has hitherto been thwarted, or considerably diminished, by occasional circumstances. It is a constant fact, sanctioned by the experience of many centuries, that almost all the great dominations which have oppressed our country have come from the African regions, similar, in their impetuosity, to the torrents which descend from the summits of the Atlas, and ardent like the sand which, in its immense deserts, covers and burns the foot of the bold traveller. The sons of old Carthage, as well as the fanatical sectaries of the Islam, rushed, from Africa, upon our fertile soil, and came here to relinquish their rude and ferocious customs, and to worship the sciences and the arts.

This fact is a proof that, in its periods of exuberance, in her political and social life, Africa has considered Spain as the most suitable sphere for her development; while Spain, in her periods of greatness, has thought, in her turn, that she could, and ought to, extend her dominions on the other side of the Straits. The profit which Spain has derived from the conquest of America is still very problematical. We are of opinion the Spaniards contributed, by that conquest, more to the progress of civilization than to the furtherance of the true interests of their country; and what seems to us to be indubitable, is, that if, instead of sending large fleets across the Atlantic, Spain had launched them on the vast surface of the Mediterranean, she would have been enabled to maintain in her hands, for many centuries, the sceptre of political, industrial, and commercial supremacy. Unfortunately, the autocratic ambition of Charles V and Philip II, and the pertinacity of preserving our influence in the heart of Europe, weakened our strength, and annulled the highly-patriotic project of Don Fernando, Donna Isabel, and Cardinal Cimeros. Our glory was buried in the Island of Los Gelves, and the Spanish flag, which had brilliantly fluttered for one moment over the walls of Tunis and La Goleta, came to the ground with an immense crash, and fell upon the dead bodies of our heroic soldiers.

Notwithstanding these disasters, and the false direction given to public

enthusiasm, the idea of our influence in Africa always sprang forth again whenever a Prince of eminent qualities appeared on the Spanish Throne. So it was that Philip V, when the wounds inflicted on the country by the War of Succession were not yet entirely healed, sent the Duke of Montemar to conquer fresh laurels at the foot of the walls of Oran, the fortunate and rapid re-conquest of which place might have been, at the same time, an omen, and a guarantee of more important enterprises, if new complications had not, then, unfortunately occurred in Italy. The immortal Charles III also entertained the project of causing our flag to be respected on the African coasts, and the two expeditions which he sent against Algiers are an eloquent proof of his ardent wish to see the banner of Castile fluttering over the high turrets which sheltered that nest of pirates. Even during the reign of Charles IV the same project was persisted in, and the means resorted to by the intriguing adventurer Abadia, to serve the interests or the ambition of the Prince of Peace, reveal that this Minister thought that the best means for him to obtain the applause of the people was to secure our prestige in Africa.

And if such has been the aspiration of our most remarkable men, at different periods of history; if such has been the most persevering tendency of our country at different times, at present the aforesaid aspiration must be considered as a necessity, and the above-mentioned tendency as a feeling openly manifested. France, under the pretext of putting a stop to the excesses of the inhabitants of the coast of Barbary, took possession of Algiers, and, advancing more and more every day her gigantic arms, she may, possibly, one day, compressing the old Empire of Morocco, come to display her tents in front of our frontier towns. It is true that such an extraordinary aggrandizement would, perhaps, rouse the jealousy of some Powers, and, amongst them, of Great Britain, but the more or less probable opposition of the latter will not, perhaps, be sufficient to detain the victorious French eagles in their rapid career.

Should such an event take place, the position of Spain would be an eminently-critical one. Threatened on the side of the Pyrenees, and hemmed in by the coasts of the Mediterranean, if she preserved her nationality it would be at the cost of her independence, because she would be condemned to live under the Protectorate of France; and, even though such were not the case, although our proverbial and historical chivalrous feelings should revolt against any more or less disguised domination, it would always finally result that Spain, being doomed to remain circumscribed within a limited territory, would undergo the torments of Procrustus' bed, and would for ever be a poor country, deprived of all future prospects, without any possible means of development, and, consequently, deprived of any political and commercial importance.

If Spain wishes to be a great and prosperous nation; if she desires to cast her sword into the political scale of the world; if she be anxious to recover her historical brilliancy and the splendour of her name, it is necessary for her always to have her eyes fixed on Africa; let Africa be her constant thought; in a word, let Africa be to Spain what Carthage was to Rome.

No. 76.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received February* 13.)

(No. 58. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Madrid, February* 8, 1859.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 28th ultimo, in which it is stated that the Reefian prisoners had been sent from Malaga to Tangier, I learnt yesterday from Mr. Drummond Hay that they had not arrived there on the 2nd instant, and did not even appear to be expected by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

I therefore called at the Foreign Office, where I saw M. Comyn, and inquired whether there was any doubt as to the prisoners having been sent from Malaga.

His Excellency said that all he knew on the subject was that the Foreign Department had recommended the Department of War to place the prisoners at the disposal of Don Juan Blanco; and that he had, afterwards, seen their departure

from Malaga announced in the public papers. He had, therefore, every reason to believe, and still did believe, that they had sailed for Africa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 77.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received February* 15.)

(No. 61.)

My Lord, *Madrid, February* 10, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 58, marked Confidential, of the 8th instant, respecting the Reef prisoners, I have ascertained that the report of their having sailed from Malaga was incorrect, some delay in their departure having occurred in consequence of the Captain-General of Granada having had no vessel at his disposal in which to embark them. I am assured, however, that M. Calderon Collantes has now arranged with the competent authorities for a small ship of war or revenue vessel being immediately provided for the purpose.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 78.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1859.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 46 of the 2nd instant, in which you report your communications with M. Calderon Collantes respecting the language of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, and the questions under discussion between the Governments of Spain and Morocco.

I have to acquaint you that I have spoken to M. Isturiz on this subject, and I approve your language to M. Calderon Collantes as reported in your despatch. You will maintain a friendly tone in urging your advice upon his Excellency in this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 79.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received February* 18.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Madrid, February* 12, 1859.

M. CALDERON COLLANTES observed to me two days ago, that the conduct of the Reefians in refusing to give up the Spanish prisoners was so inexcusable, that he feared it would be absolutely necessary to chastise them; and, in the meantime, he had sent instructions to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, to urge the Moroccan authorities to take decisive measures for obtaining the release of the prisoners.

I said I had no doubt that whatever measures might be necessary would be taken by the Sultan, and that I had also every reason to hope that confidential advice which Mr. Drummond Hay had offered to the refractory Chiefs would induce them to obey the orders of their Sovereign. His Excellency replied that he trusted it might be so; adding, however, that if the question of the prisoners had occasioned so much trouble, there was little hope of the Spanish Government obtaining by negotiation the acknowledgment of the claims they had presented to the Government of Morocco, or the establishment of a neutral camp in the valley of Melilla. I replied that I believed his negotiations had but little prospect of success as far as the claims were concerned, and he was already

aware that my Government were of opinion that the Sultan would be justified in rejecting them. He maintained, however, that they were founded on the strictest principles of right and justice. I, therefore, said that abstractedly they might be so, but that Spain had apparently adhered to the policy of England and France in 1856, when they addressed remonstrances to Morocco respecting the piracies of the Reefians, and demanding redress for the last cases which had occurred, declared that the Sultan would be held responsible in future for the safety of the coast of Reef. I said that the "San Joaquin," being the last Spanish vessel plundered, formed the subject of the Spanish demand, which, having been at first refused by Morocco on the ground of exceptional Treaty relations between the two countries, has now, after a negotiation of two years' duration, been granted, on the principle that Spain was entitled to insist on her being put upon the same footing as England and France. Her Majesty's Government were, therefore, justified in considering that the new claims do not rest on legitimate grounds, and in disapproving of the policy which had led to their being put forward.

I said that if Spain merely desired to effect an arrangement for the purpose of preventing collisions between the Reefians and her garrisons in Africa, I felt assured she would have had a better chance of success, if she had not embarrassed the question by objectionable pecuniary demands; and that though Her Majesty's Government were dissatisfied with the exceptional course which she had adopted with regard to piracy, they might possibly be induced to acknowledge her exceptional position on shore, and to admit the expediency of a rectification of the lines around her fortresses, with a view to enabling her to maintain peaceful relations with Morocco.

M. Calderon Collantes listened to these observations without making any reply, but whatever impression they may have made upon him, I fear that the eventual direction given to Spanish policy in this question will depend principally upon Marshal O'Donnell.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 80.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 72.)

My Lord, *Madrid, February 18, 1859.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 61 of the 10th instant, on the subject of the refusal of the Reef Chiefs to give up their Spanish prisoners unconditionally, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Spanish Government have received a telegram, through Algeciras, from Don Juan Blanco, reporting that the prisoners were on their way to Tangier, and were daily expected there.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 81.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 15.)

My Lord, *Tangier, February 17, 1859.*

YOUR Lordship will have learnt, from a private letter I had addressed Mr. Hammond on the 2nd instant, the steps I was about to take with the view of obtaining the liberation of the seven Spaniards in the hands of the people of Akkalaya, in Reef. I am happy to inform your Lordship that my messenger, Hadj Abdallah Lamarty, returned here, in Her Majesty's gun-boat "Quail," on the night of the 14th instant, having successfully accomplished the object of his mission.

I have the honour to inclose, herewith, a translation of the reply of the

friendly Chief of the Beni Said tribe, Seid Mohamed Alhadary, to the letter I had addressed him, asking for his mediation with the Akkalayans.

Hadj Abdallah relates, that on his arrival at Beni Said, in Her Majesty's gun-boat "Quail," he proceeded, by land, with Alhadary to Akkalaya, and held to the Reefian Chiefs the language I had recommended. The Akkalayans offered to embark the prisoners on board Her Majesty's gun-boat "Quail," if Hadj Abdallah would engage, on my part, to recover for them the little cannon belonging to their tribe, which, they said, had been treacherously betrayed into the hands of the Spanish authorities at Melilla. Hadj Abdallah very properly replied, that the cannon was public property, and not that of any private individual, and that as the Sultan their Sovereign chose to demand that the Spanish prisoners be sent to Tangier without the previous restoration of the gun, it was their duty to obey, and that if they did not release the prisoners, he thought it his duty, as a fellow-countryman and a friend, to inform them a force would be sent against them by the Sultan, and that the other Reef tribes would loyally aid the Sultan in the execution of his orders. The discourse of the Hadj had a good effect, for the majority of the Chiefs declared they would give up the captives, and send them by the "Quail." Hadj Abdallah, however, said he had received orders not to embark the Spaniards on board the English steamer, but that they should be sent overland, as ordered by the Sultan.

On the second day after my messenger's arrival, an officer from the Sultan's Court, accompanied by five troopers, arrived with a further order from the Sultan for the delivery of the prisoners.

A question arose regarding the payment of the Chief, who had furnished food and clothes for the Spaniards during their detention in the Reef, and some of the Chiefs refused to liberate them until this claim was satisfied, whilst the Sultan's officer declared he had only received authority to pay for the hire of animals to conduct them to the Moorish Court and to Tangier.

A Chief of the Oolishky tribe then offered to Alhadary and to Hadj Abdallah to pay the money claimed, viz., 300 dollars, if the prisoners were delivered up; but he made a condition that Alhadary should obtain his pardon from the Governor of Reef, and in that case he would embark for Tangier in Her Majesty's ship "Quail," if a passage could be granted.

This was agreed to by Alhadary. The money was paid, and the prisoners were handed over to the Moorish officer, who was to have started for Meknas with a guard of twenty-five Reefians, and thence to Tangier, the day Hadj Abdallah returned here in the "Quail."

I mention all these circumstances to your Lordship, as it will best explain why Seid Mohamed Alhadary asks for my mediation to obtain the pardon of the Oolishky Chief.

I have made known to Don Juan Blanco and Seid Mohamed Khateeb the tidings I have received of the release of the captives; and both of these functionaries have expressed their satisfaction at the result which has been obtained.

I communicated also to Seid Mohamed Khateeb the petition of Alhadary for the pardon of Oolishky, the praiseworthy conduct of the latter in assisting Hadj Abdallah to carry into execution the Sultan's orders for the liberation of the Spaniards, and his intention to have proceeded to Tangier in Her Majesty's ship "Quail," had a passage been granted, to implore the forgiveness of the Governor of Reef, and to pay the debt owed by his father for arrears of tithes to the Sultan.

Khateeb was good enough to authorise me to announce at once to Seid Mohamed Alhadary that Oolishky's pardon was granted, and that solely the payment of the money due to the Sultan from his late father would be required.

This Oolishky Chief is, after Alhadary, the most important man in Reef, and possesses great wealth. Lieutenant Osborne very properly objected to give a passage to the Reefian Chief and his friends on board the "Quail," as he had not been requested by me to bring any person from the Reef in that vessel. I am very happy to have had an opportunity of requiting the friendly offices of Alhadary.

I have made a present to the messenger, Hadj Abdallah, of 4*l.* sterling for his services, which sum I beg your Lordship may authorize me to charge in my contingent accounts.

I have further to inclose herewith the translation of a letter addressed by the Vizier to Seid Mohamed Khateeb on his receiving from the latter the tidings of the failure of the mission of the first officer sent by the Sultan to effect the release of the Spaniards. The success which has attended the mission of the last officer fortunately prevents the necessity of any coercion being now employed by the Sultan in the Reef.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 81.

Seid Mohamed Alhadary to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments,) 8 *Rajeb*, 1275. (*February* 12, 1859.)

WE have received your esteemed letter which was brought by your friend Hadj Abdallah Lamarty, who is the beloved of all who know him. We have perused and understood all you say.

Be it known to you that God Almighty has caused all your wishes to be fulfilled, inasmuch as you ever seek to promote the welfare and peace of God's creatures.

Hadj Abdallah presented himself to us in person, and also came in person to us an officer from the Sultan, the bearer of a letter to us, and to the people of Akkalaya. We went in person to Akkalaya, and we read to them the letter of His Majesty, and we exerted ourselves to the utmost. At first they wished to oppose us, so we then tried to tempt them with the things of this world, and we made them gifts of the value of about 300 dollars, which were divided amongst the chief men; and this was done in order that we might carry into execution the wishes of our Lord (the Sultan), who is God's Caliph.

The Akkalayans are now about to set out with the Sultan's officer to the Court, and they take with them the Spanish captives.

I pray God that the result which has been obtained may be considered satisfactory, and that peaceful relations may now be restored both by sea and by land.

I have to repeat to you that which I have told you before, that the Spaniards have always been the cause why the Reefians have molested vessels at sea, for no confidence or faith can be placed in the Spaniards' promises or engagements. They have frequently promised to the Mussulmans to respect their vessels, and not to molest them, and when credence is given to their assurances, they break them or act deceitfully, and capture our vessels.

Now, the tribes of Beni Said, of Beni Oolishk, and of Temsemam have never, from the most ancient times, committed the smallest outrage or depredation on the sea; nevertheless, the Spaniards have at various times captured many of our boats, have killed our people, and plundered our property, yet we have not found to whom we could appeal for justice, but to God Almighty, as we are opposed to use force, and thus do anything which might be contrary to the Sultan's wishes. The Spaniards, moreover, have alone been attacked by the Akkalayans; no one else has ever molested them by sea, except the Akkalayans, may God bring upon them the retribution they deserve!

Now, O my friend, I have a favour, a great favour to ask of you. There is a most worthy man, one of our best friends, who has taken refuge with us, and begged for our protection, and for that of your friend Hadj Abdallah. His name is Alarby Ben Al Hadj Mohamed Oolishky. He had a difference with the Governor of Reef, Abbas Emkished, so the latter arrested him, his father and brothers, and all were put into prison. His father (may God have mercy on his soul!) died in prison. Now, this man has rendered considerable services in Reef, and has paid large contributions towards providing for the maintenance of the Sultan's troops whenever they visit Reef. He has always been ready, and no one is like unto him, to act up to the wishes of the Sultan. I implore of you to act as a mediator in bringing about a conciliation between him and Abbas Emkished, and that you will also ask Seid Mohamed Khateeb to regard him with the eyes of kindness and goodwill, and weigh him in the balance of justice, and to allow him to return here happy and contented.

I send with him our nephew to represent us. He throws himself upon you

for protection. I write by him another letter urging all this on your attention. God never overlooks an act of charity which may proceed from the goodness of the heart.

I will accept of no excuse from you in this our behest: may God aid you to accomplish it! We ever continue in friendship and peace towards you.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED ALHADARY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 81.

Seid Mohamed Sefar to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.) 1 *Rajeb*, 1275. (*February* 4, 1859.)

WE have received your letter, informing us of the return to Tangier of the Kaid Ali Ben Abd-el-kader, and the soldiers who accompanied him to Reef, in consequence of the people of Akkalaya having refused to deliver up to them the Christians in their hands.

The counsels you have given have been taken into consideration, and our Lord the Sultan has written to Hadji Maimon, the Chief of Beni Snassel, to take steps to compel the people of Akkalaya to deliver up the Christians.

We have received, also, the reply of Seid Mohamed Alhadary, and we communicated it to the Sultan, and His Majesty has sent, this very morning, his Royal orders to the Chief Hadj Maimon, of the Beni Snassel province, to go to Akkalaya in person.

Peace. (Signed) MAHOMED SEFAR.

No. 82.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Tangier, February* 17, 1859.

SEID MOHAMED KHATEEB has communicated to me, confidentially, a letter which he has received from the Sultan, of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a translation.

The Sultan, as your Lordship will observe, appears to confirm the reply given by his Minister to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, regarding the claim the latter had put forward on account of piracies committed by the Reefians before the year 1856, and rejects with indignation the proposition of accepting a pecuniary compensation for the cession of territory in Reef, and the offer of the Spanish Government to withdraw their claims on that condition. His Majesty consents, however, to take into consideration the proposition for establishing a new boundary line in front of Melilla, in order to insure peace and tranquillity between the Reefians and Spaniards, and agrees that it should be established according to international usage in such matters.

In another letter which Seid Mohamed Khateeb has received from the Sultan, His Majesty authorizes him to inform the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires that he will agree to appoint Moorish officers to command the Reef guards in front of the Spanish African garrisons.

Khateeb has not yet communicated the Sultan's reply to Don Juan Blanco, and has therefore requested me to keep secret the contents of the Sultan's letter. To-morrow he intends to address him a letter, and will couch the orders he has received from the Sultan in more conciliatory language that that of the Royal letter.

The view your Lordship had taken regarding the impolicy of the presentation by the Spanish Government of the obsolete claims for the furtherance of their views, with regard to a boundary at Melilla, has been verified, for such a course has not had any beneficial effect on the mind of the Sultan, but the reverse. Your Lordship will, I believe, learn with satisfaction the prudent course which has been taken by the Sultan in admitting the rightful pretensions of the Spaniards for the establishment of a neutral ground; and I trust the Spanish Government will now have the good sense to rest satisfied with this

very important concession on the part of the Sultan, and that they will not put forward unjustifiable pretensions for the cession of territory which they held some two centuries ago, and which they abandoned, I believe, about the time Oran was retaken by the Moors. I am convinced the Sultan would never grant any such territory, and that, even if he did so, the Reefians would, doubtless, never submit to carry His Majesty's orders into execution. Nor would the Sultan find a Mohamedan in Morocco who would be disposed to serve under his banners, with the object of compelling the Reefians to make a cession of territory to a Christian nation. The Sultan will, I apprehend, meet with the greatest difficulty and obstacles on the part of the Reefians, even in carrying out his present intention of agreeing to the demarkation of a neutral ground; and unless the Spanish Government does all in its power to strengthen the Sultan's position in the eyes of his unruly subjects of Reef, by affording proper reparation for the injury sustained by the owners and crews of the peacefully trading boats captured by the Spaniards, I fear it will be a very difficult matter for His Majesty to obtain the consent of the Reefians to the proposed arrangement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 82.

The Sultan of Morocco to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 1 *Rejeb*, 1275. (*February* 4, 1859.)

WE have received your letter, and have made ourselves acquainted with the answer you gave to the letter of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, regarding the demand which he had made for the 30,000 dollars, and which you stated to him you considered they (the Spaniards) were not justified in putting forward against us. Know that all you said in reply was perfectly correct, and is exactly what our answer to them would have been, for they have no rightful claim against us on that account.

With regard to what he (the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires) says, viz., that he will abandon the demands on condition of obtaining alteration of the boundaries between us and them, we have to state that, respecting any boundary that may prove beneficial to our subjects and to our dominions, and that may be in accordance with what is proper and right for us to grant, in order to ensure the peace and tranquillity of the two nations, we will take the matter into consideration, and it shall be arranged satisfactorily, if God pleases; but with regard to the pretension that the boundary should be ceded on account of the 30,000 dollars, we have to say that, even if their demand for that amount were a just one, not so much of the territory which God has granted to the Moors as may be equivalent to the paring of a nail shall be yielded by us, whether for 30,000 dollars, or 30,000,000 dollars. We will not, on any account, yield one jot of our territory to any Power whatsoever, except it be to bring about an arrangement for such a boundary as it may be right and proper, according to the usage of nations, for us to cede.

Peace.

No. 83.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received February* 26.)

(Private.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, February* 17, 1859.

MY despatches Nos. 15 and 16 of this date, report the release of the Spanish captives, and that the Sultan has consented to the demarkation of a new boundary in front of Melilla.

You will learn, also, that the Sultan won't listen to any proposition for a sale of territory, and in this he follows the good example of the Spaniards, if we are to judge from the late language of O'Donnell in the Cortes; so I suppose he won't complain that the Sultan should also have some sentiment about national dignity.

Had it not been for the advice given to the Sultan in the name of the British Government, he would never have consented even to grant a neutral ground.

I wrote the day before yesterday a private letter to Mr. Buchanan, giving him the tidings about the release of the Spaniards, and that the Sultan agrees to a new boundary; but I had not time to give him further details. I told Mr. Buchanan that M. Collantes had misinformed him in stating that the Reef prisoners had been sent to Tangier, and also in having stated that the claims for vessels captured by the Reefians were all subsequent to 1845.

My Spanish colleague appears much pleased at the liberation of the Spaniards, and says he shall go to Madrid when they arrive, and tell O'Donnell his mind about the claims, &c. Don Juan is, I fear, a weathercock, and shifts his position as the wind blows from Madrid.

He let the cat out of the bag the other day in a conversation I had with him, in which I happened to mention that I had heard the Governor of Ceuta had been appointed to command the expedition against the Reef, had it taken place, by his saying very warmly, "No, O'Donnell would, in such a case, take the command himself, for a successful General would become the most popular man in Spain." Don Juan is in constant private correspondence with O'Donnell.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I have let the Admiral at Malta know the progress of the Mauro-Spanish negotiations.

J. H. D. H.

No. 84.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 1.)

(No. 78. Confidential.) *Madrid, February* 23, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE this morning received a private letter from Mr. Drummond Hay, dated the 15th instant, confirming the telegraphic intelligence that I communicated to your Lordship in my despatch No. 72 of the 18th instant, of the release of the Spanish prisoners in the Reef. They were to set out for the Court of the Sultan on the 12th instant, and to be forwarded from thence to Tangier. The reports received by the Spanish Government from the Governor of Melilla represent them to have been previously in some danger, the Chiefs having threatened to shoot them if the cannon captured by the garrison were not restored within a given time.

The Governor promised to write for instructions on the subject to the Captain-General of Granada; and the release of the prisoners, which may be attributed partly to fresh orders from the Sultan, and partly to the counsels of Mr. Drummond Hay, took place in the meanwhile.

Mr. Hay also informs me that the Minister of the Sultan had just received a letter from His Highness, consenting to the establishment of a neutral ground at Melilla "with a Moorish guard-house and Moorish officers to command on the frontier." The Sultan appears to have declared, with reference to the financial claims of the Spanish Government, that, even if they were good, he would never consent to sell an inch of Moorish territory "neither for 30,000 nor for 30,000,000 of dollars, though being ready to do what is right and proper" about the neutral ground, and "what may ensure the tranquillity of his own subjects, and peace between the two nations, he is prepared to take the question into consideration, and to settle it in an amicable manner."

Khateeb had not yet communicated the Sultan's decision to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, as he was waiting for official information of the arrival of the Spanish prisoners at His Highness' Court.

The issue of the question will now depend on the moderation and prudence of this Government; and if it can be shown that all that is necessary for the

future tranquillity and freedom from insult of the African garrisons can be obtained by the concessions which the Sultan is prepared to make, it may be hoped that they will scarcely venture, in defiance of the counsels of their allies, to embark, without any reasonable pretext, in a war of aggression and conquest, more especially as they cannot be blind to the fact that hostilities against the Empire of Morocco may prove more advantageous to France than to themselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 85.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 2, 1859.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copies of two despatches from Mr. Hay, &c., reporting the steps taken by him to procure the release of the Spanish prisoners, and regarding the question as to the boundary at Melilla.*

Her Majesty's Government have approved Mr. Hay's proceedings, as reported in these despatches, and they consider that he deserves the praise of the Spanish Government for his judicious and intelligent conduct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 86.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 3, 1859.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 78 of the 23rd ultimo, regarding the release of the Spanish prisoners in Reef, and the proposed arrangement for a neutral ground at Melilla; and I have to instruct you again to urge upon the Spanish Government the policy of moderation in their mode of dealing with the Moorish question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 87.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, March* 6, 1859.

A LETTER, just received from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, states that the Reefians have again refused to give up the Spanish prisoners. From the temper of the Spanish Government on this subject, serious consequences may be apprehended. I shall endeavour to obtain time for the Sultan to enforce his orders.

No. 88.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, March* 7, 1859.

A DUPLICATE of a despatch to your Lordship from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, dated 1st March, reports arrival of two Spanish vessels-of-war, and that Spanish Agent threatens to break off relations if prisoners are not immediately released. Mr. Hay believes, if cession of territory at Melilla is not made, a rupture will ensue, and has requested senior naval

* No. 82.

officer at Gibraltar to provide protection for British residents. I shall forward despatch, with explanations of this Government, by Spanish messenger on the 10th. Foreign Minister assures me, unless prisoners are killed, force will not be immediately employed to obtain Spanish demands. He says, to accept the neutral ground would be a renunciation of Spanish claim to the old lines.

No. 89.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 8.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord, *Tangier, February* 26, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 16 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose, herewith, the translation of the draft of a letter addressed by Seid Mohamed Khateeb to M. Juan Blanco, and which was communicated to me by the former, on the 19th instant, making known to M. Blanco the reply of the Sultan to the communication he had made to His Majesty, regarding the claims put forward by the Spanish Government for vessels captured by the Reefians before the year 1855, and regarding the Spanish demand for a cession of territory at Melilla, and the demarkation of a neutral ground.

Khateeb informs me that the letter, of which the above-mentioned document is a translation of the draft, was sent by him to M. Blanco on the 20th instant; that on its receipt M. Blanco returned the letter, through his interpreter, to Khateeb, with a request that he should withdraw or alter the phrase which I have marked with asterisks,* as Don Juan, said he, wished that phrase to be worded in another form. Khateeb consented to make any slight alteration which might be agreeable to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

Shortly afterwards, Khateeb informed me, Don Juan Blanco had sent again his interpreter to say that it would greatly facilitate the settlement of all questions if he would consent that the wording of the whole letter should be altered, but without affecting any important modification of the Sultan's instruction. Khateeb consented, on that condition, to take into consideration the draft that Don Juan might send for his perusal, and, consequently, on the 22nd instant, the latter sent, through his interpreter, a draft of a letter in the Spanish language, with directions to translate it, verbatim, into Arabic to Khateeb; and I have the honour to inclose, herewith, a translation from the Arabic draft of the original, which has been communicated to me by Khateeb.

When the Spanish interpreter brought the draft to Khateeb, he informed him he had been directed by Don Juan to warn Khateeb against communicating the draft to myself, and added, Don Juan had received information that a certain person had been writing to his Government, and to Madrid, to propose that he should act as umpire for the demarkation of the frontier lines; but that the Spanish Government would never accede to such a proposition. Khateeb replied that he had never heard a word from any person at Tangier about such a proposition, and that he ignored to whom he alluded; but that, with regard to the proposed draft, he could never accept it, for it was in direct contradiction to the instructions he had received from the Sultan, which authorized him alone to say, that the demarkation of the boundaries for a neutral ground at Melilla would be acceded to; but that no cession of territory to the Spaniards would be granted.

Don Juan, on receiving the reply of Khateeb, sent a peremptory message, demanding that a letter identic with the draft be addressed to him, or he would reply to his, Khateeb's, letter of the 15th ultimo, wherein he had rejected the claims for pecuniary compensation. To this Khateeb retorted, by saying that M. Blanco was at liberty to act as he pleased; but that he must adhere to the Sultan's instructions. Later in the day, M. Blanco sent his interpreter to say he wished to see Khateeb before any further step was taken, and perhaps some understanding might be come to; but that as he did not wish any one, more especially the English Chargé d'Affaires, should know of his visit, he would visit him at 10 o'clock at night. Khateeb replied he would see him next day at any time he pleased, as he was too much occupied that night to receive him.

* See page 117, 17 lines from the bottom, viz.: "That if your Government will bring to a close all these discussions, as you had said to us in the garden of the Government."

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

I happened to be absent in the country during the two days these discussions were taking place; but on the 24th instant I had an interview with Khateeb, when he gave me the above relation of what had occurred, and put in my hands the draft which Don Juan had required him to write, and asked my advice. I replied that if the Sultan would be disposed to concede a portion of territory at Melilla, as well as the neutral ground, as demanded by M. Blanco, the British Government, I felt persuaded, would be happy to learn that all matters had thus been finally adjusted, for we had not the slightest interest in opposing such a concession. Khateeb said the cession of territory was out of the question; that the Sultan had agreed to the demarkation of the limits of a neutral ground, because I had declared the Spaniards had just grounds for putting forward such a pretension, but that not an inch of such ground would be ceded or sold under any consideration whatever: moreover, that even if the Sultan had agreed to make such a concession, the Reefians would never obey His Majesty's orders to give up a portion of their territory to the Christians; that even in the arrangement of the neutral ground, it was very possible the Sultan would have finally to send an army to enforce the execution of his orders. As M. Blanco had told Khateeb he would visit him that night, I recommended the latter to take into consideration any reasonable proposition he might have to put forward for an alteration of the letter Khateeb had addressed him. I told him, also, I thought it would be advisable he should no longer leave M. Blanco under the false impression that all that was passing, and had passed between them, was kept secret from me, especially as I reported officially to your Lordship and Mr. Buchanan all the communications he (Khateeb) had chosen to make me on this subject, as also the counsels I had proffered to the Moorish Government. Khateeb agreed with me in thinking it would be advisable no longer to let M. Blanco be led away by erroneous impressions in this respect, and said he would take an opportunity of telling him frankly that he had received orders from the Sultan to ask my advice, as the Agent of a Government which was the friendly ally of both parties, and that in doing so, the Moorish Government only followed the usages of other Governments who, in grave matters of dispute with other nations, sought for the counsels of a friendly and impartial ally; moreover, he said, he would tell M. Blanco that the principal concessions, hitherto made by the Sultan, had been made out of deference to the counsels he had received from the British Government through myself.

M. Blanco, on receipt of the letter, sent his interpreter to ask why Khateeb had not waited for its presentation till he could see him, as some alteration might have been made in the wording of the note, which would have facilitated the adjustment of all questions. Khateeb replied that as M. Blanco had again deferred his visit, he, Khateeb, could no longer delay putting into execution the instructions he had received from the Sultan regarding his answer about the claims and the demarkation of a neutral ground. The interpreter then told Khateeb that one of the chief objections of M. Blanco to the letter was that the Sultan had said, "he would take the matter into consideration;" and that M. Blanco feared this was done merely to gain time, and that, eventually, no arrangement about the frontier at Melilla would be come to. To this Khateeb informed me he replied that the Sultan was acting with perfect good faith; "that a neutral ground which was proper, according to the usages of other nations, would be granted at Melilla;" but that such a matter could not be arranged with precipitation, for it would be necessary, when once the Spanish Government had accepted the Sultan's offer, that Commissioners should be sent by the Sultan to report on the extent of territory requisite for the neutral ground, and on the feelings of the Reef population about such a concession; and also whether it would be necessary for the Sultan to send an army into Reef when the moment arrived that the new lines were to be marked, in order to secure obedience to his commands; that were the Sultan to act without great prudence and circumspection in the affair, the object both Governments had in view for securing a peaceful solution of all questions, would be thwarted.

Khateeb has informed me this morning that M. Blanco has not yet called on him, as he declared was his intention, nor has he received any further message from him.

Yesterday evening M. Blanco dispatched a Spanish steamer of war, stationed at the port, to Algesiras, and I profited by that opportunity to send to the Government Post-office, by a passenger, a hurried private letter to Mr. Buchanan,

containing the information I have now given to your Lordship, together with copies of the two inclosures.

The Spanish prisoners are not expected till next week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I hear, to-day, that Don Juan Blanco went himself with the steamer to Algesiras.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 89.

Draft of a Letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

(Translation.) *February* 19, 1859.

WE have to acquaint you that we had made known to our Lord the Sultan what you had written to us on the 31st December last, and what we had replied to your regarding the claims, as also that which you communicated verbally to us in the garden of the Government last month, and we sent a copy of the Memorandum you transmitted us, at that time, through your interpreter. Our Lord has replied that the answer we addressed you regarding the claims for the vessels is in conformity with his Royal orders, and that our reply is his reply; that the sole claim which your Government had put forward three years ago, namely, for the vessel "San Joaquin," and upon which representations had been made by you on your arrival, had, as you are aware, been settled in a manner satisfactory to you, for we had delivered to you, at the time, 2,000 dollars, but our Lord never supposed, at the time, you would put forward claims which were prior to that which was then settled, whilst our Lord then agreed to settle the said demand, to give a proof of his friendship and goodwill to your Government; but as to the demands for vessels captured by the Reefians before that time, he cannot acknowledge them, and he has replied to that effect repeatedly to other nations. He cannot separate himself from his first declaration, either towards your nation or towards other nations; but all that he has ever conceded in justice to others he has equally conceded to you, for our Lord's desire is to promote a good and friendly understanding between himself and your Government.

With regard to what you have proposed, that the demands should be withdrawn in consideration for the cession of a boundary at Melilla, our Lord has replied that even had those demands been acknowledged as proper, and we had agreed to pay them, our Lord would never concede any portion of the land which God has granted to the Mussulmans, neither for thirty thousand dollars nor for thirty millions of dollars. Your Government, from its well-known judgment, and you, also, from your discernment, will understand the propriety of this; for Kings cannot dispose, by sale, of the territory they rule over, nor grant their territory in any other way; but His Shereefian Majesty has directed me to say, that if your Government will bring to a close all these discussions, as you had said to us in the garden of the Government, that a boundary, which may be proper at Melilla, tending to promote a good understanding and peace between the two parties, and which may be arranged according to the received usages amongst nations, so as to prevent conflicts between the Reef people and the inhabitants of your fortresses, our Lord has desired us to acquaint you, will be taken into consideration, and will be satisfactorily arranged, if it pleases God; for the Sultan desires to agree to that which may promote the welfare and honour of the two Governments, and which may cement their peace and friendship. With regard to the fortresses of Peñon and Alhucemas, they are islands; God has, therefore, fixed their limits by the sea. With regard to the guards in the frontier, our side at Melilla, and in front of the islands, officers of the Sultan's army shall be appointed to superintend the guards of the frontier, who will be placed by those officers, and not by the people of Reef. All these matters, if it pleases God, will be amicably settled, if it be your desire, as it is ours, to do so. You, thank God, are a man of discernment, and are therefore acquainted with the state of the Reef people, and know that it will be necessary to conduct all

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

these affairs with prudence and moderation, in order that they may be settled in a satisfactory manner.

Peace.

Inclosure 2 in No. 89.

Draft of a Letter which Don Juan Blanco requested Seid Mohamed Khateeb to address to him.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.)

IN accordance with the promise made in our interview with you of the 22nd January last, we reported all that took place to our Lord, and said that you desired to promote peace, amity, and friendship, between the two Governments; and we also reported what you promised to us, namely, that you would use friendly persuasion with your Government in urging them to withdraw all the claims that were mentioned in your letters of the 31st December and 13th January, on the condition (as you said) that our Lord would grant to your Government a (new) frontier, as well as a space of land requisite for their fortresses, and such commanding positions as might prevent conflicts between the two parties. Our Lord has replied, in the satisfactory manner we supposed he would do, and this because he desires to promote friendship and goodwill between the two Governments, and to cement a lasting friendship between him and your nation.

Now, there is not any one of the Sultans who would give either a large or small portion of his dominions, whether for 30,000 or 30,000,000 dollars, but our Lord wishes for an arrangement by which all conflicts and disorders may be checked between the Reef people and the authorities of your fortresses, for sometimes the injuries proceed from the Reef people, and sometimes from your authorities in your fortresses, in consequence of their insufficient knowledge of the established rules and the disorderly state of the Reefians, and thus conflicts have ensued between them, and the peace that ought to exist between them is interrupted. The desire of our Lord is, that your towns should not be molested, nor any injury done to them by the people of Reef; and he likewise desires that the vessels of the Reefians engaged in trade should sail in the sea without interruption or hindrance on the part of your vessels in our dominions, as no injury had been done to them till the year 1856; and our Lord has ordered us to write to you that you must not doubt that this our letter to you is, as it were, from his Shereefian hand.

1st. To cede to Spain the frontier requisite for their fortress of Melilla, and to widen the frontier to such a distance as to prevent any injury being caused to the inhabitants, and to fix the limits of the frontier by parties appointed by us and by you.

2ndly. That a settlement be come to, also, regarding a neutral ground, and in order that the frontier be respected on our side, a Kaid will be appointed by our Lord, with soldiers who are not Reefians.

As to Peñon and Alhucemas, they are islands, so God has fixed their boundaries by the sea; but on the coast opposite to them our Lord will appoint guards to be stationed. On these conditions our Lord requires that all the demands that you mentioned, or any others, be settled; and from your perfect judgment and experience, we are persuaded that you will seek to promote a friendly understanding, as we have done, and that no matter of discussion shall remain between the two Governments, as was agreed upon at the interview which took place between us. We have no doubt, also, that whenever you have an opportunity of communicating this verbally to your Government, you will, as in accordance with your promise, exert yourself to bring about the withdrawal of the demands which our Lord cannot accept, as he has already declared to other nations, when similar demands were made previously by them, and as we wrote to you before, in our letter dated the 1st of Joomad the second, 1275.

We have written this to you as a proof of our friendship, and hope you will regard it in that light.

No. 90.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 9, 1859.

I INCLOSE, for your information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tangiers, inclosing correspondence respecting the demands of the Spanish Government upon Morocco.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 91.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 9.)

(No. 90.)

My Lord, *Madrid, March* 4, 1859.

IN my despatch No. 86 of the 3rd instant, I transmitted to your Lordship some information which I had received from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, relative to the position of the negotiations, up to the 25th ultimo, which have been for some time pending between the Spanish and Moroccan Governments respecting the wish of Spain to reoccupy certain old lines round the Spanish fortresses in Africa, and to have a neutral ground, garrisoned by Moorish troops, established between the Spanish and Reefian territory in the valley of Melilla; and I reported, at the same time, that orders had been issued by the Spanish Admiralty for a new demonstration by a squadron of steam-vessels on the coast of Morocco.

I have now further to add, with reference to this subject, that I have had, this morning, an interview with Marshal O'Donnell, in which his Excellency declared that though objections were, at present, made by the Government of Morocco to the views of Spain, assurances had been given some time ago to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires by the Sultan that the zone marked around the fortresses, asked for by Spain, would be granted. He said, also, that the Spanish Government would undoubtedly consider such a concession a necessary condition of any arrangement which might be come to; and he intimated that if the Sultan could not be induced, by negotiation, to accept "the reasonable proposals" which had been made to him, the Spanish Government would be obliged to have recourse to other means for causing them to be adopted.

I observed that Her Majesty's Government, whose only interest in the question was that the amicable relations of Spain and Morocco should not be interrupted, would learn with great regret that the Spanish Government might possibly seek to extend their territorial limits in Africa by conquest; but his Excellency maintained that the re-occupation of the old lines around the fortresses, which had never been ceded to Morocco by Treaty, even if force was necessary to effect it, could not be considered a conquest.

He spoke of the impossibility of continuing to permit the garrison of Melilla to be prisoners within the walls, and of the right of Spain to the territory under the guns of the fortress. I asked, therefore, whether the British lines extended over the country commanded by the guns of Gibraltar; and his Excellency, without being able or willing to answer this question, seemed to be of opinion that the territory now occupied by Great Britain exceeded what she had been originally intended to do.

The range of guns around a fortress has, indeed, lately become a very elastic limit of territorial jurisdiction, but, if no other base on which to treat can be found, it appears to me that the state of things established at Gibraltar might not be an unfair precedent on which to regulate the question which has been raised by the Spanish Government in Africa.

I shall forward a copy of this despatch to Mr. Drummond Hay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

P.S.—I inclose a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Mr. Hay, forwarding to him a copy of this despatch.

A. B.

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* No. 89.

Inclosure in No. 91.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, March* 4, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your information, the copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to the Earl of Malmesbury, relative to the claim of the Spanish Government to reoccupy certain old lines around their fortresses in Africa.

I shall endeavour to hope that the Spanish Government will not have recourse to the extreme measure of employing force to obtain their object, if the Sultan of Morocco cannot be induced to renounce his sovereignty over territory which, though formerly occupied by Spain, appears to have been tacitly abandoned by her garrisons.

The language of Marshal O'Donnell, however, is very decided on this subject; and I cannot disguise from myself that his Excellency seems to consider that the old lines must be re-established, whatever measures may be requisite for the purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 92.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord, *Tangier, March* 1, 1859.

M. BLANCO returned to Tangier yesterday evening from Algeciras in a Spanish war steamer, and was accompanied by another steamer.

At 9 P.M., I received a letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb, of which the inclosed document is a translation. His letter to M. Blanco of the 20th ultimo, which had been returned, and which he inclosed for my perusal, I found to be identic with the draft he communicated to me on the 18th ultimo, except the passage in the first paragraph of that letter: "and what we replied to you regarding the claims, as also that which you communicated verbally to us in the garden of the Government last month," which had been omitted, in consequence, I believe, of M. Blanco's having requested, when first the letter was presented, that no mention should be made in it of the interview in the garden.

As Seid Mohamed Khateeb sent me also a verbal message, requesting me to come and see him, or to reply to his letter, I gave to my interpreter, Mr. David Sicsu, this morning, instructions in the Spanish language, of which the inclosed is a translation, and I trust they may not be disapproved of by your Lordship.

I have further the honour to inclose herewith a translation of Mr. Sicsu's report of Khateeb's reply.

From information I have received from the nephew of Seid Mohamed Al Hadary, who has accompanied the Chief of the Oolishky tribe, whose pardon I had obtained from this Government, it appears that the day after the departure of my messenger, Hadj Abdullah, the Spanish captives actually started with the Sultan's officers for the Moorish Court, accompanied by an escort of Reefians, when some of the Chiefs, who had no share in the 300 dollars which had been given for their release, stopped the party, and declared they should not be set at liberty until the little cannon, which had fallen treacherously into the hands of the Spaniards, were given back to them, and until their Reef brethren detained in captivity in Spain were released.

My informant said he had also heard that Kaid Maimon was expected in Akkalaya, and that he would demand the delivery of the captives. Your Lordship will observe, by Mr. Sicsu's report, that Khateeb entertains considerable apprehensions that the Spaniards would be murdered by the Reefians if force were employed, and that this had made the Sultan hesitate about resorting to such a measure.

I beg to call your Lordship's attention to the passage in the instructions I gave this morning to Mr. David Sicsu, where I say that, even if the prisoners

had arrived, and had been delivered up, Don Juan Blanco would not have acted differently from what he has now done; for his arrival here with two vessels of war, after his visit to Algeciras, and his refusal to accept Khateeb's letter of the 20th ultimo, give grounds for believing that the Spanish Government has decided upon breaking off its relations with this Government, and resorting to hostilities, unless the new frontier-line coveted by the Spanish Government is ceded, and that, even if the claim for the 30,000 dollars were satisfied, other more obsolete demands of forty or fifty years' standing are to be raked up, as would appear from the language held of late by Don Juan to some of my colleagues, and that a demand be also made that the Tariff annexed to the Treaty between Spain and Morocco be put in force, even though it has never been acted upon since the stipulations were drawn up, and the money and weights alluded to in the said Tariff are uo longer in use. The object the Spanish Government has in view, therefore, is evidently an accession of territory in Melilla, besides the grant already made of the neutral ground. All other demands would, I believe, be withdrawn if that object were attained.

Your Lordship will observe that I urge these matters on Khateeb's attention, and tell him that the British Government would learn with satisfaction that the Sultan could make such concessions; but Khateeb persists in saying that the Sultan will not—and, what is more, he tells me in confidence His Majesty dare not—make them, as the feelings of the Reefians would thus be roused still more against his rule and nominal sovereignty, and I am indeed afraid he would thus become very unpopular throughout his dominions.

If the Spanish Government was not led away by wrong impressions regarding this country, and regarding their position at Melilla, by the interested counsels of military men such as Brigadier-General Buceta, the Governor of Melilla, they ought to have accepted at once the offer of the Sultan of a neutral ground, to be established, as he says, "according to the Law of Nations"—a most important concession, which Spain has never hitherto been able to obtain —as also the establishment of guard-houses on the lines, with efficient Moorish officers to command them; and they might also have required, if they thought proper, that the Sultan should withdraw his demand for the 14,000 dollars for the cargoes of the Reef boats, and the duty of 5,000 dollars on the cargo of wheat, of which his Customs have lately been defrauded by the master of a Spanish vessel, and the latter's apparent accomplice, the late Spanish Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General, and only agree to return the boats to the Reef prisoners.

When the neutral ground came to be marked, a liberal space might be required, and hereafter, when better relations should be established between the Reefians and the Spaniards, or upon the death of the Sultan, or other like favourable occasion, the Moorish Government might consent to an advance on the neutral ground of the present Spanish lines, or a tacit acquiescence might then be given that the lines be so advanced, and afterwards accepted as a *fait accompli*.

But I confess I do not see the slightest prospect of a peaceful solution of the present affairs, if Don Juan Blanco is instructed to insist upon the immediate cession of territory, besides the neutral ground.

With regard to the non-arrival of the Spanish captives, I may mention to your Lordship confidentially, that I think it is fortunate they have not yet arrived and been delivered up, for it appears to me the object of Don Juan is merely to ensure their safety, and then break off relations with this Government, and that hostilities may be entered upon at once; though I must avow such a proceeding does not seem to me to be worthy of a civilized Government, especially after the strenuous efforts made by the Sultan to release the Spanish soldiers who had been captured in the act of invading the Moorish territory for the purpose of spiking a cannon, whilst the Spanish Government still refuses to deliver up the twenty-eight Reefians who were innocent of the infringement of any law, and who were peacefully engaged in a coasting traffic with the Moorish ports, at a moment when they supposed they would not be molested; no notice of the hostile intention of the Spanish Government, or that a blockade of the Reef coast was to be enforced, having been given to them.

It appears, however, both from the proceedings of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, and from the language held on several occasions by the Spanish Ministry to Mr. Buchanan, that all consideration for what is politic towards this

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Government is to be set aside, because popular opinion in Spain is for war with Morocco, and because the position of the present Spanish Ministry would be weakened if something is not done by which the Sultan of Morocco is compelled to part with his territory by concession, by sale, or by force.

I shall write to-day to the senior naval officer at Gibraltar to send over here Her Majesty's ship "Argus," with orders to remain on this station until I feel assured her services are no longer required to ensure the safety of British subjects; and I shall further request that Her Majesty's ship "Quail," or a more efficient vessel, if there be any at his disposal, be held ready at any moment to come over here, or to visit the coast, to afford aid and protection to British subjects, in case the ports of this Empire are to be attacked, or in case Tangier be bombarded, as there is no foreseeing whether such hostilities might not produce a revolution in the interior, and place the lives of Europeans in the greatest jeopardy, unless full time is given for them to embark.

I trust your Lordship will excuse me for taking the liberty of expressing a hope that the Spanish Government may again be warned of the danger of the course they are pursuing, and that, if hostilities are to be engaged in, they should limit their operations to the Reef. I need not point out on this occasion to your Lordship that the blockade of Tangier, or an attack on the town, will stop the supplies of fresh provisions to Her Majesty's garrison of Gibraltar, whilst we have strong grounds for apprehending that the probability of any settlement of the question regarding the frontier line, or of the claims put forward, being come to, after the bombardment, will be still more remote than it was before, and that, finally, the gravest complications may be brought about if war is entered upon between Spain and Morocco.

As Don Juan Blanco chooses to continue to keep entirely aloof from me, and requests Khateeb not to communicate anything that is passing to me, and as he has been told repeatedly what my views and sentiments are, I fear any further representation from me to him would be of no avail, if a rupture is to take place; and I shall, therefore, abstain from any verbal or written communication with him on the subject, unless he seeks me, further than, if he announces that hostilities are to be entered upon without a reasonable delay, I shall address him a temperate letter pointing out the grave responsibility which the Spanish Government and he, their Representative, will incur, if adequate time and means are not afforded for every European, who may so desire, to leave the country; and I shall protest against any precipitate act that might involve the safety of their lives and property. Though I shall, probably, send my family to Gibraltar, if a bombardment is to take place at Tangier, my present intention is to remain, under such circumstances, at my post, even though I believe all my colleagues would embark, as I have some little hope that my presence in the town might assist in preventing a revolution in the province, and checking the wild tribes, who will flock to this neighbourhood to defend their country, from pillaging the houses and property of Europeans.

If your Lordship considers, after all the information I have now transmitted, that hostilities are likely to ensue, I beg that your Lordship may communicate to me without delay your instructions as to my conduct in such an emergency, either by sending a steamer direct to Tangier with despatches, or by telegraph through Mr. Buchanan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I send this despatch by an express boat which I have hired for the occasion.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 92.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.) 24 *Rajeb*, 1275. (*February* 28, 1859.)

I HAVE to inform you that the Spanish Vice-Consul came to us with his interpreter, Yahia Sicsu, about an hour ago, and delivered to us the letter with the seal broken that we had addressed him, giving the reply of our Lord the

Sultan to the verbal communication he had made us before, and of which you are cognizant, and we had acquainted him with all our Lord had instructed us. When the Vice-Consul delivered to us our letter, I asked whether he refused to receive it: he replied that the Chargé d'Affaires had directed him to return it to us, as he could not accept it. After this he said that the Chargé d'Affaires had desired him to require we should give a reply about the claim of the 30,000 dollars, regarding which he had written to us before in his letter of the 13th January.

I replied that I would give our answer after reflecting on the instructions in the Sultan's letter. He then asked about the Spaniards who are captives in the hands of the Reefians. I told him that our Lord had sent, on the first instance, a Kaid and six cavalry soldiers, supposing that the Reefians would have delivered over the captives, but the Reefians told the Kaid that the letter he had read to them was not the Sultan's, and the Kaid came away. Then the Sultan sent another Kaid from Faz, and the Marabout Seid Mohamed Alhadary accompanied him, and read to the Reefians the letter of our Lord, and they agreed to deliver up the captives; but when they were about to depart, several of the evil-disposed Reefians declared the letter was not from the Sultan, but a trick from the Marabout Alhadary to release the Spaniards, and that this took place after the captives were delivered over to the Kaid; upon which that Kaid also departed, but in the evening of the same day arrived the Kaid Maimon, the Chief of Benisnassel, and this circumstance gave me hopes the captives might be expected in a very few days if it pleased God, for the Sultan had sent at first officers to obtain their release without using force; but as the Reefians had refused to give the captives up, the Sultan had sent Hadj Maimon, and, therefore, that I thought they would soon be released.

The Vice-Consul replied that the Chargé d'Affaires granted a term of four days, and if the captives did not then arrive, relations would be broken off between them, and vessels would be sent to attack all the ports. I replied if the Charge d'Affaires desires peace that, with regard to the captives, they would ere long arrive, and would be delivered up to him; but that if he sought for a rupture of their relations, his words, granting a term of four days, were equivalent to declaring a rupture was about to take place, for that even if the captives were at Tetuan, that term would hardly suffice to bring them to Tangier; that such language might, perhaps, have been used, if the Spanish Government had been told that the Sultan had refused to deliver the captives up, but that the Sultan had done all in his power to bring them to Tangier, and could not have done more even if they had been his own subjects, but that in dealing with the wild people of those districts much patience was required.

Now he (the Chargé d'Affaires) does not listen to what appears to us to be reasonable, but his aim and desire is to bring about dissension, and a rupture of the friendship which has existed between the two nations.

We write this to you secretly, that you may be cognizant of what is passing, and how we have replied.

We send you also the letter we had transmitted to him, and which he returned to us refusing to receive it.

This man's desire is evidently that the affairs should not be arranged amicably.

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 92.

Instructions given by Mr. D. Hay to the Interpreter, Mr. Sicsu, on the 1st March, 1859.

(Translation.)

YOU will inform Seid Mohamed Khateeb that I received, last night, at a late hour, his letter, informing me that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had returned on the 20th instant, and had demanded that a reply should be given to the claims he had put forward for 30,000 dollars for the vessels captured in Reef before the year 1855; and had further informed him that if the Spanish captives did not arrive in four days, he, Don Juan Blanco, would break off relations between the two Governments, and that a squadron would be sent to bombard all the ports of this Empire.

You will say to Seid Mohamed Khateeb that I am not of opinion that the threat of an immediate rupture has been made, because the prisoners have not arrived, as I cannot suppose that Don Juan Blanco would be so unreasonable, after the facts that have been brought to his knowledge, not to be satisfied that the Sultan, in this matter, has acted with the greatest good faith. Moreover, the term of the four days, as he, Seid Mohamed Khateeb, had justly observed to the Spanish Vice-Consul, was not sufficient for a courier to reach the Akkalayan country, for twelve days or a fortnight were at least required to get a reply by a courier overland; that even if the captives had arrived I feared the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires would have acted as he now does; for it appeared to me, from his sudden departure to Algesiras on the 25th instant, and return here yesterday with two steamers of war, that he had communicated to his Government, by telegraph, the decision of the Sultan regarding the pecuniary claims, and his refusal to cede a portion of the Reef territory, except for a neutral ground, and that he had obtained a reply, which I conclude authorized him to use the present menacing language, and which I feared, from all appearances, would be carried out, whether the Spanish captives arrived or not; for Don Juan Blanco was ignorant of the fact that the captives had again been retained by the Reefians until he returned here. That, under all the peculiar circumstances of the case, it was a very delicate matter for me to offer my counsels to the Moorish Government, unless Seid Mohamed Khateeb had any further instructions from the Sultan than those he had communicated to myself, or that he considered he, Seid Mohamed Khateeb, could take upon himself, at this critical moment, to make further and important concessions regarding the cession of a new frontier, which I suspected, from the manner the negotiation had hitherto been conducted, was the chief and sole aim of the Spanish Government, and that I apprehended, even if the 30,000 dollars were paid, the question of the frontier would still be mooted, and have to be solved. That, as I have repeatedly told him *vivâ voce*, and written to him before, the British Government would learn with satisfaction that all matters were arranged amicably by the Sultan, even though His Majesty had resolved on making all the concessions which were demanded by the Spanish Government, for we had not the slightest interest or object to encourage opposition to them; and it remained for the Moorish Government to consider whether it was not preferable that the concession of a new frontier line, or even the payment of the claim for the 30,000 dollars (whatever might be thought of the regularity or the justice of such demands) should be made, rather than that relations should be broken off, and hostilities ensue, the final result of which might be most disastrous to both parties, and especially to Morocco. That there was not time for me to make a reference to Her Majesty's Government, and get their reply; and that in such an emergency, therefore, the Moorish Government ought to come to a prompt decision, after reflecting on the gravity of their position.

As a *résumé*, you will say:—

1. That if he, Seid Mohamed Khateeb, thought he could make any further concession, without a reference to the Sultan, let him do so at once, by letter, or in an interview.

2. That if he feel assured he has not the power to modify his letter of the 20th instant, he had then better request the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to state, by letter, clearly what his demands and instructions are, and to grant him a term of a fortnight or three weeks to refer to the Sultan at Meknas for his decision.

You will tell Seid Mohamed Khateeb that, later in the day, I shall have the honour of calling on him to deliver a letter from Her Majesty the Queen to the Sultan.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 92.

Report, by Mr. Sicsu, of Seid Mohamed Khateeb's Reply to Mr. D. Hay's communication of the 1st of March, 1859.

(Translation.)

IN reply to the message which I delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the name of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, his Excellency informed

me that it appeared to him the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had withdrawn from the determination which he last night communicated to him regarding the ultimatum of four days, and was satisfied with the arrangement that the Minister should address him a letter touching all that has caused the protracted detention of the Spanish captives in Reef, and the reason why they had been brought back to Reef after they had been set at liberty, in order that he might communicate it to his Government. The Minister further declared he had, consequently, written to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, to the following effect:—"That the Sultan had sent to Reef one of his principal Kaids and five soldiers, with a Royal Order to the Chiefs of Akkalaya, for the immediate release of the captive Spaniards; but that the Reefians would not believe that the letter containing the order came really from the Sultan, and so refused to give the Spaniards up; that the Sultan was very much irritated at this, and sent another Kaid and the Marabout, Seid Mohamed Alhadary, to cause, if possible, the liberation of the Spaniards." (Seid Mohamed Khateeb said he did not think it convenient to mention the voyage of Hadji Abdallah to Reef, and what passed between the latter and the Reefians.)

The Minister said he concluded his letter to M. Blanco by stating, that the Reefian Chiefs had delivered the captives over to the second officer that was sent; but that on a report being spread by some bad people in Reef, that the Marabout had received money for liberating them (the captives), the latter were brought back; that the Sultan had directed the Sheikh Maimon of Benisnassel to go to Akkalaya and take away the Spaniards, but that His Majesty had hesitated until now having recourse to force, on purpose that the captive Spaniards should not suffer. (The Minister observed to me, in order that I might communicate the remark to Mr. D. Hay, "that if force were used against the Akkalayans, the latter would probably murder the Spaniards.")

I then called the Minister's attention to the message of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, that the object of the menacing attitude assumed towards his Excellency by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires appeared to him not to refer so much to the captives, for, while M. Blanco was ignorant of what had passed with regard to them, he came from Algeciras with two war-steamers. As to the question of the frontier-line, and that even if the prisoners had been given up, the consequent occurrences would have been the same.

The Minister replied, that whatever threats he might be subjected to, he could make no further concession than what he had already offered in his letter of the 20th, without a further reference to the Sultan, and that he had no further instructions from His Majesty than those he had already communicated to Mr. Drummond Hay.

His Excellency added, that, with reference to the letter which had been returned to him by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, the latter had declared to him, through his interpreter, that he had done so because all that had passed between them, at the interview they had had with each other, was private, and that he (the Minister) replied to this, that he could not consider as private what passed at the interview, as, on that occasion, he treated with the Chargé d'Affaires, who requested him to communicate to the Sultan the propositions put forward, and to beg His Majesty to reply to them. The Minister also remarked he was fully aware of the fact, that all that referred to the prisoners was not the principal object of Don Juan's proceedings; that the additional term fixed by the Spanish Charge d'Affaires was only given in order to get the prisoners into his hands, and that as soon as that is effected the Spaniards would act in the same way as before; but, his Excellency added, that he did not oppose himself to the demand of M. Blanco, as he wished also to gain such time as would enable him to inform the Sultan of everything, and receive His Majesty's instructions before any rupture of the relations with Spain took place.

(Signed) D. SICSU.

No. 93.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Tangier, March* 5, 1859.

KHATEEB has sent me the inclosed draft of a letter which he informs me the Spanish interpreter has declared M. Blanco is disposed to accept and transmit to his Goverument, or convey himself, in person, to Madrid, when the prisoners arrive.

On returning the draft, I replied that I was very glad to hear M. Blanco had agreed to accept the letter, and that I did not see the slightest objection to the modification he, Khateeb, had made in his letter of the 20th ultimo, which had been rejected.

The Spanish interpreter was, as Khateeb assures me, very profuse in his expressions of M. Blanco's desire to arrange matters in a peaceful manner, but, after the frequent changes, and, I may say, unreasonable conduct of M. Blanco or his Government in these discussions, I have no longer the slightest confidence in anything they say or do.

Her Majesty's ships "Argus" and "Quail" have arrived, and I send one of these vessels to-night to Gibraltar, with my despatches to your Lordship and to Mr. Buchanan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 93.

Draft of a Letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.)

IN accordance with the promise made in our interview with you on the 22nd January last, we reported all that took place to our Lord, and said that you desired to promote peace, amity, and friendship between the two Governments; and we also reported what you promised to us, viz., that you would use friendly persuasion with your Government in urging them to withdraw all the claims regarding the five vessels that were mentioned in your letter of the 31st December and 13th January, on the condition (as you said) that our Lord would grant to your Government a (new) frontier, as well as a space of land requisite for your fortresses, and such commanding positions as might prevent conflicts between the two parties.

Our Lord has replied in the friendly manner we supposed he would do, and this, because he desires to promote friendship and goodwill between the two Governments, and to cement a lasting friendship between him and your nation.

Now, there is not any one of the Sultans who would give either a large or a small portion of their dominions, whether for 30,000 or 30,000,000 dollars, but our Lord wishes for an arrangement by which all conflicts and disorders may be checked between the Reef people and the authorities of your fortresses, for sometimes the injuries proceed from the Reef people and sometimes from your authorities in your fortresses, in consequence of their insufficient knowledge of the established rules and the disorderly state of the Reefians, and thus conflicts have ensued between them, and the peace that ought to exist between them is interrupted.

The desire of our Lord is that your towns should not be molested, nor any injury done to them by the people of Reef, and he likewise desires that the vessels of the Reefians engaged in trade should sail in the sea without interruption or hindrance on the part of your vessels in our dominions; and (he added that) no injury had been done to your vessels by the people of Reef since the year 1856; and our Lord has ordered us, in his Shereefian letter, to write to you, and to say that he agrees to cede a neutral ground, upon which guards will be placed on our part and yours at the lines. All this our Lord has directed us

to say shall be taken into his consideration and shall be satisfactorily arranged; for our Lord desires that which may promote a good understanding, and be in accordance with the honour of both parties, and that may cement the peace and amity.

As to Peñon and Alhucemas, they are islands, so God has fixed their boundaries by the sea; but, on the coast opposite to them, our Lord will appoint guards to be stationed, as also guards, who are troops of the Sultan, will be stationed on the lines in front of Melilla.

On these conditions, all the demands that you mentioned, or any others which you might have to bring forward, are to be settled, if your desire is for peace, as is ours; and from your judgment and experience all these questions will be settled, as you had engaged, and that then no other differences or claims should be brought forward hereafter.

We feel persuaded you will do all in your power to bring about a peaceful understanding between the two Governments, and a withdrawal of the claims (for the vessels) which our Lord can never acknowledge, in the same manner as he had already refused to accept similar claims when they were put forward by other Governments, and we then replied to those Governments in the same manner as we had replied to you in our letter of the beginning of Joomad the 2nd, of this year.

This our letter (we are persuaded you can make your Government understand) is dictated by the most friendly feelings, and that in dealing with the Reef people it is requisite that we proceed with circumspection and prudence, so that all affairs may be arranged peaceably and satisfactorily.

Inclosure 2 in No. 93.

The Sultan of Morocco to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.) 1 *Rajeb*, 1275. (*February* 4, 1859.)

WE have received your letter acquainting us with the arrival, at Tetuan, of Aly Ben Abd-el-Kader, and the soldiers whom we sent to Reef, to bring the Christians, and that they have not brought them, in consequence of the Reefians having refused to deliver them up until the Spaniards restore to them a cannon; and I am also informed that should those Christians (may God confound them!) not be delivered up, much dissension may result therefrom. You recommend, therefore, that we—if it be our will—should write to the Sheik Maimon, of Benisnassel, and that we order him to act in this matter with the Akkalayans, until the latter be compelled to restore the Christians.

At the moment we received your letter we wrote to the Sheik, and we ordered him to give his earnest attention to this matter, and even to go in person to the Akkalayans, and compel them to deliver over the Christians to the Kaid Mohamed Ben Khaddats, being the second officer we have sent to bring the Spaniards. I pray God that he may facilitate the affair. We have also perused the letter of the Marabout Seid Mahomed Alhadary, which you sent to us, and we learn from it how he had exerted himself, until he found his endeavours to effect their liberation were of no further avail.

Peace.

No. 94.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received March* 11.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, March* 1, 1859.

MY despatch No. 21 of this date will tell you that Don Juan again raises the cry of "Wolf!" and tells Khateeb that all the ports of Morocco are to be bombarded if the 30,000 dollars are not paid, or the new frontier lines at Melilla granted, besides the neutral ground; whilst he declares that as the propositions he made to Khateeb, for communication to the Sultan, were private, he cannot accept his letter of the 20th instant. I cannot make head or tail of Don Juan's proceedings, and it is no use my talking frankly to the man any longer; for

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

either his Government, or some one, appears to have convinced him I am the perfidious agent of "perfide Albion," and, therefore, alas! not to be trusted.

If it was not for the results that might ensue, I should really almost like to see the Spaniards burn their fingers, by engaging in war with the Reef. Hostilities, however at the Morocco ports will be a graver matter. Tangier is almost in a defenceless state, the 100 cannon mounted on the batteries being honey-combed, and carriages rotten. Attao has bought, in England, the new guns and carriages, &c., but the vessels to bring them are not expected till the end of this month.

Suppose the Spaniards attempt to take Tangier by a *coup de main*, and garrison it; what am I to say or do? There is an old instruction from, I think, Lord Aberdeen, which would cause me to protest against the occupation of any portion of the Moorish territory by a foreign force. Blanco has not spoken of the occupation of Tangier to any one, but it appears he has spoken to one of my colleagues about the occupation of the Island of Mogador. I shall await anxiously Lord Malmesbury's instructions. In 1845, if my memory does not fail me, the British Government protested against the occupation of that island by the French, or at any rate gave them a clear hint they must turn out, and they did turn out, even before peace was concluded. I fear Lord Malmesbury will not be able to stop the Spaniards from playing pranks, but there might be a limit placed upon their proceedings. If what the Spaniards are doing is according to international law, it appears to me they can hardly complain if the Americans ask them to pay their old claims, &c., or accept a further amount and cede Cuba.

My French colleague has never opened his mouth to Khateeb, to offer a word of advice to arrange matters; on the contrary, he appears, from what I hear of his language to others, to chuckle over the prospect of a row in this country, and Bell writes to me, from Algiers, that the military folks did not conceal their dissatisfaction at the prospect of Spanish grievances being arranged. Nevertheless, if a rupture takes place, I shall ask my French colleague to unite with me in urging moderation on the Spanish Representative, and that, under any circumstances, due time be given to secure the safety of Europeans. If M. de Castellon refuses to act with me, I shall do so alone.

As I have said in my despatch, I do not think I shall take my departure from Tangier, unless I have reason to fear my throat may be cut by the Kabail, for I may do good by staying, and I hope the shells will be civil enough to respect a non-combatant.

After all, Don Juan may be only crying "Wolf!" but the vagaries of his Government, and of himself, are so strange that we may expect anything.

I sent a duplicate of my despatch to Mr. Buchanan, and I send the original, under flying seal, to Captain Warden, upon whose discretion I can rely, but to whom I had no time to write at length, in order that he may communicate what is passing to the Admiral at Malta. I have also let the Governor know that the contractor will get in a good supply of beef and other fresh provisions.

Khateeb wrote to me the other day, to ask me to request the Governor of Gibraltar to lend the Morocco Government a barge, or to allow him to pay its cost, as it was immediately required, and they did not know where to purchase such an article, and there was not time to get one made. Though Khateeb did not say so, I know the barge is required for unloading the cannon, which are daily expected, for the other machinery requisite for that purpose has already arrived: but as I received this request when matters looked as if they were to be arranged quietly, some days ago, and as I was not called upon to know what the barge is wanted for, I made the request to the Governor, but have not yet received his reply. I told him, if it was granted, to send the pay over by the merchant-steamer that plies between this place and Gibraltar.

I go to Khateeb now, to give the Queen's letter.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—5 P.M. I have just returned from Khateeb. He says, the Sultan will never agree to pay the 30,000 dollars, nor to cede territory, except the neutral ground, even if all the ports were bombarded. He intends to ask, to-morrow, Don Juan to state, in writing, what his demands are, and he will transmit them to the Sultan.

Don Juan has asked him to send a Moroccan officer, with a Spanish steamer, to Melilla, to learn what has been done about the prisoners.

The boat is going to start, so I must close.

J. H. D. H.

No. 95.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1859.

TWO heavy ships will be sent immediately to Tangier, though your telegram of 7th modifies the alarm created by Mr. Hay's despatch of 1st. A blockade of Tangier would not be permitted long by us on account of provisioning Gibraltar. Hay should urge the Sultan to grant the zone, according to the law of nations, if Spaniards will declare themselves satisfied with that and the surrender of prisoners.

By raising obsolete claims, Collantes gives a precedent to America against himself and Cuba. Tell him this.

No. 96.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1859.

I AM directed by the Earl of Malmesbury to request that you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that it appears, by a despatch dated the 1st of March, received this morning, from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, that considerable uneasiness prevails at Tangier in consequence of the threatening language of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, who declares the determination of his Court to bombard that and other Moorish ports in the event of the Moorish Government declining to comply with certain demands which the Cabinet of Madrid is pressing upon it.

It would seem, indeed, from a telegram dated the 7th instant, from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, that the Spanish Government do not contemplate having recourse to force unless certain Spanish prisoners in the hands of the Reef people are put to death, and that forcible measures will not be resorted to on account of the after-demands which it has made on Morocco.

The conduct of the Spanish Government, however, in regard to its differences with Morocco, has been so wayward and unreasonable, that it appears to Lord Malmesbury that it would not be wise to rely implicitly on assurances given to Mr. Buchanan, when, if those assurances should not be acted up to, British subjects, and Christians in general, in Morocco would be exposed to most serious risks; and Lord Malmesbury begs, therefore, to suggest to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that one or two ships, of considerable force, should, as soon as possible, be sent to Gibraltar to watch events, and to be in readiness, in the event of an attack by the Spanish naval forces on the Moorish ports, to repair to such ports and receive on board the subjects of Her Majesty and their property, as well as the subjects of any other Powers, and Christians and Jews in general, who may be anxious to place themselves and their property in safety at a time when the fanaticism of the Moorish population may be aroused by acts of violence on the part of Spanish ships of war.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 97.

Mr. Hammond to Sir B. Hawes.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1859.

I AM directed by the Earl of Malmesbury to request that you will acquaint Secretary Major-General Peel that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General in Morocco, in a despatch dated March 1, and received this morning, calls attention to the embarrassment which may be felt by the garrison of Gibraltar, in the event of the threatened blockade of Tangier by the Spanish naval forces being carried into execution, and, as a consequence thereof, the exportation of cattle for the use of the garrison impeded.

If reliance could be placed on the assurances given by the Spanish Government to Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, there would be reason to hope that the apprehensions felt at Tangier of an attack on the part of the Spaniards will not be realized; but Lord Malmesbury, after the course taken by the Spanish Government in regard to its differences with Morocco, is not prepared to say that the threatened blockade of Tangier, if not its bombardment, may not, after all, take place.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 98.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1859.

I RECEIVED, this morning, your despatch No. 21 of the 1st instant, respecting the apprehension felt at Tangier in consequence of the threats of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

You will probably have heard from Mr. Buchanan that, on speaking to M. Collantes on the subject of your despatch, of which a duplicate had reached him, he was assured by the Spanish Minister that unless the prisoners are killed, force will not be employed to obtain the Spanish demands; and that M. Collantes had added, that to accept the neutral ground would be equivalent to renouncing the claim of Spain to the old lines.

Notwithstanding these assurances, however, Her Majesty's Government have not thought it right to leave British subjects and property in Morocco without adequate protection in case of hostilities being commenced by Spain, and leading, as they probably would do, to an outbreak of Moorish fanaticism.

An additional naval force will accordingly be at once dispatched to Gibraltar to watch events, and to be ready, in case of need, to interfere for the protection of Her Majesty's subjects, and the subjects of other foreign Powers, and generally of Christians and Jews in the Moorish ports.

I inclose a copy of a letter to that effect which I have caused to be addressed to the Board of Admiralty, and also a copy of a telegram which I have sent this afternoon to Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 99.

The Earl of Malmesbury to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government having received information which leads them to apprehend that the Spanish Government meditate occupying Tangier, I am to signify to your Lordship the Queen's commands that a squadron, consisting in part of line-of-battle ships, should be immediately appointed to cruize between Gibraltar and Tangier, and to prevent any landing of a Spanish force on the Moorish territory.

* Nos. 95 and 96.

If the operations of the Spanish naval force should be limited to a bombardment of Tangier, the officer in command of Her Majesty's squadron will not be justified in interfering with that operation, except so far as, by amicable representation to the Spanish commanding officer, he may endeavour to mitigate the horrors of such an attack on an almost defenceless town. But the active interference of Her Majesty's squadron must be restricted, in that case, to the preservation of the lives and property of Her Majesty's subjects in the first place, and then of the lives and property of the subjects of foreign Powers, and of Christians and Jews indiscriminately, and also of any subjects of the Sultan of Morocco who may seek to escape from the effects of the Spanish attack.

Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid has been instructed to declare, frankly and openly, to the Spanish Minister, that any occupation of the coast of Morocco on the part of Spain, could not be viewed otherwise than in a very serious light by Great Britain, and could scarcely fail to lead to evils of great magnitude; and he will not conceal from the Spanish Government that an attempt to land a Spanish force at Tangier, or on the coast adjacent, will be resisted by Her Majesty's squadron.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 100.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 86. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Madrid, March* 3, 1859.

A GOVERNMENT newspaper reported yesterday that orders had been given by the Admiralty that a squadron of steamers should be again organized to cruize on the coast of Morocco, and to support the representations of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, who had not yet been able to obtain the release of Lieutenant Alvarez and the other prisoners made by the Reefians last autumn, and who had also found the Moroccan Government indisposed to grant other demands which he had addressed to them on the part of his Government.

Such a measure appears to be entirely uncalled for as far as the prisoners are concerned, as Mr. Drummond Hay informs me in a private letter received yesterday, and of which I inclose an extract for your Lordship's information, that he expected them to arrive at Tangier about the 1st instant.

His account of the state of Don Juan Blanco's negotiations on other points is not, however, entirely satisfactory. While the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires is represented to be dissatisfied with such concessions as the Sultan is willing to make in the valley of Melilla, with a view to prevent collisions between the Reefians and the garrison of the fortress, his Highness appears determined not to cede the territory asked for by the Spanish Government, and which Mr. Drummond Hay has, I believe, already expressed an opinion to your Lordship he is unable to do, as he would, in the first place, have to send a force against his own subjects to drive them out of the territory to be ceded.

Under these circumstances, I shall continue to avail myself of every proper opportunity to deprecate the use of force to obtain the concessions wished for, though it may possibly be intended to resort to it on the clumsy pretext of seeking redress for acts of piracy committed against Spanish shipping during nine years previously to 1856; and I should be unwilling to doubt that a renewed friendly, though frank expression, of the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on the subject, would have a favourable influence on the policy of Marshal O'Donnell and his colleagues. At all events, I feel convinced that the interest which Her Majesty's Government have hitherto taken in the discussions which have been pending during the last six months between Spain and Morocco, have merely contributed to temper the arrogance with which the Spanish Government were disposed at one time to act towards the Sovereign of Morocco; and the counsels of Her Majesty's Government may perhaps, also, have in some measure shown that circumstances are for the present unfavourable for the accomplishment of the schemes which they apparently entertain of seeking territorial aggrandizement in that country.

I had some conversation, yesterday, with M. Comyn, on the proposed

dispatch of a squadron to the coast of Morocco, and he said the orders had been given in consequence of the delay which had taken place in the release of the prisoners.

I told him that this cause for a demonstration on the Moroccan coast had, I believed, already ceased to exist; and I observed that I was sorry to learn that, whilst the Sultan is prepared to do everything he can for the preservation of tranquillity between the Reefians and the Spanish garrisons compatible with the integrity of his dominions, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires still insists on the cession of territory to Spain. M. Comyn said he believed, however, the Sultan might be brought to comply with the wishes of the Spanish Government on this subject, and that Mr. Hay might do much to induce His Highness to do so. But I replied that it was out of the question that we should recommend the Sultan to cede territory to Spain, without there being any good reason why he should do so, and that it appeared to me, after the sensitiveness which the Spanish Government had shown with regard to Cuba, they ought to be able to understand the feelings entertained by the Moroccan Government on a question of this kind. I said that Her Majesty's Government, in any advice which they had tendered in this subject, were actuated by the most friendly feelings towards the Government of Her Catholic Majesty, but they could not change the feelings of the Sultan, and could not approve of Spain seeking her objects by force of arms.

M. Comyn then observed that if the prisoners were released, he hoped other matters might be arranged without difficulty; and though I cannot attach as much importance to an assurance of that kind coming from his Excellency as if I had received it from M. Calderon Collantes, results have hitherto generally proved that his statements to me, as to the views of Government, have been correct.

Mr. Hay observes, in his letter above referred to, that the Reef prisoners had not arrived at Tangier, but this may be accounted for by their having been sent direct to Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 100.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

My dear Buchanan, *Tangier, February* 25, 1859.

I WROTE to you on the 15th instant, reporting the liberation of the Spanish captives, and that the Sultan had written to Khateeb to say he consented to the cession of a neutral ground in front of Melilla. On the 19th Khateeb communicated to me, confidentially, the inclosed draft of a letter he was about to address to Don Juan Blanco, making known to him the tenour of the instructions he had received from His Majesty. On the following day, I believe, he sent the letter. Khateeb informs me that a few hours afterwards the Spanish interpreter brought a message from Don Juan Blanco, requesting Khateeb to alter or omit the phrase which I have marked in the inclosed translation with an asterisk, and he left the letter with Khateeb, who said if that was the only objection, he would take it into consideration. The interpreter told Khateeb also he was especially directed by Don Juan to warn Khateeb against communicating with me on any matter connected with the negotiations. Before Khateeb made the required alteration, the interpreter returned with a further message from Don Juan, to say that he was desirous that Khateeb should write him another letter to the same purpose as that which he had sent him, but couched in different language, as it would greatly facilitate the settlement of all their differences. Khateeb replied he would be happy to take into consideration any proposition of Don Juan's, as long as it did not militate against the Sultan's late instructions to himself. The interpreter then brought a draft of a letter, in the Spanish language, of which he made a verbal translation to Khateeb, who committed it to paper, and I send herewith, for your Excellency's information, a translation into English of the Arabic version, which was communicated to me by Khateeb. The interpreter took the opportunity also of renewing the warning to Khateeb not to communicate to me this draft; and he added that Don Juan

had received information that a certain person (alluding to me, Khateeb thinks) had written to Madrid to propose that he should mark the boundary, as mediator, but that such a proposition would never be accepted. Khateeb replied, he had never heard of such a proposition (and I need not add, in parenthesis, nor have I).

Khateeb, after perusal of the draft, told the interpreter to inform Don Juan that he would not, and could not, write such a letter as he proposed, as a cession of territory was spoken of, as well as neutral ground, and that the Sultan had only consented to the cession of a neutral ground.

Don Juan Blanco, on receiving this message, sent back in a peremptory manner to say that Khateeb must write the letter, or he would send him a reply to his letter of the 15th January, in which he had refused to liquidate the claims of the Spanish Government for the vessels plundered by the Reefians. To this Khateeb retorted that he was at liberty to act as he thought proper, but that he, Khateeb, could not separate himself from the instructions he had received from the Sultan.

Don Juan then altered his tone, and said he wished to see Khateeb, but as he desired that no one should hear of his visit, he would call upon him at 10 at night. Khateeb replied he was a little unwell that day (the 23rd instant), but would be happy to see him the following day.

I happened to be absent during the two days in which this bantering took place between Khateeb and Don Juan, so the latter cannot accuse me, as usual, of having advised Khateeb to resist his demands.

On my return, yesterday, I had an interview with Khateeb regarding other matters, when he related all that had taken place, and asked my advice. I replied that as far as our Government was concerned, we should not have the slightest objection if the Sultan would cede the additional territory as well as the neutral ground, and also the 30,000 dollars, for we should be delighted to learn matters were arranged amicably. Khateeb replied that the Sultan would never cede an inch of territory, except a neutral ground, and that he had solely consented to make the latter concession out of deference to the advice I had given in name of my Government, and he showed me a letter from the Sultan to prove this assertion, and, moreover, that the Sultan would never consent to pay the 30,000 dollars, *coute qui coute* a refusal.

As Khateeb said he was to have an interview with Don Juan, I recommended him to wait till then, and to hear with patience what the latter had to propose, and I added that I trusted he would treat in a friendly manner any reasonable proposition of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

Khateeb said he should take that opportunity also of telling Don Juan he was greatly mistaken if he supposed that I had advised the Moorish Government to resist the Spanish demands, but that, on the contrary, the principal concessions made by the Sultan had been made out of deference to the counsels given His Majesty by me, in the name of the British Government, and that he, Khateeb, was ordered to consult with me by the Sultan, and must continue to do so; for that, in grave matters like these between two Governments, the Sultan desired to have the opinion of an impartial friend, and in seeking for such counsels he only followed the example of other nations when a Government was involved in a grave question with another Government. I told Khateeb I perfectly approved of his intention of speaking plainly to Don Juan on this subject, as the constant recommendation made to him by the latter not to let me know what was passing, whilst he, Khateeb, did report everything an hour afterwards to me, was a farce that ought to cease.

This morning Khateeb informed me Don Juan did not visit him last night on plea of indisposition, so Khateeb sent him again the letter, of which inclosure No. 2 is a translation.

Don Juan upon receiving the document sent a message to ask why he, Khateeb, had not awaited the interview. He replied that he could no longer delay executing the Sultan's orders; that when the interview took place, if any other reasonable proposition was made for an alteration in the letter, it would be taken into consideration. Don Juan then sent to say he objected to the letter in consequence of the phrase which I have marked with a line on the 5th page, and that he feared the Sultan only intended to draw on the negotiation, and never come to a settlement of the neutral ground. To this Khateeb replied that the Sultan was acting with perfect faith, but that orders could not

be sent to mark the neutral ground until Commissioners had reported what extent that ground should be, and until His Majesty had ascertained also, after the Spanish Government had accepted the arrangement, whether the Reefians would be disposed to obey his orders quietly on this subject, or whether he would have to send a force to Reef to impress on the Abahalegners an obedience to his wishes; therefore, Khateeb added, the Sultan says he will take the matter into consideration.

To-day or to-morrow the interview is to place, and I will let your Excellency know the result.

Khateeb intends to tell Don Juan (as I have said before) that I am cognizant of all that has passed, and, therefore, it is natural for them to suppose I have duly reported all to your Excellency and to Her Majesty's Government.

Khateeb has further authorized me to assure Her Majesty's Government and your Excellency that the Sultan is disposed to act with perfect good faith about the demarkations of a neutral ground, and that the extent of it will be according to the usual extent of such territories as generally arranged amongst the nations of Europe.

I learn from the Governor of Gibraltar that the extent of the neutral ground between Gibraltar and the Spanish territory is 710 yards.

I think the Spanish prisoners arrive here in about five or six days.

The twenty-nine Reefians have never appeared.

I remain, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 100.

Draft of a Letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 89.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 100.

Letter which Don Juan Blanco requested Seid Mohamed Khateeb to address to him.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 89.]

No. 101.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received March* 12.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, March* 4, 1859.

READE told me the other evening of a conversation he had with my Swedish colleague M. d'Ehrenhoff, who is at present on very intimate terms with Don Juan Blanco; and as M. d'Ehrenhoff said he had seen Blanco's instructions, I directed Reade to make a memorandum of what passed between them, which I herewith inclose, and beg to call your attention more especially to the last paragraph regarding the supposed intentions of the Spaniards to occupy Tangier if a rupture of relations takes place between Spain and Morocco. M. d'Ehrenhoff is a man of little or no judgment, but is, I think, an honourable man, incapable of stating an untruth, and I suspect merely retails Blanco's language and views. I confess I had not supposed till within the last few days that the Spaniards would take such a bold step as the occupation of Tangier; but in addition to what M. d'Ehrenhoff has asserted, curious information has oozed out from some of the ladies at the Spanish Mission, which would tend to encourage my belief that something of the kind is on the *tapis*. The bombardment of

Tangier would not, I believe, bring the Sultan to better terms than those he now offers; whilst, if Tangier was occupied till the Sultan of Morocco cedes territory in the Reef, or even consents to pay the 30,000 dollars demanded, the town might have to remain for many years in the hands of the Spaniards; for the fact of a Moorish post being taken by force by the Spaniards would probably bring about the downfall of the dynasty of Mulai Abderrachman and a revolution in the country, and the Spanish Government would not know even with whom to treat for terms. Moreover, after what has occurred at Algiers, and the promises previously to its occupation made by the French to our Government, I should have little faith about the restoration of Tangier if once the place was occupied by a foreign Power, and if a hundred good cannon were mounted in the batteries manned by European artillerymen, it would require a strong fleet to retake it. Moreover, the Spanish Government knows right well it would thus cut the chief artery of supplies to Gibraltar; and that if Tangier was retained, sooner or later we should have to give up Gibraltar, especially if, at some future time, Spain and France were allied against us. The port of Tetuan is too bad and too unsafe for shipping to be depended upon for regular supplies of Her Majesty's garrison, and the west ports are too far off, and some even more dangerous for shipping than Tetuan. You remember what I wrote to you on the 7th of April of last year, asking for instructions in case of a *coup de main* on the part of the French. Lord Malmesbury's reply of the 6th May would authorize me to protest against any attempt of a foreign Power to occupy Tangier; but unless there was a British squadron ready to support that protest, I suppose Blanco or the Spanish Admiral would put the protest in the fire.

I have written to the Governor of Gibraltar, and to our Consul at Cadiz, requesting them to keep me informed, even by express, of any land or sea forces being collected at the neighbouring Spanish ports; and especially to let me know, and also Her Majesty's Government, without delay, if any land forces were about to be embarked on board ships of war or transports. I may be thought an alarmist, bnt I am so thoroughly convinced of the injury that would result to the interests of Great Britain, as a Naval Power in the Mediterranean and as the possessor of Gibraltar, if Tangier was taken, that I should not sleep a wink, neither would my conscience forgive me, if I did not raise my weak voice to warn Government against our being taken by surprise. I will even go so far as to say, subject to correction from wiser heads, that if Tangier is seized upon by a foreign Power, it will be far more injurious to British interests ultimately than if the Dardanelles were occupied by Russia.

Two of my colleagues have told me gravely that, from all they have heard and can collect, they believe that Tangier is not to be bombarded, but to be seized by a *coup de main*, and held till all Spanish demands be settled. I responded, of course, I do not believe the Spaniards would be so rash as to occupy a Moorish port, for it would be a *casus belli* with Great Britain. In saying as much, I think I am not rash, for it is well that it should reach the ears of Blanco.

Of course, if the attempt to take possession of the town was made before I could hear from Lord Malmesbury, I should never take upon myself to do more than protest; neither should I venture to ask the commander of any British naval force, without instructions, to make any demonstration of opposition.

I have told you before of the dead silence Castellon keeps; not a word of advice to Khateeb to arrange matters, and I hear he says he has no instructions from his Government. Does not this look strange, and as if France would gladly see Morocco embroiled in a war with another Power, the result of which cannot be unfavourable to France? Has not the Emperor, perhaps, even let O'Donnell (for whom we know he has the greatest esteem) secretly know that France would not interfere, and that she does not disapprove of their ambitious schemes? Blanco, I am assured, has said on one or two occasions, that he knew the French would not be displeased if Spain attacked Morocco.

One of the officers of the French Mission has expressed privately to friends his belief and satisfaction that Tangier would be taken by the Spaniards. Do not the French feel that it would be the severest blow British interests at Gibraltar could receive?

I dare not say all this in a public despatch, but if you think it will not be thought by Lord Malmesbury that I have formed wrong conceptions regarding the importance of Tangier, I beg you will let him know what I have had now to

submit, and perhaps a diplomatic step taken with the Madrid Government in good time, may prevent even the possibility of such freaks as these I think the Spanish Government may possibly play.

If Lord Malmesbury considered there is the slightest danger of Tangier being occupied before proper assurances can be obtained from the Spanish Government, and if his Lordship agrees with me in thinking that such an occupation might be injurious to British interests, I would then beg to submit whether it would not be advisable, to prevent the possibility of such a contingency, to have a small squadron sent to Gibraltar or to Tangier without delay, with sealed orders to the commanding officer to support, if necessary, the protest I might have to make against an occupation of Tangier, or other Moorish port, even though the bombardment was admitted.

If the British squadron was directed to anchor in front of Tangier, and I was authorized to say that Her Majesty's Government would never consent to the capture of Tangier, I don't suppose the Spaniards would think further of their rash project. I suggest this step, if reliable and satisfactory assurances are not given by the Spanish Government.

Don Juan and his Government have so frequently shifted their position during the negotiations, that, after all, they may withdraw from the menacing attitude which has been assumed; but I think it is my duty not to hesitate a moment in submitting to Lord Malmesbury the danger I apprehend of injury to British interests, even though it may be considered that danger is most remote, as the possibility of such a contingency as the occupation of Tangier ought to be guarded against.

A boat is starting, so I write in greatest haste, and have not time even to read my hurried lines; so I trust if I have said too much, or spoken too freely my opinion, it may only be attributed to my zeal in the public service, and not to presumption.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S., 4 P.M.--Another Spanish steamer has just arrived. No further news overland of the captives. The family of Don Juan have just told my brother-in-law (whom I have granted a month's leave to purchase furniture, &c., for his house at Taffee), that they are packing to depart. This I think is a little bit of diplomacy, for I think we have yet to await another reference to Madrid before a rupture takes place, especially as Khateeb tells me Blanco has asked him to modify his letter of the 20th ultimo, and he will then see whether he can forward it to Madrid. Khateeb is going to make the attempt, though he says he cannot alter the Sultan's instructions regarding the concessions to be made, but may, perhaps, alter the wording.

J H. D. H.

Inclosure in No. 101.

Memorandum of observations with regard to the existing differences between Spain and Morocco, which the Swedish Consul-General, M. d'Ehrenhoff, made, in the course of conversation with the Undersigned, at the latter's house, on the night of the 2nd of March, 1859, and which are committed to paper, at the special request, and for the information of Mr. Drummond Hay.

M. D'EHRENHOFF asked me what I thought about the report that was being circulated in the town, that the Spanish prisoners had been set at liberty, and had already arrived at Mequinez. I replied that the report had appeared to come too soon after the announcement of the second capture of the Spaniards to be worthy of credit. He then alluded to the probable bombardment of Tangier, and, on my remarking upon the impolicy of such a proceeding, and venturing an opinion that hostilities will not be entered upon until the Spaniards are released, added, that he could assure me, most positively, the Spanish Government were prepared to bombard Tangier even before their countrymen are given up to them.

He went on to say that, from what he had been able to gather from the language of his intimate friend, Don Juan Blanco (who, he declared, had not only expressed to him his own views, but had shown to him a good deal of the correspondence he had had with his Government on the subject), the prospect of any peaceful solution of the existing differences between Spain and Morocco seemed hopeless. He remarked, that although Don Juan was exerting himself to the utmost in the interest of peace, the Spanish Government was bent upon war, adding that he (D'Ehrenhoff) had himself seen instructions which Don Juan had received from his Government, within the last day or two, and which give to the former (Blanco) power to act, with regard to the pending questions, upon his own discretion and according to circumstances, and to assume a menacing or hostile attitude towards the Moorish Government, in case the latter do not afford ample and immediate satisfaction to the Spanish demands.

He also stated, that Don Juan had informed him that a large squadron is being collected at Cadiz, to operate in these waters, of which squadron one of the ships is the "Francisco de Assisa," a magnificent frigate of fifty guns; that it must not be supposed that the ill feeling which the Spanish Government had latterly evinced towards the Government of Morocco had originated simply on account of the Spaniards who are detained captive in Reef, or on account of any other recent grievance, but declared they had one great object in view, and that was—the vindication of a thousand acts of humiliation which they have suffered at the hands of the Reefians during the last fifty years. M. d'Ehrenhoff further expressed his conviction that no war would be so popular in Spain, and, indeed, throughout the greater part of Europe, as a war with Morocco; and that if France, in such a war, was not prepared to support Spain physically, she would certainly afford her assistance morally, and, under no circumstances, interfere between the contending parties.

Upon my asking how Spain would benefit herself by bombarding Tangier, M. d'Ehrenhoff said she would certainly do very little good if she confined her operations to a simple bombardment of the place; but, he added, he believed her troops would land and occupy Tangier until the Moorish Government complied with her demands.

Taugier, March 3, 1859.

(Signed) THOS. F. READE.

No. 102.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1859.

IT appears by a report dated the 5th instant, which I have this morning received from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General in Morocco, that the release of the Spanish prisoners had been effected, and that they were on their way to the Moorish Court.

Her Majesty's Government greatly rejoice to hear that this cause of dissension between Spain and Morocco is removed; and they would gladly contribute by their good offices to persuade the Moorish Government to yield to any other reasonable claims which may be made by the Spanish Government, and to facilitate, as far as possible, the defence of the Spanish fortresses from attack on the part of the Reefians, by assigning a district of territory between the walls of the fortresses and the surrounding country which shall be declared neutral.

But Her Majesty's Government have also heard from Tangier that threats and intimations have been made by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, implying an intention, on the part of his Court, either to bombard Moorish forts, or to occupy Tangier itself by a Spanish force.

Her Majesty's Government trust that the Cabinet of Madrid has no intention to resort to either extremity. The bombardment of the Moorish forts, for which you will not disguise from Señor Collantes that Her Majesty's Government conceive no provocation whatever has been afforded by the Moorish Government, would not only be productive of an amount of misery to an unoffending population at which humanity shudders, but would, in all proba-

bility, arouse and direct against Christians and Jews in general the fanaticism of the Moorish population.

But the occupation of Tangier would be attended with still more serious consequences, inasmuch as the material interests of England would not admit of Her Majesty's Government remaining passive under such circumstances. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that such a step is not contemplated by the Spanish Government; but as Her Majesty's Government would be deeply concerned at any interruption of the good understanding which now exists between this country and Spain, they think it right to declare frankly and openly to M. Collantes that any occupation of the coast of Morocco, on the part of Spain, could not be viewed otherwise than in a very serious light by Great Britain, and could scarcely fail to lead to evils of great magnitude.

Should the Spanish Government appear to be bent on this scheme, and you should have reason to believe its accomplishment to be probable, you will not conceal from the Spanish Government that any attempted landing of Spanish troops at Tangier, or the coast adjacent, would be resisted by Her Majesty's squadron.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 103.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March .)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, March* 12, 1859.

HAY reports that Spanish prisoners are now on their way to Tangier.

According to a letter from Melilla in newspapers, the garrison will attack the lines held by Reefians, having prepared gabions for their subsequent defence.

No. 104.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March .)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, March* 12, 1859.

I HAVE acquainted Foreign Minister with substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday. He expects every day to learn that Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has concluded an arrangement with Moroccan Minister, and says if war becomes necessary, contrary to his belief, some time will be requisite for preparation, and it is not against Tangier he will act.

No. 105.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 12, 1859.

I INCLOSE, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Mr. D. Hay, and copies of two letters which I have caused to be addressed to the Admiralty, regarding the differences between Spain and Morocco.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

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* Nos. 96, 98, and 99.

No. 106.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury —(Received March .)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, March* 13, 1859.

I COMMUNICATED yesterday to Hay the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 11th, and will write again to-day.

I saw Foreign Minister after arrival of your Lordship's two telegrams of yesterday. He accepts with pleasure support of Spanish claims, of which zone and neutral camp are alone important.

Line of wire to Algeciras not open to public, but my telegram has been forwarded to stop ships. Governor of Gibraltar is requested to acknowledge it. Spanish Government will believe ships are stopped on their way to Morocco.

No. 107.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received March 15.)

(Private.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, March* 7, 1859.

KHATEEB informs me that Blanco has accepted his note, of which I sent a translation in No. 23, and says that when the prisoners arrive he will go to Madrid, and endeavour to persuade his Government to accept the offer of the Sultan, and to withdraw the claims for the vessel; but he asks Khateeb not to communicate the draft of the letter to any one (meaning me, of course), as his Government might be disposed to reject it, if he has not had an opportunity of explaining matters in the first place *vivâ voce*. He has also asked Khateeb to write him another letter, announcing the liberation of the prisoners, to mention the various steps taken by the Sultan before he effected their liberation, and to attribute the backwardness of the Reefians to obey his orders to the proceedings of the Governor of Melilla, who had made far more advantageous offers to the Reefians regarding money, cannon, &c., than the Sultan could.

Blanco has urged Khateeb confidentially to make this hit against the Governor of Melilla, as it appears Blanco is much vexed with that officer's interference with the negotiations, and with the general conduct of the Spanish authorities at the African garrisons.

Though all this looks very well, I have little or no faith in the stability of Blanco's intentions; and as he takes care never to make any of his promises except through the Jew interpreter, I suppose, like all good Spaniards, he would feel himself authorized to break faith when his Government found it convenient to do so.

To all appearances we have a lull just now, though I hear Blanco's family have all their traps and furniture packed, ready for a start at any moment.

Khateeb tells me the Viceroy, Seid Mohamed, is expected with a large army to attack the Azamor tribe, and therefore, if the Spaniards again threaten hostilities, they would move towards Tangier. I have recommended that no large body of troops should approach, for the present, within a day's journey of Tangier.

Yesterday Castellon called on me. He asked me what I thought of the state of affairs here.

I replied that I hoped matters would be arranged amicably, as Spain must understand it is her interest to abstain from a war against Morocco.

Castellon observed that a bombardment was probable.

I replied I did not understand what beneficial result the Spanish Government expected to obtain by hostilities, as, after the bombardment, I feared the Sultan would and could not do more than before it; and moreover, there could be no glory gained in attacking a defenceless town like Tangier.

Castellon said that he thought there was no reason why the Moors should not be chastened because they were weak, when they refused to satisfy just claims; and he cited the late question between France and Portugal, as a proof of the justice of such proceedings.

To this I replied by saying, "But are the pecuniary claims of Spain just and regular?" I said that as far as I could judge, they were not, and that though I had instructions from my Government to cede all that was just and reasonable, I should keep silent regarding those claims.

Castellon then said, "After all it may not be a bombardment: the Spaniards may land 5,000 men."

I laughed, and replied, "Ils ne sont pas fous: France and England would never admit of the occupation of any town or portion of Morocco."

Castellon replied, "Je ne sais pas, je ne suis pas sûr. Je n'ai pas des instructions, mais je suppose que mon Gouvernement m'en donnera."

I replied that I felt persuaded the British Government would never admit of the occupation of Tangier, "plutôt on fera la guerre."

He replied, Your Government would never go to war for such a trifling matter ("pour si peu de chose").

I asked whether Castellon thought France would declare war against England if she was to take possession of Sicily.

He said, France could never allow the occupation of Sicily; but that is a country of importance.

I laughed, and said, "Have you not yet discovered the position of Morocco lying on the Dardanelles of the Mediterranean. Depend upon it, neither England nor France will ever consent that Spain or any other Power take possession of Morocco, though bombardments may be admitted."

Castellon then said, "I am only joking about the Spaniards landing."

I replied, I supposed so, and that I was also joking, but I said, "On parle quelquefois la vérité même en badinage."

Castellon concluded by saying, that affairs in Europe were too grave for either the British or French Government to care much about what happened in Morocco.

I replied that the Emperor and the British Government could keep their eyes upon Asia and Africa as well as Europe.

Nothing was said by him or by me regarding the frontier question.

All this passed in a friendly and half-joking tone between us; and on Castellon taking leave, I said that if the Spaniards had happened to have broken off their relations with this Government, and to have threatened immediate hostilities, I should have asked him (Castellon) to have joined me in requiring that a reasonable delay be granted to enable us to take precautionary measures for ensuring the safety of Europeans resident at Tangier and in the Western ports.

Castellon replied, Spain calls herself a civilized nation, and therefore must give us proper notice, in case she enters upon hostilities.

As Castellon has not spoken to me for a long time upon the differences between Spain and Morocco, I have thought it right to let you know what has passed between us. I believe, from what he has said to me and to others, he has never received a line from this Government regarding their views on this question.

I may mention to you, that I have never lost sight of the removal of the restriction on wool. I have on several occasions, during the last six months, spoken to Khateeb on the subject; and a few days ago I sent in a note, representing the fall in the prices of wool, and urging that the restriction be moved. I have also made a move regarding the exportation of wheat, soap, &c.

I think we shall have a good harvest this year, and a good clip of wool.

Last year trade has fallen off from the failure of the harvest, the rebellion of Azamor, and low prices in Europe. This year there is greater activity.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I have sent Mr. Buchanan a copy of the modified letter of Khateeb's, and told him that he had better not communicate it to the Spanish Government.

J. H. D. H.

No. 108.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord, *Madrid, March* 11, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 97 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit, herewith, a despatch which I have received this morning, for your Lordship, from Mr. Drummond Hay, under flying seal, reporting that the Spanish prisoners left Akkalaya on the 2nd instant, for the Court of the Sultan. They cannot, however, I understand, be expected at Tangier before the 16th instant.

From what Mr. Hay says in a private letter received at the same time, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires appears to have promised to accept a modified copy, of which a draft had been communicated to him, of the note which he had formerly returned (as reported in Mr. Hay's despatch No. 21) to Seid Mohamed Khateeb, although it still limited the concession offered by the Sultan, to the establishment of a neutral camp in the valley of Melilla, garrisoned by Moorish troops.

With reference to this part of the question at issue between Spain and Morocco, the inclosed translation of a letter from Melilla, published in the "Epoca" of last night, is not altogether without interest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 108.

Extract from the "Epoca" of March 10, 1859.

(Translation.)

A LETTER from Melilla says that since the 14th of January last, the aysd may be counted on which have not been heard there the whistling of the Reefian bullets, and the continued war cries of the savages, who, under cover of their entrenchments, named the Leña, Tarara, San Lorenzo, the Higuera, Rojo, and Seco, harass and fire upon the Spaniards whenever they get an opportunity. This circumstance keeps them continually on the alert, and checks curiosity, which often costs persons their lives.

In Melilla a stock of gabions and sand-bags was being prepared, and it was stated that the Governor intended to take possession of the Seco attack, which is the attack which most dominates and annoys the fortress. In the event of that point being taken, it would be necessary to fortify and keep it; in which case the convicts and soldiers would serve as sappers and miners, under the orders of a Lieutenant of Engineers, who is at present on the spot.

No. 109.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 18, 5 A.M.)

Telegraphic.) *Madrid, March* 17, 1859.

TELEGRAM from Vice-Consul Glynn reports Spanish prisoners were delivered to Spanish Consul at Tangier yesterday.

No. 110.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 112.)

My Lord, *Madrid, March* 17, 1859.

AFTER the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 11th instant, on the subject of the differences between Spain and Morocco, I called at the Foreign Office, and had some conversation with M. Comyn on its contents; and I had, subsequently, an interview with M. Calderon Collantes in the afternoon.

From what M. Comyn told me in the morning, I expected to have found his Excellency somewhat excited at the nature of the communications which I had to make to him, but he received me in the most friendly manner; and having renewed his former assurances as to the desire of the Government to avoid hostilities with Morocco, he said that he could say no more on the subject at present, except that the prisoners were on their way to the Sultan's Court; and that he expected every day the arrival of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires from Tangier, with acceptable proposals on the part of the Government of Morocco, with respect to the Spanish lines at Melilla. He observed, however, he was convinced the question would have been settled long ago, if Mr. Hay had not encouraged the Sultan's Minister to resist the proposals of Spain; and he was not disposed to change this opinion, although I assured him that, without positively urging the Moorish Government to accept the Spanish proposals, because many of them were of a nature which Her Majesty's Government could not approve, Mr. Hay had always told Seid Mohamed Khateeb that Her Majesty's Government had no interest in the matter, beyond the speedy re-establishment of amicable relations between Spain and Morocco; and they would, therefore, learn with satisfaction that every concession necessary to ensure that object had been made by the Sultan; and I was now authorized by your Lordship to direct Mr. Hay to recommend the concession of a reasonable zone round the fortresses, if the other objectionable claims were withdrawn.

This observation led M. Collantes to defend the pecuniary claims of Spain; and he expressed his belief that Her Majesty's Government had presented some of a similar character to the Government of Morocco. I replied that I felt assured he was mistaken; and, as I said Her Majesty's Government considered it was unjustifiable to rake up claims for acts which had occurred previously to the arrangements of 1856, he repeated that he had already given me to understand that the zone and the neutral camp were the principal objects for which he contended, and that the pecuniary claims were of an entirely secondary importance. With reference to any coercive measures which it might be necessary to adopt, he said Her Majesty's Government need be under no apprehension for the communication of Tangier with Gibraltar, as the plans of the Spanish Government were already made, and it would not be against that point of the Morocco coast they would act.

I replied that it was, therefore, probably intended to send an expedition into the Reef; and as I observed that, in that case, they were not likely to meet an enemy to conquer, as I believed the Reefian system of defence was for the whole population to abandon the plains and to retire to the mountains, his Excellency apparently confirmed my supposition by replying that the Spanish soldiers would have no difficulty in following them.

After my interview with M. Collantes, I received your Lordship's telegrams of the 12th instant, and as I met his Excellency in the course of the evening, I repeated to him that if Her Catholic Majesty's Government desired it, Her Majesty's Government would recommend their wishes with respect to the zone around Melilla to the favourable consideration of the Sultan; and his Excellency replied that, in the interest of peace, the Spanish Government would receive with gratitude any assistance which Her Majesty's Government might be disposed to afford them for the attainment of the objects which they had in view.

His Excellency spoke, during these conversations, as decidedly as on former occasions, of the intention of the Spanish Government eventually to employ force, if necessary, to secure a better frontier at Melilla; but he said, on my referring to preparations spoken of in the newspapers for occupying the lines

now held by the Reefians, that nothing would be done until negotiations were entirely broken off; and he made no objection whatever to the determination of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Tangier. He seemed, however, to be under an impression that Don Juan Blanco's negotiation would prove successful, notwithstanding the unfavourable opinion, I told him, Mr. Hay had expressed as to its result.

With reference to this subject, I have the honour to inclose copies of three letters which I addressed to Mr. Hay on the 12th and 13th instant, acquainting him with the opinion of Her Majesty's Government as to the course which he ought to pursue, and I trust that their determination to prevent a blockade of Tangier will increase his influence in the question.

I also lost no time in taking measures to secure the detention of Her Majesty's ships "Victor Emanuel" and "Orion" at Gibraltar, until they receive further orders from the Admiralty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 110.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, March* 12, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government are of opinion that you should strongly recommend to the Government of the Sultan the expediency of granting the zone around the fortress of Melilla, which Spain is entitled to, according to the Law of Nations, if the Spanish Government will withdraw all the other claims which they have recently put forward.

Your despatch of the 1st instant has been received by the Earl of Malmesbury; and Her Majesty's Government have felt it to be their duty to provide for the serious eventualities which the late proceedings of your Spanish colleague have led you to apprehend.

Therefore, although I have been able, from the explanations which I have received from M. Calderon Collantes, to allay in some degree the alarm caused by the language of Don Juan Blanco to the Sultan's Minister lest hostile measures against Tangier should be contemplated by the Spanish Government, two large ships of war have been ordered to proceed thither without delay, for the protection of British interests.

You are already aware of the importance which Her Majesty's Government attach to the commercial relations of Tangier with Gibraltar, and I may state that they would not see with indifference measures adopted of a nature to disturb them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 110.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, March* 13, 1859.

I HAVE been instructed to inform Her Catholic Majesty's Government that Her Majesty's Government will be happy to forward an arrangement of the questions pending between Spain and Morocco, and that they will, if it should be desired by Her Catholic Majesty's Government, recommend the Sultan to accept the claims which they have recently put forward, as far as they may be reasonable, and more particularly to grant the zone which the Spanish Government wish to occupy around the fortress of Melilla.

I have already mentioned to you that the Spanish Government maintain that they have a legal right to the territory claimed, as they formerly held it, and never ceded it by Treaty to Morocco, though the Reefians have long occupied it by sufferance. You have expressed an opinion that the Sultan's unwillingness to relinquish his sovereignty over any territory which he considers to belong to his Empire, will not be easily overcome; but the abandonment of a disputed right of sovereignty over a narrow strip of land lying immediately under the guns of a Spanish fortress, would be a trifling price to pay for the establishment of permanent relations of amity with a neighbour whose power and resources are daily increasing, and who some years hence, if the question is left open, which it is now hoped may be satisfactorily arranged, would find in it a pretext, of which they might be ready to avail themselves, for seeking aggrandizement in Africa. It is quite certain that if Spain were to relinquish for the present the prosecution of her claim to the valley of Melilla, it would only be until she was fully prepared to enforce it; and as I have already informed you, from all I learn here, it may be presumed she now believes that she can do so, and has decided, if her negotiations fail, to try the chances of war; and although the interests of Great Britain may give Her Majesty's Government a right to protest against measures being adopted which would interrupt the commercial relations of Tangier with Gibraltar, there are many other vulnerable points upon the coast, and a plan is, I have reason to believe, already prepared for occupying, and doubtless endeavouring to hold permanently, a portion of His Moroccan Majesty's dominions.

A letter from Melilla, published in the Madrid newspapers, reports that the garrison are preparing fascines and gabions, with a view to the capture and occupation of the lines held by the Reefians; but I am assured no offensive measures will be adopted until negotiations are broken off with Seid Mohamed Khateeb, and that if the Government eventually act, it will be with ample means to ensure the success of any operations which they may undertake.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 110.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, March* 13, 1859.

THE ships of war which I mentioned in my despatch of yesterday would be sent to Tangier for the protection of British interests are instructed to remain at Gibraltar until further orders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 111.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Tangier, March* 10, 1859.

HER Majesty's Minister at Madrid has transmitted for my information a copy of a despatch, marked No. 90, he addressed your Lordship on the 4th instant, reporting the language held to his Excellency by Marshal O'Donnell regarding his intention of re-occupying certain old lines in front of Melilla, which he declares had never been ceded to Morocco, but had been tacitly abandoned by the Spanish garrison.

With reference to that passage of Mr. Buchanan's despatch where his

Excellency says, "Marshal O'Donnell declares that though the Government of Morocco made at present objections to the views of Spain, assurances had been given some time ago to the Spanish Chargé d'Affairs, by the Sultan, that the zone marked around the fortresses asked for by Spain would be granted," I sent a verbal message this morning to Seid Mohamed Khateeb to inquire whether the Sultan or his Minister had ever engaged to cede the territory which the Spaniards say they formerly possessed, and I received in reply a letter, of which I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation, and which would lead me to believe that Marshal O'Donnell has been entirely misled by the information which has been transmitted to him by M. Blanco or his predecessors; for Khateeb stated also verbally to the interpreter when I made known to him, as, in compliance with his request, my reasons for having sent the message, that "he challenged the Spanish Government to produce any proof of his having held language which authorized such a construction to be put upon any language he had employed regarding the question of the frontier lines."

Up to the present time, as far as I am aware, the Moorish Government has not received from M. Blanco a demand for the restoration of any line they may have posseseed at Melilla in ancient times; but, on the contrary, M. Blanco, in his notes to the Moroccan Government, of which I have transmitted copies to your Lordship in former despatches, asks alone for an extension of the present lines, and the concession of a neutral ground.

When I was at Melilla a few years ago General Buceta pointed out to me some old ruins on the side of a mountain which, he said, had formerly belonged to Spain, and, as far as I could judge, they appeared to be two or three miles distant from the town; but I do not believe that point had ever been held by the Spaniards during the last hundred years. If I remember rightly there were other detached ruins within fifty or a hundred yards of the walls of the town, which perhaps are those the Spaniards desire to re-occupy, and from which it is possible they may have retired or have been driven out by the Reefians at a later period.

It appears to me it would have been politic and proper for the Spanish Government, in putting forward its demands about the restoration of old lines, to have clearly defined what and where these limits are, and to have stated when they last occupied them, and how they were abandoned, captured, or ceded; but the vague demand for "the concession of a new frontier at Melilla" may mean much or little, and I am not surprised that the Sultan has rejected such a demand; in fact, as I have said before, the Sultan has not sufficient authority or control over the Reefians to compel them to cede territory to the Spaniards; and, if he employed force against the Reefians for such a purpose, it might lead not only to successful resistance on their part, but even to rebellion against his authority throughout Morocco.

If, however, in addition to the neutral ground, the restoration of some contingent outworks at Melilla (proved to be Spanish), and which were within 100 yards or so of that fortress, was alone required, it might possibly be obtained by negotiation, though I could not form any decided opinion regarding the disposition of the Sultan on this point; neither do I think it would be convenient for me to moot the question until the intentions of the Spanish Government were clearly explained.

The suggestion made by Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, that the Spanish Government should accept the same space of neutral territory as actually exists at Gibraltar, viz., 710 yards, appears to me to be very reasonable; for the Spanish Government can hardly be justified in demanding from Morocco (because that Power is weak) a concession of territory greater than Spain has been prepared to admit the right of Great Britain to possess on the Spanish Peninsula.

The range of guns around a fortress has indeed, as Mr. Buchanan observed, become a very undefined limit, for it may be one mile, or six miles, or, in a few years, guns may be manufactured which may range double that distance.

Two Spanish steamers of war arrived this morning from the East, and one was previously anchored in the bay.

The Spanish prisoners are expected in the beginning of next week, from the Mixed Court at Meknas.

M. Blanco has not again altered the language he had held to Khateeb regarding his intentions of going to Madrid, and endeavouring to bring about a peaceful solution of the present differences, as reported in my despatch No. 23;

but I have little or no confidence in his promises, or even those of the Spanish Government, after the experience I have had of their conduct of affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I have sent a duplicate of this despatch, under flying-seal, to Mr. Buchanan.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure in No. 111.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.) 5 *Shieben*, 1275. (*March* 10, 1859.)

IN reply to the query you put us this morning, through your interpreter, whether our Lord the Sultan, or we his Agent, had ever engaged to restore the boundaries of Melilla, to the old ruins of forts which the Spaniards say that they formerly possessed, we declare we never have used any language like unto this, neither to the present Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, nor to any other person.

Reefians have informed us that there exist some ruins (which had fallen to the ground), and are situated about a league from Melilla; but the oldest inhabitants in Reef never remember that those sites were occupied by the Spaniards. If other nations had a right to demand the possession of all the old fortresses now in ruins, but which were built by them, when the Christians occupied a portion of this country, all the ports of this Empire, except two, would have to be ceded to the Portuguese and to the English; and we then, on our part, might demand the restoration of Gibraltar, and the greater part of Spain.

We have been much astonished at the query which you put us, after what we have repeatedly told the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires and yourself, and that we now should be asked why we have not acted up to a promise that had been made, or be asked whether such a promise had been given, and we had withdrawn from our engagements. We beg of you, therefore, to let us know what has caused such a supposition regarding language we have never held.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

No. 112.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received March* 28.)

(Private.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, March* 18, 1859.

MY despatches Nos. 29 and 30, and the previous despatches sent through Mr. Buchanan, will, when they reach the Foreign Office, explain what I have been about, and whence comes the sudden transition from menace to the most friendly assurances.

The few words sent by telegraph through Spain to Gibraltar, "Stop 'Orion' and 'Emanuel Victor,'" has done more than all other arguments with the Spanish Government.

I inclose for your information the copy of a private letter I have addressed Mr. Buchanan.

If Blanco and his Government put forward reasonable demands about the neutral ground, all will be satisfactorily settled; if not, I don't see how a conflict, at any rate in Reef, is to be prevented.

Khateeb tells me that he received through a third party very lately, an intimation that if he would refer all their differences with the Spanish Government to M. de Castellon, they would promptly be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. One of the French native interpreters told this to Khateeb's right-hand man, but did not say that Castellon had sent him with the message. Khateeb says he replied, "I have never received, since the commencement of the present difference, a word from the French Chargé d'Affaires on this subject. I won't

leave my hold of a stout stick to grasp at a reed. When I have a sheep's head on my shoulders instead of a man's, I shall listen to such insinuations."

As matters have taken now a very favourable turn, I hope Lord Malmesbury will not think I have been, or I am, an alarmist. A timely step, as taken by Lord Malmesbury, may have saved us much trouble, and it is a strong hint to others, and which may be a warning to them in any future dissension with this Government.

I am sorry to say that Khateeb has shown me a letter he has lately received from the Vizier at the Court, saying, that he had made known to the Sultan my advice about the exportation of wool, now that the "clip" has begun, but that the Sultan says he fears prices would rise again immediately, and, therefore, does not consent.

Khateeb, by my advice, returns to the charge, for it will please the French if we can get our testy Sultan to export wool again. In the same letter, however, the Vizier says the Sultan tells Khateeb to thank me for the barge, and repeats that he must follow my counsels in the question with the Spanish Agent. He also says that he has ordered his Governor of Mogador to settle an old claim of Mr. Grace, who was formerly, as you remember, British Vice-Consul at that port, and was engaged in commerce.

I am worn out with all the worry and work I have had these days, but now hope to have a little holiday until Blanco returns.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

My dear Mr. Buchanan, *Tangier, March* 18, 1859.

YOU will learn from my despatches to Lord Malmesbury up to this date, that there is now a very fair prospect of all questions being brought to an amicable settlement, if the Spanish Government, or rather M. Blanco, puts forward reasonable demands regarding the extension of the frontier lines and the neutral ground, but, under any circumstances, we shall have a lull for three weeks or a month, and if a conflict finally takes place, it will be confined to the Reef, I hope, and not at the Sultan's ports.

Blanco has altered his tone greatly, and I cannot help thinking that a Spanish steamer which arrived here as an express on the 15th, and departed three hours afterwards, brought him some instructions by telegraph from his Government to modify his language and his demands. That steamer arrived a few hours after Her Majesty's steamer "Redpole" brought me the tidings sent to Gibraltar by your Excellency, that "Orion" and "Victor-Emmanuel" were to be stopped at Gibraltar. I suppose the telegraph folk at Madrid must have reported this message to the Spanish Ministry, and, though they may have made a wry face at such a prescription, I am sure it will have had a very salutary effect, and has tended to moderate the fiery passions of Don Juan and his masters, whilst it shows the world England cannot for a moment allow her interests at Gibraltar to be trifled with, or exposed to the slightest risk. I had certainly submitted my views to Her Majesty's Government, regarding the great injury which would result if a *coup de main* was attempted, and suggested that unless "reliable assurances" were obtained from the Madrid Government through your Excellency, some precautionary step should be taken by us to guard against eventualities.

Your Excellency appears to think Don Juan exceeds his instructions; I thought so also at one time, but from all I can collect, the private correspondence he carries on with General O'Donnell, and the orders he receives from that Minister, guide his conduct. One of my colleagues who is an honourable though not a very brilliant man, and who stated he had seen some of the instructions to Don Juan, declares that he has acted far more moderately than the tenour of his instructions might have permitted him to do; and though Blanco told me, as you will have seen in my despatches, that the Spanish Government did not "intend to bombard, but to blockade Tangier," if the Sultan did not accede to

their demands, his menaces and language to Khateeb, both written and verbal, as well as his language to some of my colleagues, were totally at variance with that assertion. My French colleague went so far as to tell all his dependants to be ready to embark at a moment's notice, and the general belief at Tangier was, from the language of Don Juan, and what oozed out from the ladies of his house, that Tangier was to be taken.

Notwithstanding the lame explanations offered to me about the protection and passports given to the Jews, I think all that tended to show that the Spanish Government was about to take some rash step, but have veered about in consequence of your Excellency's language and that of Her Majesty's Government.

I am sorry to learn what you tell me of M. Collantes' opinion of my proceedings, and that he supposes I am prejudiced against the Spanish claims. He is greatly mistaken, and I fear he has been misled both by Blanco's predecessor, and also Blanco *ipse*. I can most conscientiously declare that, from the very outset, I have taken a most unbiassed view of all the questions, but had I plumped down upon the Moorish Government the advice to yield all the demands, reasonable and unreasonable, without demur, the Sultan would have turned a deaf ear to my counsels, and probably Moors and Spaniards would now be hammering away one at another. The Sultan is an obstinate man, but has some glimmerings about the policy and necessity of acceding to the just demands of foreign Powers. If it is supposed that he will yield like wax wherever he is pressed, the Spaniards are much mistaken. The archives at the Foreign Office, in Downing Street, can tell how difficult it has been to obtain the slightest concessions, even when he has been threatened by the might of France or by ourselves. On the present occasion he has been far more yielding, and I, perhaps foolisly, flatter myzelf I have led the old gentleman, by allowing him to believe I am (if anything) his partizan.

With regard to the remarks of M. Collantes to your Excellency that the British Government had at one time made claims for vessels plundered by the Reefians prior to 1856, it is very true; for when the claim was put forward for the last-captured British vessel, there were claims also made for three other vessels that had been plundered prior to that (I think since 1848): but the British Government, taking into consideration that the Sultan had, until the expeditions Her Majesty had sent against the Reefians in the years 1855 and 1856, always declared his want of power to chastise the Reefians, and had, until then, tacitly consented that we should seek redress with our own hands, withdrew all claims for vessels captured by the Reefians plundered before that time, *i.e.* 1856. Now the Spaniards have retaliated on the Reefians over and over again, and without regard to whether they belonged to the piratical tribes or not; and they have, during the last fifteen years, captured boats, seized the property, slaughtered and imprisoned the Reefians; so a long bill could be made out by the Moorish Government. Moreover, as I had told your Excellency, in 1845 all accounts and claims were settled between Spain and Morocco when I was the mediator, and yet the former has now chosen to hark back to claims prior to 1845. I am happy to say, however, Blanco has assured Khateeb that all their pecuniary claims will be withdrawn, and the boats, &c., restored when the frontier question is settled.

Your Excellency will be tired of my terrible long stories, but I think it right to let your Excellency, as well as Her Majesty's Government, know all I think, and then you or they will better be enabled to correct me when I am thought to be in error.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I am glad the liners did not come over here; I should have sent them back to Gibraltar if they had come under existing circumstances. If there was anything very urgent and of a secret character, I would communicate it by cypher, as your Excellency suggests, through the Postmaster at Gibraltar.

J. H. D. H.

No. 113.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Tangier, March* 14, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 25 of yesterday's date, and the Memorandum I inclosed reporting the conversation I had yesterday with the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, I have the honour to make known to your Lordship the language held by Don Juan Blanco, regarding the question of the boundaries of the Spanish territory at Melilla and the neutral ground.

M. Blanco informed me that, as soon as the prisoners arrived, it was his intention to go to Melilla before proceeding to Madrid, and that he would then determine on the extent of territory and neutral ground which his Government ought to require should be ceded by the Sultan; and that he expected, after the assurances he had received from Khateeb in his last letter, all matters would be arranged satisfactorily.

I replied that as I had every confidence in his, Don Juan Blanco's, desire to arrange matters in an amicable manner, and as the Spanish Government would depend upon his report in coming to a decision regarding the extent of neutral ground, that I trusted he would suggest that which, whilst it could be satisfactorily accepted by his Government, would not be of a nature which he thought the Sultan might have reason to refuse; for he, M. Blanco, should bear in mind that in the peculiar position of the Sultan as Sovereign of the semi-independent tribes of Reef, if His Majesty attempted to require their acceptance of unreasonable conditions regarding the cession of a territory for neutral ground, they might refuse to obey; neither could the Sultan ever expect to be supported by his Mussulman troops or subjects if he attempted to inflict a chastisement on his rebellious subjects, for refusing to deliver up territory to the Christians; therefore, I said, the Sultan would be in the dilemma, if unreasonable demands were put forward, either of going to war with Spain, or of risking a rebellion on the part of his Reef subjects, and the general discontent, and perhaps disobedience of his own troops to execute his orders.

M. Blanco replied that the Spanish Government would not take into consideration any such excuse on the part of the Sultan, for that he knew he had the power to grant the territory they required, and, if he did not grant it, they had the means and the intention to take it by force.

I said, "Then it is your intention to make conquests in the Reef territory."

M. Blanco replied in the negative; and added that they merely required the cession of the limits they formerly possessed.

I asked, where those limits extended to, and at what period they (the Spaniards possessed them; and remarked, that if every nation were to demand the concession of what it formerly possessed, many countries and lands would have to change hands; that it appeared to me they should clearly define the limits they demanded; that if they sought to acquire the cession of the old ruins, which are said to have been held by the Spaniards at the time they occupied Oran, and which, if I remembered rightly, were situated on the side of a mountain at some distance from the garrison of Melilla, I feared it would not be obtained by peaceful negotiation, nor could I believe that, commanded as those ruins were by the high ground on their flank, they could be considered as a military position; but, I went on to say that if the demarkation of a neutral ground were arranged, and the Spanish Government chose, in course of time, to advance their lines to some distance from their present position, I hoped the Moorish Government would not offer any obstacle, but tacitly allow of the encroachment; that, as far as British interests were concerned, I believed my Government would not have the slightest objection or wish to oppose the cession of one, or even six, miles of territory in Reef, but that it would have been a very different matter if there had been any question about the cession of a port, or territory bordering the Straits of Gibraltar or on the western coast of this Empire, or if any attempt were made to obtain such territory by conquest, in which case, he would understand, the British Government would never admit such pretensions, whether on the part of Spain or of any other Government,

though, I added in parenthesis, "such ideas of conquest have never, of course, been for a moment entertained by your Government."

M. Blanco replied that he had demanded the cession of the "vega" of Melilla, and that the Sultan had declared he was prepared to yield such frontier lines and neutral ground as might be established according to the usages of civilized nations. I remarked, "Neutral ground, you mean," M. Blanco contradicted me, saying, If no new frontier lines are to be ceded, what means the last letter of Khateeb which he had accepted? and added that, if my supposition that only a neutral ground was to be granted was correct, he would at once give up the idea of visiting either Melilla or Madrid, break off relations, and hostilities would commence. I replied that, of course he should rely upon the wording of the Moorish Minister's letter, and not on my reflections: and that I was very happy to hear I was labouring under an erroneous impression on this point, and now only hoped that when the matter is to be decided, on his return from Madrid, there would be no difference of opinion about the extent of the lines or neutral ground. I must avow, my Lord, when I made this remark I was satisfied, in my own mind, that I was in the right, and that M. Blanco has received an imperfect or incorrect translation of Khateeb's letter; but I did not think I was called upon, neither would it have been politic, to persist in maintaining my opinion, as I was not the responsible party, but I beg to refer to my despatch No. 24 of the 10th instant, in confirmation of my views; and I have, this day, obtained from Khateeb the orginal draft of his letter of the 5th March to Don Juan Blanco, and I do not find, as far as my knowledge of the Arabic enables me to form an opinion, there is any phrase in it which would authorize M. Blanco to suppose that a cession of territory as well as neutral ground is granted. I inclose, however, a copy of the Arabic version in case a question is hereafter raised on this point, and the Moorish Government is accused of bad faith; as it is apparent, from the language held by General O'Donnell to Mr. Buchanan, as reported in the despatches of his Excellency to your Lordship, that he is under the impression the Sultan has acceded to the demand for the extension of the Spanish lines, as well as the cession of the neutral ground.* My belief is that the expression "boundaries, that is to say, of the neutral ground," has been interpreted by the translator into "boundaries and neutral ground."

M. Blanco went on to say that no further delay could be admitted in the negotiation on his return from Madrid, for the spring was fast advancing, which would be the best season for operations; that they could not allow the negotiation to draw on, and that the Sultan should forthwith appoint Khateeb his Plenipotentiary to mark out the boundary, and send him to Melilla for that purpose when he (Blanco) returns from Madrid. I replied that as Khateeb was naturally a timid man, I feared he would not like to make a visit amongst the lawless people of Reef on such an errand, but that I should be very glad to hear that either Khateeb or any other prudent and judicious person were selected by the Sultan for that duty; and that I had only to assure him (M. Blanco) that it would afford me much pleasure if the demands of the Spanish Government, regarding the cession to be made, were of such a reasonable nature as to enable me not only to say to the Moorish Government that the British Government would be glad to learn that the Sultan should give his consent to grant them, but to add that we considered the demands to be just and reasonable, and such as the Government of Morocco ought to grant without demur; and that we entertained a very favourable opinion of the moderation and forbearance shown by the Spanish Government in the conclusion of these questions.

In my interview with Khateeb, yesterday evening, I thought it advisable to make known to him what had taken place between M. Blanco and myself, and put him on his guard, especially as M. Blanco has informed me it is his intention, before taking his departure for Madrid, to have an interview with Khateeb, and to obtain from him categorical explanations on the subject of the concession, and added that, if he discovered no arrangement about the extension of the frontier lines would be agreed to, he would break off relations at once, and suspend all further negotiation. Khateeb expressed to me his great surprise at the erroneous inference which had been deduced by M. Blanco from his letter

* Verbatim translation:—"He (the Sultan) would grant boundaries at Melilla, that is to say, of a space which belongs neither to us nor to you."

of the 5th March, and appealed to me for my opinion thereupon. I replied that, whatever might be the real or equivocal interpretation of the words, the evil was done, and that he had better reflect well before he contradicted M. Blanco, and declared there was to be no concession of new frontier lines.

I added that M. Blanco had not yet stated, and could not, till he had visited Melilla and proceeded to Madrid, state where those lines should extend to; that there would be time enough for the Moorish Government to object (which I hoped they would not have to do) when the exact sites were pointed out, if they were considered unreasonable; and that, in the meantime, I hoped he would write to the Sultan, and request that His Majesty would not oppose the Spaniards advancing their lines to such positions as were necessary for their security, nor make difficulties about the cession of a spacious neutral ground; and that the question of 100 yards, more or less, of uncultivated and worthless ground was of little importance when contrasted with the danger of Morocco going to war, the result of which step no one could foresee.

Khateeb said he was deeply impressed with the prudence of my counsels, and that, in his interview with M. Blanco, he would say as little as possible to compromise himself with the Sultan, after his late instructions, or, on the other hand, by any ill-advised opposition to M. Blanco's demands, produce a suspension of the negotiation, and perhaps, a rupture, and that he would lose no time in making known to the Sultan what had occurred, and urge His Majesty to be prepared to make all the concessions which he considered could be granted without bringing about rebellion and discontent on the part of his own subjects.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Draft of an Arabic Letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

No. 114.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Tangier, March 15, 1859.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 27 of the 14th March, and the counsels I stated I had given to Seid Mohamed Khateeb regarding the boundary question of Melilla, in consequence of the language which had been held to me by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, I have the honour to inclose herewith the translation of a letter I have received this day from Khateeb, in which he assents to follow my advice, if further explanations are demanded of him by M. Blanco regarding the construction to be put on the wording of the letter which was addressed to him on the 5th instant. Khateeb further requested the interpreter to state to me, that though he was disposed to make the fresh concession mentioned in his letter, out of deference to my counsels, yet that he hoped I would understand there was no tergivisation on his part, or that he had received any secret instruction from the Court, which authorized him to take upon himself the responsibility of the present step; but that he coincided with me in thinking it was prudent and politic for the Moorish Government not to offer any further obstacles to the progress of the negotiation until the Spanish Government clearly defined what was the extent of the territory they expected the Sultan would concede, either for advancing their lines or for a neutral ground. Khateeb further said, if he was pressed by M. Blanco for a categorical reply as to whether, in his letter, he had conceded new boundaries for the Spanish lines, and also a neutral ground, he should not commit himself by assent or dissent, but would repeat the precise tenour of the Sultan's instructions; adding, that he would engage His Majesty would concede all that was reasonable, and according to the laws and usages amongst other nations; and that if it was hereafter

satisfactorily proved to the Moorish Government, that the Spaniards had ever held any lines or frontier more advanced than the positions they now occupy, during the reign of the present Sultan (thirty-seven years), he had no doubt they would be restored, as he knew of no Treaty which had been entered upon either by which the Spaniards were deprived of, or had acquired territory, during the last forty years; but that if, on the other hand, M. Blanco claimed the restoration of positions or frontiers which he might choose to declare the Spaniards held a century or two ago, that he would then acquaint him he could not accede to such a demand; and that, under any circumstance, it would be necessary that both M. Blanco and the Moorish Government should have a precise knowledge where those positions were situated before any definitive reply could be given. Khateeb further told the interpreter that the question now entirely rested upon the demands which might be put forward by M. Blanco for territory after his visit to Melilla and to Madrid.

It is a matter of regret that when I visited Melilla in 1855, and on the occasion of Mr. Reade's visits to that place in 1856, 1857, and 1858, neither of us attempted to make, at the time when it was fresh in our memories, a rough sketch of the country and the vicinity of that fortress; but we had not then the grounds for supposing the Spanish Government would raise a question about the lines. Mr. Reade has now made a very rough sketch, herewith inclosed, of his recollection of the country, and which corresponds with my own, as it may enable your Lordship, as also Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, to form some conjecture, however vague, regarding the demand of the Spaniards. The outline given of the form of the town is, no doubt, incorrect, but that is not of importance.

The red line is intended to mark the position which was occupied by the Reefian guards about the time of Mr. Reade's visit to Melilla.

From the northern side of Melilla, marked on the sketch "Reefian outpost," which is situated about 150 yards from the town-walls, the Reefians can easily shoot any sentry who shows himself on the opposite walls of the town. I believe an old Spanish outwork was formerly erected somewhere near that site, of which, I think, the Spaniards have good grounds to claim the restoration.

The natural boundary on the south-east side of the town would appear to me to be, the north-west bank of the stream Oro; and, on the western side, a line extending from the deep ravine, in a southerly direction, to the stream, and beyond that line the neutral ground might be extended about 700 yards.

Now the claim of the Spaniards is, I believe, for the whole "vega," which, I suppose, means the Valley of Melilla, and then, a neutral ground; but how they will be enabled to substantiate such a claim I cannot comprehend. It is said, in ancient times (perhaps a century or more ago) they possessed some outwork, or castle, at the site dotted in the sketch "Spanish ruins," about two or three miles from the town.* This site appeared to me to be surrounded by very high grounds to the east of it, and, though I confess the most complete ignorance on military matters, I cannot comprehend how it would be advantageous for the garrison to possess the Valley of Melilla,† surrounded, as it is, on both sides, by high ground; or how a neutral ground could be marked on the hills that surround the valley. When I was at Melilla in 1855, the Governor talked much about the possession of the "vega" for a pasturage of cows, and the difficulty of getting fresh provisions from Spain, and the necessity, therefore, of their having ground upon which they could raise a sufficient quantity of vegetables, and have pasturage for their herds of cattle and sheep; but he appeared to me to speak more with an eye to agriculture, and personal profit, than with regard to military necessities for the security of the garrison; and I have strong grounds to suppose that the Spanish Government has hitherto been misled by the reports of the Melilla authorities, who, I think, are the last persons to take an impartial and unprejudiced view of this question. My conviction is, that, even if the Spanish Government should be guided solely by a sense of justice, and by the requirements of the garrison in a military point of view, and that they finally state to the Moorish Government what are the precise limits

* It remains to be proved whether these ruins are not of an old Moorish castle, and not of a Spanish fort; for it does not appear to be a position which would be selected in a military point of view by the occupants of Melilla.—J. H. D. H.

† It remains to be proved whether the word "vega," used by M. Blanco, means all the valley. The question at issue will almost turn upon this.—J. H. D. H.

they desire should be granted, and that the Sultan then accedes to all they demand as being moderate and reasonable, His Majesty will still experience the greatest difficulty and opposition from the Reefians when he requires their submission to the performance of the requisite conditions; and I have considerable doubts whether those wild and warlike people would ever submit to his mandates on such a subject; but, be that as it may, I have no hesitation in declaring that it is out of the question to expect that the cession of all the Valley of Melilla could ever be obtained by peaceful negotiation; or, at any rate, if the Sultan finally consents to put on paper that he acceded to such a demand (of which I do not foresee the remotest prospect), that the Reefians would obey the Sultan's orders; but, on the contrary, I am convinced all the Reefian tribes would be prepared to unite in resisting, to the last, the arms of the Sultan, or of the Spaniards, to compel them to submit to such conditions; whilst I do not hesitate to say, that not a hundred men would be found in Morocco who would fire a shot against the Reefians for disobedience to the Sultan regarding a cession of Moorish territory.

If my views are not very erroneous, the Sultan will have finally to select between a war with Spain, or the rebellion of his own subjects, and I am convinced he would naturally prefer the former to the latter evil. There is, perhaps, a middle course which he might be counselled to pursue, though it would, no doubt, be very repulsive to his feelings, namely, to tell the Spaniards that in Article XV of the existing Stipulations between Spain and Morocco, it is declared, that the Spanish garrisons on the African coast are justified in repelling, by force, the aggressions of the Reefians, and that such conflicts are not to disturb the peace and amity between Spain and Morocco; that as the Spanish Government has declared it formerly held certain advanced lines at Melilla, which they had tacitly abandoned, but now require their restoration to ensure their security, and as he, the Sultan, feels he has not the power to compel his rebellious and warlike subjects of Reef to cede the territory which they now occupy, without risking a revolution in other parts of his dominions, that the question had better be settled between the Spaniards and the Reefians, without interrupting the friendly relations with Spain, and that he engages to remain neutral as long as the Spaniards confine themselves to the recovery of their old lines, and that no further attempts of conquest be made when once they are obtained.

If I am not very much mistaken, the present question—if all the Valley of Melilla be claimed—is only to be solved by the Sultan pursuing such a course, or by a war between Spain and Morocco. I have told M. Blanco, repeatedly, that the Sultan had not the power to concede the territory they have demanded, and that his own subjects would not support him in enforcing such a demand. M. Blanco has always replied, he is convinced the Sultan has sufficient authority in Reef to impose any condition he pleases. M. Blanco, therefore, seems to me to have formed very erroneous opinions, or, that he is misled by the foolish language of some persons here, who desire to see a conflict between Spain and Morocco. It is therefore to be apprehended that as M. Blanco entertains those sentiments, he will mislead also his Government; and though I had no *arrière pensée* in giving my opinion to M. Blanco, yet he will, doubtless, when reporting my language to his Government, say, that I had put forward those opinions in the hope that I should persuade him to moderate his demands. Three weeks or a month of peace will, I hope, be gained, if M. Blanco goes to Melilla, and then to Madrid, before final demands about the territory are put forward, but I fear little more, unless the Spanish Government greatly modifies its demands, or the Sultan can be persuaded to follow the course I have now suggested, and that the Spanish Government assent to the existence of such a state of things. A war between Spain and Reef certainly is far preferable to a war between Spain and Morocco, though the former contingency may lead, finally, to the latter, unless the greatest success attended the operations of the Spaniards, and that what is to be accomplished in Reef was quickly and successfully executed.

If I could venture any opinion on military matters, I should say that during the summer months, in the flat country, the disciplined forces of the Spaniards would repulse any number of Reefians, and that the Spaniards would be enabled to advance their lines; but that before the month of January of next year, if the contest in Reef was continued, the Spaniards would have to retreat again to

the lines they now possess in Melilla, unless they are prepared to sacrifice the lives of 20,000 men, and nearly as many millions of dollars, for attaining the object they have n view.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 114.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 10 *Shaban*, 1275. (*March* 15, 1859).

HAVING taken into consideration the friendly and prudent counsels you gave me two days ago, with regard to the statement made to you by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at the interview you had with him on that day, that is to say, the remarks, viz., that he had demanded of us the valley of Melilla, in addition to the demarkation of the frontier line of a neutral ground, that I had stated in my letter to him of the 5th instant, that we would cede new boundaries as well as a neutral ground, which should be laid down in accordance with the established laws of nations, and that, if he found this was not the correct interpretation of my letter, he would immediately break off relations, and hostilities would be entered upon at once, we beg to repeat to you that we do not withdraw from what we have told you before, in conformity with the instructions of our Lord, which we have shown to you; and that in our letter we do not say more than that we would "grant the boundaries of a piece of ground which should belong neither to them nor to us;"* but we will now add that, if the said Chargé d'Affaires requests an explanation of our words, we purpose, out of consideration for your prudent counsels, and as they have not yet alluded to the extent of the neutral ground they intend to demand, nor even specified their wishes about the boundaries, to reply to him (the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires) that we do not withdraw from the promises we made in our letter, that now all must depend upon the extent of ground they may ask for, and that, when the precise nature of their demands shall have been stated, and the Commissioner whom we may send to the spot shall have been able to form an opinion as to their justness, the question will be decided, either by the immediate admission of the demands, or, in case the said Commissioner is unable himself to cede what may be asked for, by a reference to the Sultan.

We will also add that, until then, it would entail a loss of time to discuss the matter further, as neither party know exactly the extent of ground that may be demanded. We promise you, likewise, that we will write to the Sultan, and inform His Majesty of all that has passed, and also submit that, in the event of their asking for a neutral ground of ordinary extent, and only demanding, besides, that they may advance the limits of their guard-stations to certain contiguous points which, they may say, were, not many years ago, in their possession, and which they require for their security, it would be better not to offer any opposition to their pretensions, although it may not be possible to admit them in a formal way, and that, if difficulty or opposition arise, as we fear there will probably be, on the part of the Reefians, in coming to a settlement of this matter, the Spanish Government will be persuaded that the Sultan has shown good faith throughout the negotiation, that he was prepared to do all that was just and reasonable, and that all opposition and difficulty comes from the Reefians, and not from him, but, of course, on our suggestions the Sultan must alone decide.

Given on the morning of the 10th of Shaban in the year 1275.
Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 114.

Map of Melilla and its neighbourhood, sketched from memory, by Vice-Consul Reade.

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* This is translated literally from the Arabic, but signifies a "neutral ground."—T. F. R.

No. 115.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 28.)

(No. 36.)

My Lord, *Tangier, March* 18, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copies of three despatches which I have received from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, and of my reply. When my despatches Nos. 25 and 27 of the 13th and 14th instant, and No. 28 of the 15th instant reach your Lordship, as they have been sent under flying seal through Mr. Buchanan, your Lordship will be better able to form an opinion of my conduct, and I humbly trust it will not be disapproved.

I have the honour to submit a further letter which I have received this morning from Seid Mohamed Khateeb, acquainting me with the substance of his conference with M. Blanco last night, and which appears to have been very satisfactory.

The Reef prisoners are expected to be sent to Tangier in a day or two by the Spanish authorities of Malaga, and M. Blanco will then set out for Algeciras, Melilla, and Madrid. Until he returns and defines what are the exact pretensions of the Spanish Government regarding the new limits, it would be difficult to form any conclusion as to the final results of the question, but if the demands are reasonable, I trust all matters will be satisfactorily and amicably settled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 115.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay, March 12, 1859.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 110.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 115.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay, March 13, 1859.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 110.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 115.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, March* 13, 1859.

I HAVE been instructed to inform Her Catholic Majesty's Government that Her Majesty's Government will be happy to forward an arrangement of the questions pending between Spain and Morocco, and that they will, if it should be desired by Her Catholic Majesty's Government, recommend the Sultan to accept the claims which they have recently put forward, as far as they may be reasonable, and more particularly to grant the zone which the Spanish Government wish to occupy around the fortress of Melilla.

I have already mentioned to you that the Spanish Government maintain that they have a legal right to the territory claimed, as they formally held it, and never ceded it by treaty to Morocco, though the Reefians have long occupied it by sufferance.

You have expressed an opinion that the Sultan's unwillingness to relinquish his sovereignty over any territory which he considers to belong to his empire will not be easily overcome; but the abandonment of a disputed right of sovereignty over a narrow strip of land, lying immediately under the guns of a Spanish fortress, would be trifling price to pay for the establishment of permanent relations of amity with a neighbour, whose power and resources are daily increasing, and who some years hence, if the question is left open, which it is

now hoped may be satisfactorily arranged, would find in it a pretext of which they might be ready to avail themselves for seeking aggrandisement in Africa. It is quite certain that if Spain were to relinquish for the present the prosecution of her claim to the Valley of Melilla, it would only be until she was fully prepared to enforce it; but, as I have already informed you, from all I learn here, it may be presumed she now believes that she can do so, and has decided if her negotiations fail, to try the chances of war. And although the interests of Great Britain may give Her Majesty's Government a right to protest against any measures being adopted which would interrupt the commercial relations of Tangier with Gibraltar, there are many other valuable points upon the coast; and a plan is, I have reason to believe, already prepared for occupying, and doubtless endeavouring to hold permanently, a portion of his Morocco Majesty's dominions.

A letter from Melilla, published in the Spanish newspapers, reports that the garrison are preparing fascines and gabions, with a view to the capture and occupation of the lines held by the Reefians, but I am assured no offensive measures will be adopted until negotiations are broken off with Seid Mohamed Khateeb; and that if the Government eventually act, it will be with ample means to ensure the success of any operations which they may undertake.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 4 in No. 115.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Sir, *Tangier, March* 17, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 12th instant, and two despatches of the 13th instant.

The despatches severally marked Nos. 25 and 27 of the 13th and 14th instant, and No. 28 of the 15th, addressed to the Earl of Malmesbury, and sent, under flying-seal, for your Excellency's information, will have acquainted your Excellency that I had forestalled, in great measure, the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and the very excellent advice which your Excellency has recommended I should urge upon the attention of the Moorish Government. And your Excellency will have also learnt the success which has attended my good offices in urging the Moorish Minister to withdraw from opposing, in any conference he might have with M. Blanco, the concession of new frontier lines, as well as the neutral ground, even though he has no instructions from the Sultan to that effect.

I have been further enabled to convince Khateeb that the whole question will now turn upon the demands which may be put forward by the Spanish Government, after the visit of M. Blanco to Melilla and to Madrid; and, therefore, opposition at the present time, before the extent of territory is defined, would be most uncalled for. It has been a great satisfaction for me to find that, in giving this advice to the Moorish Government, I have been acting in accordance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, whilst I flatter myself that the impartial and disinterested counsels which have hitherto been offered by me, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, have led the Sultan and his Minister to show such readiness in acceding to all we require; but I may take the liberty of adding, that the Spanish Government would be wrong to imply, on that account, that the same success would have attended our good offices if I had shown myself a warm supporter from the first of all the Spanish demands, without making a distinction between what is reasonable and just, and what appeared to be grasping and irregular.

Though I trust the Sultan can now gradually be led by the counsels of the British Government, even to concede on paper more perhaps than he will find it in his power to grant in reality (that is to say, what his subjects of the Reef will be disposed to accede to without resistance); yet a great obstacle will have been removed in bringing about a peaceful adjustment of the present differences between Spain and Morocco, by the fact that the Sovereign of the latter country should have signified his consent to the reasonable demands of Spain; but I must beg to refer to the opinions I have given in my despatch No. 28 of the

15th instant, which are founded upon a long experience of this country, and the character of its inhabitants, and from that opinion, I regret to say, I cannot recede.

With all deference to the opinion of the Spanish Government, I think time will show my predictions will be verified, unless the Spanish Government should confine themselves to the moderate pretensions I have recommended. M. Blanco, and, probably, the Spanish Ministry, will, no doubt, believe that I am prejudiced in favour of the Moors, and therefore have opposed, and do oppose, Spanish pretensions. If such be their belief, they are mistaken, and your Excellency can assure them that every step I have taken, every counsel or opinion I have given, have been solely dictated by the desire to bring about a satisfactory and peaceful settlement of all questions between Spain and Morocco, and that, had I not assumed, from the first, the part of a disinterested and impartial counsellor of the Moorish Government, we should not have been enabled, step by step, to have led the Sultan and his Ministers to make the various concessions they have made during the negotiation.

All now depends, as I have expressed my opinion in my despatch No. 28, upon what the words "Valley of Melilla" mean to imply, and what may be the decision of M. Blanco upon that point, if, as he has told me, he goes to Melilla.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I have reported to the Earl of Malmesbury that the Spanish prisoners arrived here on the 16th instant, and were delivered over to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires. A Spanish steamer of war saluted the town on that occasion with twenty-one guns, which was returned by the Moorish batteries.

The agitation and alarm which had prevailed amongst the population at Tangier has been calmed, and troops which were marching from the capital and other parts towards Tangier and the northern coast, have been arrested, for the present, in their progress.

I have the honour to inclose, herewith, a letter which I have received from Khateeb, reporting the result of his conference with M. Blanco, last night, which appears to have been very satisfactory.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure 5 in No. 115.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 13 *Shaban*, 1275. (*March* 18, 1859.)

WE have to inform you that, at 8 o'clock last night, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires paid us a visit. He was very civil and courteous, and spoke to us in just and reasonable terms. He told us that it was his intention to proceed to Madrid, in order to confer with his Government, and that, therefore, he had decided upon speaking with us on the subject of the boundary question of Melilla; and he asked if the assurances given in the letter we had addressed him on the 5th of March were to be completely relied on.

To this we replied, that what had been promised in that letter would be faithfully carried into execution; that, with regard to the question of the Melilla boundaries, four of his predecessors had made representations on the subject, but without success; but that, since the Spanish Government had again brought forward the matter, and that the negotiation had been entrusted to the hands of one like him (M. Blanco), a person who was peaceably disposed, a wise man, not like his predecessor (we said this to flatter and please the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires), we had again urged upon our Lord the Sultan to agree to a territorial arrangement, and to place Moorish guards, selected from the Sultan's troops, who shall put a stop to the conflicts which have hitherto been wont to occur between the Reef people and the Spaniards; and His Majesty has replied, that what would be proper, and for the interests of both parties, he would agree to, but that the boundary question must be settled according to the established usage and laws of nations, and that neither an addition nor reduction should be

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required by either party. This, we said, is the construction to be put on the letter we wrote to him (M. Blanco).

M. Blanco replied, that he would only demand what was right and proper, according to the usages of other nations, and that he would not seek to obtain a palm's breadth of our land, except what would be just to grant according to the laws of nations.

Upon this we observed that, provided this arrangement is agreed to on our part, the Spanish Government would withdraw all her other demands; that all other questions or claims would be considered settled and dropped, and that no discussion would be raised on the past.

To this he (M. Blanco) replied, that all demands, claims, or questions, which had been put forward or raised up to that day would be dropped, and never, on any account, be repeated. He said, also, they would restore the Reef boats, and also the little Reefian cannon which they had in their possession, and thus put an end to all discussions or questions. M. Blanco observed, also, that he desired all that passed between him and us should be kept secret, so that no one might write to Madrid, before he could report to his Government what had taken place.

We replied, we never speak to any one upon these matters, nor take counsels of any one, except the English Chargé d'Affaires; that to him we speak, and we take his counsels, as he has ever sought to promote a good understanding, and to adjust these differences; that, moreover, we were ordered by the Sultan to ask his advice whenever we were in doubt as to how we ought to act, and that, by asking his advice, we might avoid doing that which might be unfriendly or irregular; that the English Chargé d'Affaires had no ill-feeling against any one, but was guided by what was just and kind to all, and sought to promote peace, and give satisfaction to both parties; and that, moreover, in these affairs, he had acted as if he were the Agent of the Spanish Government, in urging all just demands. Then we said to M. Blanco, "You are a just man, and, therefore, tell us, whether you have ever found, from the day these discussions began, that we ever replied to your communications in an unfriendly tone, or in an irregular manner, or did otherwise than keep in the straight path. From this, also," we added, "you may know that the English Chargé d'Affaires has always counselled us in the cause of peace, and in a manner friendly to both parties."

M. Blanco replied, he was certain you were desirous of promoting an amicable arrangement between both parties.

We have further to inform you, in conclusion, that, with God's help, questions of the Melilla territory shall be settled according to what is right and proper, according to the usages of nations, as you have urged upon us, in the name of your Government.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

No. 116.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 125.)

My Lord, *Madrid, March* 25, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Drummond Hay, on the question of the Melilla boundary, and inclosing the copy of a letter, dated the 18th instant, which he had received from the said Mohamed Khateeb, reporting what passed at an interview which his Excellency had granted to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, before his departure for Melilla and Madrid.

As Mr. Hay's despatch vindicates his own conduct in the transactions which have lately taken place at Tangier, from the charge of hostility to the views of the Spanish Government, which M. Calderon Collantes has made against him, and expresses opinions which may possibly have some influence on the future course of Her Catholic Majesty's Government, I have placed a copy of it confidentially in the hands of M. Comyn for communication to them; and I at the same time communicated to him a Memorandum which I drew up from

Mr. Hay's despatch No. 28 to your Lordship, of the 17th instant, and of which a copy is inclosed for your Lordship's information, stating his views as to the extent of territory around Melilla which it might be fair for Spain to ask, and which it may, perhaps, be possible for her to obtain without the necessity of using force to induce the Reefians to withdraw from it.

I am sorry to say that M. Comyn spoke incredulously of Mr. Hay's apprehensions, and confidently as to the prospect of the whole valley of Melilla being eventually ceded to Spain. If Mr. Hay, therefore, has formed correct opinions on the subject, it may be presumed that his Spanish colleague entertains others, and will probably induce his Government to persevere in claiming territory, the occupation of which, even if it can be effected without a war with Morocco, is likely to require serious military operations against the people of the Reef.

Don Juan Blanco is now at Melilla, and is expected at Madrid in about a week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 116.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan, March 17, 1859.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 115.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 116.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay, March 18, 1859.

[See Inclosure 5 in No. 115.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 116.

Memorandum.

A MISUNDERSTANDING seems to have arisen as to the interpretation of Seid Mohamed Khateeb's letter, stating the readiness of the Sultan of Morocco to grant new lines between the Reefian and Spanish outposts; and it appears that the Moorish Minister intended to say, "to grant boundaries of a piece of ground which should belong neither to them nor to us." He has consented, however, not to raise a difficulty on this point; and if the Spanish requirements are moderate and reasonable, it is hoped that the Government of Morocco will be disposed to grant them.

Everything therefore will depend on the extent of these demands.

A natural boundary on the east side of the fortress it is believed might be found in the north-west bank of the stream Ora, and on the western side in a line drawn from a deep ravine beyond the present nearest Reefian outpost in a southerly direction to the same stream; and beyond that line a neutral ground of the same extent as that at Gibraltar might be established.

The Spanish Government, however claims, it is said, the whole valley of Melilla, as having occupied upwards of a century ago a fort or castle two or three miles from the town; but it will not be easy for them to establish this claim; and it may be questioned, from their position, whether the ruins are not Moorish. The site of the ruined fort also is said to be surrounded by high ground, which would render it incapable of defence; and, were it included in the Spanish territory, together with the whole valley of Melilla, would it be possible to mark out a neutral ground on the hills that surround the valley?

The valley therefore, it is supposed, though useful to the fortress as affording pasturage and garden grounds, would not improve its means of defence.

It should also be considered, that even if the Spanish Government limit their demands to what may be required for their garrison in a military point of

view, and if the Sultan therefore agrees to them, His Majesty will find it difficult to impose the arrangement upon the Reefians; and if he were induced to consent to the whole valley of Melilla being included in the Spanish lines, there is little doubt that the Reefians would resist its occupation by the Spaniards, and that he would not find a hundred men in Morocco who would fire a shot against them for refusing what the whole nation would look upon as a cession of Moorish territory.

The Sultan may therefore finally have to choose between a war with Spain, and rebellion among his own subjects, unless he leaves Spain, under the 15th Article of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco, to establish herself by her own means in the territory which it may be agreed she is to occupy.

No. 117.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 72.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 30, 1859.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 125 of the 25th instant, reporting your late communications with the Spanish Government regarding the boundary at Melilla; and I have to instruct you to repeat to M. Calderon Collantes, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, the apprehensions which you have already expressed as to the results which must ensue unless the Spanish Government confine themselves to the proposals which have been recommended by Mr. Hay.

The advice which has been treated by Her Majesty's Government, and which has been conveyed in the despatches addressed to you on this subject, is of deep interest, not only to Spain and Morocco, but also to Great Britain, and you will continue to press it earnestly on the consideration of the Government of Her Catholic Majesty.

You will, at the same time, and on all proper occasions, impress upon the Spanish Government the determination of Her Majesty's Government not to permit the landing of Spanish troops at or near Tangier, nor any attack on that place.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 118.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord, *Tangier, March* 28, 1859.

THE crews of the Reefian trading-boats who had been taken prisoners by the Spaniards last year, arrived here yesterday in a Spanish steamer of war, and were delivered over to the Moorish authorities, who have set them at liberty. Three of the prisoners were left in hospital at Malaga, and one had been sent direct to Melilla.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb informs me the boats and cargoes, valuing between 3,000*l.* and 4,000*l.*, have not been delivered, but that he has thought it prudent not to put forward any pecuniary claim against the Spanish Government on this account, until the boundary question has been brought to a final settlement.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb has further informed me that he has requested the Spanish Vice-Consul, with whom he had an interview the day before yesterday, to write to Don Juan Blanco, or to the Government at Madrid, to request that when the limits for the new lines at Melilla are defined, an exact account of the distance in yards from the town walls to the required lines be presented for the consideration of the Moorish Government, and that also a statement be made of the number of yards which the Spanish Government desires to propose as the space to be allotted for a neutral ground.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb observed to the Spanish Vice-Consul, the mere names of the sites in the vicinity of Melilla would not be sufficient to enable the

Moorish Government to come to any decision regarding the pretensions of the Spanish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 119.

Mr Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord, *Madrid, March* 31, 1859.

DON JUAN BLANCO, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, arrived here three days ago from Melilla; but I have not yet been able to ascertain what opinion he has expressed as to the amount of territory which it will be expedient to claim from Morocco.

M. Comyn has shown me confidentially an old map found in the archives of the War Department, in which the whole "vega" of Melilla is included within the Spanish lines. From what he says, however, although he speaks confidently of the new boundary being fixed in conformity with the views of Spain, it does not appear that the Government have yet formed a decided opinion on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 120.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 144.)

My Lord, *Madrid, April* 7, 1859.

IN conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 72 of the 30th ultimo, I yesterday reminded M. Calderon Collantes of the opinions expressed by Mr. Drummond Hay, on the subject of the proposed rectification of the boundary of Melilla, referred to in your Lordship's despatch, and in the inclosed extract from a private letter from that gentleman to myself, dated the 26th ultimo, which I had communicated to his Excellency a few days previously, and I said that I had been instructed by your Lordship to repeat to him in the name of Her Majesty's Government the apprehensions entertained by Mr. Hay as to the results which must ensue, unless Her Catholic Majesty's Government confine themselves to the proposals which he has recommended.

M. Calderon Collantes replied that the valley of Melilla and the environs of the fortress would be surveyed by competent engineers, and that the Government would certainly not claim more territory than they were justly entitled to; in reply to which I observed that the question was not only one of how much might be justly claimed, but also as to what could, under the circumstances, be obtained without war, which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, was the more important consideration.

M. Calderon Collantes then repeated his former protestations of being as averse to war as Her Majesty's Government could be, and of his being most anxious and hopeful, now that the prisoners were released, that all other questions between Spain and Morocco would be amicably arranged. I said I entirely confided in his assurances, but that it was not to be denied that the desire was becoming general in Spain to seek aggrandizement in Morocco; that the Opposition newspapers excited public opinion on this subject with a view to embarrass the Government; and that Statesmen of all shades of politics, some even holding important offices under the Crown, when they wished to make a popular speech, flattered the country with visions of future conquests in Africa. It therefore, I said, appeared to me expedient that the views of Her Majesty's Government, with respect to such conquests, should be fully known to the

Spanish Government, and I would tell him frankly that Her Majesty's Government would never permit the landing of Spanish troops at or near Tangier, nor any attack on that place. I was, myself, I said, so convinced that there was no immediate danger of war between Spain and Morocco, that, though I had received a despatch on the subject from your Lordship soon after the receipt of your telegrams, announcing the departure of ships of war from England to protect British interests at Tangier, I had not thought it necessary to recur to the question in my late conversations with his Excellency; but, as your Lordship had again mentioned the determination of Her Majesty's Government to prevent any invasion of the coast near Tangier, and appeared anxious that there should be no misunderstanding on the subject between Great Britain and Spain, I felt bound to call his attention to it.

His Excellency then, while assuring me that there was now no probability of a conflict, asked by what right Great Britain could interfere in any military operations which might be undertaken by Spain against Morocco in prosecution of just claims against that country, and how I could reconcile such a pretension with the Law of Nations? I replied, that if the interests of Great Britain required that she should protect a part of the coast of Morocco from the attack of a foreign Power, she would of course be justified in doing so, and that she would be ready to accept the consequences of her act, even if it should cause a hostile collision with the invading Power; adding that Morocco appeared to me to be somewhat in the position of Turkey, and might thus eventually give rise to a Western question in which Great Britain might have to act the same part as she had already done in the Eastern one, as I had reason to believe that her traditional policy would never permit her to allow an European Power to occupy Tangier and the neighbouring coast.

M. Calderon Collantes requested me to make this communication to him in writing, in order that he might refute the pretension of England to exercise what he called a Protectorate over Morocco, or to do more in the event of a war between Spain and that country than to require diplomatic explanations as to its objects, and such guarantees as to its results as she might deem necessary for her interests. This I declined, saying that I had no instructions to make so formal a communication to him, and that, for the present, it was sufficient, with a view to prevent future difficulties between the two Governments, that he should be aware of the decision come to in England; and I added that I knew your Lordship's language on the subject to be no vain menace, as I was in possession of the correspondence between your Lordship and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty with reference to the instructions which were given, when your Lordship believed war was imminent, to the commanding officers of the line-of-battle ships dispatched from England.

M. Calderon Collantes is, I have no doubt, somewhat annoyed at the language which Don Juan Blanco's proceedings have induced your Lordship to instruct me to hold on this subject; but our conversation was carried on in the most friendly terms, and from the assurances which I received from his Excellency, I am bound to believe that he will take care that the question of the Melilla boundary does not lead to the hostilities which your Lordship so justly deprecates.

M. Collantes requested me to read the Treaty of 1799 between Spain and Morocco, observing that if the Spanish Government insisted upon the strict fulfilment of its stipulations, as they were entitled to do, they might be supposed to entertain aggressive designs against the country; and he appealed to their forbearance in not claiming all that was due to them, as a proof of their desire to seek advantages in Morocco through commercial enterprizes alone. In compliance with his Excellency's wishes, I have looked over the Treaty, without however, being able to discover the proofs of Spanish magnanimity and self-denial which it is alleged indirectly to exhibit. I have not, however, had leisure to study it carefully.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Extract.) *Tangier, March* , 1859.

I DON'T suppose we should care whether the Sultan ceded the whole, the half, or the tenth part of the "vega;" but I am convinced that even if the Sultan can be pushed on by Spanish threats, or by our counsels, to yield on paper the whole "vega," that the Reefians will never submit to any mandate of the Sultan conceding the "vega," unless it be backed by a very large force which the Sultan might send into Reef; but when this force retired the Reefians would probably attempt to retake their old lines.

If by the word "vega" the Spaniards mean to imply only the ground within a quarter of a mile of the town, some satisfactory arrangement may possibly be come to, and I can understand in a military or strategical point of view the necessity of their requiring the withdrawal of the Reefians from the lines they now occupy; but that the Spaniards should desire to retain the whole "vega," surrounded as it is by high ground, and inhabited by a wild and semi-independent people, I cannot understand *cui bono*, except it be for the sake of the Governor's cows, or to provoke conflicts with the natives.

No. 121.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 81.)

Foreign Office, April 13, 1859.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 144 of the 7th instant, respecting the discussions between the Governments of Spain and of Morocco; and I have to state to you that I approve your language to M. Calderon Collantes in the conversation which is reported in your despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 122.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 160.)

Madrid, April 23, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, the copy and translation of an article published on the 18th instant, in the "Correspondencia Autógrafa," a semi-official paper, upon the present relations of Spain with the Government of Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 122.

Extract from the "Correspondencia Autografa" of April 18, 1859.

O LOS periódicos de la Oposicion no han leido con atencion "La Epoca" del Sábado 16, ó "La Epoca" no ha escrito lo que suponen los periódicos de la Oposicion, ó aquel periódico no ha acertado á interpretar el pensamiento del Gabinete, cuando dice ó se le hace decir que España tiene miras de conquista sobre el territorio Africano. "Nuestra política está en Africa" se dice hace mucho tiempo, pero la política en general y la buena fé de las naciones no permite al Gobierno Español pensar en estos momentos en el aumento da nuestro territorio con daño de un Imperio que acaba de darnos la satisfaccion mas completa, haciendo justicia á todas nuestras reclamaciones.

Sin aspirar á inmotivadas conquistas, España acaba de recobrar por medio de negociaciones habilmente dirigidas y apoyadas con la fuerza y con el derecho el territorio que nos correspondia por los antiguos Tratados delante de Melilla;

ha puesto á cubierto esta plaza de las incesantes hostilidades de las hordas indisciplinadas del Riff, y ha conseguido que el Gobierno de Marruecos tomó á su cargo la represion do los Rifeños, colocándose en primera linea delante de ellos para evitar toda hostilidad a nuestros fuertes, toda falta á los Tratados.

Esta conductá, amiga del Gobierno Marroquí, exige de nuestra parte una conducta igualmente amiga. Una falta ó una ofensa por su parte no quedaria por lo demás impune. Este es lo que accuseja la buena fé nacional. La dignidad Española no puede exigir mas del Gobierno.

(Translation.)

EITHER the Opposition newspapers have not read with any attention the "Epoca" of Saturday the 16th, or the "Epoca" has not stated what the Opposition press suppose, or that paper has not been a correct interpreter of the intentions of the Cabinet, when it said, or is stated to have said, that Spain has ideas of conquest in the African territory. It has long been said "our politicians should look to Africa;" but our general policy and the good faith of nations do not allow the Spanish Government to contemplate at present any increase to our territory, which would prejudice an Empire which has just given us the most complete satisfaction by doing justice to all our reclamations.

Without aspiring to ill-timed conquests, Spain, by means of negotiations carried on cleverly, and supported both by force and by right, has just recovered the territory which by ancient Treaties belonged to us, around Melilla; she has guaranteed that fortress from the incessant attacks of the undisciplined hordes of the Reef, and has obtained from the Government of Morocco that they will undertake to drive back the Reefians, placing themselves in the front line against them, in order to prevent any attack on our forts, or any breach of the Treaties.

This friendly conduct of the Moorish Government requires on our part proceedings equally friendly. Any default or aggression, however, on their part, will not on this account be left unpunished. National good faith suggests this. Spanish dignity can require no more of the Government.

No. 123.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 180. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Madrid, May 3, 1859.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 169, marked Confidential, of the 28th ultimo, on the subject of the differences between Spain and Morocco, I have the honour to transmit, herewith, the copy of a confidential letter which I addressed to M. Calderon Collantes, communicating to his Excellency the copy of a note from Mr. Drummond Hay to Seid Moahmed Khateeb, dated the 27th instant, with an extract of that Minister's reply, relative to a hope which I had expressed to Mr. Hay that the Spanish Government were disposed to arrange these differences in a satisfactory and amicable manner.

Copies of the documents in question are inclosed herewith, for your Lordship's information, and my object in communicating them to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs was to place on record, in a correspondence with his Excellency, confidential assurances which I had received from M. Comyn on the subject to which they relate.

I had, also, an interview with his Excellency yesterday, when I expressed a hope that Don Juan Blanco, who was to leave in the evening for Tangier, would carry with him instructions which would remove the various causes of irritation that existed between the Spanish and Moroccan Governments; and, I said, as the Sultan was now prepared to grant both new lines and a neutral territory round Melilla, and the extent of the zone claimed could alone become a ground of dispute, I trusted Her Catholic Majesty's Government would be moderate in their demands, and limit their pretensions to what the Sultan could easily concede.

I may here inform your Lordship that, among other reasons which his Excellency mentioned, confidentially, and which I should not like to be repeated

on my authority, as having induced the Government to insist on this claim, were the abuses that arose from the proximity of the Reefians to the garrison, there being good grounds, he said, to fear that, on many occasions, a traffic had been carried on between them in powder and other Government stores.

I, of course, acknowledged the cogency of this reason for removing the Reefians from the vicinity of the fortresses, but I urged moderation in acting upon it.

M. Collantes' reply to my inquiries as to M. Blanco's instructions respecting the improper protection afforded by the Spanish Consulate-General in Morocco to Moorish subjects was not quite so satisfactory as I could have wished, as he has postponed giving that gentleman final instructions on the subject until he sends him a report upon it from Tangiers.

I said that the question did not require much elucidation, as it was merely necessary to decide whether M. Blanco had a right to inscribe in his Consular Register the names of Moorish subjects, and to extend to them, afterwards, the privileges of persons under the jurisdiction and protection of the Spanish Government, a pretension which, I presumed, the Spanish Government would not attempt to defend.

Without giving me any explicit answer to this observation, his Excellency replied, that the Government had no interest in the matter; and he begged me to believe that, on receiving M. Blanco's report, he would consider it without any bias whatever, and with a determination to send him such instructions as the justice of the case required.

In all these conversations I can perceive that there is, on the part of the Spanish Government and their Agents, an extreme jealousy of Mr. Drummond Hay, and of the influence which he enjoys with the Moorish Government; and, also, a suspicion that he endeavours to repress that of Spain. I fear, therefore, that M. Blanco, on his return, will become a more dangerous, restless, and arrogant Representative of his country than he has even hitherto been, as he has had the most fulsome flattery heaped upon him, here, by the Government prints, has received the Grand Cross of Isabel the Catholic, and been publicly complimented by the Queen; doubtless for the purpose of magnifying the success of the policy pursued by the Government in Morocco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 123.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

My dear Sir, *Madrid, May 2, 1859.*

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's confidential information, the copy of a letter lately addressed by Mr. Drummond Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb, together with an extract of his Excellency's reply, from which your Excellency will learn that the influence of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco is, and has always been, exerted to promote a satisfactory and amicable arrangement of the questions pending between the Sultan's Government and that of Her Catholic Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 123.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.) *April 27, 1859.*

I HAVE received information from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, which leads me to expect that the Spanish Government is disposed to give instructions to their Chargé d'Affaires to act in a friendly and conciliatory manner in the settlement of the Melilla frontier question, as also the difference which has lately arisen in consequence of the Spanish Acting Consul-General continuing to exercise jurisdiction over those Moorish subjects who had been lately registered as Spanish subjects in the books of the Spanish Consulate,

contrary to the assurance conveyed to you, through me, by M. Blanco, previously to his departure. Under these circumstances, and as M. Blanco may be daily expected to arrive at Tangier, I think it my duty to repeat to you the advice I have already given on various occasions, namely, that the Sultan and his Government should show every disposition to meet the reasonable expectations of the Spanish Government for the settlement of the frontier question, and that the new lines at Melilla, which may be considered by the Spanish Government to be requisite for the safety and tranquillity of the Spanish garrison, as also a reasonable space for a neutral ground, shall be granted.

The counsels which I have hitherto offered to you throughout this negotiation, in the name of my Government, have been dictated, as you are aware, by the most friendly feelings towards the Moorish Government, and it will afford me the greatest satisfaction if all pending questions are now brought to a final and satisfactory conclusion, and that I can assure Her Majesty's Government that the successful issue of the negotiation is mainly to be attributed to the forbearance and moderation which have distinguished the conduct of the Moorish Government throughout these questions.

Spain and Morocco are neighbours, and it is therefore the true interest of both Governments to be firm friends and allies, which also is the sincere desire of the Government of Great Britain, who is equally the friend of both Powers.

Peace. (Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 123.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.) 23 *Ramadan*, 1275. (*April* 27, 1859.)

YOUR letter of this date has reached us, and we have much satisfaction in learning that the English Ambassador at Madrid has written to acquaint you that the Spanish Government appears to be disposed to bring to a satisfactory and amicable settlement the pending frontier question of Melilla, as also the question of jurisdiction over the subjects of the Sultan.

We are penetrated with the soundness of the counsels you offer, and which are in accordance with the advice you have repeatedly proffered to the Moorish Government; for you are the Agent of a nation which is a well-wisher to these dominions.

You are aware that our Lord the Sultan only instructed us at first to concede the boundaries of a neutral ground, and, in accordance with His Majesty's command, we made this concession only, in our letter to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires; but, subsequently, in consideration of the counsels which you urged upon us, we agreed to admit the concession of new lines, as also a space for a neutral ground, and that the demarkation of both should be made in accordance with what is usual and proper to grant in like cases.

We also wrote to the Sultan to request His Majesty to approve of this fresh concession, and he acceded to it; but he said that all would depend upon the extent of territory which the Spanish Government might claim; and that the Moorish Government will only cede that which any other nation similarly situated would be disposed to grant, as, for instance, the territory which is held by you at Gibraltar, or like unto that.

The Spaniards have chosen to assert they possessed certain territory in ancient times; but if this is exact, it must have been in a very remote period, for no one in this country has the slightest recollection of it, nor are there any proofs; for as to the ruins of buildings which exist, they are probably ruins of old castles held by the Moors, and not Spanish.

Though the Spaniards chose to say all this, they have not produced a single document or ancient stipulation to prove their right, though we had always denied the justice of these claims.

When the question took place about the boundaries at Ceuta, in the year 1845, we are told that the Spaniards produced an ancient document, viz., a map, in which the limits were marked, and which were subsequently proved to be exact.

Now, we are convinced that, had they any proofs in their possession regarding Melilla, they would have produced them. The fact of their not having done so shows that they have no grounds upon which to base their claims.

We have, however, to repeat to you, and we wish you to inform your Government, that the Sultan will cede at Melilla all that any other nation, similarly situated, would be disposed to yield; neither can they (the Spaniards) have a right to demand of us more than what is necessary to preserve peace with the Reefians. We are very glad to learn also what you say regarding the question of protection, that it will be satisfactorily arranged.

We had felt persuaded that the Spanish Governmeut, from its sense of justice towards us, would never desire to interfere with the rights of the Sultan to govern his own subjects; neither could we ever admit such proceedings, whatever might be the consequence of our refusal: for such an admission would lead to the destruction of the dominions of our Lord the Sultan.

Peace. (Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

No. 124.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 91.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 13, 1859.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 169 of the 28th ultimo, I have to state to you, that you should continue strongly to urge, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, upon M. Collantes, that no protection shall be granted by the Spanish Agents in Morocco to the Moorish subjects of the Sultan.

The question of protection to foreigners in Mohammedan countries is one which has caused great embarrassment, and has frequently led to diplomatic quarrels; and Her Majesty's Government would rejoice that Spain, as an enlightened State, should join in putting an end to a practice which is contrary to International Law.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 125.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 197.)

My Lord, *Madrid, May* 14, 1859.

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 87 of the 3rd instant, on the subject of the questions pending between Spain and Morocco, and more particularly with respect to the pretension of the Spanish Consulate at Tangier to exercise jurisdiction over Moorish subjects, was delivered to me, yesterday, by the messenger Poignand.

I shall not fail to bear in mind the instructions therein conveyed to me; and your Lordship will learn by my despatches (marked Confidential) No. 169 of the 28th ultimo, and No. 180 of the 3rd instant, that I have lately made several communications to the Spanish Government in anticipation of them, and in conformity with the views of Her Majesty's Government on the subject to which they relate.

I trust, however, that a satisfactory solution of the differences between the two Governments will shortly take place, as I learn, confidentially, from Mr. Drummond Hay, that the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs is disposed to grant the amount of territory which, it is said, the Spanish Government intend to claim at Melilla; and, as I have been assured by M. Calderon Collantes that he will not sanction any proceedings of the Spanish Consulate at Tangier which are inconsistent with international usage.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

P.S. *May* 17.—Mr. Nesbitt, who was to have taken charge of this despatch on the 14th instant, having been obliged to delay his departure until to-day, I

am able to add, that I have just learnt from Mr. Drummond Hay that M. Blanco, at an interview with Seid Mohamed Khateeb on the 10th instant, gave up his pretensions to protect Moorish subjects, and, withdrawing all other claims against Morocco, left the demarkation of the ground around Melilla alone for settlement, which he claims should be regulated by the range of a 24-pounder cannon.

A. B.

No. 126.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 215)

My Lord, *Madrid, May 25, 1859.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I have received for your Lordship, under flying seal, from Mr. Drummond Hay, reporting the capture of four Reef boats by the Spanish garrisons in Africa.

Mr. Hay, however, states that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had expressed, warmly, his disapprobation of these outrages; and I am happy to be able to add that Her Catholic Majesty's Government have also disapproved of them, and that a severe reprimand has been addressed to their perpetrators, so that it may be hoped not only that the present complaints of the Reefians will be immediately redressed, but that measures will be taken by the Spanish Government to prevent a recurrence of such objectionable proceedings in future.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 127.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 216.)

My Lord, *Madrid, May 25, 1859.*

WITH reference to the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 91 of the 13th instant, on the subject of the pretension of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier to protect Moorish subjects, I have stated to Señor Calderon Callantes that the question of protection to foreigners in Mohammedan countries is one which has caused great embarrassment, and has frequently led to diplomatic quarrels; and that Her Majesty's Government would rejoice that Spain, as an enlightened State, should join in putting an end to a practice which is contrary to International Law.

As Señor Blanco had excused his conduct to his own Government, by alleging that Her Majesty's Mission in Morocco afforded protection to numerous Moorish subjects, I read, at the same time, to his Excellency an extract from a letter from Mr. Drummond Hay, reporting that Seid Mohamed Khateeb had shown Señor Blanco a list of the Moorish subjects under Mr. Hay's protection, amounting to twenty-two, who were all servants and dependents of the Legation, or of the Consulate, and who, if guilty of any misdemeanour, would be given up to the jurisdiction of the Moorish authorities.

Señor Calderon Collantes did not tell me frankly that Señor Blanco had already withdrawn his pretension, but he assured me that the question would be satisfactorily arranged.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 128.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received June 28.)

(No 247.)

My Lord, *Madrid, June 17, 1859.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch which I received this morning, under flying seal, for your Lordship from Mr. Drummond Hay, reporting the advice which he gave to Seid Mohamed Khateeb, before leaving Tangier on leave of absence, with reference to the extension of the Spanish lines around the fortress of Melilla.

I have made Señor Calderon Collantes acquainted with the substance of the inclosure in Mr. Hay's despatch, to prove to his Excellency that every reasonable claim of the Spanish Government against the Government of Morocco has received the support of Her Majesty's Legation at Tangier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 129.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 257. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Madrid, June 25, 1859.*

AN Opposition newspaper maintained, a few days ago, that some Reef boats had attacked a Spanish guard-boat near Melilla, thus proving that the Government had deceived the public, by representing themselves to have placed their relations with Morocco and the Reef on a satisfactory footing.

I have inquired into the truth of this report, and have been informed that a conflict did take place near Melilla, as stated by the press, and that a complaint on the subject, which had been forwarded to Tangier by the Governor, in accordance with his instructions, had met with immediate attention from the Moroccan authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 130.

Acting Consul-General Reade to Lord J. Russell.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Tangier, July 21, 1859.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 1 of the 2nd instant, inclosing a copy of a letter from the War Office, reporting the opinion of the Secretary of State for War, with reference to the extent of territory to be ceded for the new lines of the Spanish fortress of Melilla, and instructing me to communicate the substance of that letter to the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A few days after the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, I proceeded to Tetuan, for the purpose of conferring with Seid Mohamed Khateeb upon various matters of business; and, at an interview which I yesterday had with that functionary, I was informed by him that the question regarding the new lines of Melilla had been definitively settled, and that it had been agreed upon, between him and the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, that the neutral ground to be ceded by the Moorish Government is to extend from the Spanish lines as far as a cannon-shot fired, point blank, from a smooth-bored gun can range.

Khateeb also informed me that the Spanish Government have withdrawn the demand they had lately put forward, that provisions from the mainland may be allowed to enter their garrisons in Reef.

Under these circumstances, I have thought it prudent not to incur the risk of disturbing in any way the above-stated arrangements, by communicating to the Moorish Minister the opinion of the Secretary of State for War upon the subject, and I hope your Lordship will not disapprove of my conduct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOS. F. READE.

No. 131.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1859.

I TRANSMIT to you, for your information, a copy of a despatch from the Acting British Consul at Tangier, regarding the question as to the lines of Melilla.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 132.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 332.)
My Lord, *San Ildefonso, August* 17, 1859.

HAVING observed in the newspapers this morning that the Moors had destroyed some works which the garrison of Ceuta have been erecting within the lines of the fortress, I have ascertained at the Foreign Office that the report is true, and that the Spanish Government have applied to the Government of Morocco for redress.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 133.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, August* 27, 1859.

A MINISTERIAL journal states, that five battalions of Infantry, one regiment of Cavalry, and a battery of Artillery, are ordered to strengthen garrisons in Africa.

No. 134.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J Russell.—(*Received August* 30, 3·15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, August* 30, 1859, 10·30 A.M.

BESIDES reinforcements for the garrison, I have reason to believe that a camp of 12,000 men will be formed near to Gibraltar, to be employed against the Moors, if the Sultan refuses redress for attacks on Ceuta. It is thought that His Highness, whose new Convention was signed the day after the second outrage, will give redress demanded.

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* No. 130.

No. 135.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received August* 31, 9 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, August* 31, 1859, 2·30 P.M.

THE Spanish Minister is authorised to communicate to your Lordship a despatch now on its way to London, giving satisfactory explanations and assurances as to the intentions of his Government for making military preparations against Morocco.

I am assured that the garrisons having been strengthened, the force to be encamped near Gibraltar will not proceed to Africa, unless the Sultan refuses redress asked for.

No. 136.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 1.)

(No. 348.)
My Lord, *San Ildefonso, August* 27, 1859.

LAST night's "Epoca" states, that in consequence of the opposition offered by the Reefians to the works begun by the Spaniards for strengthening their African fortresses, the Spanish Government have determined on reinforcing their garrisons at Ceuta and Melilla, and have already placed under orders for these ports five battalions of Infantry, a regiment of Cavalry, and a battery of Artillery; and that another regiment of Infantry will probably be eventually added to the expedition.

It is not impossible that the measure may be connected with the reported illness of the Sultan of Morocco, and the probability of disturbances in the Empire in the event of his decease.

I may take this opportunity of mentioning that a report from Her Majesty's Consul at Carthagena announces the arrival, at that port, from Toulon, of four French gun-boats, mounting twelve guns, with whose destination he was not acquainted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 137.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 350.)
My Lord, *San Ildefonso, August* 28, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 348 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the immediate cause of the adoption, by the Spanish Government, of the energetic measures therein referred to for the reinforcement of their African garrisons, was an attack made by the Moors, on the 24th instant, to the number of 1,500, on the sentries at the advanced works of the fortress of Ceuta, which had been reconstructed by the garrison, after their destruction, reported in my despatch to your Lordship, No. 332 of the 17th instant.

It appears that they had intrenched themselves the preceding night, behind the walls of an unfinished guard-house, and in some neighbouring ravines, whence they opened fire on the sentries at daybreak.

The Governor of the place, Brigadier Gomez, ordered two small gun-boats, mounting one gun each, to sweep the ravines, while he attacked the Moors in front with a couple of companies of Infantry, dislodging them from their positions, with a loss, it is stated, of 100 men, while that of the Spaniards was extremely trifling. Two battalions of Chasseurs are already embarked at Alicante, and the rest of the expeditionary force is on its way to the ports of embarkation.

The Government appear determined to act in the most energetic manner,

and the press, of all shades of opinion, is unanimous in offering them its approval and support.

It is said that a general officer of distinction will be appointed to the command of the expedition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 138.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 351.)

My Lord, *San Ildefonso, August* 30, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 350 of the 28th instant, I have the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of an article, accompanied by a translation, which was published in last night's "Epoca," and may be taken as a fair statement of public opinion on the question which has arisen between Spain and Morocco.

The Moderado newspapers are the most energetic in approving the steps already taken by the Government, and in urging them to avail themselves of the opportunity now afforded for following up "the mission of Spain in Africa." Their language, however, is, doubtless, in a great measure intended to enable them to denounce a want of patriotism on the part of the Government if the affair is arranged amicably, as there are good grounds to believe it will be by the Government of Morocco punishing the perpetrators of the late acts of aggression on the Spanish outposts at Ceuta.

A large force, it is said, is about to be organized near Algeciras, to be prepared to act as eventualities may render expedient, and General Echagüe, the Captain-General of Valencia, and a personal friend of Marshal O'Donnell, is spoken of as destined to command it.

The last attack on the garrison of Ceuta took place on the 24th instant, and I understand that the Convention negotiated by Don Juan Blanco del Valle, for regulating the future relations of Morocco with the Spanish garrisons, had been signed the previous day by himself and the Moroccan Plenipotentiary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

P.S.—Since writing the above I learn that Marshal O'Donnell has said to one of my colleagues that 14,000 men would proceed at once to Africa, in order to show the Reefians that Spain has the means of punishing them; but this information is not confirmed by the answers I have received to inquiries which I have addressed to well-informed persons.

The Government also have received, by telegraph, the most satisfactory assurances from the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A. B.

Inclosure in No. 138.

Extract from the "Epoca" of August 29, 1859.

LO esperábamos: apenas se difundió por Madrid la noticia del envio á Ceuta de algunas fuerzas del ejército en número suficiente para obtener una reparacion instantánea del ultraje recientemente inferido por los Moros del Riff al pabellon Español, la prensa de todos los matices respondió como debia responder, atendida su hidalguia y su patriotismo, con una esplosion de entusiasmo. Saludamos con júbilo a todos nuestros apreciables colegas. Con sus simpatías, con su co-operacion contabámos. Amigos y adversarios del Gobierno, no era posible que se engañasen en esta cuestion. A la enérgica actitud del Gabinete correspondia un aplauso unánime, y unánime le ha obtenido. Hé aquí un campo donde todos vamos á ser ardientemente ministeriales. Hé aquí una gran ocasion para el pais y para el Gobierno; para el pais, que sabrá demostrar

la altura á que ha llegado; para el Gobierno, que está en el caso de probar que comprende los destinos del pueblo que le está confiado.

Seguros del espíritu del pais, es al Gobierno, animado de los mas nobles y patrióticos deseos, á quien nos toca dirigirnos. Que no defraude las esperanzas que á todos nos ha hecho concebir; que no desmaye un momento en la prosecucion de la comenzada empresa. Esa aclamacion unánime con que sus últimas rápidas medidas acaban de ser acogidas, ese apoyo sincero que sus enemigos políticos le ofrecen, ese olvido de diferencias anteriores que comenza á notarse, esa disposicion alentadora y benévola que en todos los ánimes impera, le imponen grandes deberes que, nosotros, sus amigos de siempre, los que estuvimos á su lado en la vispera, los que hemos de acompañarle en el infortunio, cuando el no ser ó el infortunio vengan, nos permitiremos recordarle, por mas que abriguemos la confianza gratísima de que no lo há menester. Sí: la actitud favorable de la prensa entera le impone grandes deberes. Ya que hemos sufrido un nuevo ultraje y nos disponemos valorosamente á vengarlo, venguemos todos los que en la costa Africana se nos han inferido; y en lugar de limitarnos á esto, convirtamos las nuevas operaciones en base de un plan mayor, de un plan de engrandecimiento territorial á que la geografia y la historia, la política y la religion, nuestro porvenir económico y nuestro ascendente moral nos están llamando.

Colocados entre el Africa y el resto de Europa, en la confluencia de las dos grandes civilizaciones del continente, nosotros poseemos todas las soluciones de continuidad necesarias para llevar á cabo la mision civilizadora, que pesa como una afrenta sobre la Europa, que afrentoso es para los hijos de una region donde plugo á la Providencia derramar á manos llenas los tesoros de la civilizacion, consumir su inmensa fuerza en esteriles luchas y no emplearla en domoñar la barbarie que se agita á sus puertas. Mientras la Inglaterra conduce sus mercancías y sus biblias á tierras apartadísimas; mientras que la Francia continúa perseverante en la colonizacion de la Argelia; en los instantes mismos en que la Turquía agoniza á la presencia de dos imperios poderosos, fatalmente inclinados sobre el Oriente, un puñado de bárbaros, unas cuantas hordas salvajes insultan nuestro pabellon e inquietan nuestras posesiones de Africa.

Nunca mejor que en la ocasion presente pudo decirse que España ejercita un derecho y cumple á la vez con un deber llevando sus huestes al Africa. Ejercita un derecho porque hemos sido molestados cien veces, porque se nos ha inferido recientemente un grave insulto con mengua de todas las estipulaciones o Tratados. Cumple con un deber porque la civilizacion Europea, eminentemente cosmopolita, por lo mismo que es esencialmente Cristiana, tiende á la propagacion, á la conquista; como quiera que la propagacion y la conquista que entraña en su seno no violan ningun derecho ni se levantan sobre la ruina de ningun interés legitimo. Los agravios nos dan derecho á reparacion: la barbarie que los produce nos impone como deber una mision civilizadora.

Quien desconozca estos titulos, que presente otros mejores; quien resista estas consecuencias, que pulverice antes las premisas; el que se oponga á esta tendencia, el que desconozca este designio, interrogue antes á la geografia y demande esplicaciones á la historia, que los designios providenciales se estampan comunmente en la historia y en la geografia.

No se nos oculta que las difficultades de la empresa son grandes, y los sacrificios que exige considerables; que es menester caminar con mucho pulso y proceder con gran meditacion para consolidar los resultados que se obtengan, y no abandonarse á esperanzas quiméricas; pero la oportunidad que se presenta, el brillante estado del ejército, el entusiasmo nacional houdamente escitado, la confianza que inspira el Gabinete y la reconocida aptitud de su ilustre Presidente para empresas de esta naturaleza, disculpan en cierto modo el ansia que á todos nos devora, la impacienza que en todas partes se advierte. Ojalá continúe la opinion nutrida de ese entusiasmo compatible con la sensatez de que en los momentos actuales la vemos felizmente poseida!

(Firmado) J. JUANCO.

(Translation.)

IT is as we expected! As soon as it was known in Madrid that a sufficient amount of forces had been sent to Ceuta to obtain an instantaneous reparation for the insult lately offered by the Moors of Reef to the Spanish flag, the press of

all parties answered as it ought to answer, having regard to their chivalrous and patriotic sentiments, with enthusiastic applause. We thank our worthy colleagues. We depended on their sympathies and help.

It was not possible that either the friends or adversaries of the Government should be mistaken in this affair.

The decided conduct of the Cabinet deserved unanimous applause, and it has obtained it. On this subject we shall all be strongly ministerial. This is a great opportunity of the Government and the country: for the country, which will be able to show the height to which it has risen; for the Government who, on this occasion, can prove they understand the welfare of the people confided to their care.

Sure of the spirit of the country, it is to the Government, who are animated by the most noble and patriotic desires, that we are bound to address ourselves. That they may not fail in any of the hopes they have made us conceive; that they may not pause for a moment in the prosecution of the enterprize which they have undertaken. The unanimous approbation with which their last energetic efforts have been welcomed; the sincere support which their political adversaries offer them; the forgetfulness of previous differences which has begun to be observed; the encouraging and favourable disposition which reigns in every mind, impose upon them great duties, which we, who are always their friends, who were at their side in opposition, and who are ready to accompany them when misfortune or the loss of power arrives, may be allowed to remind them of, however strong be the confidence we entertain that it is unnecessary to do so. Yes, we repeat it, the favourable attitude of the press imposes on the Government serious duties. As we have suffered a new outrage, and we are disposed bravely to revenge it, let us at once avenge all those that have been inflicted on us on the African coast; and instead of limiting ourselves to this, let us enlarge these operations into a plan of territorial aggrandisement, to which history, geography, policy, and religion, our economical future and our moral ascendancy, are calling us.

Placed between Africa and the rest of Europe, at the confluence of the two great Continental Powers, we possess all the solutions of continuity necessary to carry out the mission of civilization which weighs upon Europe; for it is humiliating to the children of a region in which Providence has deigned to lavish all the treasures of civilization, to consume their immense strength in barren strife, and not to employ it in subjugating the barbarism which presses on their frontiers. While England carries its commerce and its Bibles to the most remote countries; while France continues perseveringly in colonizing Algiers, at the same moment in which Turkey is in her death struggle, in the presence of two powerful Empires whose destiny directs them towards the East, a handful of barbarians, a few savage tribes, insult our flag, and disturb our possessions in Africa.

Never better than on this occasion could it be said that Spain has a right, and at the same time fulfils its duty by leading its armies into Africa. She has a right to do so, because we have been annoyed a hundred times, and lately a great insult has been offered us in spite of all our Treaties and stipulations. She fulfils a duty because European civilization is eminently cosmopolitan, and for the very reason that it is essentially Christian, tends to propagation and conquest, as long as they do not violate any right, or raise themselves on the ruins of any legitimate interests. Outrages give us a right to reparation, and the barbarism that produces them imposes on us as a duty a civilizing mission.

Whoever ignores these rights, let him show better ones; whoever resists these conclusions, let him first of all refute the premises; he who would oppose this movement, and does not recognize this design, let him study geography and history, in which the intentions of Providence are for the most part made manifest.

We are not ignorant that the difficulties of this enterprise are great, and the sacrifices it requires considerable; that it is necessary to proceed with great discretion and forethought, so as to consolidate the results which may be obtained, and not to give ourselves up to vain hopes; but the opportunity which presents itself, the brilliant state of the army, the national enthusiasm deeply excited, the confidence inspired by the Government, and the known fitness of its distinguished President for enterprises of this nature, excuse in a

in a certain measure the anxiety which we all feel, and the impatience which is evidently everywhere perceived. May the tone of public opinion now so enthusiastic continue to be compatible with the prudence with which we see it inspired at the present moment.

(Signed) J. JUANCO.

No. 139.

Acting Consul-General Reade to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September .)

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, September* 5, 1859.

AN ultimatum was this day handed in to the Moorish Government by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, with the terms of which the former are called upon to comply within ten days. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has declared that, if the satisfaction demanded is not accorded, an invasion of the Sultan's territory will be immediately undertaken by the Spanish forces at Ceuta.

Under these circumstances I would beg to suggest that a British naval force may be directed to proceed to this coast to guard against eventualities. I do not know the precise terms of the ultimatum, but I have reason to apprehend that they will not be acceded to. I shall, however, proceed to Tetuan, at once, and confer with Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

No. 140.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 354.)

My Lord, *San Ildefonso, September* 1, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 351 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the "Epoca" states that a ship of the line, two frigates, a corvette, and ten steamers of war are under orders for service on the coast of Africa.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 141.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 7, 9·15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, September* 7, 1859, 4·30 P.M.

A TELEGRAM received to-day from Her Majesty's Consul in Morocco, states that his Spanish colleague has presented an ultimatum, and if its terms are not accepted in ten days, the garrison of Ceuta will assume the offensive.

He believes Spanish demands to be inadmissible.

I am told they merely insist on the punishment of the offenders on arms of Spain destroyed by the Moors, and on an engagement to respect Spanish rights in future.

British Agent has gone to Tetuan.

No. 142.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 9, 3·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, September* 9, 1859, 4·30 P.M.

IF reports of disputed succession in Morocco are confirmed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs says the Spanish garrisons in Africa raised to a considerable force, will probably remain on the defensive a reasonable time, to allow a settled Government to become established.

No. 143.

Lord J. Russell to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1859.

YOUR Lordships will have seen by the despatches from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, of which copies were sent to you on the 2nd and 6th of September, that a Spanish expedition is about to proceed to Ceuta, for the protection of that fortress against the Moors, who have recently annoyed it, and to obtain reparation of some kind from the Moorish Government.

Her Majesty's Government hope that no serious interruption of friendly relations between Spain and Morocco will result from this state of things; but they, nevertheless, think it desirable that an adequate British naval force should be stationed at Gibraltar, to be available for the protection of British interests in Morocco, if they should be imperilled. For this purpose I would recommend to your Lordships to send forthwith to Gibraltar two sail of the line, and to instruct the commanding officer to watch events, although not to interfere with the Spanish operations, except so far as, in the event of an intention on the part of the Spanish Commander to bombard Tangier, to endeavour by amicable representation to mitigate the horrors of such an attack, on an almost defenceless town. If the efforts of the British commanding officer are unavailing, it will then be his duty to do his utmost to preserve the lives and properties of British subjects, as well as those of the subjects of other Powers, and of Christians and Jews, without reference to nationality, and he will also succour any Moorish subjects who may seek to escape from the effects of a Spanish attack; and he will act in the same manner as far as the means at his disposal will admit, in the event of an attack being directed against any other Moorish town.

The commanding officer should be instructed to keep Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid regularly informed on all matters connected with the operations of the Spanish forces.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 144.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1859.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches Nos. 348, 350, and 351, of the 27th, 28th, and 30th ultimo, respecting the intention of the Spanish Government to send an expedition to Ceuta for the defence of that fortress against the attacks of the Moors; and to obtain reparation of some kind from the Moorish Government.

Her Majesty's Government much regret that the good understanding between Spain and Morocco should again be threatened with interruption, and they trust that the security of the Spanish garrisons on the Moorish coast may be provided for without having recourse to violent measures.

Her Majesty's Government have nevertheless thought it advisable to detach a portion of Her Majesty's fleet to Gibraltar, and I inclose, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Board of Admiralty on the subject.*

Her Majesty's Government can hardly suppose that the Spanish Government, having been made aware a few months ago of the objection which would be felt in this country to the occupation of any part of the coast now belonging to the Emperor of Morocco, will attempt to effect any permanent occupation beyond what they are by Treaty entitled to maintain; and as the wrongs for which redress is thought are mainly local, it may be expected that the operations of the Spanish forces will be confined to the protection of the Spanish garrisons, and that no question will arise, such as that contemplated in the Earl of Malmesbury's despatch No. 59 of the 12th March last, of an attempt on the part of Spain to land a Spanish force at Tangier or on the coast adjacent. Such an attempt, you will not disguise from the Spanish Government, would be viewed by Her Majesty's Government in a very serious light.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 145.

Lord J. Russell to Acting Consul-General Reade.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1859, 7·15 P.M.

YOU are expressly prohibited from employing force, or sanctioning the employment of force, in regard to the Spanish sailor; and you will warn the Governor of Tangier of the serious consequences which must result from any popular outbreak, such as you anticipate.

As regards the differences between Spain and Morocco, you will recommend compliance with any reasonable demand made by Spain for reparation.

No. 146.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 9, 1859.

YOUR telegram of the 7th has been received. Two sail of the line will proceed immediately from England to Gibraltar, in consequence of the difference between Spain and Morocco; and a considerable portion of the Mediterranean fleet will also repair to that place, under orders previously sent out, contingent on the death of the Emperor of Morocco. Her Majesty's fleet will not, however, have recourse to force except by orders from England; and you may assure the Spanish Government that Her Majesty's Government will not support the Moors in resisting reasonable domands for reparation. Ascertain and report precisely what are the Spanish demands.

Communicate with Mr. Reade, at Tangier, in this sense. Mr. Hay left Paris last Monday, on his return to Morocco.

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* No. 143.

No. 147.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1859.

MR. HAMMOND has laid before me your letter of the 3rd instant, announcing your intention to return forthwith to Tangier, in consequence of the accounts which you have received of the hostile intentions of the Spanish Government against Morocco; and I have to acquaint you that I entirely approve of your decision.

The despatches from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, of which I inclose copies, contain all the particulars which I have received from that quarter respecting the origin of the present dispute, and the measures in the contemplation of the Cabinet of Madrid.

Her Majesty's Government greatly regret the occurrence of these further differences between Spain and Morocco, and they rely upon your exertions in endeavouring to induce the Moorish Government to give adequate satisfaction for wrongs which may have been done by the Moors, and to take effectual measures to prevent a renewal of similar causes of complaint.

Her Majesty's Government have thought proper, under existing circumstances, to dispatch to Gibraltar an adequate naval force for the protection of British interests; and I inclose, for your information, a copy of a letter I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the subject, together with a copy of a despatch to Mr. Buchanan, acquainting him with that arrangement.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 148.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 8. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1859.

I THINK it expedient to place confidentially in your possession copies of a letter which I addressed to the Board of Admiralty, and of my correspondence with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,* in regard to the course to be pursued in the event of the death of the Emperor of Morocco; but the only further observation I have to make to you in the present state of things is, that you will consider the instructions conveyed to you in the Earl of Malmesbury's despatch of the 6th of May, 1858, to be still in force; and that you will bear in mind that those instructions give you no authority to occupy any part of the territory of Morocco; Her Majesty's Government necessarily reserving for their own exclusive decision any measure of that description.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 148.

Lord J. Russell to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords, *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that there is reason to apprehend that the death of the Emperor of Morocco, who is of advanced age, may shortly take place, and it is impossible to anticipate what may ensue on that event: at all events it would be desirable that the British fleet should be at Gibraltar as soon as possible after it occurs; and I have accordingly to request your Lordships to give orders to Vice-Admiral Fanshawe, that, on receiving intelligence of the Emperor's death, which will reach him in all probability much sooner from

* See Appendix, Nos. 10 and 12.

Gibraltar than it would from England, he should proceed at once to Gibraltar with a considerable part of the fleet under his command, and there await further orders from home.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 149.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 52.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government cannot object in any way to an expedition intended to obtain reparation for insults offered to the Spanish garrisons of Ceuta.

The case would be changed if a plan of aggrandizement on the Moorish Coast, as suggested by the "Epoca," were to be carried into effect. The consequences might be very serious.

I transmit to you a Memorandum stating what has passed on this subject in correspondence with the French Government at various periods. To the last despatch on this subject no answer has yet been given.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 149.

Memorandum.

IN consequence of certain articles which had appeared in the French papers in 1839, implying that the quarrel which had then recently broken out between Abd-el-Kader and the French would be made by the latter a pretext for commencing hostilities, either by sea or land, against Morocco, Lord Granville, then British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed to take an opportunity of reminding the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a friendly and inoffensive manner, of the pledges given by the Government of France to that of Great Britain that France had no wish or intention to make any attack or encroachment upon the territories either of Tunis or Morocco. Shortly after the receipt of this instruction by Lord Granville, he received, during a conversation with Marshal Soult, the assurance that it was not the intention of the French Government to adopt any hostile measures against Morocco.

To Lord Granville, No. 397; December 13, 1839.

Lord Granville, No. 16; January 13, 1840.

In 1841, Mr. Bulwer reported to the Foreign Office a conversation he had had with the King of the French, on the subject of the mission of Captain Leroy to Tunis, to support the Bey against the supposed intended interference of the Porte in the government of that Pashalic. In this conversation, the King observed, that he should like to keep things as they were, and that he would, in such case, enter into any, the most solemn and binding, engagements, never, for his part, to seek to obtain any conquests in that quarter (Tunis).

Mr. Bulwer, Separate and Confidential; July 12, 1841.

With reference to this latter observation on the part of the King of the French, Mr. Bulwer was instructed to take the earliest opportunity of respectfully reminding him that the French Government had already, and more than once, pledged itself to the British Government to that effect, and that the British Government considered France as being distinctly bound to abstain from any encroachment either upon Tunis or Morocco.

To Mr. Bulwer, Separate and Confidential; July 22, 1841.

Mr. Bulwer was also instructed to hold this language to any member of the French Government who might make any observations which might render such remark necessary.

In consequence of this instruction, Mr. Bulwer took the earliest opportunity of informing the King that the British Government had always considered the French Government as already pledged not to interfere with either Tunis or

Mr. Bulwer, Private and Confidential; July 30, 1841.

Morocco; to which His Majesty replied, that "he was glad of it;" and said, "What have I to do with Tunis or Morocco?"

Mr. Bulwer, No. 305; September 27, 1841.

In a conversation between M. Guizot and Mr. Bulwer, in September 1841, the former having stated that it was the determination of France to maintain her hold of Algiers at all risks, Mr. Bulwer replied, that he believed the British Government had hitherto said that, as to Algiers, it would not interfere with the occupation of that country by the French; but that he (M. Guizot) was aware that it had always at the same time stated that, were the French to extend their conquests in that part of the world, and attempt to take either Tunis or Morocco, it would materially alter the case, and that any such attempt to add to the French dominions in Africa would involve very serious consequences.

M. Guizot acquiesced in the observations made by Mr. Bulwer, and added, that he was only anxious to keep things in their then existing state.

Lord Cowley, Separate and Confidential; April 15, 1842.

General Bugeaud having, in 1842, proposed to the French Government that war should be declared against Morocco, in consequence of the assistance rendered to Abd-el-Kader by the Government of that country, the French Government decided that they would not consent to this proposal, so as to avoid any serious misunderstanding between France and England.

To Lord Cowley, No. 186; July 2, 1844.
Lord Cowley, No. 298; June 14, 1844.
Lord Cowley, No. 302; June 17, 1844.
Lord Cowley, Confidential, No. 339; July 7, 1844.
Lord Cowley, No. 347; July 11, 1844.
Lord Cowley, No. 352; July 14, 1844.
Lord Cowley, Secret and Confidential; August 2, 1844.
Lord Cowley, Secret and Confidential; August 19, 1844.
Lord Cowley, No. 442; Aug. 28, 1844.
To Lord Cowley, No. 241; Aug. 23, 1844.

No further correspondence of importance respecting an attack by France on Morocco appears to have taken place until 1844, when Lord Cowley was instructed to address a note to M. Guizot, expressing the great pleasure with which the British Government had received the frequent assurances "that even in the event of France being compelled to resort to hostilities, she had no intention of appropriating to herself any portion of the Morocco territory, and that all the French Government required was security from further attacks."

M. Guizot having given most satisfactory assurances in the two Chambers that it was not the intention of the French Government to seek any aggrandizement of territory by their hostilities with Morocco, and such assurances fully bearing out those which had already been given to the British Government, Lord Cowley presented the note to M. Guizot, in accordance with his instructions, and received, in reply, the renewed assurance that the French Government intended to maintain the same moderate policy as had been already verbally stated to Lord Cowley, as also to the two Chambers.

These promises on the part of the French Government were frequently renewed in conversations between Lord Cowley and the King of the French on the subject of the attack of the French on Tangier; and M. Guizot also assured Lord Cowley that, in the event of the war with Morocco being prolonged, the temporary occupation by the French on some points of the coast might become necessary; but that they had no intention of forming any permanent establishment, either upon the coast or upon the land frontier of that country.

In reply to these assurances, Lord Cowley was instructed to express the satisfaction with which they had been received by the British Government; but he was instructed to state, at the same time, that the British Government would not feel themselves justified if they abstained from declaring, frankly and openly, that any occupation of the coast of Morocco, on the part of France, could not be viewed otherwise than in a very serious light by Great Britain, and could scarcely fail to lead to evils of great magnitude.

Lord Cowley, Confidential, No. 446; August 30, 1844.

The above instructions were communicated by Lord Cowley to M. Guizot; but they did not call forth any renewed assurance on his part.

Foreign Office, August 20, 1859.

No. 150.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1859.

I STATED to you by telegraph yesterday afternoon, that a portion of Her Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean, and two ships of the line from England, would at once proceed to Gibraltar; and I instructed you, at the same time,

with reference to the present difficulties between Spain and Morocco, to assure the Spanish Government that Her Majesty's Government would not support the Moors in resisting reasonable demands for reparation; but I desired you to inquire precisely what those demands were.

I further told you that no force is to be used by Her Majesty's fleet except by orders from home; and you will understand from this that you are not authorized to call upon Her Majesty's fleet to resist the landing of the Spaniards at Tangier, or the coast adjacent.

I directed Her Majesty's Consul at Tangier, by telegraph, yesterday afternoon, to recommend compliance with any reasonable demands made by Spain for reparation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 151.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 54. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1859.

I INCLOSE to you, confidentially, and for your own information, copies of my correspondence with Earl Cowley, respecting the course to be pursued in the event of the death of the Emperor of Morocco, which has now occurred.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 152.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1859.

I INCLOSE, confidentially, for your information, copies of despatches to Mr. Drummond Hay,† respecting the Spanish differences with Morocco, the question of protection in that country, and the contingency of the Emperor's death.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 153.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1859.

I INCLOSE, for your information, a copy of a telegram from Mr. Acting Consul-General Reade,‡ reporting that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has presented to the Moorish Government an ultimatum on the part of his Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* See Appendix, Nos. 10 and 12.
† See Nos. 147 and 148.
‡ See No. 139.

No. 154.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 10, 3·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, September* 10, 11·15 A.M.

FRENCH messenger will carry to-day a despatch to your Lordship from Her Majesty's Consul in Morocco, attributing late conflicts between Spaniards and Moors, on authority of Moorish Government, and of a confidential emissary sent to Ceuta, to imprudence of Governor of that fortress, and to his erecting buildings and setting up a flag on boundary, contrary to arrangement under mediation of England, that landmarks alone should be placed there. I shall acquaint the Spanish Minister with this.

No. 155.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 10, 11·50 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, September* 10, 6 P.M.

I HAVE received telegram of yesterday. Terms demanded by Spain are punishment of guilty, salute, restoration of arms, and acknowledgment of right to build works of which construction has been interrupted. Moorish Minister had promised two first, and was waiting sanction of the Emperor before granting the third, when His Majesty died. He now asks for an extension of the ten days, and orders were sent to-day to grant reasonable delay. Accounts of success confused and unsatisfactory.

Strict orders sent to African garrisons to remain on defensive, and not to act beyond their lines or orders from Madrid.

I think, though I could not obtain a direct assurance, that capital punishment will not be insisted on, but Spanish Minister says five Spaniards have been assassinated, and maintains that garrison were acting within their strict rights when attacked. He is satisfied with assurances of Her Majesty's Government, but regrets their intention to send a naval force to Gibraltar.

No. 156.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 10, 1859.

THE British squadron is ordered to watch events, but not to interfere with Spanish operations, except as far as endeavouring, by amicable representations, to mitigate the horrors which would attend such operations as the bombardment of Tangier or any other Moorish town. If such bombardment should, nevertheless, be carried out, the British squadron will do its utmsst to preserve the lives and properties of British subjects and those of other Powers, and of Christians, Jews, and Moors generally, who may wish to escape.

Her Majesty's Government conclude that Spain does not contemplate any permanent occupation of Moorish territory beyond what she is by Treaty entitled to maintain, or the landing of a Spanish force at Tangier or on the coast adjacent. An attempt to do so would be viewed in a very serious light by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 157.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 11, 10 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, September* 11, 1859, 5·30 P.M.

AS I felt assured the Spanish Government would be unwilling to appear indebted to a third Power for arrangement of the difficulty with Morocco, I have made offer of good offices by note, in order that its rejection may be more difficult. Foreign Minister, whom I have sent to, considers it impossible for his Government to accept it, though he will evidently be grateful if Her Majesty's Government use independently their powerful influence with Moors to obtain the reparation he has asked for. He is anxious for an immediate settlement, so as to render increase of the army unnecessary.

No. 158.

Acting Consul-General Reade to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 12.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Tangier, August* 27, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, the inclosed copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Green, the Acting British Vice-Consul at Tetuan, relative to a severe conflict which took place, on the 24th instant, on the frontier lines of Ceuta, between some of the troops of that garrison and Moors of that neighbourhood.

The conflict reported by Mr. Green was, it appears, renewed on the following day. The Spaniards commenced the attack, but were ultimately driven back, with some loss, by the Moors, who assembled in overwhelming force, and pursued them as far as the gates of the fortress.

As the reports current at this place, with regard to the above conflicts, are of a very contradictory and improbable nature, I have dispatched a confidential messenger to the scene of action, for the purpose of obtaining, through him, reliable information on the subject.

In the meanwhile, measures are being adopted by the local authorities to quell the spirit of hostility against the Spaniards, which is daily gaining ground in the neighbouring districts.

All was quiet at Ceuta yesterday.

I am informed by Seid Mohamed Khateeb that the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, Don Juan Blanco, who was at Tetuan when the above hostilities broke out, has expressed to him his disapprobation of the conduct of the Governor of Ceuta, and promised to complain to his Government of that officer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOS. F. READE.

Inclosure in No. 158.

Acting Vice-Consul Green to Acting Consul-General Reade.

Sir, *Tetuan, August* 26, 1859.

AS I have already had the honour to inform you by my semi-official communication of the 21st instant, rumours have been floating about this town, for several days past, that hostilities were on the eve of breaking out between the garrison of Ceuta and the neighbouring tribe of Augera, and that I had, in consequence, made inquiries of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seid Mohamed

Khateeb, whether there was any foundation for these reports. His Excellency, as I mentioned to you, informed me that the Spaniards had commenced restoring some old fortifications on their lines, but that, having discovered these proceedings caused great distrust to the Moors, they had consented to discontinue the repairs, and consequently all cause of misunderstanding had ceased.

Yesterday, about noon, I was repeatedly assured, by several well-informed persons, that peasants, from the neighbourhood of Ceuta, had come into the town, and stated that several skirmishes had taken place the previous day, outside the walls of Ceuta. These reports increasing during the afternoon, I considered it my duty to call upon Seid Mahomed Khateeb, and have them either confirmed or refuted by him.

His Excellency, on my asking him, informed me that, to his great grief, he had just received intelligence that the Moors around Ceuta, contrary to his express orders, had committed several hostile acts against that garrison, and that the whole tribe of Augera were preparing to rise in arms against the Spaniards. The reason of this movement he believes to have arisen from the following incident:—

The Moors, a short time since, destroyed a sort of monument which defined the limits of the neutral ground, and which bore on one side the arms of Spain, and on the other an Arabic inscription laudatory of the Moorish Empire. The Governor of Ceuta considered it his duty to re-erect this boundary stone, and therefore sent out a fatigue party, accompanied by an armed force to protect it, to accomplish this object.

Khateeb complains that this party, instead of carrying out their work quietly, raised on the spot a staff, with the Spanish flag, and made the neighbourhood resound with their vivas. The cheering seems to have attracted the attention of the neighbouring mountaineers, who very quickly construed it as shouts of defiance, and as a declaration of hostilities on the part of the garrison: they therefore descended from the hills, and opened fire on the Spaniards. The latter soon found that they were likely to be outnumbered, and their retreat to the town cut off; which it seems, indeed, would have happened, had not the Commandant of Ceuta dispatched a sloop of war along the coast, which by some well-directed shots was able to cover their retreat.

The Spaniards state that they have had three men killed, whilst they compute the loss of the Moors at upwards of fifty. The Moors confess to have had some two or three men killed; but, on the other hand, raise the casualties of the Spaniards to above thirty.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb tells me that the whole of the neighbouring country is in great commotion, but that he has written to the Kaid of Tangier to proceed at once to the scene of action, and proclaim that these violent proceedings will be visited with the Sultan's highest displeasure.

His Excellency has also dispatched a courier to the Court, detailing the above circumstances.

Khateeb cannot refrain from expressing his great regret that the Governor of Ceuta permitted his garrison to make a sort of triumph of the re-erection of the boundary-stone, and considers that he is greatly to blame for this outbreak.

Tetuan has been for the last two days much excited, large numbers of peasants coming in to purchase ammunition and arms, and then starting to join their fellow-tribesmen before the walls of Ceuta.

Khateeb informs me that he has every hope that the measures he has taken for recalling these wild mountaineers to their peaceful avocations will prove efficacious.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

No. 159.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 61.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 12, 1859.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch from the Acting British Consul-General at Tangier,* inclosing copy of one from the Acting British Vice-Consul at Tetuan, reporting the occurrence of conflicts on the frontier lines of Ceuta between the Spanish troops and Moors.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 160.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 12, 11·40 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *San Ildefonso, September* 12, 5·30 P.M.

SPANISH Consul at Oran reports that a body of Moors having invaded Algeria and killed forty persons, a large French force was preparing to enter Morocco.

The President of the Council agrees with Foreign Minister that good offices of Her Majesty's Government cannot be accepted.

The Moors attacked Ceuta again on the 10th instant, and were repulsed with six men killed.

I return to Madrid to-morrow with the Court and Government.

No. 161.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* .)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September* 15, 1859.

THE period now granted to Moorish Government for answer to Spanish ultimatum is twenty days from date of its delivery.

I have received no answer to offer of good offices, and have addressed a confidential letter to Foreign Minister urging expediency of its acceptance.

No. 162.

Acting Consul-General Reade to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 2, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter which I yesterday received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seid Mahomed Khateeb, complaining bitterly of the imprudent and unjust proceedings on the part of the Governor of Ceuta, and charging the latter with being the cause of the recent hostilities between that garrison and the surrounding tribes of this country.

The confidential messenger whom, as I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my previous despatch, I had sent to the scene of the late conflict, returned last night, and corroborates Khateeb's account of the affair. He adds that, except on the 24th and 25th ultimo, since which days the Spaniards have kept within their territorial limits, there has been no fighting on the lines, and that the Moors have returned to their homes, after leaving, at different points along the surrounding heights, heaps of fagots of wood, which are to be set fire to, in the event of any farther act of aggression on the part of the Spaniards, and serve as signals for calling to the assistance of the Kabyles of Augera armed men from all the neighbouring tribes.

Whilst I trust that no invasion of any part of the Sultan's territory is intended by the Spanish Government, I feel it is my duty, nevertheless, to state to your Lordship that I am informed, at this moment, by a person upon whose

* No. 158.

veracity I can rely, that M. Blanco has either already put forward, or is about to do so, a demand for the capital punishment of some of the guards who were on duty on the Moorish lines before Ceuta, at the time of the first conflict between that garrison and the Moors. A compliance with such a demand, even if it were entertained by the Moorish Government, is, I imagine, beyond their power to enforce, and would be the signal for a general rising throughout the country. Considerable reinforcements daily arrive at Ceuta in steamers from Algeciras, Malaga, and other Spanish ports.

The nature of the ground on the inland side of the Moorish lines before Ceuta, which, from being mountainous and broken, is very unfavourable for military operations, leads me to apprehend that, if coercive measures are really contemplated by the Spanish Government against the Moors, some other point of the Sultan's dominions—perhaps Tangier or Tetuan—will be selected as the point of attack.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOS. F. READE.

Inclosure in No. 162.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Acting Consul-General Reade.

(Translation.)
(After the usual preamble.) *August* 31, 1859.

WE inform you of the foolish and unreasonable conduct of the Governor of Ceuta. No sooner had he assumed the command of that garrison—that is to say, before he had been there a week—he went out with a great number of people as far as the guard station of the Moors, and told the latter that he wanted to go as far as Dar-el-Baida (the white house), which is situated within the Moorish frontier, in order that he might see it as well as reconnoitre the whole of that part of the country. The guards replied that they had no orders to allow him to go so far. He then told him he would go, and declared that the man who might venture to oppose him should suffer for it, and continued his way to that locality walking about and reconnoitering all the hills notwithstanding the protests which the guards continued to make. He at length returned some days afterwards; they (the Spaniards) began to build on the frontier line. The Kabails told them, that the ground where they were building was allotted to the boundary line, and that the latter had been marked out in the presence of a Commissioner of the Sultan and the Spanish agent, as well as the agents of Great Britain who acted as mediator on that occasion, and it was then settled that there should be no building on that spot nor anything else except some landmarks, and that matters stood thus as from ancient times. He answered that he would build in spite of them, and that he who might obstruct him in any way should suffer. They added that the Chargé d'Affaires of his nation ought to confer about this affair with the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs. He replied that he had nothing whatever to do with such an arrangement, and continued to build. Upon this, some of the Kabails, being moved with courage, proceeded to the spot at night and threw down part of this building and one of the columns on the frontier line. As soon as we heard of this we wrote to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, telling him that the building which they were erecting ought not to be. He answered us, that he had written to his Government on the subject, and that it was agreed that there ought not to be any building there, and that what had been built should be thrown down. He told us also that he had written to the Governor of Ceuta that he should not go on with the building. Notwithstanding this, the latter continued to build and would not pay attention to what the Chargé d'Affaires had written. After this, the Governor came out with a body of soldiers, bringing with them a flag which they fixed on the site of the column which the tribe of Augera had thrown down. They then told the guards that they should keep watch over the said flag, and declared that, if anything happened to the flag, he would cut their heads off. They replied that they were not there to keep guard over the flag, but to watch at their own posts. He then left some troops there. As soon as the Kabails had heard that the

Governor of Ceuta had gone out with troops and with his flag, and that he wanted to fight with the Kabails, a general rising took place amongst them; and some of them approached the boundary line and wrote to some of their neighbouring tribes, telling them that the Spaniards had come out with troops to fight with them. Some of the other Kabails then came out without being directed to do so by the Government or by any one, for, as soon as the Pasha was informed of all this, he sent his brother with six soldiers to order this people away. The Pasha's brother, however, found that the Governor of Ceuta had gone out with his troops to fight with the Moors and, when he told the latter to go away, they answered him that, as he himself had seen that the Governor of Ceuta came out with his troops and wished to take possession of their territory and fight with them, they would not retire from that place but remain in front. He thereupon returned to Tangier. After this the Pasha sent the Kadi and notaries and his own brother in order to get the Kabails to go away, and they protested against the Kabails and warned them that, if they were loyal subjects of our Lord, the protected by God, they would not remain there. The Kabails hearing this retired, not one of them remained.

We tell you all this, in order that you may know, that the guilty party and aggressor is the Governor of Ceuta, that the Kabails of Augera from the time the Spaniards first occupied Ceuta, have never acted unjustly towards them, but have always kept within the bounds established by law and custom, and that, they have never done them any injury until now, when this mad Governor arrived and attempted to display his might over them, telling them that he would kill them and cut off their heads, and expressing himself to them, every day, in a manner that no one could put up with, and in a way that, would excite to action of any man, even though the latter had no spirit in him naturally. This man (the Governor of Ceuta) is a mad man and does not know how to conduct himself according to prudence and the established regulation, for the tribe of Augera is composed of the best of people, and he irritated them by his language and bad acts. This is all we have to say to you. Peace!

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

P.S.—The Governor of Ceuta has caused a revolution amongst all the tribes of this part of the empire.

No. 163.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 16.)

(No. 376.)
My Lord, *San Ildefonso, September* 9, 1859.

I HAVE received, since writing my despatch No. 375 of this date, the inclosed despatch from Mr. Consul Reade to your Lordship's address, from the contents of which it would appear that the Governor of Ceuta is responsible for the late conflicts between the neighbouring Moorish tribes and the garrison of that fortress.

I have had a memorandum made of the substance of Mohamed Khateeb's letter to Mr. Reade, and I shall take an early opportunity of acquainting Señor Calderon Collantes with the alleged imprudent conduct of the Governor of Ceuta, and of informing his Excellency that Her Majesty's Legation in Morocco have reason to believe that the buildings and flag thrown down by the Moors, were placed on the boundary line upon which it had been agreed between Spain and Morocco, under the mediation of Her Majesty's Government, that no buildings and nothing except land-marks should be erected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 164.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September .)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September* 17, 1859.

PRESIDENT of the Council and Foreign Minister both declare that resistance to a landing of troops at Tangier would be an unjustifiable act of hostility against Spain, as it might be necessary for her to occupy temporarily that town to bring war to a conclusion, and to obtain the indemnity for its expenses which will be exacted. They say Her Majesty's Government should declare their intentions clearly and officially. Period for answering ultimatum is extended twenty days, and expires on 6th October. I hope to despatch extra messenger on Tuesday the 20th instant.

No. 165.

Acting Consul-General Reade to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 10, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 of the 5th instant, relative to the pending differences between Spain and Morocco, I have the honour to transmit herewith the translation of three letters, which I have received from Seid Mohamed Khateeb, and which are dated respectively the 3rd, 5th, and 9th of this month.

On being informed, on the 6th instant, that M. Blanco had addressed an ultimatum to the Moorish Government, whereby he demanded satisfaction from them for certain alleged acts of aggression on the part of the Moorish tribe of Augera, and intimated that war would be declared between Spain and Morocco, if that satisfaction were not given within the term of ten days. I proceeded at once to Tetuan, for the purpose of urging upon the Moorish Government the necessity of complying with the demands of the Spanish Government as long as they are reasonable.

On arriving at Tetuan, I was informed by Khateeb that the late Sultan had died; that there was consequently no Government in existence; that he himself was powerless and without authority; and that therefore he had replied to the demands of the Chargé d'Affaires by stating that, as there was no responsible Moorish Administration with whom he (Blanco) could treat, he hoped the Spanish Government would defer, for the present, acting upon the terms of the ultimatum. I am happy to learn that M. Blanco has consented to request his Government to conform with Khateeb's wishes.

Khateeb told me that the Spaniards demand the severe chastisement (by bastinado, in presence of their troops assembled on the lines at Ceuta,) of some of the principal chiefs of the Augera District; the immediate and uninterrupted reconstruction of the monument which they had in vain attempted to build on the boundary lines, the erection of a flag-staff on this monument, and the inauguration thereof by hoisting the Spanish colours and causing them to be saluted, and the monument protected, by the Moorish guards as well as the Spanish.

I have, &c.

THOS. F. READE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 165.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Acting Consul-General Reade.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.) *September* 3, 1859.

AND now we have to give you information on the subject of the affair with the Spaniards. We have already informed you, in our former letter, of all that passed between us and the Chargé d'Affaires of Spain, who was here with us; and we informed you respecting the Governor that had arrived at Ceuta this year, who is the cause of this revolution, and the consequences that have resulted, have all originated in him, and he is continuing to occasion misunderstandings between the two Governments. At this moment, as we are writing to you, a Spanish steamer has arrived with a despatch from the Chargé d'Affaires to his interpreter Yahia Sicsu (whom the said Chargé d'Affaires had already sent to Tetuan), ordering him to inform me of its contents, which are, that when the Chargé d'Affaires wrote to his Government, after leaving this and going to Algeciras, they informed him that troops were being collected in the towns in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, for the purpose of having them conveyed to Ceuta; and they also informed him that their intention was to come out of that garrison and fight the Augera people—they (the Spanish Government) direct him also to get us to write to the Augeras, that should the troops come out, they must neither show themselves nor fight. Just observe; is it possible to accept such words, by which they assume the right to invade the territory of Augera, and that no one should oppose them. They have told him also about the new building on the limits. They intend continuing it, and advise no one to interrupt them whilst building. They require that we should seize all those Kabyles of Augera that have taken a part in the late conflicts, and punish them, and place them in prison,—and other matters similar to the foregoing; and that when they (the Kabyle) approach the columns that mark out the limits, the troops will come out and fire upon them. They also require that our guards should not be supplied with powder, they otherwise will consider it a demonstration on our part against peace.

We replied that the cause of these disturbances originated in the Governor of Ceuta: however, that the Kabyles of Augera, from the day that the Spaniard conquered Ceuta, have never done them any prejudice or injury, and this has been for four hundred years. There have been many Governors of Ceuta, and all have followed the conditions with the Kabyles of Augera, both keeping within their limits—but when this Governor arrived, his first words to the Moorish guards were, that he wished to go to Dar-el-baida (Moorish territory). They objected, as they had no orders to allow any one to pass that place. He replied that he would go by force, notwithstanding who opposed him; so they allowed him to pass, establishing first that he did so without an order, and without any right, and they then waited for the instructions of the Government of this Empire. He (the Governor) then commenced building, and informed them that whoever obstructed him would be killed. After this, they came out with a flag of their nation, and planted it on their limits, where there was a mark (a column), as we informed you in our former letter, telling them that they must watch this flag, and that if anything happened to it he would cut off their heads. This was said to the Moorish guards. They replied that the flag was that of his Sovereign, and not of theirs, and they could not guard it, as they were merely guards of their own territory. On the following day they came out with some troops, and approached their limits. All the Kabyles assembled, saying that the Spaniards had come out with the flag and troops of their city, for the purpose of following up the Kabyles, upon which, without any order from their Government, or anybody else, the latter immediately went to meet them, alarmed for the safety of their territory—and thus the people were assembled on the second day, when they came out from the town, and the fight took place.

After this the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires wished us to write to the Kabyles to withdraw from the neighbourhood of Ceuta, as they did not want anyone

to be near there, so as not to see the Governor of Ceuta who had come out with his troops and flag, which made the people gather together. We wrote to them, and sent there the brother of the Pasha of Tangier, the Kadi, the Adules, and Sherifes to intimate to the Kabyles, that we were not at war with the Spaniards, and that all should return to their villages; and they did not object to what was written and said to them, and consequently every one returned to his respective village and Kabyle. Now, they tell us that they have come out with their troops from Ceuta, and they pretend that no one shall oppose them, which (not oppose them) we tried to do at first, as we have already informed you. At first we said that we had got the people to retire because we were not at war, and sent functionaries to the Kabyles to protest against them, as we were on good terms with the Spaniards. The Kabyles obeyed and all returned home. Then those vexatious words arrived which, as you know, cannot fail to occasion disturbances amongst the peasants, particularly as they have been subjected to injustice and wrong. As the Governor of Ceuta wishes to throw all the blame on the people of Augera, we think that the Spanish Government is ignorant of the true state of things, because the deeds of the Governor of Ceuta have caused all; but it seems he has written contrary to the truth.

So we privately inform you of what has taken place between us that you may bring all to the knowledge of your Government, which will certainly not approve of any injustice or wrong, and this Governor of Ceuta will collect the opprobrium of all nations; so inform your Government of the truth.

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 2 in No. 165.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Acting Consul-General Reade.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 7 *Safar*, 1276 (*September* 5, 1859).

WE have to inform you that the Pasha of Tangier, Seid Mohamed Saidi, has written to us that the son of the commander of the guard in front of Ceuta, had sent him a message by his (the commander's father), acquainting him (the Basha) that the Governor of Ceuta, accompanied by a large force of infantry and cavalry, had made a sortie from that fortress, and had insulted the Moorish guards, who being few in number, had to escape.

The Governor of Ceuta then continued his march as far as Seid Ombarek, the centre of the Kabyle, where he however did not find any opposition, for the people who had been assembled there before, had retired, at our request, when the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires asked us to cause them to retire. It was the Governor of Ceuta who was the cause of their assembling at all.—for, when, on the former occasion, the Governor of Ceuta sallied from the fortress and planted the Spanish flag on the lines, the Kabyle became alarmed, and thought the Governor challenged them to fight, for they saw many troops, and moreover the Governor informed them that if any insult was offered to the flag it would cost the Kabyles their heads. The Kabyle replied, that they were there to guard their own ground, and that they had nothing to do with the Spanish flag. Upon this the Spanish troops, after illtreating the Moors, and leaving some guards for the night, retired into the fortress. All these circumstances alarmed the Moors, and thinking that the Spaniards intended to take possession of the territory of the Kabyles, they marched to the Spanish lines. This caused the revolt,—all originated in the conduct of the Spanish Governor; and when the Moors were assembled, the Spaniards complained and said that no assemblage could be allowed at the lines. We have written to the Augera people and told them that we are on good terms with the Spaniards, and that there ought not to be any assemblage of Moors on the Spanish lines. They then retired. When the Spaniards knew this, and knew there was no one to oppose them, they sallied with their troops and entered the territory of Augera.

We bring this to your notice, and now considering this outrageous conduct of the Governor of Ceuta, as above related, we inform you of all in order that you may acquaint your Government of the provoking conduct of the Spaniards at Ceuta.

Peace.

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

Inclosure 3 in No. 165.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Acting Consul-General Reade.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) *September* 9, 1859.

WE have to inform you that we have received reliable intelligence concerning the Sultan our Master, Abderrahman, who has been called before the clemency of God the Highest, and, according to what the people say, his son Sidi Mohamed, whom God protect, has been proclaimed at Fez and Mequinez. In this city nothing has come from him (Sidi Mohamed), and the inhabitants are waiting for a letter to arrive from him, in order that he may be proclaimed, with the favour of God.

We have written to the Chargé d'Affaires of Spain, and we have informed him of all we have said above, and have added that, with respect to his affair, it is not seeming at this moment to write about it, and that we must await the arrival of despatches from Sidi Mohamed, upon which he would be proclaimed the successor to the throne of his father (may his soul rest in peace). Then we will write to him about the Spanish affair, and he will not fail to do all that he can respecting these questions, and, with the favour of God, he will punish all those Angera who may have been the cause of any mischief.

The Chargé d'Affaires of Spain urges us to give him an early reply, but you must well know that our master has gone from us, and that it is necessary that time should be given for a Government to be established, and then we will communicate with it about what he has written, and we will employ all our power to obtain justice. With respect to the Kabyle of Augera, since the day they have been neighbours of Ceuta, they have never done anything wrong, but as soon as the Governor, who is now at Ceuta, was named, he acted unjustly towards them, and spoke in such a manner to them that they were exasperated and broke into open hostilities with them (the Spaniards).

Patience! when the Government is well established and we have proclaimed our master the punishment of all those who have been the cause of this outbreak will take place. So, for the present—Peace!

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

We have written a similar paper to all the agents of the other nations.

No. 166.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 20, 1859.

WITH reference to the demand for reparation which the Spanish Government have made upon the Moorish Government, I have to state to you that it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to advise that Government to accede to those demands without precise information as to what those demands are, and on what grounds they rest.

You may, however, use your own discretion as to giving instructions upon this subject to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 167.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 22.)

(No. 383.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September* 15, 1859.

MY telegraphic despatches will have kept your Lordship informed of my proceedings here with respect to the reparation demanded by the Spanish Government from the Emperor of Morocco, for the late hostile acts of a neighbouring Moorish tribe against the garrison and fortress of Ceuta.

I have now, however, the honour to report more fully that on the morning of the 10th instant I addressed a private letter to Señor Calderon Collantes, with a memorandum, of both of which copies are inclosed herewith, acquainting his Excellency with the manner in which the late events at Ceuta are represented to Her Majesty's Government in Acting Consul-General Reade's despatch No. 19 of the 2nd instant, and having shortly afterwards received your Lordship's telegram, dated the 9th instant, informing me that a considerable British naval force was about to proceed to Gibraltar, I sought an interview with his Excellency, and acquainted him with the intentions of Her Majesty's Government on this subject.

I assured him at the same time that they would not support the Moorish Government in refusing to afford reasonable redress for the acts of aggression of which the Spanish Government had complained, adding, however, that I hoped the information which I had sent to him in the morning, would influence his views as to the amount of reparation which the circumstances required. I said that a belief on the part of the Moors that the Spanish authorities were erecting works contrary to Treaties, though it would not justify the acts of aggression of which they had been guilty, ought in some degree to palliate them, and that I hoped he would see the matter in this light, and not insist upon too severe a punishment being inflicted upon the offenders.

Señor Calderon said that the Spanish Government had demanded—

1. That those persons who fired upon and killed, in violation of all law, five Spanish soldiers, should be punished.

2. That the arms and flag of Spain which were thrown down and insulted, should be replaced in the presence of the Moorish authorities, and be saluted by their military attendants; and—

3. That the right of the Spanish Government to construct the works and fortifications, on which they are now engaged, should be formally recognized by Morocco.

A compliance with the two first of these demands, he said, had been promised, previously to the death of the Emperor, by the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had, however, asked for time to arrest the guilty, who are well known, and who he promised should be taken to Tangier for trial, and subsequently punished in the most solemn manner. The third point, Señor Calderon said, had been referred to the Emperor, and he showed me a telegram which he had just received, by which Seid Mahomed Khateeb requested that the period of ten days, before the expiration of which the Spanish Government had demanded an answer, should be extended in consequence of His Imperial Majesty's decease; and Señor Calderon said orders had been despatched in the course of the morning, complying with this request.

I then inquired what amount of punishment would satisfy the Spanish Government, asking whether it was true that they had demanded the capital punishment of the offenders.

He said, they had not done so explicitly, but as Spanish soldiers had been assassinated while in the discharge of their duty, the Government had a right to expect that the severest possible punishment would be inflicted on the assassins.

To this I replied, that, under the circumstances, it would however be only fair to look upon the Moors as having acted under a mistaken sense of duty, and to deal leniently with them; and I intimated that the degradation of an officer, or the punishment by stripes usually, inflicted on persons in the lower ranks of life in Morocco, would surely suffice to prove to the tribe of Augera that they could not in future take the law into their own hands with impunity.

Our conversation then turned upon the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send a naval force to Gibraltar, and his Excellency insinuated that it might be intended to influence the succession to the throne of Morocco, in which country, he said, Great Britain appeared anxious to exercise a predominant influence.

I said that the protection of British interests, in the event of disturbances in the empire on the death of the Emperor, and the anarchy which might possibly attend a disputed succession, were sufficient grounds for the presence of a British squadron on the coast; but that of course British interests would require increased protection, in the eventuality of a war between Spain and Morocco; and as to the predominance of British influence in that country, I said any influence which Her Majesty's Government might enjoy there, was the natural consequence of the designs attributed, rightly or wrongly, by the Moroccan Government to France and Spain, and to their conviction that Her Majesty's Government desired the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Empire; and as he deprecated the justice of any distrust of the Spanish Government being entertained by the Moors, I told him that while the Spanish press continued to speak of Morocco as a future field for Spanish aggrandisement, he must not expect that any assurance he could offer on the subject would meet with much credence from the Emperor or his subjects.

Señor Calderon Collantes said no one disapproved of the late language of the Spanish press more than he did, and he hoped I had perceived that since his return its tone had been materially modified; and he trusted that the public would be brought to share his opinion, that Spain had too much to do at home for many years to come, to think of foreign conquests.

I acknowledged what he said of the salutary influence which the Government appeared to be at present exercising over public opinion; but I told him it was vain for him to hope that Morocco would cease to look upon Spain with suspicion, as a Power that had been constantly hostile to her, or on Great Britain as a powerful friend, whose interests were, in a great measure, identical with her own,—though I might say British interests and those of Spain were, in reality also the same, because most assuredly, if events took place in Morocco dangerous to the integrity of the empire, Spain would not, under present circumstances, as he had himself often acknowledged to me, be the country which would turn the misfortunes of the Moors to the best advantage.

Our interview ended by Señor Calderon Collantes giving me the most positive assurances of his anxious desire to avoid war, and to place the relations of Spain with Morocco on a footing which would prevent any future difficulties between the two countries.

At a late hour in the same evening I received simultaneously your Lordship's two telegrams, of the 10th instant, and, on the following day, I waited again upon Señor Calderon Collantes, and, having prepared a memorandum, in French, of which a copy is inclosed, of the orders which will be given to the British squadron about to be stationed at Gibraltar, and of the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the inexpediency of a Spanish force being landed at Tangier, I read it to his Excellency.

He said that Her Majesty's Government were quite right in their belief that the Spanish Government had no views of conquest in Morocco, and that he had nothing to object, therefore, to any part of my communication, except to what I had stated with regard to Tangier, which would require consideration, though he believed there was no idea on the part of Spain of attacking that town. He said, however, that the right of a neutral Power to interfere with the operations of a belligerent, in the sense I had indicated, appeared to him questionable; to which I replied, that our own interests, and the necessity of securing supplies for Gibraltar, were perfectly justifiable grounds for our objecting to even the temporary occupation of Tangier by Spanish troops; and I said I felt assured Her Majesty's Government would never consent that it should be held permanently by an European Power, which might on some future day be hostile to Great Britain.

His Excellency said, that the interests of England and Spain in the Mediterranean precluded the possibility of their being enemies; but I said that all things were possible, and that a Government must provide for all contingencies. He then asked whether I could not leave my memorandum

with him, and I eventually agreed to do so, confidentially, to assist his memory in reporting our conversation to his colleagues; but I did so also because I thought that a clear knowledge by the Spanish Government of the possible embarrassments which a war with Morocco might lead to, could not fail to exercise a salutary influence over their policy.

Having exhausted this subject, I said I had a further communication to make to him, having been instructed by your Lordship to offer the good offices of Her Majesty's Government to that of Her Catholic Majesty, to assist them in obtaining an adequate reparation for the events at Ceuta, and I read to him the note, of which a copy is inclosed, and which I had addressed to him, for the purpose of executing your Lordship's instructions.

He replied that, as he was well aware of the powerful influence of Her Majesty's Government in Morocco, he should be most happy to learn that they had exerted that influence to induce the Emperor to afford the just reparation to Spain, which the Government had demanded, but that it would be most inexpedient with a view to the future, that the semi-barbarous government and people of Morocco should be allowed to think that Spain had found it necessary to avail herself of the good offices of a friendly Power to obtain redress for the injury she had sustained, as they might in that case suppose she was unable to protect herself. He said, were the Spanish Government, therefore, to accept the offer I had conveyed to him—the friendly nature of which he entirely appreciated—they would meet with the obloquy and disapprobation of all parties in the country.

I was quite prepared for this view of the case being taken by Señor Calderon Collantes, as I have long observed the extreme jealousy which his Excellency and his colleagues entertain of appearing to owe the success of their negotiations with the Government of Morocco to the influence of Her Majesty's Government; and they have also a not unworthy desire to convince the Government of the Emperor that Spain is no longer a prey to internal discord, and unable to make herself respected by her neighbours, and that she has the power as well as the will to resent offences against her dignity or her interests.

I said he ought, however, to remember that a Sovereign of Morocco, on ascending a throne to which there were other pretenders, who had doubtless partizans in the various provinces of his dominions, might well hesitate to accede to peremptory demands for satisfaction for an offence, committed through an excess of patriotic zeal by one of the semi-independent and powerful tribes which acknowledge his sovereignty, But if His Imperial Majesty were invited to do so, as an act of justice, by a power whose friendship towards his empire is notorious, and is known to all his subjects, he would have less hesitation and incur less danger in giving Spain the satisfaction which the circumstances required; and at the same time it was evident that, without some previous engagement on the part of the Spanish Government to await the result of their representations, Her Majesty's Government could not act effectually at the Court of Morocco; and I endeavoured also to satisfy his Excellency that, though Spain might be unwilling to submit a question, in which she considered her honour concerned, to the mediation of a third Power, there could be no good cause why she should not accept a mere offer of good offices for its arrangement.

To this his Excellency said, that he would have had no objection, before the late acts of hostility, to have entered into a negotiation with Morocco, under the mediation of Great Britain, to clear up any doubts which might have been entertained by the Moors as to the right of Spain to build the forts, of which it had been attempted to interrupt the construction, but it was now impossible to listen to any representation on the subject.

As I replied that such a doctrine was as much as to say, that a right, which admitted of discussion with the Government of Morocco, had ceased to be so, because some of the Emperor's subjects had been guilty of an offence against the Spanish Government; he then asserted that there was no room for discussion on the subject, as Treaty engagements clearly establish the right of Spain to build whatever fortifications or works she might think expedient within the limits of her own territory.

Having heard enough to convince me that there was little probability of the offer of Her Majesty's Government being accepted, I said I would leave my note with him for the consideration of his colleagues, and that he would do well to

endeavour to answer it in a manner which would give some opening for Her Majesty's Government to use that influence in Morocco which they were ready to exert for the preservation of peace, its maintenance being as desirable for the interests of Spain as for those of Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 167.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

(Translation.)

My dear M. Calderon Collantes, *San Ildefonso, September* 10, 1857.

AS I think it right that you should know how the origin of the late conflicts between the garrison of Ceuta and the neighbouring Moorish tribes will be represented to my Government, I inclose herewith for your confidential information, the substance of a report which has past through my hands on its way from Tangier to London.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 167.

Memorandum.

ACCORDING to information which has reached the British Legation at Morocco, and which has been confirmed by the report of a confidential emissary sent to make inquiries on the spot, there is reason to believe that the late conflicts between the garrison of that fortress and the neighbouring tribes, was provoked by imprudent proceedings on the part of the Governor of Ceuta, in visiting and examining positions beyond the Spanish lines in defiance of the remonstrances of the Moorish guard, and in his having subsequently erected the buildings and set up the flag which were thrown down on the boundary line, contrary to the arrangement made under the mediation of the English Chargé d'Affaires some years ago, that no buildings or anything except mere landmarks should be set up there.

Inclosure 3 in No. 167.

Memorandum.

San Ildefonso, le 11 *Septembre,* 1859.

DANS le cas où la guerre éclaterait malheureusement entre l'Espagne et le Maroc, le Commandant des Forces Navales d'Angleterre qui seraient stationnées à Gibraltar s'abstiendrait de toute intervention dans les opérations militaires, mais il serait chargé, s'il y avait question d'un bombardement de Tangier ou de toute autre ville Maroccaine, de faire mitiger par des représentations amicales, en autant qu'il pourrait, les horreurs auxquelles donnerait lieu une telle opération; et dans le cas où ses représentations ne parviendraient pas à empêcher son exécution, il employerait tous les moyens à sa disposition pour sauver les vies et biens des sujets de la Reine et de ceux des autres Puissances y établis, ainsi que de tous les Chrétiens, Juifs, et Mussulmans, qui voudraient se sauver.

Le Gouvernement Anglais a la conviction que le Gouvernement Espagnol n'a pas le projet d'occuper d'une manière permanente d'autre territoire en Afrique que celui qu'il possède actuellement, et qui lui a été assuré par des Traités.

Pourtant comme même un débarquement de troupes en Tangier ou sur la côté près de cette ville serait une affaire très serieuse aux yeux du Gouvernement Anglais, on espère qu'une telle mesure ne sera pas comprise dans les opérations militaires que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique se propose d'adopter.

Inclosure 4 in No. 167.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Sir, *San Ildefonso, September* 11, 1859.

I HAVE not failed to acquaint the Government of the Queen my Sovereign, that though the Government of Her Catholic Majesty have found it necessary to demand of the Government of Morocco redress for the events which have lately taken place at Ceuta, and have made military preparations which will enable them to take such measures as they may consider necessary to maintain the dignity and honour of the Spanish nation should such redress be refused, they have no wish to provoke an unnecessary conflict with the Empire of Morocco, but on the contrary look forward with hope to the differences which have unfortunately arisen between Spain and that Empire being speedily and satisfactorily arranged.

The Government of the Queen my Sovereign, therefore, duly appreciating the spirit of justice and moderation with which they believe Her Catholic Majesty's Government to be animated, have instructed me, in the event of these differences not having been brought to a satisfactory solution in consequence of the present circumstances of the Empire of Morocco, or any other cause, to offer to Her Catholic Majesty's Government, through your Excellency, the good offices of Her Majesty's Government, for the purpose of obtaining for them an adequate reparation for the events which have given rise to the demand which they have lately addressed to the Government of Morocco.

Trusting that Her Catholic Majesty's Government will receive this communication in the spirit in which it has originated, and with the same earnest desire which animates the Government of the Queen my Sovereign for the preservation of the blessings of peace in the Mediterranean.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

No. 168.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 384.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September* 15, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch which I addressed to Mr. Acting Consul-General Reade on the 10th instant, acquainting him with the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the differences between Spain and Morocco, in conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 168.

Mr. Buchanan to Acting Consul-General Reade.

Sir, *San Ildefonso, September* 10, 1859.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 2nd instant, inclosing one under flying seal for Lord J. Russell, which I have forwarded to-day to London.

You will by this time have ascertained the nature of the demands made by the Spanish Government to that of the Emperor of Morocco for the alleged aggression of the neighbouring Moorish tribes upon the garrison of Ceuta, and I learn from your despatch above referred to that you are of opinion that the Government of Morocco are justified in attributing the origin of the conflicts at that fortress to the imprudence on the part of the Governor and to the erection of buildings and the setting up of a flag in a spot where, according to an agreement entered into some years ago under the mediation of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, it was arranged that nothing should be placed beyond mere land-marks. If this view of the case be correct, it ought to have due influence with Her Catholic Majesty's Government, but the acts of indiscretion attributed to the Governor of Ceuta though a fit subject for remonstrance to his Government would not be sufficient to justify, however much they may palliate the extreme measures resorted to by the neighbouring tribes and the insult they have offered to the Spanish flag. Therefore though I have lost no time in conveying to Her Catholic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of your despatch (to Lord J. Russell), I do not anticipate that it will effect any change in the estimate which this Government have formed of the amount of redress they are entitled to demand. In the meanwhile, however, if reports which have reached Madrid be confirmed that several pretenders to the throne of Morocco have caused themselves to be proclaimed as the successor of the late Emperor, I have reason to hope that Her Catholic Majesty's Government will not press matters to extremities, while there is no settled and generally recognised Government established in the Empire. They will send large reinforcements to their African garrisons, but it will, I trust, depend upon the conduct of the neighbouring tribes whether any serious military operations are commenced immediately against them.

I am informed by Her Majesty's Government that a very considerable British Naval Force will, in consequence of instructions given to Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, for the contingency of the Emperor of Morocco's death proceed to Gibraltar, and that some ships-of-the-line have also been dispatched from England for the same destination since Her Majesty's Government have become acquainted with the misunderstanding that has arisen between Spain and Morocco, and the serious consequences which it may lead to. The Moorish Government must not, however, expect to receive support from Her Majesty's Government if they resist reasonable demands on the part of the Spanish Government for reparation for the hostile acts against the garrison of Ceuta, of which certain subjects of the Emperor have been guilty, and for the insult which these persons have offered to the Spanish flag. I trust, therefore, that you will have no difficulty in convincing the Emperor and his Ministers of the necessity of granting such redress as may, under the circumstances, appear to be due.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

No. 169.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 589. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September* 15, 1859.

AS far as I have been able to ascertain the state of public opinion since my arrival in Madrid, it would appear that the question of Morocco is likely to prove extremely embarrassing to the Government, if they do not receive a

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

satisfactory answer to the demand which they have addressed to the Moorish Government, as the impolicy of embarking in a serious war in Africa is becoming generally understood.

The Queen, who is very Spanish in her feelings and prejudices, is said to be favourable to extreme measures, but the Government feel, I am assured, that war could not fail to be prejudicial to the interests of the country. On the other hand, they have committed themselves to obtaining amicably or by force the redress which they have demanded, and their own existence as a Ministry would be seriously compromised if they were to show any change of purpose. However, as I am told that they profess the greatest moderation, and express their desire that some means could be found of bringing this question to an amicable solution, which would satisfy the honour of the country, and secure Ceuta hereafter against agression, and as I have not yet received an answer to my note of the 11th instant, I have this day addressed a confidential letter to M. Calderon Collantes, of which a copy is enclosed herewith, urging the expediency of the Government accepting the offer of the good offices of Her Majesty's Government, and thus opening a door to his modifying the opinions which he has verbally expressed to me on this subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received information which leads me to suspect that the Spanish Government hope to obtain some additional territory as at Melilla, on the plea of providing for the future security of Ceuta.

A. B.

Inclosure in No. 169.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Cher M. Calderon Collantes, *Madrid, le 15 Septembre*, 1859.

J'OSE espérer que le Gouvernement Espagnol ne se soit pas encore tout à fait décidé à refuser l'offre que le mien lui a fait de ses bons offices pour faciliter l'arrangement de la question du Maroc, dans le cas où l'Empereur aurait hesité à donner une réponse satisfaisante aux demandes de l'Espagne.

Il me paraît que le Gouvernement Espagnol devrait avoir quelques égards pour la position difficile d'un Prince qui vient de monter un trône auquel il y a plusieurs prétendants tous prêts à tourner en arme contre lui, la réparation qu'il pourrait accorder à l'Espagne, pour les actes d'une tribu barbare mais puissante, qui jouit sans doute des sympathies de beaucoup de ses compatriotes, et qui a cru rendre un service à sa patrie en s'opposant à l'exécution de vos travaux à Ceuta. C'est, il me semble, un de ces cas où l'intervention amicale d'une troisième Puissance est spécialement nécessaire pour faciliter à une des parties l'exécution d'un devoir, qui pourrait être pour elle, sans cette intervention, un plus grand danger même que la guerre étrangère.

Comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de dire à votre Excellence, il sera plus facile pour un Souverain pareillement situé de céder aux conseils d'un ami qu'aux exigences et menaces d'une Puissance offensée. On pourrait dire que rien n'empêche actuellement que le Gouvernement Anglais fasse valoir ses conseils à Mequinez dans l'interêt de la paix: mais votre Excellence ne peut pas ignorer que de tels conseils auraient mille fois plus de chances de succès, si le négociateur chargé de les donner fût à même de déclarer qu'il tenait un engagement de la part du Gouvernement Espagnol que la paix ne serait pas interrompue à moins qu'il fût obligé de lui annoncer qu'il n'avait pas pu atteindre le but de sa mission.

Assurément le Gouvernement Espagnol, en acceptant l'offre que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui transmettre, ne ferait rien qui pourrait nuire dans le moindre degré ni à sa dignité ni à son honneur; et j'ose soumettre ses observations à votre Excellence dans l'espoir qu'elles recevront de sa part une considération favorable, et que je serai à même de dire, si la guerre devra éclater, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique n'y a pas eu recours qu'après avoir épuisé tous les moyens possibles pour en éviter les malheurs.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) A. BUCHANAN.

No. 170.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 69.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 22*, 1859.

WITH reference to the preparations making in Spain with a view to hostilities in Morocco, I wish you to observe to the President of the Council and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the differences between the Governments of Spain and Morocco appear to have arisen from outrages committed by Moors in the vicinity of Ceuta, but that those outrages appear to have been provoked by the excitements and defiances of the Governor of Ceuta; that a wild and untamed race seem to have become ungovernable, and to have made hostile attacks against the Spanish garrison of Ceuta.

That if the Spanish Government only seek redress for wrongs, and vindication of their honour, Her Majesty's Government will not interpose any obstacle to their obtaining such reparation. But if the outrages of the wild Moorish tribes are to be made a pretext for conquest, and especially on the coast, Her Majesty's Government are bound to look to the security of the fortress of Gibraltar.

You are therefore instructed to ask for a declaration in writing, that if the Spanish troops should in the course of hostilities occupy Tangier, that occupation will be temporary, and will not extend beyond the ratification of a Treaty of Peace between Spain and Morocco. For an occupation till an indemnity is paid might become a permanent occupation, and such permanent occupation Her Majesty's Government consider inconsistent with the safety of Gibraltar.

Her Majesty's Government are sincerely desirous of maintaining with Spain the most amicable relations, but they are bound to provide for the safety of Her Majesty's possessions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 171.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 23*, 1859.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 17th instant, stating that the term assigned for answer to Moorish ultimatum expires on the 6th of October, you will ask for further delay till 15th of October, for new Sultan to consider answer. Her Majesty's Government will do all in their power to induce the Sultan to accede to reasonable demands.

No. 172.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 24*, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government await with anxiety your reports on the state of things which will have presented itself in Morocco, on your resuming your duties in that country.

The death of the Emperor of Morocco, the complications with Spain in regard to the frontier, and the renewed complaints on the part of the French

Government, of inroads on the Algerine frontier, are all calculated to give rise to great anxiety, in regard to the future; and the interest which Her Majesty's Government have in the maintenance of the existing state of territorial possessions in Morocco, naturally induces them to do their utmost to avert the evils which any one of the circumstances I have enumerated might possibly produce.

As far as Her Majesty's Government are at present informed, the succession to the throne has passed in due order, without any opposition on the part of rival pretenders; and as every day of undisputed possession will add to the stability of the Emperor's Government, it may be hoped that civil war will not be added to the difficulties under which the new reign commences.

The most pressing of those difficulties is the quarrel with Spain, and our first endeavours must be directed to prevent its degenerating, as it seems likely to do, into open warfare. Though it may be difficult to appreciate correctly the exact amount of provocation given on either side in a frontier dispute, and though the Spaniards may have inaugurated their newly acquired territory with a greater display than prudence might have suggested, there seems to be no reason to doubt that they did not transgress the frontier limit assigned to them, and within that limit, unless by special agreement, they had a right to do what they thought proper.

Any interference on the part of the neighbouring Moorish population was therefore unjustifiable; and for the consequences of such interference the Moorish Government, unless it avows its abdication of authority, is clearly responsible.

Her Majesty's Government are not aware of the precise nature of reparation demanded by Spain. The Cabinet of Madrid professes its anxiety to settle the questions at issue in a manner consistent with the rights and dignity of Spain, without having recourse to arms; and it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that you should second, to the best of your ability, this moderation on the part of Spain, and urge the Moorish Government to give prompt and ample redress for all the grievances for which Spain can justly demand reparation.

You will point out to the Moorish Government that in a quarrel sustained on insufficient and untenable grounds, it must not look for the countenance or support of England. The British Government wishes well to Morocco, by reason of the long-standing friendship which has subsisted between the two countries; but they cannot allow any feeling of that kind to influence their conduct, and to induce them to advocate the cause of Morocco, unless fully satisfied that that cause is just.

The same principle applies to the complaints which France has brought forward against incursions on the Algerine frontier. It is the duty of the Moorish Government, and one which you cannot too earnestly inculcate upon it, to avoid giving any just cause of offence to its powerful neighbour, and to restrain, as far as it can do so, its frontier tribes from acts of aggression on the French possessions. For any such offence or aggression, the French Government are entitled to exact reparation, and though the French Government may be willing faithfully to act up to the assurances given by Count Walewski to Her Majesty's Ambassador, and reported in the despatch, of which a copy was transmitted to you in my despatch No. 8 of the 10th instant, and may renounce all schemes of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Morocco; still a war with France, however short might be its duration, would convulse Morocco from one extremity to the other, and render very precarious the maintenance of the Sultan's throne.

If you should be of opinion that your representations on these matters would have greater weight and influence with the Moorish Government, if addressed personally to the Emperor, you will be at liberty to repair to his Court, taking occasion for doing so from his accession to the throne, and announcing that the special object of your journey is to offer to the Emperor Her Majesty's congratulation on that event, and her sincere good wishes for his personal well-being, and for the prosperity and peace of the country over which he has been called to rule.

But if you should proceed to the Court of Morocco and leave Mr. Reade in charge at Tangier, you will before you set out make him clearly understand

the views and wishes of Her Majesty's Government, and enjoin him to act with the utmost prudence, and above all to discourage to the utmost of his ability any disposition on the part of the Moorish local authorities to court a collision either with France or with Spain.

You will fully understand that the British Admiral has strict orders not to come into collision with the Spanish navy or army, unless he receives positive directions to that effect from this country.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 173.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 25, 4·30 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September* 24, 1859, 4·45 P.M.

ORDERS have been issued raising army intended for Africa to 24,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and proportionate force of artillery. The Government are unwilling to prolong unnecessarily the expence occasioned by concentration of these troops, and other preparations for war, but Foreign Minister is disposed to accede to proposal in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, and has requested me to make it by note which I have done. As Mr. D. Hay telegraphs to-day that [definite ?] term is indispensable, I have replied that the 15th, if granted, will be utmost concession to be hoped for.

No. 174.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received September* 25, 7·5 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September* 24, 1859, 10·30 P.M.

THE Foreign Minister has informed me, confidentially, that the extension of term to October 15 will be granted. I told him that Mr. D. Hay had stated, by telegraph, that if due time were allowed he could almost engage that the Moorish Government would accede to all Spain has yet asked for. His Excellency said if the term now granted was insufficient to obtain decision of Sultan it would be absolutely impossible for the Spanish Government to extend it again. We have, therefore, agreed that I should ascertain, by telegraph, from Mr. Hay the date before which he will undertake to obtain the Sultan's decision, and if he only requires a few days beyond the 15th, and I include them in the request, I have been instructed by your lordship to address the Spanish Government. The Foreign Minister will recommend his colleagues to accede to my amended application. I have taken back my note provisionally, to wait Mr. Hay's answer.

No. 175.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 26, 3·58 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September 25, 1859, 11·45 P.M.*

MR. HAY reports, by telegraph, from Gibraltar, arrival of fleet. He had crossed to see Admiral, and would proceed to Tetuan to prevent Moorish Minister mistrusting object of fleet's presence, and to urge him to write to the Sultan before Mr. Hay left; his Excellency, engaging His Majesty to grant the Spanish demands at once, and thus to prevent all excuse for war. He does not mention having received my telegram relative to the extension of term for answer. Sultan believed, here, to be at Rabat.

No. 176.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 26, 1859.*

MY message of the 23rd instant requires an immediate written answer from the Spanish Minister. If that answer is not satisfactory Her Majesty's Government will be free to take any course they may think proper.

No. 177.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 76.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 26, 1859.*

I INCLOSE for your information, copies of two despatches from Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Tangier, relating to the differences between Spain and Morocco.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 178.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 26, 1859.*

I INCLOSE for your information a copy of a despatch I have addressed to Mr. D. Hay, respecting the state of affairs in Morocco.†

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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* No. 139 and 165.

† No. 172.

No. 179.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 26, 1859.*

M. ISTURIZ called upon me this afternoon, and in the course of conversation he referred to the existing differences between Spain and Morocco.

He said that the Moors having committed aggressions on the Spanish garrison at Ceuta, the Cabinet of Madrid had found it necessary to require that reparation should be made, and that they were prepared, if necessary, to enforce the demand; but he would assure me, that Spain had no intention of conquests in Morocco, and only desired not to be molested in her existing possessions.

I said, that I had already instructed you to communicate with the Spanish Government on the subject, and to obtain from it a distinct renunciation of any views of territorial aggrandizement, to which M. Isturiz replied, that he was himself prepared to address to me a note to that effect if I desired it; and I informed him that it was desirable that he should do so.

I went on to say, that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco was in hopes that the Emperor would be inclined to acquiesce in any reasonable demands of the Spanish Government; but I observed that Her Majesty's Government could not, with a due regard to the safety of Her Majesty's fortress of Gibraltar, look with indifference on the acquisition by Spain, of any further territory on the coast of Morocco, and that the occupation of any part of the Morocco coast after the signature of a Treaty of Peace, would be viewed in much the same light by Her Majesty's Government.

I thought it right to encourage M. Isturiz to make to me the formal declaration which he offered; but this is not to interfere with your demand for such a declaration to be made through you, by the Cabinet of Madrid.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 180.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September 15, 1859.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of a letter I have addressed to Seid Mohamed Khateeb, announcing my arrival in this country, and offering some general counsels on the present critical state of affairs.

As I suppose my letter will be forwarded to the Sultan Sidi Mohamed, I have thought it politic to allude to the late Sultan in the manner I have done, and to express a hope Sidi Mohamed will follow in the steps of his sire in keeping peace with foreign Powers.

It is a very fortunate circumstance that Sidi Mohamed has been acknowledged Sultan at the principal cities of Morocco, without any serious disturbance being occasioned thereby. It appears that, on the death of the late Sultan, the Vizier resorted to the stratagem of addressing letters to the authorities at Fez, and to the chiefs of the neighbouring districts, announcing the wishes of the Sultan with regard to what should be done at his demise, and stating that which was not entirely correct, viz., that Sidi Mohamed had already been proclaimed by a large majority of the population in other districts. These tidings facilitated the election of Sidi Mohamed, and it would also appear that a timely largess distributed amongst the body guard and

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

troops by His Majesty, has tended to remove the chief obstacle to his election, and which had hitherto rendered him so unpopular, namely, his character for avarice, and neglect to remunerate the services of his followers.

I am far from being sanguine, however, as to the continuance of the present apparent state of tranquillity in the interior. Much will depend on the vigorous, and at the same time conciliatory measures which may be taken by Sidi Mahomed, to shew the population that their choice has fallen upon a Prince who is disposed to give more encouragement to industry and commerce than his predecessor, and to secure the tribes from being plundered by the officers who are appointed to rule over them.

I trust that the Spanish Government will have the prudence to await the consolidation of the new Sovereign's position, before they attempt to exact from the Moorish Government any humiliating terms of satisfaction, for it is to be apprehended that not only there would be considerable difficulty attending such proceedings, even with the best disposition on the part of His Majesty to accede to their demands, for a hasty or humiliating concession might lower him in the estimation of the wild tribes in this neighbourhood and in the Reef, and should it be attempted to enforce his commands before he had secured his own position, it would probably lead to rebellion and a general state of anarchy, though on one point there would certainly be general community in Morocco, and that would be to support the Prince who would lead the Moors to battle agaist the invaders of their country.

I am informed that an officer of high rank, and thirty cavalry, were seen to-day on their road to Tetuan. They are very probably sent by the new Sultan to confirm Khateeb in his post of Minister, or, perhaps, to assist in preserving order before Ceuta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 180.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)
(After the usual compliments.) *Tangier, September* 14, 1859.

I RETURNED to Tangier yesterday, and have resumed the duties with which I am encharged as Her British Majesty's representative in this country.

I learned, with the deepest regret, the demise of His Majesty, the late Sultan, Mulai Abderrahman, a Sovereign who had given many proofs of his being a sincere and friendly Ally of Great Britain, and who, from the excellent judgment and prudence which distinguished His Majesty, had maintained for many years amicable relations with all other foreign Governments, and thus had been enabled to secure the welfare of His Majesty's subjects, and the peace and tranquillity which has hitherto prevailed in His Majesty's dominions.

It has also been with the deepest satisfaction, that I have learned of the unanimity which has hitherto so happily been evinced at the chief towns of the Empire, in electing and accepting His Majesty's successor; and in conforming, as I am informed, with the written recommendation which had been given by his late revered Majesty to his subjects, before his demise, that the election has fallen on the eldest son of His Majesty, the late Viceroy Sidi Mohamed, now proclaimed Sultan of this Empire.

Her Majesty's Consul, Mr. Reade, has informed me, that on the occasion of the authorities of this town having saluted the inauguration of His Majesty Sidi Mohamed, as the Sultan of Morocco, one of Her Majesty's ships, the "Firebrand," had, at the request of Her Majesty's Consul, fired a salute of twenty-one guns, in honour of the occasion. This proceeding will, I am

convinced, meet with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government, who, actuated by the most friendly feelings for the maintenance of the welfare and tranquillity of this Empire, would always be disposed to recognize the Sovereign who had been elected by the free-will of the people of Morocco. I was also very glad to learn that a similar course had been pursued at the French Mission, and that a French vessel of war had likewise saluted on that auspicious occasion. This is a proof of the friendly feelings which animate the Emperor of the French, and of his sincere desire to continue to preserve peaceful relations with these dominions.

I await the instructions of Her Majesty's Government to offer, in a more formal manner, their condolence on the demise of his late revered Majesty, and their felicitations on the accession to the throne of Sidi Mohamed.

It has been with the greatest concern that I have learned that fresh differences have arisen between the Spanish and Moorish Governments, in consequence of the late events in the Ceuta territory. I am not sufficiently well-informed regarding the origin of the conflicts that have taken place, to form any opinion, which would enable me to offer definitive counsels to the Moorish Government as to the course they should pursue, except to repeat that advice which I have ever, as a true friend of Morocco, had the honour of offering to your Excellency—viz., that prompt concession to the reasonable and just demands of a foreign Government, is the most dignified, and the best policy for the Government of Morocco to pursue. In the present case, it appears to me, the Moorish Government will have less difficulty in coming to an arrangement of existing differences with Spain, from the fact that the conflicts which have taken place had not, in any way, originated from, or been supported by, the officers or troops of the Moorish Government; but that the wild tribe of Augera had acted upon the impulse of the moment, under the impression that their territory was about to be encroached upon.

I trust your Excellency may lose no time, when you receive the necessary order from His Majesty, to return to Tangier, and by friendly and verbal communications with the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, bring to an amicable termination any questions that may yet be in dispute, for I feel confident, from all I have heard of the distinguished qualities which adorn His Majesty Sidi Mohamed, that he will follow in the steps of his revered Sire, and avoid the calamities of war, and the state of anarchy which would necessarily follow throughout the country. I will not conceal from your Excellency that, from the preparations which have been made by the Spanish Government in vessels and troops, on the opposite shore, that they appear determined to have recourse to arms, if satisfaction cannot be obtained by negotiation.

Tidings have also been received, which, I fear, are worthy of credence, of a grave outrage committed by the wild tribe of Beni Snassel, upon the Algerine frontier, and of the massacre of some French soldiers at Mooden, who had been treacherously attacked by a superior force. I feel persuaded the Moorish Government will have learned this deplorable and wanton outrage with the deepest regret, and that every step will be taken in their power, under existing circumstances, to mark their displeasure, and to repress and punish the tribes guilty of this infraction of the peace.

I await hourly the return of Her Majesty's ship "Vulture," from the western ports, when I hope to hear that the same tranquillity and order, as so happily exists at Tangier, has been maintained throughout the western ports.

I feel confident that the Moorish Government will lose no time in sending instructions to all their authorities at the ports, to protect foreign subjects, and their property, from all molestation and interference.

Peace!

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 181.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 398.)

My Lord, *Madrid, September 20, 1859.*

IN consequence of my having been led to suspect, as reported in my despatch No. 389, marked Confidential, of the 15th instant, that the Spanish Government had demanded some increase of territory at Ceuta, I called two days ago on Marshal O'Donnell, and on finding that no answer had been received from Morocco to the Spanish demands, I said I should be glad to learn from his Excellency the precise nature of these demands, and he described them nearly in the same terms as Señor Calderon Collantes had done, as reported in my despatch No. 383 of the 15th instant, with the addition, however, to the third, that security should be given for the future freedom from insult and aggression of all the Spanish fortresses in Africa.

I asked, therefore, what he meant by security, and whether he included in that expression an extension of the territory around the fortresses.

His Excellency replied, that no such proposal had yet been made, but that, if a war ensued, Spain would undoubtedly require the position of the fortresses to be ameliorated in that manner.

As his Excellency then spoke of the late attack on Ceuta as having been entirely unprovoked, I replied that the Moorish Government represented the case differently, and that, if it were true that the garrison had erected works on the extreme limits of the territory of Spain, the guns of which would command that of the Moors, it was not unnatural that they should have been interrupted.

Marshal O'Donnell, however, denied positively the right of the Moors to object to the works in progress at Ceuta, which had been undertaken, not with any aggressive views against them, but to place the fortress in a state to resist attack from whatsoever quarter it might come.

I then expressed regret that the Spanish Government did not appear disposed to accept the good offices of Her Majesty's Government for the arrangea dispute, which was not really a national one on the part of Morocco, and which it might be extremely difficult for the Emperor, under present circumstances, to settle by a direct negotiation with Spain.

He replied, that he was glad to find Her Majesty's Government disposed to act a friendly part towards Spain, and to impress upon the Emperor of Morocco the necessity of giving her due reparation; but to accept formally the good offices of a third Power in a question of this kind would be as impolitic as if Her Majesty's Government were to do so to obtain redress for the late outrage at the Peiho.

I then said, that his Excellency had been doubtless informed of the extreme objection, which Her Majesty's Government entertained, to the permanent occupation by an European Power of any part of the Mediterranean coast now belonging to the Emperor of Morocco, or even to the disembarkation of Spanish troops at Tangier, or on the adjacent coast; and his Excellency answered that he quite understood the right of England, if her interest required it, to protest against the permanent occupation of the coast; but he could not allow that she would be justified by international law in interfering with the operations, which it might be necessary, in the event of war, for Spain to adopt in order to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. He could assure me solemnly that Spain would make no permanent conquests in Morocco, but he would at the same time tell me frankly that he intended to make war effectively, by sending 40,000 men into Africa; a measure which the conntry was too poor to adopt, without making her enemy pay the expences of the war, which he could easily secure by occupying some important position on the coast; that he had not yet decided what that position should be, but that, if he should select Tangier, which was in many respects the most suitable, no principle of International Law could justify England, as a neutral, in opposing it; and that the necessities, or rather convenience, of Gibraltar, would afford

no better right for such an act, than a neutral would have, in any other case, to resist the blockade of the ports of a belligerent, because it was injurious to its commerce.

His Excellency became somewhat excited on this subject, declaring that it was his desire, and the true policy of Spain, to cultivate the most friendly relations with England, under an impression that the day might not be distant, when the two countries might find a close alliance as advantageous as it had been to them in the last great European war; but that such an attack on the dignity and independence of the Spanish nation, as the language of Her Majesty's Government appeared to threaten, would most assuredly excite the deepest resentment in the country, and lead it to seek for support and friendship elsewhere.

I replied that he must not allow himself to believe that Her Majesty's Government did not entertain the most friendly feelings towards Spain, or that they acted towards her with less respect and deference than to their other allies; but that the occupation of Tangier and the neighbouring coast was a question of vital importance to Great Britain, and however extreme the measures might be to which Her Majesty's Government might resort to prevent it, they would not be undertaken in a spirit of hostility, and I believed nearly the same language, which had now been held to Spain, had been addressed to the Government of King Louis Philippe, when that Sovereign was Her Majesty's intimate ally.

Marshal O'Donnell rejoined with some warmth that, whatever the intentions of Her Majesty's Government might be, they ought to be communicated officially by note to the Spanish Government, who would, if necessary, appeal to the public opinion of Europe in support of their rights.

I said, he must remember that Her Majesty's Government had threatened nothing, neither the occupation nor the defence of Tangier by a British force, having merely declared that they would see the disembarkation there of Spanish troops in a very serious point of view; thus acquainting the Spanish Government with the extreme importance which they attached to the question, and intimating their earnest desire that it should not be allowed to become a source of misunderstanding between them.

In the course of the same day I saw Señor Calderon Collantes, and read to him some portion of your Lordship's despatch No. 49 of the 9th instant, which I had received by messenger from Marseilles.

His Excellency would not listen to the suggestion that the offence received from the Moors was of a local character, and he endeavoured to interpret your Lordship's language with regard to the Coast of Africa as merely relating to an attempt to occupy it permanently.

I said the last paragraph would not admit of such an interpretation, when he repeated his own opinion that the occupation of another town, I believe Mogador, would have more influence with the Government of Morocco than that of Tangier, but held nearly the same language to me with respect to the latter which Marshal O'Donnell had done, intimating likewise that I should make an official communication to him on the subject.

I said that friendly Governments merely expressed wishes to each other, and did not use threats, and that the language of Her Majesty's Government appeared to me sufficiently explicit, as a confidential declaration of their views.

Señor Calderon Collantes having also objected that the temporary convenience of Gibraltar was not a sufficient motive for the apparent intention of Her Majesty's Government to resist the disembarkation of Spanish troops at Tangier, I observed that a recollection of a former event might possibly, although I had no authority for saying so, have some influence upon their policy on this subject, as they had once received the most solemn assurances a Government could give, that an expedition to Africa, to chastise injuries received from the Dey of Algiers, would not be followed by the conquest of that Prince's country, but a change of Government and a revolution in France had caused these assurances to be disregarded, and had led to the establishment of the French province of Algeria.

Señor Calderon Collantes made light of the chance of the recurrence of

such an event, but he appeared to admit that Her Majesty's Government might reasonably wish to guard against its possibility.

In the course of our interview he informed me that he had just received the copy of a note which Don Juan Blanco del Valle had addressed to Seid Mohamed Khateeb, extending the period for answering the Spanish demands to the 6th of October next.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 182.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 399.)
My Lord, *Madrid, September 20, 1859.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, the copy of a telegram in cypher, which I forwarded to Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General in Tangier on the 17th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 182.

Mr. Buchanan to Acting Consul-General Reade.

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September 17, 3·30 P.M.*

I AM convinced that Spanish Government are most anxious to avoid war, which would interrupt all their measures now in progress for developing the resources of the country, and improving its public establishments and general administration. They have, however, committed themselves to obtaining reparation for the hostile acts of the Moors, amicably, or by force, and the opposition for party objects, will keep them to their bond. The Foreign Minister gives the most solemn assurances of their desire to cultivate amicable relations with Morocco, but to prevent future difficulties, he says the fortresses must be secured against insult, and that if the right to build the works which have led to the outbreak was open to discussion, it is impossible to abandon it after what has passed. To do so, or to modify ultimatum, would, he maintains, increase the disrespect hitherto shown to Spain by the tribes which surround her fortresses, and thus inevitably cause future quarrels. They intend to raise the army in the event af war, to 200,000 men, and will not quit the territory of Morocco without a complete indemnity for their expenses.

No. 183.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 27, 9 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September 27, 1859, 4·15 P.M.*

I HAVE the following message from Hay, dated Gibraltar last night: "Moorish Minister has acceded to all I have asked, and has written to Sultan a strong letter, urging His Majesty to give him immediate orders to grant at once all Spanish demands. I saw the letter. It could not have been stronger. He expects an answer in thirteen days. At my recommendation, he proceeds to Tangier in five or six days. His nomination as Foreign Minister of Sultan arrived yesterday. The Minister does all to please the British Government. I consider Spanish difference as settled, if Sultan acts as advised by the Minister, and if Spain keeps faith, and does not at last moment bring forward other demands, or does not create fresh excuse to quarrel. In the latter case, I hope our Government would take more active part."

No. 184.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 27, 11·10 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September 27, 1859, 6·50 P.M.*

SPANISH messenger who left on Saturday evening takes a despatch to Paris, mentioning wish of the Spanish Government for new delimitation of lines round Ceuta. I remonstrated against such proposal being made a condition of peace, as it was not included in original demands, and I am to-day to write confidential letter to Foreign Minister, recapitulating the President of the Council's assurances to me in my despatch No. 398 of the 20th instant.

Messenger arrived last night, and I found the Foreign Minister disposed to grant written declaration respecting Tangier. He was to ask sanction of Cabinet to-day. They decline to fix later day for Sultan's answer than 15th October.

No. 185.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 29, 1859.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 398 of the 20th instant.

You were quite right to seek an interview with the President of the Council, with a view to ascertain whether the Spanish Government had demanded of the Moors some increase of territory.

With respect to the past it may be true that the works in progress at Ceuta were of a defensive nature, and their creation may have been justified by the recent outrages of the wild tribes; but if they were, as alleged, inconsistent with the agreement made with the cognizance of Mr. Drummond Hay, notice should have been given of the intention to erect them, and the reasons in justification of their erection given to the Moorish Government.

The proceedings of the Spanish Agents have too much the appearance of a desire to bring on a rupture.

With respect to the future, my despatch to you No. 69 of the 22nd instant, will show the moderation of the British Government. But if it should become necessary, you will observe to Señor Collantes, that there is little difference between direct conquest, and occupation as the security for an indemnity which will never be paid.

We wish for an assurance on the honour of the Government of Spain with regard to both species of conquest, and we have no fear that Europe would

censure our desire to maintain in safety the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty.

We rely, however, on the reason, good sense and spirit of conciliation of the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Spain, with whom we wish to maintain a permanent alliance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 186.

M. Isturiz to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 29.)

(Translation.)
My Lord, *Spanish Legation, September 29, 1859.*

AS in the conference which I had the honour to hold with your Excellency last Monday, your Excellency was pleased to express a desire that the subject of it should be put in writing, I proceed to execute it, reiterating here the declarations which passed between us. I stated to your Excellency that the warlike preparations that the Government of my August Sovereign are making, have been provoked by the repeated attacks of the Moors on the frontier of the fortresses of Ceuta and Melilla, the repression and satisfaction of which has been demanded of the Sultan of Morocco, without however having been obtained, notwithstanding the ample time that has been conceded. That the Government of the Queen has no desire of conquest, but that in case of not obtaining the reparation due to the national dignity, they are resolved, till such is obtained, to carry forward their warlike operations.

To this declaration your Excellency thought fit to reply, that you recognized the right of Spain to exact reparation for the wrongs that have been suffered; that you wished it might be obtained without appealing to war; but that in that case, and in that of the Spanish troops occupying Tangier, this occupation should be momentary, to be returned to its former possessor at the peace.

I believe I have faithfully transcribed the sense of our conference, and if your Excellency is satisfied, I should esteem it a favour if you would declare it to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ISTURIZ.

No. 187.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 30, 11·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, September 30, 6·4 P.M.*

SPANISH Government will probably maintain that third demand for security of fortresses, includes a right to erect batteries on old lines, and to claim extension of pasture ground, granted in 1845, to a cannon range from fortress, as in case of Melilla, thus including guard house now occupied by Sultan's troops. May I instruct Mr. Hay, if this claim is not made a condition of peace, to recommend it to Moorish Minister as a subject for subsequent and free negotiation, with a view to prevent future conflicts? I hope to see Foreign Minister to-morrow morning, and should feel obliged by immediate answer to this question.

No. 188.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 410.)
My Lord, *Madrid, September 25, 1859.*

I TRANSMIT herewith a despatch which I received this day under flying seal, from Mr. Drummond Hay, to your Lordship's address.

Seid Mahomed Khateeb appears to have been misinformed, in stating that the garrison of Ceuta made a sortie on the 15th instant. I believe the last fighting took place on the 12th, when about 400 Spaniards were engaged, and the Moors are reported here to have lost in killed from 30 to 40 men. The Spaniards positively declare that the Moors were on that occasion, as on all others, the aggressors. I believe, however, that they have established a guard beyond their own lines since the second attack of the Kabyles, to cover the men employed in constructing the building, which has been the occasion of the present difficulty. That the mosque or shrine, which appears to have been the principal position of the Kabyles, was treated with indignity after the combat of the 12th, will, I believe, prove correct; but unfortunately the Moor is looked upon in Spain with feelings of bitter animosity, and there is still a strong leaven among the lower orders, of the hatred with which their ancestors strove for centuries against the Mahometan conquerors, and finally drove them from the Peninsula.

There may be a great deal of truth in the other observations contained in Mr. Hay's despatch; but I am not sanguine enough to hope that the forbearance which he recommends will be practised by the Spanish Government, and I see every reason on the contrary for believing, that if the Spanish demands are not accepted on the 15th of October, or the date which may be substituted for it, orders will be given for the invasion of Morocco.

The death of the late Sultan was a most inopportune event; but the Spanish Government had already committed themselves to the country to obtain summary satisfaction for the attack on Ceuta, and they have now gone too far to recede.

With respect to M. Blanco, I think it right to state that M. Calderon describes his late despatches as recommending forbearance to his Government, while there is a difficulty of communicating with the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 189.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 411. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Madrid, September 25, 1859.*

IN a conversation which I had yesterday with Señor Calderon Collantes, on the subject of the differences between Spain and Morocco, his Excellency said it would be necessary, in order to secure the future freedom of Ceuta from insult, that the Spanish lines should include some elevated ground contiguous to them, from which the Moors at present had been able to annoy the advanced sentries of the garrison.

I replied that such a proposal would be entirely at variance with explanations which I had received a few days previously from Marshal O'Donnell, and reported to your Lordship. His Excellency having distinctly stated, in answer to my inquiry, whether an increased rayon round Ceuta was included in the Spanish demands, that no cession of territory would be asked for, if the satisfaction required by Spain was granted without war. Señor Calderon Collantes replied, that nevertheless when the Government came to consider how the Moorish Government could guarantee the fortress against insult, it had appeared to them that some arrangement, which would be equally efficient with that lately concluded between M. Blanco and Seid Mohamed Khateeb with respect to Melilla, would be necessary, and that the Moorish Government would find it more convenient to cede a few metres of territory to Spain, which would render access to the fortress less easy, than to keep a considerable force on the frontier to prevent hostile acts on the part of the Kabyles.

I said that if his proposition was merely one for the convenience of both parties, it might be discussed between the two Governments, after the present question was settled; but there were good reasons why it should not be brought

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
F.O.

forward now; as, in the first place, it would be, in all probability, quite impossible for the Sultan to cede territory under his present circumstances; and, in the second, the proposal would give foreign Governments an unfavourable impression of the proceedings of the Spanish Government, which had hitherto been apparently free from views of aggrandisement.

Señor Calderon Collantes said he hoped, however, that I would recommend Mr. Drummond Hay to support the wishes of the Spanish Government, as the arrangement would prove most advantageous as a means of preventing future collisions; and, on my observing that to advance the sentries, would only be to change the position which would be exposed to fire from without, Señor Calderon Collantes rejoined that, from the nature of the ground, a great increase of security against furtive approaches to the lines would be obtained by the arrangement which he wished to be adopted.

He also mentioned another subject, which, he said, the present circumstances appeared to him to afford a favourable opportunity for pressing on the attention of the Moorish Government, namely the expediency of Foreign and Diplomatic Agents being permitted to reside at the Sultan's Court, a concession which would have, in his opinion, the most favourable influence on the relations of the Empire with Christian Powers; but he merely put forward this idea as a suggestion which would be worthy of consideration.

I shall send a copy of this despatch to Mr. Drummond Hay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 190.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 1.)

(No. 412.)

Madrid, September 25, 1859.

My Lord,

ON the 21st instant I received a private letter from Mr. Drummond Hay, in which he expressed a hope that, if the Spanish Government would act with patience and moderation, all they ask from the Government of Morocco might be obtained,

He stated also, that though there is no provision in the Convention of 1845 prohibiting the construction of fortifications on the territory ceded at that time to Spain, there was an understanding that none should be erected upon it, and he mentioned his having received a letter from Seid Mohamed Khateeb, explaining the difficulties which would prevent the Moorish Government answering the Spanish ultimatum before the 6th of October.

I therefore addressed a confidential letter to M. Calderon Collantes on the 21st instant, of which I inclose a copy, transmitting to him the extract, of which a copy is also inclosed, from Mr. Hay's letter, and stating that I had reason to hope from Mr. Hay's correspondence that the Moorish Government would not reject the demands of the Spanish Government, if they were limited to those with which I was acquainted, and if that deference were paid to the difficult circumstances in which the Empire was placed, which was to be expected from the moderation of the Queen of Spain's present Ministers.

Your Lordship's telegram of the 23rd instant, therefore, found some preparation already made for the proposal it conveyed, and I lost no time, after receiving it, in seeking an interview with M. Calderon Collantes, and requesting, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, that the term for answering the Spanish ultimatum, should be extended to the 15th of October, assuring his Excellency at the same time that Her Majesty's Government would employ all their influence with the Government of Morocco, to induce them to accede to any reasonable demands for reparation, which may have been addressed to them.

His Excellency received my communication favourably, and assured me of his own earnest desire to avert the necessity of war. He said he had already done much to check the violence of public opinion, and that, though the duty might be fatal to his popularity, he was prepared to defend in the Cortes, as he had already done in the Cabinet, the policy of acting with

moderation, so that if war did ensue, no one would be able to reproach the Spanish Government with not having done everything that could reasonably be expected of them, to prevent it.

I replied that I felt assured his wise and patriotic conduct would be appreciated, not only by Foreign Governments, but also by his own countrymen, among whom, I had reason to believe, there were many who had no sympathies with the extravagant opinions expressed by the public journals; and I hoped, therefore, he would have no hesitation in complying with the wishes of my Government.

M. Calderon said he had already acquainted his colleagues with the substance of the private letter I had addressed to him on the 21st instant, and he could not say that they were much disposed to extend a period of uncertainty, which was attended with great expense, in consequence of a large force being concentrated at Ceuta, and preparations being necessarily in progress for the eventuality of war; more particularly as this expense was about to be increased by orders which had just been issued, for raising the army intended for service in Africa to 24,000 Infantry, 8,000 Cavalry, and a proportionate force of Artillery. If, however, he said, I would make the communication to him by note, which I had done verbally, he would submit it to the Cabinet, at a Council to be held the following day, and recommend them to accede to the request of Her Majesty's Government.

I then took leave of his Excellency, and, in the course of the evening, I addressed a note to him, of which I have the honour to transmit a copy herewith.

The question stood thus—when I received yesterday a telegram from Mr. Drummond Hay, stating that he would almost promise the acceptance of the Spanish demands, if sufficient time were allowed for obtaining it; and I replied by acquainting him with the instructions which I had received from your Lordship, and stating that no delay, after the date named therein, could be hoped for.

In the evening, however, I had an interview with M. Collantes, when I learned from his Excellency that the Government had agreed to extend the term for answering the ultimatum to the 15th of October, but with the strict understanding that the new limit was to be final.

I then mentioned Mr. Hay's anxiety for delay, and his sanguine expectation of an amicable arrangement; and M. Collantes said that though he might not have been unwilling to recommend the adoption of a later date than the 15th of October, if Her Majesty's Government had asked for it, it would be impossible for the Spanish Government to grant any new delay, after the expiration of the term now fixed upon.

I observed, therefore, that perhaps he would not object to my substituting a longer term for that specified by my instructions. He at first considered this suggestion inadmissible, stating, however, that if Mr. Hay could have named a definite period in which the Sultan's answer could be obtained, it might have been otherwise. It was consequently proposed that this information should be asked for; and on my undertaking to communicate immediately with Mr. Hay by telegraph we separated, on the confidential understanding that the term already applied for by Her Majesty's Government will be granted; that I should take back my note until I received an answer from Mr. Hay, and that if he names a reasonable period, in which he will undertake to obtain the decision of the Sultan, I may substitute it for the term fixed by Her Majesty's Government, and M. Collantes will recommend its adoption in deference to their wishes, such being the ground on which it is intended to defend in the Cortes the concession already agreed to.

I ought not to conclude this despatch without doing justice to the anxious desire, evinced by M. Calderon Collantes, to conciliate what he conceives to be necessary for the interests and honour of his country, with the maintenance peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 190.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Cher M. Calderon Collantes, *Madrid, le* 21 *Septembre*, 1859.

JE viens de recevoir une lettre confidentielle de M. Drummond Hay dont j'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-joints quelques extraits à votre Excellence dans l'espoir qu'ils ne seront pas sans quelque intérêt pour elle.

J'aime à croire aussi d'après les opinions exprimées dans la correspondance de Mr. Hay que le Gouvernement Maroccain ne refusera pas à adhérer aux demandes de l'Espagne s'il n'y en a pas d'autres que celles qui me sont connues, et si le Gouvernement Espagnol continue à montrer cet égard aux circonstances difficiles de l'Empire du Sultan auquel on est en droit de s'attendre de la modération et de l'esprit de conciliation et de justice qui distinguent si honorablement les Ministres actuels de Sa Majesté Catholique.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) A. BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 190.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Extract.) *Tangier, September* 16, 1858.

WITH reference to the passage in your Excellency's letter, which speaks of my having been present at the demarcation of the frontier lines at Ceuta, and, therefore, that I must know whether the Spaniards had trespassed on the Moorish territory; I have not received precise information regarding the site where the building was being erected, but I believe it was within the Spanish territory; and in the Convention of 1845 there is no stipulation that the Spaniards should not erect fortifications in the territory then ceded to them, which was in effect a restoration of their old lines. I fixed each post of the new boundary myself. There was, however, a question with the Moorish Government, in consequence of the Moors having thrown down some stone monuments, or pillars, erected to mark the lines; and it was only after considerable difficulty and explanations that those pillars were re-established, it being clearly explained through and by me, *viva voce*, that the sole intention was to mark the frontier, and that they were not any buildings for offence or defence. It was also understood that the restoration of the old territory was ceded especially for the pasturage of the cattle of the garrison. I have received a long letter from Khateeb, but he does not explain clearly what the new buildings are, and where they are. He says the new Sultan had not yet written to confirm his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, therefore, he could do nothing for the moment; that the Sultan would require a little time to consolidate his position, before entering upon the matter in discussion; that the Spanish Government had prolonged the term for the Ultimatum to twenty days; but that it was impossible to do anything within that term, for the Sultan was still at Morocco, or on his march; that the couriers take a month to go and return from Morocco, and latterly all the couriers have come here with letters opened or destroyed. Khateeb hopes, therefore, that a reasonable delay will be granted.

Let the Spanish Government be reasonable and patient, and regard the question dispassionately, and with justice, and I am pretty confident the new Sultan will do all they desire.

Inclosure 3 in No. 190.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Sir, *Madrid, September* 24, 1859.

THE Government of the Queen, my Sovereign, have learned with satisfaction that Her Catholic Majesty's Government have complied with a wish expressed by the Moorish Minister for foreign affairs, in consequence of the death of the late Sultan of Morocco, that the period allowed for answering the ultimatum delivered by his Excellency on the 5th instant, by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, should be extended for a reasonable time to enable the new Sovereign to make such administrative arrangements as may be indispensably necessary on his accession to the Throne, before he enters upon the consideration of questions of foreign policy.

At the same time, however, that Her Majesty's Government apprcciate the conciliatory spirit in which Her Catholic Majesty's Government have met the wishes of Seid Mohamed Khateeb by the extension of the term originally named to the 6th of next month, they are of opinion that the object of his Excellency's request will not be obtained by this concession, for as the Emperor was at Morocco when his father died, and has since had many immediate and pressing difficulties to contend with, the period which will elapse before the 6th of October will not afford His Majesty sufficient time to make himself fully acquainted with the circumstances which have occasioned the demands addressed to his Government by that of Her Catholic Majesty, or to give that consideration to these demands which their serious and important character will evidently require,

Her Majesty's Government are, however, persuaded that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty will be disposed to do everything which may be compatible with a due regard for the honour and dignity of the Spanish nation, to prevent the events that have lately occurred at Centa from becoming an occasion of war, as there is much reason to fear such a calamity would be attended with the most disastrous consequences, not only to foreigners residing in Morocco, but likewise to the whole Christian and Moorish population throughout the Empire. I have, therefore, been entrusted to request Her Catholic Majesty's Government to add a few days more to the period already granted for answering their ultimatum, and that it should not expire before the 15th of October next. Her Majesty's Government believe that such an arrangement would enable the Emperor of Morocco to consider calmly and dispassionately the important question by which he has been met at the outset of his reign, and, in order to evince to Her Catholic Majesty's Government the deep interest which they take in the peaceful and amicable solution of that question, and the importance which they attach to the compliance of Her Catholic Majesty's Government with the proposal which I have now had the honour of submitting to them, I am to assure your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government will employ whatever influence they may possess with the Sovereign of Morocco, to induce His Imperial Majesty to accede to any reasonable demands for reparation which the Spanish Government may have addressed to him.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

No. 191.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 19, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the translation of a letter I have received from Seid Mohamed Khateeb, communicating to me the ultimatum which has been transmitted to him by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires (as far as he comprehends the demands it contains).

Though the origin of the conflict at Ceuta appears to have been caused by the imprudence of the present Governor of that garrison, who had persisted in building a guard-house or fort on a site where, during the present century, at least, no such building had been raised. I trust I shall be able to persuade the Moorish Government, that their most prudent course is not to discuss the justice or right of the Spanish demands in the ultimatum, which, after all, do not involve any material concession; but to grant, with as good a grace as possible, all that has been put forward, and thus avoid the consequences that might ensue, if a rupture of relations took place, and hostilities were commenced.

I will not, however, conceal from your Lordship, that I should be very much surprised, and, indeed, I think it almost unreasonable to expect, that the new Sultan Sidi Mohamed, should, at the present critical moment, when he has hardly seized the reins of government, be disposed to accede to demands, which would render it necessary for him to act so unpopular a part, as that of requiring the large tribe of Augera to humiliate itself by the delivery of their chiefs to be chastised in the presence of the Spanish garrison.

The second term, said to be of twenty days, granted by M. Blanco, for the acceptance of the ultimatum, is equivalent to a declaration that the Spanish Government is determined not to give time for the Moorish Government to accede to their demands, for the new Sultan, when that ultimatum was presented, was full ten days journey distant from Tangier. If the Spanish Government desires to settle all the differences amicably, at least three months ought to have been given, or no terms fixed until their representative here felt assured that the new Sovereign was in such a position as to be enabled, without endangering his own position, to afford the satisfaction required, otherwise the Sultan has to choose between revolution in his own dominions, or war with a Foreign Power. The latter evil would naturally, I suppose, be that which would be preferred by His Majesty.

It appears to me that the Spanish Government has had the misfortune of confiding the conduct of its negotiations with this Government to an inexperienced and rash Agent, who, though he may be most anxious of upholding the views of his Government and the interests of his country, has all along been placing himself, and the Court at Madrid, in difficulties, from which he, and they, cannot be extricated, without involving their own humiliation by withdrawing from claims which have been intemperately and unadvisedly advanced, or by insisting on unjust and arbitrary demands on the Moorish Government. The Military Governors of the Spanish-African garrisons, more especially the present Governor of Ceuta, appear also to have been striving all along to create questions between the two Governments, or local conflicts between the Spanish garrisons and the natives, so as to render abortive the negotiations of their Chargé d'Affaires.

In another letter which Khateeb has addressed me, he states that the Spaniards made a sally upon the Moorish Guards at the lines, on the 15th instant, the latter amounting to about fifty men, eight Moors were killed, and the Spaniards marched towards the shrine or tomb of a Moorish Saint, named Seid Embarek, demolished the building, and then, by way of marking their contempt for the natives, defiled with filth the Mohamedan Chapel or Shrine, a site held in great veneration by all the people of this country. This, to say the least, is a silly way of seeking revenge, and unworthy of a great civilized nation. It is the worst policy for the Spaniards to pursue, for they can never expect to be respected or esteemed by the inhabitants of this country, when their military authorities resort to such measures for exasperating the natives and wounding their religious prejudices.

The Spanish Government has on more than one occasion, in pleading the the necessity of acting in an energetic manner in dealing with Morocco, alluded to the strong and growing feeling in Spain of the necessity of getting reparation for the many outrages committed by the Reefians and Moors during the past years, and that popular outcry would not allow the Government to refrain from taking by force what it could not obtain by negotiation; but, it appears to me, the Spanish Government always forgets that the Moors are also a nation, and are not entirely devoid of sentiments of national independence and honour, and that they have also many counter and strong grounds for complaint against the

Spanish-African garrisons, and that acts have been committed by the latter which deserve the epithet also of "outrages."

I mention all this, my Lord, to show what a difficult task it is, and will be, for the British Government to persuade the new Sultan and his Government, through my agency, to bring all these differences to an amicable arrangement, and to make the required concessions, especially as M. Blanco, instead of appreciating the very friendly part I have hitherto taken in impressing on the minds of the Moorish Government, the policy of concession, has, I regret to state, evinced, in all his acts and words, an unfriendly feeling towards the members of this mission.

Your Lordship will learn from the inclosed note of Khateeb, that he has transmitted my note of the 14th instant, in original, to the Sultan. I trust it may have a good effect, and prepare His Majesty, on hearing the counsels of a true and disinterested ally, like the British Government, to make the required concessions.

I shall, from time to time, and especially when I hear of Khateeb's nomination, follow up that note by further counsels, aiming at the same object, which dictated that note, and I do not despair, if a reasonable time is given, to be enabled to persuade this Government to accede to the Spanish demands, without discussion as to the right or justice of these demands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 191.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Mr. D. Hay.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 18 *Saffar*, 1276 (16 *September*, 1859).

WE inform you privately of the demands which have been made to us by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, bearing the date of the 5th September, 1859.

1st. When the boundary stone which was knocked down by the Augeras is replaced, all the Spanish troops will be drawn up on the spot, and the Moorish guards and people that took part in its destruction must be present and salute it.

2nd. The Chiefs who have been the cause of this dispute must be arrested by the Moorish Government, and sent to the Moorish guard-house on the limits of the Ceuta territory, where they must be severely punished, and the Governor of Ceuta must witness their punishment from within his limits.

3rd. That the building being erected on the limits of Ceuta is intended to afford protection to the latter.

The 4th speaks to us of something we do not understand: it says that "you (Khateeb) told us, at our last interview, that we had agreed not to recur to questions already settled, so as to avoid all chance of an infringement of the peace and good understanding which existed between the two Royal Governments." This 4th Article we don't understand. It requires that we should be responsible for the accomplishment of the three Articles. As to the building, what we have to reply is, that we cannot decide, but that we will refer the matter to the Sultan. His (M. Blanco's) demands are the four we communicate to you. He requires that we should accept three, and, as to the building, that we are to consult the Sultan.

We have replied to him, that there is now a new Sultan, and that we have received no communications, as yet, of this fact, neither we nor any one else, so we have not the power to bind ourselves to anything, till we receive the royal letter reappointing us to our former position.

The Sultan is at a great distance from here, being at Morocco, and as his father has died, and he has been proclaimed by the people, according to his father's will, Sultan, when his despatches arrive then we will write and inform him of your (M. Blanco's) demands, and what he orders us we will execute.

However, now, many of the Kabyles are not well under the control of Government, and when orders from the Sultan arrive, and the roads are safe, it will then be well to give a certain time to receive an answer; but now no time ought to be fixed till the Government is consolidated. This is what we replied, as just now we cannot go to Tangier, the Kabyles being all in a state of insubordination. He (Blanco) also tells us to prevent the Kabyles fighting. The Kabyles will not, at the present time, pay attention to the established laws, and are under the impression, from the part we have taken, that we are supporting the Spaniards; so we cannot travel at present through the disturbed district till orders arrive from the Sultan, and his Government is established. This is all we have to say, and we hope that you will give your attention to it. The letter* sent to us through the hands of your brother we immediately transmitted in original to the Court. And we informed the Sultan of the great friendship existing between his father and yourself, telling His Majesty that you are a good man, and are always seeking the welfare of this country, even as if it were your own country. In fact, we wrote a letter to the Sultan having reference solely to yourself.

Peace.

(Signed) MOHAMED KHATEEB.

No. 192.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 21, 1859.

CAPTAIN CAMPBELL, the senior naval officer at Gibraltar, arrived here early this morning, in Her Majesty's ship "Redpole," to bring the tidings that a number of the European residents at the port of Mazagan, had arrived at Gibraltar, and had reported that the town had been attacked by the Arab tribes of Duquella, but that up to the time of the departure of the Europeans, the townspeople had defended themselves and repulsed the assault. Mr. Stokes, the British Vice-Consul, had remained at his post.

Captain Campbell informs me also, that he had been told the Arabs who were besieging the town, had declared they would respect the lives and property of all Europeans who remained neutral, and did not take any part in the defence of the town.

I have, in concert with Captain Campbell, decided on sending Her Majesty's gun-boat "Quail," commanded by Lieutenant Osborne, to Mazagan, and after his visit to that port he is directed to touch at all the western ports of this empire. I have the honour to transmit a copy of my despatch to Mr. Vice-Consul Stokes, and also a copy of the instructions given by Captain Campbell to Lieutenant Osborne, which the latter is directed to communicate to the Vice-Consuls.

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, M. Blanco, informed me he had dispatched a Spanish war steamer to Mazagan, the day before yesterday, with orders to look after the safety of Europeans, but under all the circumstances of the case, and as the Spanish flag may not be regarded at the present moment as that of a friendly Power by the inhabitants of this country, I have thought it advisable to send a British vessel.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

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* Of the 14th instant, sent to Foreign Office in No. 2 of 15th September (Inclosure in No. 180).

Inclosure 1 in No. 192.

Mr. D. Hay to Vice-Consul Stokes.

Sir, *Tangier, September* 20, 1859.

CAPTAIN CAMPBELL arrived here this morning, in Her Majesty's steamer "Redpole," bringing information that several of the European residents at Mazagan had arrived at Gibraltar, and had reported that the town had been attacked by a large body of Arabs. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has informed me, he dispatched a Spanish steamer to Mazagan the day before yesterday. I have, however, in concert with Captain Campbell, decided on sending Her Majesty's gun-boat "Quail," direct to yourport. The Commander, Lieutenant Osborne, will communicate to you the instructions he has received from Captain Campbell, and, according to the written requisition you may make to Lieutenant Osborne, he will be ready to embark you and other Europeans; but, should you be disposed to remain at your post, and consider that the presence of Her Majesty's gun-boat is requisite, Lieutenant Osborne will remain there, unless the tidings received from any other port on the coast, render it expedient for the "Quail" to proceed there.

Should you decide on embarking, or, should there be no imminent danger at Mazagan, Her Majesty's gun-boat "Quail" will proceed, after visiting Mazagan, to the other ports on the coast, and on her return will revisit Mazagan.

I have to direct that you will send me a full report of all that has taken place at Mazagan and in the neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 192.

Orders addressed by Captain Campbell to Lieutenant Osborne.

INTELLIGENCE having reached me of disturbances having taken place at Mazagan, you are hereby directed to proceed to that port, immediately you have received Mr. Drummond Hay's despatches, to afford such protection as may be necessary to all Europeans there. Should Mr. Stokes, Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at that port, deem it unsafe to remain, you will embark him and such other Europeans as may wish to leave, that cannot procure passage in any vessels that may be at anchor there, and then proceed to Dar-el-Baida or Saffi and Mogador, according to the intelligence you may receive from the Vice-Consul or others, as to where the presence of one of Her Majesty's vessels would be most useful, calling, however, at all the northern ports again, including Rabat and Laraiche, previous to your return to Tangier, when you will acquaint Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires with the result of your visit.

Should the Vice-Consul at Mazagan assure you that his leaving his Consulate is unnecessary, but wish you to remain at the port for two or three days, you will do so before proceeding elsewhere, and do the same at the other ports, the duration of your stay at them, however, depending upon their tranquillity. You will show these your instructions to Her Majesty's Consuls at the above-named ports, and consult with them as to what is most desirable, taking care to have written requisitions from them as to the detention of Her Majesty's gun-boat under your command, or receiving on board Europeans as passengers.

Inclosed is a copy of signals agreed upon with the Vice-Consuls of Dar-al-Baida, Mazagan, Saffi, and Mogador.

Given under my hand on board Her Majesty's ship "Vulture" at Gibraltar, this 21st day of September, 1859.

(Signed) FREDERICK CAMPBELL,
Captain and Senior Naval Officer.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 193.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received October* 3.)

(Private.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, September* 21, 1859.

THE Mazagan folk who have arrived at Gibraltar are spreading most alarming reports, but I never give much credence to runaways. There are tidings, which, however, may turn out to be false, that the second son of the late Sultan, Mulai Suleiman, the Prince whom we sent to Mecca about eight years ago, has been proclaimed Sultan at Tafilet and is marching northward with a large army.

This would be a very serious complication, for he is a Prince who has always shown great energy of character and is generally beloved. Sidi Mohamed, the new Sultan, has had the prudence to remove the sole cause of his unpopularity, viz., avarice, by opening the strings of his purse and lavishing his treasures upon the soldiers and rebellious tribes. He has sent some heads of rebels to be hung up at Fez.

Mulai Abdersoliman, the pretender, who had appeared before Fez, as reported in a late despatch, has been attacked by the Fez people. Several of his followers killed, and the Prince escaped on a fast mare. His partizans at Fez have had their houses pulled down and property destroyed.

We hear nothing more from the French frontier. It is a Shereef named Mulai Abdallah who committed the outrage; and some say he is also a pretender to the throne.

I returned my Spanish colleague's call yesterday. He was very civil and courteous, and though he is a man who rarely says what he means, he assured me he was very much vexed with the Governor of Ceuta for having created all this fresh cause for dispute, and said that the popular feeling was so strong in Spain for war with Morocco, that he feared the present differences could not be arranged amicably, unless satisfaction was given before the term of twenty days expired. I pointed out to M. Blanco, in friendly language, the imprudence of having fixed a term, when there is no Government to deal with, and submitted to him the views I have already presented to Her Majesty's Government in this affair, though, of course, I held very moderate language when speaking of Spanish officers. He said he coincided in great measure with all I had said. Before taking leave I said, I thought, if a reasonable time was granted to allow the new Sultan to establish his Government at Fez, all the Spaniards asked for would be amicably arranged; and I told him that in accordance with the instructions I had received, I had urged, and should continue to urge, that this Government make all reasonable concessions in affording reparation.

M. Blanco said he wished Khateeb had made a serious complaint to him about the Ceuta military authorities for the attack on the Mohamedan shrine.

As M. Blanco had requested me to send over, by Her Majesty's ship "Redpole," his despatches, I readily complied, but suggested that we should for the future mutually communicate the departure of Government vessels for the coast or to Gibraltar and Algeciras, and thus facilitate the communications with the Consular Officers and our respective Governments.

With this proposition he readily complied, and as he dispatches every two days a steamer to Algeciras, it will greatly facilitate my communications.

I have written to the British Vice-Consul at Algeciras, Mr. Glynn, to suggest that he should keep me privately informed of the movements of troops there and of their embarcation for Ceuta, &c., and any other information with reference to Morocco he can collect. Perhaps a hint from the Foreign Office to Mr. Glynn would make him more attentive to my private request.

It is a pity the gun-boat "Quail" is so unfit a vessel for the service on the Morocco coast. She can only carry five days' coal, and can only steam in a breeze five or six miles an hour, and has no room for passengers. A far more

efficient gun-boat ought to be stationed at Gibraltar as well as the frigate. The gun-boat or small vessel of that class, but larger than the "Quail," is more useful that a frigate for visiting the western ports as a frigate cannot well enter the harbour at Mogador.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—As I receive very meagre tidings about what is passing in and before Ceuta, I have sent a trusty Moor to keep watch and bring the news whenever any event of importance occurs.

No. 194.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 23, 1859.

THE Governor of this town and province has appointed a new Kaid in command of the Moorish castle, in front of the Spanish lines at Ceuta, and, at my recommendation, has promised to give strict orders to that officer to prevent, as far as it is in his power, any assemblage of tribes in the neighbourhood of Ceuta; and that, in case the Spanish troops make any further sallies, to endeavour to persuade the tribes to retire and avoid a conflict. The tribes are, however, so exasperated against the Spaniards for the outrage on the shrine of their saint, that it will be a difficult task to persuade them to show moderation.

I received from Mr. Buchanan the inclosed telegram, and I have sent this day a reply by telegram, of which I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy.

I dispatched the day before yesterday an express courier to the British Vice-Consul at Tetuan, directing him to call on the Moorish Minister, and to urge him to lose no time in recommending the Sultan, Sidi Mohamed, to arrange the present questions with Spain; and that the most prudent course for the Moorish Government to pursue would be, not to lose time by making too strict an inquiry into Spanish claims, but to accede to them.

When I hear that Khateeb's appointment, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been confirmed by the new Sultan, I shall probably apply to the senior naval officer at Gibraltar for a Government steamer to convey me to Tetuan, to have an interview with that Minister. If the Spanish Government would only show moderation, and not act with precipitation, I entertain a hope that we shall be enabled to persuade the Moorish Government to accede to their demands, whether reasonable or unreasonable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 194.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Sir, *Madrid, September* 21, 1859.

I MYSELF used, in a conversation with the President of the Council, your argument respecting batteries having been erected on the extremity of the limits of the Spanish territory, and I am inclined to believe that this has not been done. The Spaniards say that it is expedient to render the fortress able to resist the attacks from her quarrelsome besiegers of Morocco. The contempt with which they have hitherto been looked upon by the neighbouring

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

tribes, and which they are determined to correct, will prevent their modifying the ultimatum; and their own position will make it extremely difficult for them to extend the time for an answer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 194.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Sir, *Tangier, September* 23, 1859.

TELEGRAM of 21st received. The building at Ceuta was beyond the fortifications, and certainly erected for offence or defence.

If Spain does not extend the term for ultimatum, it is clear she seeks for war, as the Sultan must insure his own position before he attempts to chastise his subjects—who have hardly accepted their new Sovereign—to satisfy a Christian Power. Let time be given; let the negotiation be conducted with moderation, and without precipitation, and I almost engage all the Spaniards have at present asked, let it be just or unjust, will be acceded to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 195.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 10.)
My Lord, *Tangier, September* 23, 1859.

THE Governor of Reef, Kaid Abbas Emkisheet, returned to Tangier the day before yesterday. He tells me the Province of Reef was tranquil, and the inhabitants were disposed to accept Sidi Mohamed as their Sultan. In consequence of the failure of the crops, all grain and provisions are at famine prices, and there is great misery throughout Reef. The population attribute the famine to the displeasure of the late Sultan, at the disobedience and misconduct of the Akkalayas, and that his curse, as a Shereef of direct descent from the prophet, has fallen upon them, and that God has caused the crops to fail. This feeling, Kaid Abbas says, is general, and disposes the Reefians to obey the new Sultan. Kaid Abbas says, he has visited the Akkalaya district, in front of Melilla, and had long conference with the Reefian Chiefs, with a view to preparing them to make the required concession of territory to the Spaniards, in front of Melilla, viz., the range of the shot of a smooth-bored cannon, of twenty-four pounds, fired point-blank. The Akkalayas say, they are ready to submit to the orders of the Sultan; but they will never agree to give up the Mosque of Jenada, and adjoining Mohamedan cemetery, which are, I believe, within musket-shot of the fortifications of Melilla, but are screened behind a projecting high ground.

Kaid Abbas declares this mosque was erected in ancient times, and that the cemetery is the chief place of burial of the neighbouring villages. He states this fact alone is a good proof that the ground never belonged to the Spaniards, as otherwise the Mohamedans would not have selected it for the erection of a mosque, and as a burial-ground. Kaid Abbas adds, that he fears the people of Reef would fight to the last, in defence of this holy ground, even against the orders of the Sultan; but that he thinks the Reefians would cede the territory, according to the arrangement which has been come to between the Moorish and Spanish Governments, if the latter engages to

respect the cemetery and mosque, and allow the Moors to continue to bury their dead, and conduct, as before, their religious rites. He says, there is also a site, within cannon-shot, where there are some Reef dwellings and gardens, and a very good spring of water. The Reefians would equally object to a concession of this site; but he says he hopes their opposition may be overcome by some pecuniary arrangement.

Kaid Abbas informs me that the late inroad into the Algerine frontier was effected by a certain Moor, who calls himself a Shereef,—Seid Mohamed Ben Abdallah, but is believed by the Reefians to be an impostor. He does not belong to the tribe of Benisnassel, and Kaid Abbas thinks he is a magician from Soos. He applied to Sheikh Mesod, the powerful Chief of Benisnassel, to aid him in attacking the French but the Sheikh refused, saying the Benisnassel were at peace with the French, and did not wish for war, and that if he did not leave the Benisnassel territory immediately he would drive him out by force. The Shereef having collected some 200 followers from different parts, but chiefly from the districts of Augad and Dooal, within the Algerine territory, attacked the French and after committing various outrages, were driven away, and did not, Kaid Abbas says, remain on the Benisnassel territory. Kaid Abbas asserts that the Augad and Dooal Tribes frequently make propositions to the Benisnassel to join them in an attack on the French, and that he believes those tribes encouraged the Soos impostor, who calls himself a Shereef, to make the inroad on the Algerine territory. Kaid Abbas says, he has been told the French are preparing a large army to march against the Benisnassel.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 196.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received October* 3.)

(Private.)
My dear Hammond, *Tangier, September* 24, 1859.

I DO not send my No. 10 of yesterday's date, regarding territory to be ceded to Spaniards at Melilla, through Mr. Buchanan, for fear it should fall into the hands of the Philistines. Until the Ceuta question is settled, the arrangement entered into about the Reef will, I suppose, stand over; but I now fear, from the information given me by Kaid Abbas, reported in No. 10, that we shall have a fresh difficulty when the Melilla territory is to be defined, in consequence of the mosque being within that territory. I don't know whether Lord John Russell may think Mr. Buchanan's advice regarding Morocco affairs will be attended to by the Spanish Ministry, but it appears to me the best way to solve the new difficulty would be to suggest that the Spaniards consent to respect the mosque and cemetery, and to allow the Reefians to pay their devotions at the shrine, and to bury their dead without molestation, as long as they come unarmed. No Christians or Jews in Morocco are allowed to enter a mosque; the Spaniards ought, therefore, to agree to respect also the religious prejudices of the natives, if they desire, for the future, to keep on good terms with them. I have told you before I left Tangier in June last, when the arrangement about the range of a cannon shot was come to as the extent of territory to be ceded at Melilla, that I feared, when the Sultan attempted to carry it into execution, the Reefians would not submit to His Majesty's orders. I fear my apprehensions are too well founded, but difficulties and hostilities in Reef are of less importance, as far as British interests are concerned, than hostilities in this neighbourhood. As the Spaniards and Moors had been good friends at Ceuta ever since they concluded the Treaty in 1845, I cannot understand what object the Spanish Government has had in view in creating a question at Ceuta before the Reef difficulties had been surmounted, unless it be, as indeed is my belief, notwithstanding Mr. Buchanan's assurances

to make some conquest of territory in the Straits. A far easier exploit than in the mountainous district of Reef, swarming with a brave and warlike people. Of course, if the Spaniards see that our Government will not allow them to remain in possession of any town or territory on the Straits they may alter their plans. The Island of Mogador, it is whispered, is one of the points they think of seizing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S. I saw two large vessels (I think English) pass from west to east this morning.

J. H. D. H.

No. 197.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 3, 1859.

YOU may instruct Mr. Hay to recommend to the Moorish Minister to agree to negotiate, with a view to the security of the fortresses of Ceuta and Melilla. If it can be shown that Ceuta is endangered by the near approach of armed Moors, it may be a reason for extending the rayon of the fortress. Assure the Spanish Minister we wish to compose the quarrel, but ask for a specific answer about Tangier. Tangier cannot be necessary to Spain for the security of Ceuta.

No. 198.

Lord J. Russell to M. Isturiz.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 3, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th of September, recapitulating what you understood to have passed between us on the 26th of that month, respecting the differences between Spain and Morocco.

I have to state to you, in reply, that I understood you to abjure, on the part of the Spanish Government, all intention of conquest in Morocco. Your letter, however, appears to me to fall somewhat short of that assurance; but I trust I have rightly understood the intentions of Spain.

You have very correctly represented my answer.

I think it right to add that, should Great Britain not receive the assurances she asks for, she will consider herself free to pursue the course which her interests may require.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 199.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 4, 1859.

IN case of war, the President of the Council will himself proceed to Africa with 35,000 men. I hope to dispatch messenger to-morrow or next day.

No. 200.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 6, 5·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 5, 8 P.M.

I HAVE just left Foreign Minister, and read answer he proposes giving about Tangier. It recapitulates demand about that place in my note, but merely answers generally that no conquest will be made. I said it was no answer to my note, which required an express engagement to withdraw troops on ratification of the Treaty of Peace; and if it was the only reply I was to receive, I must, to my great regret, deliver an answer which I had in my pocket, and threatened to produce. He then said the note was not yet approved by the Cabinet, who might possibly amend it; but thought they would hardly dare to satisfy Her Majesty's Government in the present temper of the country. If the note which he promised to send me does not clearly grant your Lordship's demand, I shall acknowledge it, stating Her Majesty's Government will consider themselves free to act as they consider best for British interests. I have said as much to-day confidentially. There is an opinion here that the late visit of the Spanish Minister at Paris to the Emperor of the French, was to consult His Majesty on this subject. The irritation against England is becoming daily more intense; the public, however, take an exaggerated view of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. The press is loud in calling upon the Government to maintain the dignity of the country.

Spanish Minister will not withdraw his pretension to exact new delimitation of Ceuta, as part reparation, as he says the demand has been communicated to Moorish Government before expiration of term for answering ultimatum. I said I was willing to instruct Mr. Hay to support wishes of the Spanish Government, if not made a condition of peace, but I did not see how he could now advise Sultan to accept such a condition. I fear, however, Sultan will be obliged to make this concession, for he had certainly better do so than go to war.

No. 201.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 6, 5·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 5, 10 P.M.

I HAVE just received the following, dated yesterday, from Mr. D. Hay, but do not agree that Sultan will not accede, if recommended by Her Majesty's Government:—

"Moorish Minister has arrived. I have seen him. Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has added a letter about extension of Ceuta lines and forts on heights. Minister tells me this was not mentioned in the ultimatum; ought not to be demanded, and could not be granted. He thinks Sultan will accede at once to the first ultimatum. Is it right to put forward fresh demands for territory? I fear I could not persuade Moorish Government to yield now, but hereafter, when peace is made, it might be discussed and arranged."

No. 202.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1852.

WHY is the answer of the Spanish Government respecting the declaration in regard to Tangier delayed? Report immediately by telegraph.

No. 203.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1859, 7·35 P.M.

ADVISE the Sultan to concede the new boundary at Ceuta as preferable to war.

No. 204.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 7, 1·40 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 6, 5·5 P.M.

I REPORTED, last night, my dissatisfaction with answer prepared by Spanish Government respecting Tangier; and my objection having been referred to Cabinet, Foreign Minister has promised a note to-morrow, which will contain the assurance required by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 205.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 6, 1859.

THIS message just arrived from Mr. Hay, dated yesterday:—

"Spanish Chargé d'Affaires visited Minister to-day. I have since seen latter. Chargé d'Affaires demanded that the Sultan cede to Spain right of building fortifications at Ceuta on pasturage ground. Vide Article XV of old Treaty with Moors, and Convention of 1845. That ground was ceded as neutral for pasturage. The Minister replied: This demand was not in ultimatum to Sultan; that answer will come in two or three days; that he cannot put forward fresh demand, as Sultan might then refuse original ultimatum; that after reparation has been given, he would refer to Sultan any pretensions which Spain had to put forward.

"Chargé d'Affaires told him that Ministers of England and France approve of demands, and will not support Sultan. I told Minister not to expect any approval from Great Britain, and therefore to cede all he could. His Excellency said Sultan would not cede new demand, and read me a letter from His Majesty, telling him to act up to Treaty, and to prevent discussion, but not to submit to humiliation. Ask for instructions, to be sent to me by telegraph, whether his Lordship wishes me to take any farther steps. British influence will fall, when Sultan discovers we support Spain in new pretensions. I foresee war, if demand be persisted in, and full time for negotiation be not granted."

I have informed Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, by telegraph, that I have been authorized to instruct him to recommend Moorish Government to accept a proposal for negotiation for extension of Ceuta territory, if not made a condition of peace, but that I have failed to induce Spanish Government to accept this compromise; and I fear war is inevitable, if Spanish demand is refused. A letter from Biarritz states that a fresh fleet is about to proceed to the coast of Morocco.

No. 206.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 7, 3·40 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 6, 11·15 P.M.

MR. HAY reports that Spanish original ultimatum was accepted yesterday: Sultan says out of deference to counsels of Her Majesty's Government, but looks to England for protection against new pretension.

Spanish Chargé d'Affaires endeavoured in vain to prevent Moorish Minister from communicating this to Mr. Hay or to himself officially, until new demand was accepted by Sultan. It has been sent to His Majesty, but Minister has no hope of favourable reply before the 15th. I shall maintain, however, that it cannot be made a condition of peace, as ultimatum was accepted before the 6th.

No. 207.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 7, 1859.

I WROTE to Hay on Monday, and also telegraphed to him yesterday evening, through Gibraltar, to advise Sultan to concede the new boundary at Ceuta, as preferable to war. To prevent accidents, you had better repeat this from Madrid.

No. 208.

Mr. Hammond to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1859.

I AM directed by Lord John Russell to request that you will state to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that it would be desirable to ascertain from Vice-Admiral Fanshawe, whether some of Her Majesty's Ships of War under his order might not be rendered available for the defence of British subjects and property at the several places on the coast of Morocco where they are established, in case of an attack on such places by the neighbouring Moorish tribes in the present state of excitement which prevails in Morocco.

They will not interfere with any belligerent operations of Spain, should war unhappily break out, without special directions.

I have, &c.
G. HAMMOND.

No. 209.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1859, 11·15 A.M.

PRESS on the Moorish Government the acceptance of the limit at Ceuta required by Spain.

No. 210.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 8, 2·10 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 7, 4 P.M.

HER MAJESTY'S Chargé d'Affaires reports last night that his Spanish colleague, in a reply to Moorish note accepting ultimatum, demanded that right of Spain to erect works on pasturage ground ceded in 1845, shall be acknowledged before the 15th instant. He tells Mr. Hay, Spanish Government will

not grant a day beyond. Hay has persuaded Minister to recommend Sultan to accept, but wishes me to urge extension of time, as he sees no hope of His Majesty, who considers ultimatum already granted, complying within term named. Hay considers the demand a new one, but Spanish Government say it was made from the first, and included in ultimatum, but that they did not receive a clear answer to it. They believe all will be yielded. Messenger left to-night with declaration about Tangier.

No. 211.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1859.

IN consideration of the concession by the Moors of the original demands, ask of the Spanish Government a further delay of ten days for Moorish answer, and a promise from Spain of no further demand, if this demand about the limit at Ceuta is granted by the Moors. Hay is instructed to press its acceptance.

No. 212.

Señor Isturiz to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 8.)

(Translation.)

My Lord, *Spanish Legation, London, October* 6, 1859.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's note of the 3rd instant, in reply to mine of the 29th September, in which I recapitulated our conference of the 26th, relative to the question between Spain and Morocco.

I regret much to see that your Excellency finds some discrepancy between my written words, that "the Queen's Government does not indulge any desire of conquest; but that in case of not obtaining the reparation due to the national dignity, it is determined to carry forward its arms until the obtainment thereof," are the words used verbally by me.

Without pretending now to state the precise words, which I could not possibly do, your Excellency will allow me to observe that they must necessarily have been in conformity with the communications made to me from Madrid to the effect that the Government indulges no desire of conquests, nor does it wish to acquire new dominions; that its efforts tend to maintain intact the dignity of the Spanish flag, and to lay down the right of constructing fortifications in the neighbourhood of the Spanish fortresses ("presidios") for the security of their inhabitants and garrisons, but that if its pacific action shall be without effect, it will use its right, and will take by force what it must demand and cannot obtain by peaceful means.

Your Excellency's absence from London has prevented me from informing you of these communications. Subsequently to our interview I received the one, a copy of which I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency, not being able to read it to you as directed; and I have no doubt that your Excellency will find in this communication convincing reasons of the justice with which the Queen's Government is proceeding in the Morocco question.

I regret that I cannot conclude without taking notice of the last paragraph of the note to which I am replying, in which your Excellency says you think it just to add that, if Great Britain does not receive the assurances ("seguridades") which it asks for, she will look upon herself as free to pursue such conduct as her interest may demand. Undoubtedly Great Britain is the sole judge of her own interest, as Spain is of hers. But in order that these interests may not clash, I think it would be expedient to explain and to define them. The Spanish Government has stated the cause and the object of its armament against Morocco, and in its turn it will be glad to know those of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) XAVIER DE ISTURIZ.

Inclosure in No. 212.

Señor Collantes to Señor Isturiz.

(Translation.)

Excellency, *Madrid, September* 25, 1859.

THE Spanish and foreign periodical press has been occupied with the conflict which has recently arisen between the Queen's Government and that of Morocco. As the opinions expressed up to this time might give occasion to a not quite accurate appreciation of our perfect right in this affair, and of the intentions of Spain therein, the Government now honoured with the confidence of the Crown considers it to be its duty to give to the Governments of Europe, through the Queen's representatives, candid explanations upon a question which, when examined in an impartial and serene spirit, will afford a fresh and signal proof of the moderation and equity which presides over all its acts.

The serious differences which had lately arisen between Spain and Morocco, upon the boundaries of Melilla and the capture of ships, had been just terminated satisfactorily by the conclusion of a Convention signed at Tetuan on the 25th August last, when the Moors of the Kabyle of Augera, to the number of 1,500, attacked the place of Ceuta. The small garrison of that fortress repulsed the attack, which was repeated on the following days by greater forces. The aggressors destroyed the works begun for the defence of the fortress, and tore down the arms of Spain placed on the stone which marks the boundary line between the land of Spain and that of Morocco.

As soon as the Queen's Government was informed of this act, so derogatory to its honour, and to the dignity of the nation, it sent instructions to the Spanish Consul-General in Tangier, to ask for immediate reparation of the offence offered to the national flag, and gave suitable orders for reinforcing the garrison of Ceuta in due proportion. At the same time, as the attacks of the Moors continued almost without ceasing, it ordered a corps of observation to be formed in Algeciras, and directed the assemblage in that harbour of naval forces necessary for attending to every contingency.

Notwithstanding the greatness of the outrage, and the intention of the Queen's Government to obtain due satisfaction, yet the latter, whose upright and pacific spirit is known to your Excellency, took occasion, in those moments, to give a fresh proof of its moderation. As soon as it received official information of the death of the Emperor Abd el Rahman, it stepped forth of its own accord to offer a suitable prolongation of the term assigned for making the reparation demanded.

Until that term expires, the Cabinet of Madrid will, as hitherto, confine itself to repelling by force the attacks against Ceuta; but should the term expire without its obtaining what justice demands, it will endeavour to procure by force of arms security for the Spanish forts on the coast of Africa, and respect for its incontrovertible rights.

Such is the state, at this day, of the question pending between Spain and Morocco, and such are the acts that have given rise to it.

In all this, the Cabinet of Madrid has not for one moment departed from its deliberate intention not to recur to the employment of force but at the last extremity, and when it can no longer cherish any hopes that its diplomatic measures will be efficacious. In this case, by virtue of its right, it is resolved, in order to repair the offence which has been given to it, to employ the same means which other nations have used in similar cases.

The Cabinet of Madrid sincerely deplores the possible consequences of the present conflict, but its conscience is quieted by the assurance that itself has not been the cause of this conflict, and by the conviction which it feels that if the case should occur for its carrying its arms to Africa in this cause, it will be in fulfilment of a duty which no Government and no nation can throw off.

For the rest, in this question the Queen's Government does not yield to the impulsion of a pre-existing desire for territorial aggrandisement. If it should enter upon military operations, their sole object would be the punishment of aggression, and the conclusion of treaties tending to furnish material and effectual guarantees to prevent its recurrence.

Your Excellency, nevertheless, cannot be ignorant that it is not possible

at present to foresee the extent and importance of those operations, or the nature of the guarantees which the Queen's Government might find itself compelled to demand, in order to secure respect for its rights.

Your Excellency may read this despatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain.

God preserve, &c.

(Signed) SATURNINO CALDERON COLLANTES.

No. 213.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 9, 5 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, October* 7, 10 P.M.

I HAVE received telegram of 6th October. I suppose the wrong cypher has been used, or wrong numbers at the telegraph office. No sense. I have advised Sultan to accede to new demand of the Spaniards.

I hope a few more days beyond the 15th October will be granted for explanation.

No. 214.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 10, 12·15 P.M.

RECEIVED your telegrams of the 6th. Glad to learn Spanish Minister has promised a note containing assurances required by Her Majesty's Government. You were right in maintaining that new condition cannot be made a condition of peace with Morocco, as original ultimatum was accepted. It will, however, be fair to examine whether Ceuta requires for their security from attack or insult, and whether that security should consist in extended boundary. This question might be fairly examined by Spain and Morocco without war. Tell Spanish Minister, and desire Mr. Hay to tell Moorish Minister view of Her Majesty's Government upon this point. War will be costly to Spain and conquests in Morocco unprofitable, if made.

No. 215.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 11, 11·10 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 10, *midnight.*

THERE is some misunderstanding, I fear, in your Lordship's instructions, as Mr. Hay is already, in consequence of a telegram from Under-Secretary of State, instructed to advise increase of territory at Ceuta.

Since my telegram of yesterday I hear there is a report that a cross fire might be obtained from the neighbourhood of that fortress with Tarifa.

I have, therefore, sent subjoined telegram to Hay, and when I execute your Lordship's instructions of to-day, I shall, if necessary, use your despatch No. 78 of the 26th September, to manifest clearly the views of Her Majesty's Government on this subject.

To Hay.—"Is it possible to get a cross fire with rifled guns between any point of the coast near Ceuta and Tarifa, so as to command the Strait. This ought to be looked to in any new boundary given by the Moors; but at the same time, it is to be considered, that war may be wished for by Spain to secure such position as security for an indemnity which never be paid. There is some mistake, I fear, in your instructions from Under-Secretary of State.

"The Secretary of State states, by telegram just received, that you are to

inform Moors that new boundary should not, after acceptance of the ultimatum, be made a condition of peace, and that the question might be fairly examined without war.

"I must add, that as the rejection of the demand will most certainly produce war, you ought to act as you think best, until further instructions, with a view to the possibility of injury to British interests, to which I have called your attention above. I send copy of this to Foreign Office."

No. 216.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 27, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches, Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the 10th instant, which reached me by Her Majesty's ship "Redpole," late on the evening of the 24th, bringing also the tidings of Vice-Admiral Fanshawe's and Rear-Admiral Erskine's arrival at Gibraltar, with eight ships of the line.

On receiving this information I decided on proceeding to Gibraltar early the next morning to have an interview with the Admiral, to telegraph to Mr. Buchanan, and to go on the same day to visit the Moorish Minister, Seid Mohamed Khateeb, at Tetuan.

I arrived on board Her Majesty's ship "Marlborough," about 11 A.M., on the 25th, and transmitted to Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, in cypher, a telegram, of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy, with a request to his Excellency to send it on to your Lordship.

I received at Gibraltar two telegrams from Mr. Buchanan, one announcing that the Spanish force for invasion of Morocco, would be raised to 24,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry; and another, that, with great difficulty, his Excellency hoped to be able to persuade the Spanish Government to extend term for acceptation of ultimatum up to the 15th October, but that he was convinced no further delay would be granted.

After conferring with the Admiral, who placed Her Majesty's ship "Redpole" at my disposition, I proceeded to Tetuan, passing, en route, close in shore, along the Ceuta territory, which gave me an opportunity of making an ocular inspection of the new building, which has been the principal cause of the conflicts between the people of Augera and the Spaniards.

I arrived in the Bay of Tetuan after dusk, and in consequence of the difficulty of landing on a dangerous beach, at night in a fog, I did not reach the town of Tetuan, which is about five miles from the port, till midnight. Early next morning, at 8 A.M., the Minister was good enough to come himself to the lodging he had prepared for me. His Excellency expressed his great satisfaction at my arrival, and told me it was most fortunate and timely, as he had just received his nomination from the Sultan, Sidi Mohamed, and he put His Majesty's letter into my hands. The letter was dated 13 Safar, about ten days ago, from a camp between Rabat and Fas. It commenced with a lamentation on the death of his late father, the Sultan Mulai Abderrahman, followed by a vivid description of his having been selected by his father as His Majesty's successor, and subsequent election by the Bokhary body-guard, and by the cities of Fas, Mekinas and Morocco, and other towns and districts. His Majesty announced his successful and pacific march through the country, with the exception of the chastisement and putting to death of some malefactors and disturbers of the peace. His Majesty then went on to say, that he had been made acquainted with Khateeb's faithful services with his late father, and that he, Khateeb, sought to preserve a good understanding between his country and Foreign Powers. His Majesty, therefore, had much satisfaction in confirming him in the same position of "Naeeb," or Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, which he held under the late Sultan. In the conclusion of the letter, he tells Khateeb that he had received a letter from the people of Augera, complaining of the hostile proceedings of the Spaniards, and of the building erected, contrary to the established usages, in the Ceuta territory.

He orders that Khateeb make a representation to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, upon this subject, and added that His Majesty is desirous no infringement of established usages should take place on either part, and that His Majesty desires to act according to what is "just and proper."

This letter is a good proof that the Sultan when he dictated it had not received from Kateeb any letter or tidings regarding the conflicts at Ceuta with the Spaniards, or had any knowledge of the ultimatum. Khateeb indeed told me, he had never written to His Majesty until he sent my letter of the 14th instant, and then he said little or nothing regarding the conflicts at Angera. That letter also had not been received when His Majesty wrote to Khateeb. Khateeb excuses to me his silence, by saying, that until he received his appointment or confirmation as Minister it would have been irregular for him to have offered any opinion on passing events, and that it was as much as his head was worth to have counselled concession to the demands of the Spaniards, before he had been appointed, or could learn the animus of the new Sultan.

It appeared to me also from Khateeb's language, that until he felt assured by the tidings from the interior, he had adopted the timid but prudent course of not offering his allegiance to the new Sultan, before he was convinced that Sidi Mohamed was the successful competitor and accepted successor to the throne.

Khateeb told me, in the course of conversation, that he had expected all along his nomination, as the late Sultan on his death-bed had written a letter to Sidi Mohamed recommending him to continue to employ four persons as faithful and good servants of the Crown, viz., his son, the Prince Mulai Abbas, now Viceroy; Seid Mohamed Sefar, Chief Oozeer; Kaid Ferajee, General of the Bokhary Guard and Military Governor of Fas; and Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

I will not encroach on your Lordship's valuable time by relating all that I said to Khateeb, to prepare him to accede to the councils I had to offer him in the name of the British Government; but it will suffice to state that, after a long conversation, in which I especially impressed on his mind that the British fleet had not come to these waters to oppose the demands of the Spanish Government for reparation, but to protect British life and property at a moment when they might have been placed in the greatest jeopardy if Sidi Mohamed had not been elected by the almost unanimous voice of the Moorish population, and that the sympathy of our Government would be with the Spaniards if the Moorish Government did not settle their demands without delay. Khateeb consented to write to the Sultan in any terms I might suggest, on the condition that the concessions he was to urge should be asked from the Sultan as emanating from myself, and not from him, Khateeb; and that he would then support in the strongest manner all my views.

As I did not think it prudent to let Khateeb into the secret that Mr. Buchanan would perhaps succeed in obtaining an extension of the term for the acceptation of the ultimatum to the 15th October, as only ten days remained for the second term granted, and as the fact of my haste in coming to Tetuan, and arriving at midnight, had produced a most salutary effect on his mind, I urged that Khateeb should write the letter, in my presence, to the Sultan, and send it off that very day to the Sultan by two express couriers. This was done, and I read the letter he prepared to transmit to His Majesty, which could not have been couched in more persuasive language. Khateeb related to the Sultan how the British Government had always been the true friend of Morocco, and its best counsellor; how all differences, during the last fifteen years, had been arranged in an amicable manner by following British counsels. He dwelt on the friendly conduct of the British Government in sending me express to this country at a moment of difficulty; of my haste in coming to Tetuan, and arrival at night; and that I would not have taken such a step if I had not felt persuaded not a moment was to be lost in acceding to the Spanish demands. He reported the large Spanish force assembled at Algeciras, military and naval, which he assured His Majesty was not an exaggeration, and that whatever might be thought of the conduct of the Spanish Government, that it had gone too far to withdraw without obtaining reparation. He said, I had assured him the demands were not of a character to compromise the honour or dignity of the Moorish Government; that I had seen the building

which had been erected; that it was close to Ceuta, and not on the pasturage ground ceded in 1845; that it did not affect in the slighest degree the Moorish interests, or augment in any important manner the offensive or defensive fortifications of the town. He commented severely on the audacity of the Augerites; said they had misinformed His Majesty, and that they had dared to break the peace without orders, and thus to declare war with a Foreign Power on their own responsibility. He pointed out to His Majesty, that even if the Spaniards had not asked for the punishment of the chiefs, His Majesty, he felt convinced, would chastise the whole tribe for their rebellious acts. Finally, he recommended an immediate compliance with the ultimatum, and that His Majesty should send as soon as possible, after acceding to the Spanish demands, a force of 2,000 of His Majesty's horse guards, to chastise the tribe, as he had little confidence in the troops of this province, who sympathized with the Augerites. He told His Majesty clearly the object of the visit of the British squadron at Gibraltar, and concluded by saying that if His Majesty followed British counsels, by a prompt and dignified concession, the sympathy of the British Government would be with His Majesty, but that otherwise he apprehended the British Government would not disapprove of the Spaniards seeking to obtain reparation by force of arms.

I regret I cannot give your Lordship a translation of my letter to Khateeb, for as I wished to impress upon Khateeb's mind, in the strongest manner the necessity of not losing a moment, and as I had not time to take a copy, or translate it into English, I dictated, in Arabic, to my Moorish secretary, a letter, which contained language similar to that which had been held by Khateeb to the Sultan, though of a more guarded character, and such as did not, in any way, compromise Her Majesty's Government. I commenced the letter by congratulating the Sultan on his arrival in the Northern Provinces, and his peaceful establishment on the throne of his late father; and I likewise congratulated Khateeb on his nomination, which, I remarked, was the best proof that Sidi Mohamed desired to maintain peaceful relations with all foreign Governments.

I must avow to your Lordship that, both in writing the language I did to Khateeb, and in recommending the latter to use strong language in urging the Sultan to concede the Spanish demands, I was guided rather by the expediency of the moment, now that the Sultan has reached his capital, without any serious revolt, than by a conviction that the Moors were solely in the wrong, or that the Spaniards are justified in making the demands. I explained, however, to Khateeb, that if the Sultan refused to accept the Spanish demands, because he thought them humiliating, His Majesty would be doing that which would be very agreeable to the war party in Spain, which was most popular and the strongest.

I left Tetuan immediately after the conference and completion of the letters, and arrived at Gibraltar at half-past seven. I transmitted, in cypher, to Mr. Buchanan, a telegram, of which the inclosed is a copy. At the request of the Admiral, I communicated to him, confidentially, a copy of the telegram, and I returned here last night, at midnight.

This morning the Governor of Tangier informed me, that he had received a letter confirming him in his appointment as Governor of this Province, and directing him to send forty Tangier Cavalry, with an officer, to guard the Moorish lines at Ceuta, and that these guards are to prevent any of the Angera people approaching the lines, and that all conflicts with the Spaniards are especially to be avoided. The Sultan sent also a letter for the Angera tribe, in which he calls upon them to desist from further hostilities with the Spaniards, and that they are to refer, for the future, all grievances and complaints to Khateeb. This preliminary step of the Sultan is very satisfactory, and gives strong grounds for expecting that His Majesty will accede to the terms of the Spanish ultimatum, as recommended, without delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 216.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Gibraltar, September* 25, 1859.

BRITISH fleet has arrived here. I have come over to see Admiral. I go to Tetuan to prevent Moorish Government misunderstanding object of fleet's arrival, and to urge Minister to write to Sultan, before I leave Tetuan, to cede all Spaniard's demand in ultimatum, at once, and thus leave no excuse for Spanish invasion. Send this telegram to Foreign Office.

Inclosure 2 in No. 216.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Gibraltar, September* 26, 1859.

MOORISH Minister has acceded to all I have asked, and has written, to-day, to Sultan, a strong letter, urging that His Majesty give him immediate orders to grant at once all Spanish demands. I saw the letter. It could not have been stronger. He expects an answer in thirteen days. At my recommendation, Moorish Minister proceeds to Tangier in five or six days. His nomination as Minister of new Sultan arrived yesterday. The Minister does all this to please British Government. I consider the Spanish affair as settled, if the Sultan acts as advised by Minister, and if Spaniards keep faith, and do not, at the last moment, bring forward other demands, or create fresh excuse for a quarrel. In the latter case, I hope our Government would take a more active part. Forward this message to the Foreign Office.

No. 217.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 28, 1859.

YESTERDAY, M. Blanco, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, sent a message to me by his interpreter, to say that he heard I had been at Tetuan, and would be obliged to me if I would give him any information regarding the intentions of the Moorish Government.

As M. Blanco has sought, since my return from England, to place himself on friendly terms with me, I thought it politic to overlook his past unfriendly acts and want of good faith, and to meet his advances for a better understanding between the two Missions. So I told the interpreter to inform him that Khateeb had been confirmed in his post of Minister, and that I had every reason to hope the Sultan would give orders to arrange, in an amicable manner, the present differences between Spain and Morocco. I said to the interpreter that I regretted I was then too busy to call upon M. Blanco to afford him any fuller information. Later in the day, M. Blanco called to thank me for the information I had sent him, and for the friendly part I had taken, officiously, in bringing about an amicable arrangement between the two Governments. M. Blanco dwelt on the important services he had rendered his Government by preventing, until now, a rupture of relations. He blamed the conduct of the Governor of Ceuta in having so rashly commenced the building on the Ceuta territory, before the other arrangements between Spain and Morocco, regarding the Reef, had been carried into execution; and he complained that, whilst he was working in the cause of peace, the Governor of Ceuta, in the hope of obtaining military advancement, was doing all in his power to bring about such a complication of affairs, by serious conflicts near Ceuta, as would impede or prevent all negotiation. M. Blanco said also, that the reports sent of the triumphs of Spanish arms over the Moors of Augera were ridiculously exaggerated, and only tended to rouse the martial spirit in Spain, and frustrated his negotiations. He said he feared that the real feeling and

hope in Spain was, that the Moorish Government would not accede to the Spanish demands, and that war should be declared between the two Governments. He added that he had made a strong representation to his Government regarding the conduct of the Governor of Ceuta, and that that officer had since been placed under the orders of the General at Algeciras, and had been directed to abstain from further sallies from the garrison.

After this preliminary conversation, and after I had expressed, in as delicate language as I could, that I hoped both the Spanish Government and himself would not continue to misunderstand the very friendly part which I had been directed to take by Her Majesty's Government, both on the present occasion, as also during the negotiation of the question about the Melilla territory, for I added, that I had laboured from first to last to do all in my power to bring about a friendly solution of the Spanish-Mauro differences; and that he, M. Blanco, would always find I was ever ready to give friendly and frank explanations to those of my colleagues who seek for information, and were disposed to show a reciprocal desire for keeping up a cordial and straightforward *entente* with myself, and the British officers who were under my supervision in this country.

I then told M. Blanco that Khateeb had not clearly understood the nature of the fourth demand in the Spanish ultimatum, and that as he had sent the original letter of M. Blanco to the Moorish Court, containing the ultimatum, Khateeb had not been enabled to exhibit it to me. I mentioned that I was not surprised at Khateeb not comprehending clearly the Arabic of his Moorish scribe, as I also could not, in general, understand it, as he writes in a confused and unintelligible idiom.

M. Blanco then informed me that the IVth Article solely stipulated that troops of Tangier, or of the Sultan, should be, for the future, placed as sentinels on the Moorish lines in front of Ceuta, instead of the Augera Guards, who had hitherto been posted under the command of a Tangier officer, with only seven or eight Tangier soldiers. I replied, I thought this was a reasonable demand, and that not the slightest difficulty would be raised thereto by the Khateeb or the Sultan. M. Blanco, upon this, said he thought the present was a good opportunity for the Spanish Government to enter into a Convention with the Government of Morocco regarding the territory of Ceuta, and place it on the same footing as Melilla.

Having remarked to M. Blanco that he appeared to forget that at Melilla, the Spaniards had possessed no territory beyond the walls, until the arrangement concluded between himself and Khateeb, but, that at Ceuta, since the Convention of 1845, when my predecessor was the mediator for the settlement of the boundary, (and on his death, I had succeeded to that office, as British Agent in this country), a large tract of land had been restored or ceded to the Spaniards for pasturage for cattle, in addition to the old lines they possessed previous to 1845, and that the boundary had been marked and established on the foundation of the ancient land-marks. M. Blanco observed that he thought it would be advisable to alter the Convention of 1845, and assimilate it to that concluded regarding Melilla. He then went on to say that the Sultan on conceding the third demand respecting the erection of the building near Ceuta, would be understood to accede to the undoubted right of the Spanish Government to raise any fortifications the latter chose, upon the territory ceded in 1845, pasturage ground included. I replied, I was surprised to hear such an assertion from M. Blanco: that I had not seen the original Spanish or Arabic versions of the ultimatum to form a decided opinion upon the subject, but that my impression was, from all Khateeb had told me, and had written to me,* that the Sultan was only required to confirm the right of the Spaniards to erect, without molestation, the guardhouse which has been the cause of the conflicts with the people of Augera. M. Blanco assured me that a wide interpretation could be given to the third demand, and that the Spanish Government would be justified in erecting forts for cannon on any part of the old lines or the pasturage ground, which he called "neutral ground," ceded in 1845, and said he would send me a copy of the ultimatum.

When I expressed my extreme surprise at this interpretation of the third demand, and assured M. Blanco that Khateeb had never for a moment under-

* *See* Mr. Reade's No. 23 of September 10 (*ante*, No. 165), and Inclosure in Mr. D. Hay's No. 6 of September 19, 1859 (Inclosure in No. 191).

stood it in that light, he replied that he was not authorized by his Government to hold this language, and that he was merely having a "chat" with me, but that he would not conceal from me, that he thought that it was the intention of his Government to insist on a stipulation for erecting fortifications on pasturage ground, for, he added, he knew the Government had determined since the war in Italy on putting generally the strong fortresses of Spain in a more efficient state; that the proposed fortifications would not be erected as defensive or offensive works against the Moors, Ceuta being quite strong enough on the land side for that purpose; but that the day might come, he said, when Spain might find herself at war, for instance, with France or any other great naval and military power. That Ceuta was exposed to attack from the land side, as there were heights that commanded the town and, therefore, batteries he believed would be erected, with rifled cannon, by the Government on certain heights, even on the pasturage ground, and thus command any attack either by sea or by land.

To this I replied by saying, that the British Government would be much surprised to hear this new phase of the question, which had never been presented either to them or to Mr. Buchanan by the Spanish Ministry, and that now, by M. Blanco's own showing, the chief object of the Spanish Government was not to obtain satisfaction for the acts of the Augerites, but to obtain the consent of the Moorish Government to concede territory which had not previously been granted, and that the Spanish Government should have the right of building strong forts on the extensive pasturage ground ceded to Spain through the mediation of Great Britain in 1845, with the distinct and clear understanding which was verbally, at the time, made through my predecessor, and subsequently through myself, that no offensive or defensive building should be raised on that territory. For this latter understanding, I added, I can pledge my word.

M. Blanco replied, "That may be the case, but if the Spanish Government thinks it necessary for the preservation of Ceuta to build the fortresses, it must be done." I observed, that the question at issue was then to be solved by "might, and not by right," and I asked if the Spanish Government would agree that the same argument should be applied to itself in the case of Gibraltar, where, I said, the slightest defensive work, on or without the lines, would I believed be the cause of a representation to Her Majesty's Government. M. Blanco repeated again and again that he was only talking without knowing the views of his Government, but that he wanted to prevent further misunderstandings with the Moorish Government, and that it would be better for Spain to come to a clear explanation and stipulation with the Sultan, so as to avoid future dissention, and that he did not see why the same extent of territory should not be ceded at Ceuta, as had lately been granted at Melilla, and in that case, he believed, the old Moorish castle or fort, which is at present the guard-house of the Moorish Government officer, and has been so for more than a hundred years, would be included within the Spanish boundary. I then said, "So after all, Spain seeks for conquest and not for reparation. This question will become a very serious one, and complications may arise which even he and I could not foresee, for, if Spain or other Powers insisted on obtaining that which was convenient to them without regard to right, why then, those who were the strongest in the world would impose their wishes as they pleased upon the weak."

M. Blanco having again made a remark respecting the exposed state of Ceuta, and necessity of advancing the fortifications, I referred him to the Article XV of the ancient Treaty between Spain and Morocco, and Convention of 1845, of which I have the honour to inclose copies and translations, for the confirmation of my views regarding the difference between the old lines, or "campo" of Ceuta, and the "pasturage ground." I remarked to M. Blanco, if a nation had a right to build forts, with cannon upon their advanced lines, as had been argued by Spain when negotiating for a concession of territory at Melilla, it would confer on them also the right to claim the territory beneath the guns of the advanced forts, as far as a smooth-bored 24-pounder gun could carry a shot; and the Spanish Government, by advancing the batteries, and putting forward each time a similar claim, could finally conquer the Empire of Morocco, whilst Great Britain might pursue a similar absurd mode of taking possession of the Spanish Peninsula. M. Blanco smiled, and then said that he hoped the Moorish Government would not make objection to their insuring

Ceuta from attack by sea, by raising forts on the heights that command that place; and that he trusted the British Government would also, as a good ally of Spain, counsel the Moors not to object; that the Spanish Government might, under such circumstances, give satisfactory assurances to the Moorish Government that they had no intention of raising forts to act offensively against the Moors, or of encroaching on the territory which did not belong to them.

I replied, that without instructions from Her Majesty's Government I could give no reply to such a proposition; that it was quite a new feature of the case, but that I was persuaded the British Government was glad to see Spain daily improving, and strengthening herself in her financial, naval, and military departments; that Ceuta could not be in better hands than the Spaniards; and that if the Moorish Government made no objection to the raising of forts for the security of Ceuta, the British Government could have no object in thwarting the Spanish Government; but that it appeared to me this question was not one to be discussed now by the Moorish and Spanish Governments, and that it was one which the ultimatum did not and ought not to embrace. That it appeared to me the Spanish Government should now accept the reparation they had demanded, and renew their friendly relations with Morocco; and that afterwards, if Spain, as a friendly ally of Morocco, sought from the latter Power for some concession advantageous to herself, and not prejudicial to the Moors, and that the latter were disposed to listen to their proposal, he might depend upon it, as I had said before, the British Government and its agents would always be found ready to support any measure which might not be prejudicial either to Spain or Morocco, and yet prove to be a benefit to one, without being an injustice to, or an unjustifiable aggression on the other.

M. Blanco parted in a very friendly manner with me, and repeated his thanks for what I had arranged with the Moorish Minister at Tetuan, in the cause of peace.

I fear I have written a very long despatch, in detailing this strange and flighty conversation, which M. Blanco chose to call a mere "chat" between two friends,—though I attach much importance to all he said, for I think he has divulged that his Government has had other objects in view, in raising this Ceuta question, than that of merely obtaining satisfaction for the acts of the Augerites. M. Collantes may be more guarded in his language to Mr. Buchanan, or may be himself in the dark as to the intentions and final purport of his military colleague, the President of the Council; but as Blanco is the intimate friend and cousin of Marshal O'Donnell, I do not doubt but that M. Blanco has imparted in the conversation he has had with me, the real object of the Spanish Government; and that, as the latter never expected the ultimatum would be acceded to by the Moorish Government, they had not thought it necessary to put in clearer terms the encroachments they desire to make on the Moorish territory.

I have always considered, from the very outset of the Reef question, that the Spanish Government was desirous to go to war with Morocco, and that O'Donnell and his Generals were dissatisfied at the British Government having obtained the consent of the Moorish Government to their peremptory demands.

Unless the Spanish Government is told in very plain terms by one of the Great Powers, that though Spain might be allowed to obtain by force of arms reparation, if refused by the Moorish Government, yet that Spain cannot be permitted to seek for a pretext to make war upon Morocco, in order to invade this country, and take possession of a port or a portion of the Moorish territory.

The Spanish Government has now a good loop-hole, by the Sultan's acceptance of its demands, to withdraw with honour and dignity from its present hostile attitude, and Spain may, perhaps, the more easily be led to do so, if it finds that its ambitious schemes, from the language of Great Britain, must for the present, at least, lie dormant.

I do not venture, my Lord, to send this despatch overland to Mr. Buchanan, but I have addressed, in cypher, the inclosed telegram to His Excellency. I should regret that M. Blanco should hear that I have reported what he called his "small talk," as it may prevent him hereafter being equally as communicative, and he expressly said to me, "I don't wish you to report anything I have said, to your Government, or to Mr. Buchanan."

His object may have been, no doubt, to draw me out. He told me on more than one occasion that his Government had not made to him the propositions he had put forward, but that he thought of suggesting them to the Spanish Minister.

M. Blanco contradicted himself several times. He is a vain man, without principle, and one who will deny, with effrontery, his own declarations and assurances within twenty-four hours. He has done so with me before. When I heard of M. Blanco coming to call on me, I especially requested Mr. Green to remain in the room, and to be apparently engaged in his official duties, so that he might be a witness of all that was said on either side. It may turn out, and more probably, if your Lordship takes any step to check Spanish pretensions and their overbearing attitude towards the Moorish Government, that all M. Blanco said was not worthy of being submitted to your Lordship in such full detail, but I should have felt a very heavy responsibility if I had withheld one word of the foregoing conversation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—Hitherto the extension of terms granted by the Spanish Government for obtaining satisfaction, appears to me to have been ceded, not so much out of consideration for the Moorish Government, but rather because further time was required for preparations for war on a larger scale, and for sending ammunition, &c., to Algeciras and Ceuta.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 217.

First Paragraph of Article XV of the Treaty between Spain and Marocco.

LOS limites del campo de Ceuta y extension de terreno para el pasto del ganado de aquella plaza quedaran en los mismos terminos que se demarcaron y fijaron en el año de 1782.

(Translation.)

THE limits of the territory of Ceuta, and those of the ground allotted for the pasturage of the cattle of that fortress, shall extend to the same bounds that were traced out and fixed upon in the year 1782.

Inclosure 2 in No. 217.

Convention between Spain and Morocco with regard to the Boundary Lines of Ceuta.

HABIENDO llegado la orden Imperial que se debe obedecer, elevada y glorificada por Dios, al empleado actual en el puerto de Tanger (defendido por Dios) para devolver los limites de Ceuta como estaban reconocidos en el tiempo de los antecesores de nuestro amo, que Dios le ayude, á la Reina de España, mandó el citado empleado en virtud de la órden Imperial devolver los limites á su primitivo estado, con arreglo al Articulo 1, y su contestacion del Convenio de 9 de Shaaban del año de la fecha (25 de Agosto de 1844), como estaban en el tiempo de nuestro Amo el protegido por Dios, y en el de sus antecesores los generosos y purificados, y que construyan pilares y demarcaciones, á fin de que no quede duda ni motivo de disputa en presencia del mediador entre ambos Gobiernos, el Agente y Consul-General de la Reina de la Gran Bretaña Drum-

mond Hay, del Consul-General Plenipotenciario de los asuntos de España por parte de su Reina, D. Antonio de Berameudi, del General Governador de Ceuta D. Antonio Ardoñez, del empleada de la Cabila de Augera el Cheg Mohammed Ben-Tayeb Cauchâa, y del Caid de la guardia de Ceuta que está actualmente residente en ella, Cid Ajamed El Assary. Se presentaron todos para averiguar los limites, y encontraron visibles restos de los antiguos.

El primero de los limites es desde el mar de la Barranca Hafats Accadar en la parte del Tinidac hasta el mar de Jaudac Babalarais (Barranca de la puerta de las Novias) que es la corriente de las aguas en el tiempo de las lluvias, y el primero de los del lado derecho pasando á la Barranca de Larais está dentro de los limites de Ceuta, y el lado izquierdo pertenece á los Moros; y el Agente mediador estableció las señales mencionadas en dichos limites para que fabricasen los pilares de material ú otra cosa, sin número y oposicion; como igualmente estableció y colocó el dicho mediador en el terreno llano entre las dichas dos Barrancas un pilar de piedra, y este es con objeto de marcar mejor los mencionados limites como estaban antiguamente, y una fuente que está en el fondo de la Barranca de Larais el espresado, dentro de la parte de Ceuta, aprovecharan su agua ambas partes, y cada una de ellas puede poner en sus limites las guardias que quiera.

Se hizo una copia de este documento y se anotó el 23 de Ramadan el Muaden 1260, correspondiente á 7 de Octubre del año del Mesias 1844.

(Firmado) E. W. A. DRUMMOND HAY.
ANTONIO DE BERAMEUDI.
El Serindar de la Corte elevada por Dios,
BUSILHAM BEN ALI,
á quien Dios en su generosidad le perdone.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Edict, which must be obeyed, since God has caused it to be respected and honoured, having reached the present Governor of the port of Tangier (the protected by God), commanding him to restore to the Queen of Spain the limits of Ceuta in the same sites they were known to occupy in the time of the predecessors of our Lord, whom God assist! the said functionary has, by virtue of the Imperial command, directed, that the limits in question shall be restored to their original position, conformably with the 1st Article; and his reply with regard to the agreement of the 9th of Shaaban of the present year (25 August, 1844), that is to say, to the sites which they occupied in the time of our Lord, the protected by God, and in the time of his predecessors, the generous and purified; and that, to prevent doubt or motive for dispute, pillars and land marks shall be constructed in the presence of Mr. Drummond Hay, the Agent and Consul-General of Great Britain, and mediator between the two Governments (Spain and Morocco) in the presence of the Consul-General and Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain, Don Antonio Beramendi, of Don Antonio Ordonez, Governor of Ceuta, Sid Mohamed Ben Tayeb Cauchaa, Sheikh of the tribe of Angera, and the Kaid in actual command at the lines of Ceuta, Sid Ahmed el Assary. All the above persons have proceeded to the ground to verify the site of the frontier line, and discovered evident marks of the old limits. The first of the limits indicated extends from the sea of the Barranca, Hafats Accadar, on the side of the Tinidac, to the sea of the Khundack Bab-al-arais (Ravine of the gate of the brides), which is a watercourse in the rainy season. The first part of the right side (of this ravine), as you pass to the Barranca of Larais, is within the limits of Ceuta, and the left side belongs to the Moors. The Agent, who acted as mediator, fixed the above-mentioned marks at the said limits, in order that pillars might be erected there of building material or anything else, without regard to number and without opposition, and placed and fixed at the same time, on the low ground between the two said Barrancas, a pillar of stones, with the object of marking better the limits in question, as they used to be in ancient times. With regard to the spring situated at the bottom of the Barranca of Larais, within the territory of Ceuta, both parties shall avail themselves of its water. Either party can place what guards they please on their own frontier line.

A copy of this document was drawn up on the 23rd of Ramadan el Muaden 1260, which date corresponds with the 7th of October, of the year of Mesias 1844.

(Signed) E. W. A. DRUMMOND HAY.
A. DE BERAMENDI.
The Servant of the Court, elevated by God,
BUSILHAM BEN ALI,
whom God in his mercy pardon.

Inclosure 3 in No. 217.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, September* 28, 1859.

THE Spanish Chargé d'Affaires called on me yesterday, to ask for news. I gave them.

To my surprise, he intimated, though he declared he spoke without instructions, that his Government would insist on a very wide interpretation of the third demand in the ultimatum, viz., their right to raise batteries with rifled guns on any part of the old lines and extensive pasturage ground ceded in 1845, and that he should recommend the conclusion of a Convention like that of Melilla, and in that case the range of a cannon would reach beyond the ancient Moorish guard-house, which is occupied by the Sultan's troops. I told him that Spain was not justified in expecting such a concession, and that it would be an infringement of Treaty stipulations, and of all that had been arranged by British mediation in 1845.

He asked me not to write to you or to the British Government, but I have done so *in extenso* to the latter; for I believe that he is holding the language of the President, and that, as I expected, Spain has other aims than mere reparation, and is bent upon war.

I hope the British Government will check ambitious projects, especially attacks on Tangier, since the Sultan will follow our counsels.

I beg you not to mention that Blanco has spoken to me on this subject.

No. 218.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 10, 7 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 9, 6 P.M.

I AM assured that France is encouraging pretensions of Spain against Morocco to a degree which excites their suspicion of their being used to advance French interests.

I hear, also, that Spanish Chargé d'Affaires demand for cession of territory at Ceuta has been disapproved as insufficient.

I addressed a note, last night, in execution of instructions in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, without specifying a period for the Sultan's answer, but have stated verbally that Her Majesty's Government ask for ten days. The Under Secretary of State appears to think that the number of days would be no difficulty, but doubted his Government extending the term at all.

I have assumed in my note that Hay's advising cession of territory will depend on my being able to assure him of finality of demand. No probability of my knowing anything till to-morrow. I have just written a letter, stating my belief that Government were in possession of a reply despatched by Hay some days ago, as to amount of territory asked for at Ceuta, and that I should deeply regret if Spanish Government should have subsequently modified the demand. I have asked explicit information on this point. An impression prevails in town to-day that the President of the Council is determined on war, and the leading men support him.

I have received your despatch No. 82 of the 29th ultimo, and think it right to mention that Foreign Minister considers that Spain, after the given

declaration respecting Tangier, will have a right to occupy, till payment of war expenses by Morocco, any other town of that country except Tangier. I referred him to your despatch No. 69 of the 2nd of September, of which he has a copy, acknowledging, however, that I understood it in the same sense with himself.

No. 219.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 10, 7·15 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 9, 7·15 P.M.

A CONFIDENTIAL note from Foreign Minister states, that though he could himself answer my note of yesterday to-day, he thinks it of sufficient importance to be submitted to the Cabinet, which will probably not meet before Tuesday on account of the Queen's birthday to-morrow.

No. 220.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 15. Secret.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 28, 1859.

KHATEEB has informed me that the pretender, Mulai Abderrahman, who lately appeared before Fez, and was driven away by the inhabitants of that city and the neighbouring tribes, as reported to your Lordship, was generally believed, from the correspondence which has been discovered, to have been encouraged in his attempt by French intrigue. I had heard some years ago, and I think I reported the circumstance in a private letter to the Foreign Office, that this prince, who is an old man of seventy-five, and son of Mulai Soleyman, the predecessor of the late Sultan, was in correspondence with the French. It does not appear, as far as I can learn from Khateeb, that any letters of the French Government or French officers have been found, but only letters from Arab chiefs in Algeria, known to be native officers in the employment of the French Government.

The chief friend and correspondent of the Pretender has been beheaded, and other partizans of his have fled, and their houses and property at Fez have been destroyed by the populace.

I recommended Khateeb not to give too ready a belief to these suppositions, based as they are on imperfect evidence; and added that, even if the suppositions were found to be corroborated, the policy of the Moorish Government would, under any circumstances, be, to appear to ignore totally any intrigue which, if it existed, I intimated may have originated from subordinate military officers in Algeria. I thought it prudent to give this counsel, which Khateeb promises to follow. Khateeb showed me also, in great confidence, a letter to an intimate friend of his at Tetuan, from an intelligent but intriguing Algerine, a resident at Tangier, named Ahmed Boudarba, who speaks French fluently, and is a frequenter of the French Mission. In this letter Boudarba, after telling his correspondent that France is now the first and most powerful nation in the world; that all nations appeal to the Emperor as mediator; that he is the protector of the weak against the strong; and a man who is ready to act energetically when his advice is not listened, to recommends that Khateeb, if he desires to arrange the Spanish question amicably, should write to Viscount Castellon, and appeal to him for advice and good offices; whereupon (Boudarba assured his friend) Khateeb would find, within twenty-four hours, a great change in the conduct of the Spaniards. He warns Khateeb against putting much confidence in my good offices, though he acknowledges I am a friend of the Moors; but he says, the British Government will confine itself to words, and, if these fail, the Spaniards will do what they please. Khateeb told me he had requested his friend to reply to Boudarba,

that he was not confirmed in his post as Minister, and therefore could take no step whatever. Khateeb then told me, he thought the proposition had emanated from a member of the French Mission with whom Bourdarba is in communication; that, putting aside the policy of the Moorish Government to hug the British alliance, and look to Her Majesty's Government solely for disinterested counsel, M. Castellon had never offered one word of friendly advice to the Moorish Government regarding their differences with Spain, neither now nor during the difficult negotiation of the Melilla boundary; and that he (Khateeb) was not going to fall into Boudarba's snare by rejecting the good councils and offices of Great Britain, and putting himself into the hands of the French.

I again warned Khateeb against letting it appear that he thought the proposition had emanated from the French Mission; and I recommended that if M. Castellon did offer any counsels to the Moorish Government on the present question with Spain, it should be taken by him in a friendly spirit; and that due deference should be shewn to the advice of the Agent of a great Power like that of France.

I think it right to mention to your Lordship that this is not the first time, as will be found on reference to my private letter to Mr. Hammond, that Boudarba has played the part of an intriguer against British influence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 221.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 10.)

(Private.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, September* 28, 1859.

I HOPE Lord John Russell will find that I have lost no time in following up his Lordship's instructions, and that I have made every exertion to induce this Government to accede to the Spanish demands. The fact of my not having kept a copy or translation of the Arabian letter I dictated at Tetuan, is, I avow, irregular; but I had an aim in impressing on the mind of Khateeb that there was not a moment to be lost, and that it was necessary I should reach Gibraltar before night, to telegraph to Mr. Buchanan progress of negotiation. Indeed, had I delayed another hour at Tetuan, there would have been difficulty in getting over bar. Mr. Green and I were nearly swamped in the breakers the previous night. Moreover, I must tell you, what with sea-sickness, no sleep, and fatigue, I was not fit for scribbling. As you will learn by my despatch No. 14 of this date, I think the Spaniards are bent on mischief, and that, as I apprehended all along, fresh pretexts will be found for a quarrel with the Moors, unless the British Government let the Don understand he cannot be permitted, if the Sultan accedes to their present demands, to give an unjustifiable interpretation to the third demand in the ultimatum, and that because the Sultan agrees to allow the guard-house to be erected, that the Spaniards are to claim, contrary to treaty, stipulations, and assurances given through British mediation in 1844, that no building would ever be erected on pasturage ground. No doubt if our Government takes a stand, M. Blanco's "small talk," as he chose to call it, would not turn out to be, as I am sure it is, the inspiration of O'Donnell. I think Collantes must be kept a little in the dark by the President, or else he misleads Buchanan in assuring him Spain desires peace. Why this expense of sending 32,000 men to Algeciras, material, ships, &c., before the Moorish Government has even rejected their demands, if they are not decided on war? From what Blanco has let drop, I have no doubt the Governor at Ceuta was merely laying a trap for a conflict with the Augerites, when he commenced the building. Blanco said as much; and though he is a sad l——r, he told me he sympathized with the Augerites for having been excited by the display of flags and forces to attack the Spaniards. (I took care, of course, not to say, I also sympathized with the Moors.)

I am persuaded the Spaniards never expected the Sultan could accede to

their humiliating demands, and therefore hoped for war, and that it would not be necessary to show to the world, by exposing their real object was conquest, and to break through existing Treaty stipulations. Now Blanco sees the game is up, and that the Sultan will grant their demands, and therefore is concocting other impossible or preposterous concessions.

With regard to the information which Mr. Buchanan imparts in his despatches contained in Lord John Russell's No. 7, to me, I think it right to tell you he has been greatly misled by Spanish accounts and by Spanish Ministry. There have not been twenty Moors killed since the commencement of the conflicts. The Moors, lying in ambush, have picked off far more Spaniards than they have lost. The affair of the 13th instant was the only defeat of the Moors, when they lost eight. The Augera guard of forty men having been attacked by two Spanish regiments, one gallant young Moor having fired his musket, drew his sword, and killed two Spaniards in cutting his way through a line of soldiers. He has a dozen bayonet stabs in his body. So far from the Augerites being discouraged, they long for the day when the Spaniards will march into their wooded mountains. Blanco himself ridiculed the accounts in Spanish papers, and said he did not believe a thousand Moors had been assembled on any one occasion, and that then the Spanish garrison had not sallied. The Augerites are still busy getting in their harvest, but they cannot muster more than 1,500 muskets.

You will observe that my strongest arguments with the Moorish Government have been the expediency of the Sultan chastising his unruly subjects for making war without his consent, and the policy of not playing the game of the Spaniards, which would be resistance to their demands.

The Sultan, by punishing the Augerites for defending their country will be acting a very unpopular part, and had he not been hitherto so very successful in his march through the country and submission of the tribes, I should have even feared revolt in the Northern Provinces. As it is, he will make a bad beginning, but of the two evils, I thought concession and all the risk of internal trouble was the best. Will it not, however, be shameful if the Spaniards produce fresh demands? Blanco has not kept his promise of sending me a Spanish copy of the ultimatum, and stupid Khateeb had not kept a copy. If what Blanco says is correct regarding the wording of the 3rd Article of ultimatum, he did not understand it, as will be seen by his letter to me and language to Reade. Both from despatches to Mr. Buchanan and to Admiralty from the Foreign Office, I perceive that even if Spaniards make a landing at Tangier, and take possession, our naval officers are not authorized to resist. The Spanish Government have certainly been told such a step would be viewed by Her Majesty's Government in a very serious light, but the Admiral tells me his instructions would not authorize him to interfere except in an amicable manner, and certainly not to prevent a landing and occupation of Tangier, as had been clearly signified to the Spanish Government on a previous occasion. The Admiral agrees with me in thinking that a display of line-of-battle ships at Tangier, to look on at bombardment and seizure of Tangier would not be very politic, and that if Her Majesty's Government will admit of such a proceeding, it would be better only to send small ships to embark British subjects and property here and on the coast, for we shall have horrid anarchy and revolution throughout the interior if war is begun. I cannot help fearing that the Spaniards will find an excuse for war and an attack on Tangier. Why are troops assembled at Tarifa in front of Tangier? We had yesterday one frigate and four Spanish steamers in our bay. Troops are pouring into Ceuta. Reade, I and Green, come what may, shall stick to our posts till the last to watch proceedings and shall not embark unless ordered to do so by Lord John Russell. Shells rarely kill in a town, and I hope the Moors will continue to respect us English. If the Spaniards entered we might perhaps be roughly handled, though of course my rôle would be solely a pacific speculator. It is a curious coincidence that the day I started for Tetuan to counsel concession, French native protegés are said to have had a hint from the French Mission to embark their property. The town was thrown into consternation by seeing French Interpreters busy in embarking property. My return, and the rumour spread by my people that all will yet be arranged, has allayed the panic. I do not attribute this to any order from the French Government, but poor weak Castellon is jealous of my influence, and I suppose cannot help now and

then trying to take the wind out of my sails. I send you a letter I have received from Mr. Glynn. . . . . I don't think he knows much about what is passing. For the present, we have no further tidings of conflict on the Algerine frontier. As I said to you in my private letter when I sent in memorandum to Lord John Russell, it would be a very favourable moment for the Sultan to die just now. After the bleeding in men and money the French have had in Italy, I do not expect, as all pretenders to the throne have failed, that we shall have any complication for the present on the part of France. I have not, however, altered in any way the opinions I put forward in that memorandum, only circumstances have combined to check ambitious views of France in the Straits at this moment.

This is such a terrible long letter, so I will not tell you of a most curious and interesting conversation I had at night in the railroad with a French Colonel, Commandant of Blidah. He took me. from my knowledge of Arabic, coming from Paris, &c., &c., for a French employé of their Mission at Tangier, and confirmed all I had heard of plans at Algeria and Paris for the conquest of Morocco. "It is put off," said the Colonel, "in consequence of war in Italy, for four or five years." I must give you on another occasion a relation of this amusing rencontre, where my dark face and beard has misled the chattering Frenchmen. Of course, I never said I was French, or who I was, but allowed him to talk. Don't suppose I pin my faith on such information, but it confirms what I can assure you has been discussed at head quarters in Paris.

I shall keep up friendly communication with my slippery colleague Blanco, and cultivate also an *entente cordiale* with my jealous colleague Castellon.

I hope Her Majesty's Government will never allow the Spaniards to put their foot into Tangier. Once in, I don't see how we are to get them out, without going to war.

The Sultan will be sadly perplexed when he finds that, notwithstanding his compliance with our counsels (if he does comply), he has not surmounted the difficulties of the question. My influence and Khateeb's will fall to zero. A word from our Government may act like the magician's wand, and change Blanco's language into mere *bavardage*. Pardon my writing thus *in extenso* what comes uppermost, but I think it best to tell all I foresee, and you can sift the grain from the chaff before communicating it to Lord John Russell.

The Admiral and I get on capitally together!

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—The Sultan is becoming popular for his liberality to troops and every one.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure in No. 221.

Vice-Consul Glynn to Mr. D. Hay.

My dear Sir, *Algeciras, September* 23, 1859.

I HAVE received your note of the 20th instant, and have much pleasure in sending you a detailed account of movements of troops in this neighbourhood, and will keep you informed, from time to time, of whatever may occur here of any interest. I have already given extensive details to his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, and to my chief, Her Majesty's Consul at Cadiz, so that Her Majesty's Government must be in full possession of all the movements.

I understand that the Spaniards have an eye on Tangier and Tetuan, so as to destroy our influence in the Mediterranean, if they be allowed; also an expedition of about 30,000 or 40,000 French marching on Fez with an eye to the treasure. I should think it would not be very difficult to have that brought down to Tangier, and even embarked for Gibraltar, if necessary,—so that, on their arrival, they might find an empty chest.

I have this moment received the "Gibraltar Chronicle" of the 21st instant, in which are inserted all the details of the forces intended for Africa at

present; these are correct, with the exception that the regiment "Rey," and Cazadores "Madrid" and "Barbastro," instead of being in Algeciras, are in Ceuta. As you might not have received a "Chronicle" from Gibraltar, I inclose mine. The mountain artillery mentioned, have arrived here to day with, I understand, 100 mules. I have not seen them assembled yet; there are twelve pieces. I avail myself of the opportunity of one of the men belonging to the English felucca "Clara" returning to Tangier to remit you this.

I remain, &c.

GEORGE R. GLYNN.

P.S.—The screw-steamer "Pateño" [?] left this at about 2·30 P.M., for your place and Tangier.

G. R. G.

No. 222.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Tangier, September* 29, 1859.

YESTERDAY night I received a telegram from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, of which the inclosed is a copy.

The language of the Spanish Minister to Mr. Buchanan tends, I think, to confirm the opinion I had formed of the intentions of the Spanish Government, from the purport of M. Blanco's "chat," as he called it, on his visit to me on the 27th instant, as reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 14 of yesterday's date.

I am glad to find that the language I held to M. Blanco, when replying to his proposition regarding the erection of batteries on the neutral ground of Ceuta, and extension of territory, corresponds in its purport with that of Mr. Buchanan, viz., that the Spanish Government ought not to put forward such demands as a condition of peace, but after friendly relations have been re-established, to endeavour to obtain by peaceful negotiation, any concession of that nature from this Government, by proving that Spain has no hostile intention against Morocco, but merely desires to insure the garrison of Ceuta from the attacks of an enemy from the sea.

I should mention to your Lordship that, as far as I can recollect, the territory and neutral ground at present in possession of the Spaniards, extend upward of a mile from the walls of the town, and far exceed the territory possessed by the British at Gibraltar.

Since the conclusion of the Convention regarding the delimitation of Ceuta in 1845, I have never heard of any outrage being committed by the Augerites on the garrison, though some Spaniard, I believe, was on one occasion wounded or killed, having been discovered smuggling over the Moorish lines.

The state of relations between Ceuta and the neighbouring district was of a totally different character from the hostile feelings existing between the Reefians and the Spanish garrisons of Melilla and Alhucemas. It appears to me, therefore, that the Spanish Government having in view, from the first, a conquest of territory, had sought to produce the late conflict at Ceuta to find an excuse to go to war with Morocco, and endeavour to seize by force of arms, that which neither by Treaty stipulations nor by the established laws of nations, they had a right to claim.

It is unnecessary for me, perhaps, to remark to your Lordship that the Sultan will lose confidence in the counsels of the British Government, if after agreeing to follow their advice, and accept the ultimatum, he finds fresh and unreasonable conditions are to be reimposed on him. Any influence I may have attained with this Government or people, is based on their knowledge and conviction, that I have never misled them or given them advice which it was not their interest to follow. During the Spanish negotiation I regret, however, to say, that placing reliance on Spanish good faith and honesty of purpose I have, on more than one occasion, been deceived, and compelled to tell this Government, that if I had foreseen the tergiversation of Spanish diplomacy, I should not have assumed the responsibility of urging the Moorish Govern-

ment, without obtaining on the first place some guarantee, to follow that conciliatory and straightforward course they have pursued throughout the conduct of their negotiations with M. Blanco.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 222.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Madrid, September 27, 1859.

(Telegraphic.)

I CONGRATULATE you on contents of your telegram of yesterday. Spanish Government decline to name a later day than the 15th October for Sultan's answer.

I wrote to you on Sunday that the Foreign Minister was asking for new delimitation of the lines of Ceuta, as a security against future collisions. I have remonstrated against such a proposition being made a condition of peace, and shall continue to insist, if it is put forward, on its being a question for negotiation, with a view to advantage both parties.

No. 223.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 418.)

Madrid, October 1, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Excellency the translation of a note which I have received from Señor Calderon Collantes, dated the 26th ultimo, and which is an answer to my note of the 11th ultimo, offering the good offices of His Majesty's Government for obtaining an adequate reparation from the Government of Marocco for the offences committed against the garrison of Ceuta by certain subjects of the Sultan in the vicinity of that fortress.

The inclosure was forwarded to me on the evening of the 27th ultimo, some hours after I had informed Señor Calderon Collantes that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had induced the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs to recommend the Sultan to accede to all the demands addressed to him by the Spanish Government, and it thus affords a curious instance of the false pride of this Government and nation. Though aware of the value of the assistance which they have received from Her Majesty's Government in the arrangement of their differences with Morocco, and, I believe, not ungrateful for it, the Government appear to fear that any acknowledgment of the obligation would humiliate them in the eyes of the Moorish Government, and expose them to the taunts of their political opponents, and to the obloquy of all classes of their countrymen.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 223.

Señor Collantes to Mr. Buchanan.

(Translation.)

Palace, September 27, 1859.

Sir,

THE Government of the Queen, my August Sovereign, have learnt with satisfaction the contents of the note which you did me the honour to address to me at San Ildefonso on the 11th instant.

They could not doubt that, knowing the principles which guide their policy, you would have reported to your Government the rectitude of their

intentions in the serious question which has arisen with the Moroccan Empire.

We have had frequent occasions of conferring together upon the situation of Spain with respect to Morocco. The claims put forward by the Government of the Queen, in order to obtain a due indemnity for the losses inflicted by African pirates on Spanish commerce by the capture of several vessels, and the negotiations carried on for fixing the limits of the fortress of Melilla, and for preventing the repetition of the attacks of which it was daily the object, have afforded me opportunities of expressing to you the sentiments of the Queen's Government.

Just as they considered that they had attained the objects which they had proposed to themselves, by the solemnization of the Treaty, signed at Tetuan on the 25th ultimo, by the Plenipotentiaries of the two Governments, an unexampled outrage committed by the frontier Moors of Ceuta took place, thus creating for Spain an engagement of honour which her dignity has not permitted her to decline.

While she may have been able to regard with indifference or contempt the constant violations of her territory, and the impotent attacks directed against her fortresses, a passive attitude on her part after the insult offered to her arms, would have been interpreted as evidence of weakness or cowardice.

It has been, therefore, indispensable to demand the most solemn acts of reparation, and the evident justice on which these are based, together with the means at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government, will, doubtless, suffice to obtain them.

The question which has arisen is of so serious a character, and affects so profoundly the honour and dignity of Spain, that it is not permissible for her to accept the interposition of the good offices which you have offered by virtue of instructions from your Government, notwithstanding that the noble and friendly sentiments which have suggested this step to them are fully appreciated by the Cabinet of Madrid.

The Government of the Queen desire earnestly to preserve the blessings of peace in all parts of the world, but, on the expiration of the term specified to the Moroccan Government for giving the satisfaction demanded, they will consider themselves at liberty to act as the honour and dignity of Spain may require, in the assurance that Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and those of the rest of Europe, will acknowledge that, while Spain has shown the firmness proper to a people who are jealous of their good name, she has not belied that moderation which has at all periods distinguished her conduct.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) SATURNINO CALDERON COLLANTES.

No. 224.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 428. Confidential.)

Madrid, October 6, 1859.

My Lord,

ON the 27th instant I received a telegram from Mr. D. Hay, of which I forwarded a copy the same day to your Lordship, reporting the successful issue of his conference with the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tetuan, and at an interview which I had immediately afterwards with M. Calderon Collantes I communicated to him the substance of Mr. Hay's message, and suggested that a few days should be added to the term already agreed on for receiving an answer from the Sultan to the Spanish ultimatum. His Excellency said he had not found his colleagues willing to admit the expediency of prolonging that term beyond the 15th of October, and that its extension would now be unnecessary, as Seid Mohamed Khateeb expected an answer in thirteen days to the letter which he had addressed to the Sultan. Besides, if the answer were delayed on the road, or did not arrive before the 15th of October, it could not fail to do so before hostilities could commence, as some days would be required for preparations before the expeditionary army could sail for Africa.

I did not therefore urge the point further, but I said that previously to his Excellency's proceeding to a Cabinet Council which was about to meet, I must recur to our last conversation on the subject of the Spanish demands which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 411, Confidential, of the 25th ultimo, and to the intention which he had then announced of asking for an increase of territory round Ceuta. I said it was too late for the Spanish Government to put forward such a pretension after they had informed the French Ambassador and myself that their demands merely required security for existing rights, and after the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had commenced their demands in a formal ultimatum to the Moorish Minister, and Seid Mohamed Khateeb, by the advice of Her Majesty's Government, had recommended the Sultan to accede to them. I said that the addition of a new claim to the ultimatum would now be justly complained of by the Government of Morocco, and Her Majesty's Government and all other foreign Governments would, I was assured, be of opinion that Her Catholic Majesty's Government would be acting in a manner which they could not approve if they made the new claim a condition of peace.

M. C. Collantes replied, that the state of things had considerably changed since the Spanish ultimatum had been presented to the Governor of Morocco, and great expenses had been incurred in military preparations, principally because it had been necessary to extend the period for receiving an answer from the Sultan.

I said it was nevertheless too late to use an argument of this kind; for if the delay which had occurred could warrant the Spanish Government in increasing the amount of satisfaction which they had originally demanded, a statement to that effect ought to have been made when the additional time for answering the ultimatum was granted, and if any proposal was now made for increasing the territory round Ceuta, it ought to be suggested as a mere question of expediency, and form the subject of an amicable negotiation.

His Excellency did not altogether admit the justice of my observations, but he promised to endeavour, when the question came before the Cabinet, to prevent its assuming a form likely to impede the settlement which there was reason to hope might be obtained from the Moorish Government.

On my return home, however, after this conversation, I thought it would be expedient to state to M. C. Collantes in writing, that a demand on the part of the Spanish Government for an increase of territory round Ceuta would be entirely at variance with their own declarations, and with the positive assurances which I had myself received from the President of the Council, and I therefore addressed the confidential letter to him, of which I inclose a copy herewith.

On the 29th ultimo, I had also some conversation on the subject, with Marshal O'Donnell, when his Excellency said that as the Moors can annoy the garrison of Ceuta, by their fire from certain heights in the neighbourhood, the security which had been required for the place could not be obtained, unless these heights were included in the Spanish lines. I replied, that this might be true, but he had himself distinctly told me only a few days previously, when I asked for information on the subject, that additional territory would not be asked for, and that it would be for the Sultan to arrange how he would fulfil the engagement which he would contract to secure the Spanish fortresses against insult. If therefore, I said, the Sultan considered he could do so by maintaining an adequate force in the neighbourhood of Ceuta, he would be perfectly justified in declining to accede to the wish of the Spanish Government to obtain an increased rayon round the fortress.

On the 3rd instant, I learnt from one of my colleagues, that he had authentic information that the Government had extended the term for answering their ultimatum to the 15th instant, but that they had added at the same time a new condition to the ultimatum, which required that the Spanish territory round the fortress of Ceuta should be considerably increased. I therefore dispatched the telegram of which I inclose a copy to Mr. Hay, urging the expediency of the Moorish Ministers acceding if possible, to the original Spanish demand before the 6th instant, and as it appeared possible that M. C. Collantes either did not intend to reply to my note of the 24th ultimo, requesting an extention to the 15th of the term granted to the Moors for replying to the ultimatum, or intended to postpone answering it until after the 6th, and then

merely to accept the proposal of Her Majesty's Government on the condition above referred to, I addressed to his Excellency the note marked Confidential,* of which a copy is inclosed, reminding him that when he informed me on the evening of the 24th ultimo, that the request of Her Majesty's Government was granted, he said nothing of conditions; and stating that he had communicated immediately the information which I received from him to Her Majesty's Government and to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, and that therefore, should the Moorish Minister, trusting to any communication made to him on my authority, or from any other cause be unprepared to answer the Spanish ultimatum on the 6th instant, Her Majesty's Government would be entitled to consider Her Catholic Majesty's Government engaged to them to extend unconditionally, the term for answering it to the 15th instant.

I trusted, however, that the difficulty might be got over by the authority which I received from your Lordship on the 3rd instant to instruct Mr. Hay to support the Spanish claim for a new delimitation of the territory round Ceuta, if it were not made a condition of peace, and I accordingly offered to forward the instruction to Mr. Hay, of which I inclose a copy herewith, if M. C. Collantes would agree to the terms in which it was drawn up. His Excellency, however, I regret to say, while he repeated the assurances of his anxious desire to avert a war and to satisfy public opinion in Spain, without violating his professions of moderation, could not or would not perceive that he was not acting with perfect justice and good faith in adding an additional Article to his ultimatum. I told him, therefore, that whatever his view of what was right might be, he was doing what I could neither approve nor support, and that Mr. Hay especially, who had recommended the Moorish Government to accept the original demands of Spain, could not now advise them to take a new one into consideration except as a subject for negotiation.

With reference to my confidential note, complaining that the additional claim was inconsistent with the manner in which he had agreed to the request of Her Majesty's Government, that the term for answering the ultimatum should be understood to be the 15th instant, M. C. Collantes endeavoured to show that he had explained to me, on the 24th ultimo, when he granted the new term, that he did so as much in consequence of a request addressed to him through M. Blanco, by the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, as of that made to him by Her Majesty's Government, to which I replied that he had certainly told me that his own agent in Morocco had recommended forbearance to the Spanish Government, and the justice of extending the term, but that it was clearly understood by me, from his explanation, that though M. Blanco's representation justified the Government in granting the extension asked for, they preferred naming a new time out of deference to a wish expressed by Her Majesty's Government, to acceding to the application of the Moorish Minister in consequence of the excitement and impatience prevailing among the Spanish public, and the dissatisfaction which a new concession would occasion.

I have to apologize to your Lordship for trespassing on your time with these details, but they seem indispensable to give a correct idea of the manner in which the objectionable condition of peace has been brought forward, and continues to be insisted upon; and they will also show how difficult it is to reconcile the declarations or understand the intentions of Spanish Statesmen, as M. C. Collantes yesterday renewed his declaration that he would do everything in his power to prevent the claim for a new delimitation of Ceuta becoming an obstacle to an amicable settlement with the Moorish Government, at the same time that he refused to withdraw it as a condition of peace.

After I left M. C. Collantes, I received Mr. Hay's telegram of the 4th instant, which I forwarded to your Lordship on the 5th and 6th instant, respectively, and from which it appeared almost hopeless, unless the original ultimatum was accepted before the 6th instant, and a strong case made out against the Spanish Government that any concession would be obtained from Madrid.

As the latter eventuality, however, was not impossible, I thought it expedient to acquaint Mr. Hay that I had been authorized by your Lordship to instruct him to recommend the Sultan's Government to accept the Spanish proposal respecting the Ceuta territory as a fit subject for negotiation, if I could induce the Spanish Government not to make it a condition of peace;

* Cancelled this day at desire of M. Collantes, to prevent a useless discussion if he answered it. —A. B.

and I therefore amended the draft of instructions which I had hoped to convert into the record of an arrangement between M. Collantes and myself, so as to suit the circumstances, and I forwarded them to Mr. Hay in the form of which a copy is inclosed above, and as I am of opinion that it would be better for the Sultan to accept the Spanish demand, than to engage in a war which I feared would be most disastrous to his country, I ventured to add an expression of this opinion, in which I trust I have not gone further than your Lordship will approve.

Yesterday, I received the satisfactory intelligence that the Sultan had acceded to the original ultimatum, but I regret to say that it has made no change in the intentions of the Spanish Government to insist upon his accepting their demand for an extension of the Ceuta territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 224

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Mon cher M. Calderon, *Madrid, le 27 Septembre* 1859.

EN me référant à notre conversation de toute à l'heure au sujet d'une nouvelle délinéation des lignes de Ceuta, je me trouve obligé de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence une conversation que j'ai eu l'honneur de tenir avec son Excellence le Président du Conseil, le 17 du courant, et que j'ai rapportée immédiatement à mon Gouvernement.

Je l'ai prié de vouloir bien me faire savoir ce que le Gouvernement Espagnol entendait par "des sécurités" pour leurs forteresses, et spécialement si le bruit était vrai qu'on pensait à demander un nouveau rayon autour de Ceuta. A cette question M. le Maréchal m'a répondu de la manière la plus positive qu'on n'allait pas demander une extension du territoire Espagnol, mais dans le cas où la guerre deviendrait necessaire, on profiterait sans doute de l'occasion pour obtenir une amélioration des lignes de la forteresse.

J'ai la conviction que je ne me suis pas trompé dans ce que m'a dit M. le Maréchal à ce sujet, et le sentiment pénible que me ferait éprouver un changement dans les intentions du Gouvernement Espagnol à cette heure-ci, sera, j'en suis sûr, mon excuse d'avoir offert ces explications à votre Excellence.

J'ai la satisfaction de pouvoir lui confirmer la nouvelle que je lui ai donnée ce matin, que Seid Mohamed Khateeb a reçu sa nomination comme Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Maroc, le 26 du courant, et a écrit hier au Sultan recommandant à Sa Majesté d'adhérer aux demandes de l'Espagne, telle comme elles ont été formulées par M. Blanco del Valle. Le Ministre Marocain s'attendait à reçevoir une réponse à sa lettre en treize jours, et il se proposait de rendre à Tanger vers le commencement du mois d'Octobre.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 224.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 3, 1859, 3 P.M.

I UNDERSTAND Spanish Government will endeavour to introduce a demand for increased territory at Ceuta, into their extension of term for answering ultimatum, I have got no official answer, and therefore it is probably intended not to answer till after 6th. I shall maintain that unconditional confidential answer precludes such a pretension, but it may be of the utmost importance that Sultan's Minister should accede to original demands before the 6th.

Inclosure 3 in No. 224.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Sir, *Madrid, October* 3, 1859.

A RUMOUR has reached me that Her Catholic Majesty's Government have given out that they have attached to the extension to the 15th instant of the term which they have granted to the Moorish Government for answering the ultimatum delivered to them on the 15th ultimo a new demand, according to which the rayon round the fortress of Ceuta would be considerably increased. Although I do not place much faith in such rumours, I think it necessary, while I am without an answer to the note which I addressed to your Excellency on this subject on the morning of the 24th ultimo, to remind you that on the morning of the same day your Excellency informed me verbally, after having submitted the request of Her Majesty's Government to the Council, that the extension of the term asked for by them was granted; and to state that I consequently considered myself duly authorized to communicate that information to Her Majesty's Government and to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affairs in Morocco, and that, should the Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs, trusting to any communication made to him on my authority, in consequence of an unconditional declaration which I received from your Excellency, not be prepared on the 6th instant to accede to the original demands of the Spanish Government, the Government of the Queen, my Sovereign, will be entitled to consider Her Catholic Majesty's Government engaged towards them to extend the term for doing so unconditionally until the 15th instant.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 4 in No. 224.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

Amended form sent to Mr. D. Hay, October 6.

Sir, *Madrid, October* 6, 1859.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 25th ultimo, on the subject of the intention of Her Catholic Majesty's Government to propose that the Spanish territory round Ceuta, should be increased (by applying to it the principle which was adopted in the Convention lately concluded, for extending the zone round Melilla, I have much satisfaction in informing you that I do not) believe it is intended to argue that the proposal can be insisted upon as a legitimate sequence of the Sultan's (engaging to grant new securities to the fortresses, by his accepting the Spanish ultimatum of the 5th ultimo. As far as I understand the intentions of Her Catholic Majesty's Government, I believe they will on the

(I regret to say I have reason to)

(If not)

(accepting the Spanish ultimatum of the 5th ultimo, because it has been made before His Highness accepted that ultimatum.

I frankly confess that I cannot consider such a claim defensible,

Sultan's acceptance of the ultimatum, merely) propose a new delimitation of the territory around Ceuta, as a subject for negotiation, with a view to preventing collisions in future between the garrison and the wild tribes with which it is surrounded, (and I have reason to hope that a compliance with their wishes on this point, would induce them to be lenient in the exaction of the punishment of the Angeran chiefs, compromised in the late hostilities against the fortress.)

though I can quite understand that Her Catholic Majesty's Government should)

(and if I had had reasons to believe that merely such a proposal would be made.)

(I have therefore to instruct you in conformity with an authority which I hold from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

(I should have instructed you)

to recommend the Sultan's Minister to receive this proposal favourably, and not to reject it without due and mature consideration, and without satisfying himself that it will not attain the object it is intended to do, for if it can be shown that the fortifications are not at present secure from the attacks of armed Moors, there would be reason for extending the rayon round it, and any arrangement which would secure tranquillity on the Moorish-Hispano frontiers, and prevent the recurrence of paltry conflicts, as dangerous to the maintenance of peace between Spain and Morocco, as that which has now nearly caused a serious war, would be undoubtedly an occasion of sincere congratulation to the friends of the Sultan, and to all well-wishers of the Moroccan Empire.

Whatever may be the primary matter in dispute, in such conflicts as we have lately witnessed at Ceuta, the Khabyles are not likely, when they do occur, to act within the limits of international law, and if a new delimitation of the Spanish lines would, as it is alleged, have rendered it impossible for any enemy without artillery to annoy the fortress, it might, indeed, be worthy of the consideration of the Sultan's Government whether a compliance with the wish of the Spanish Government would not prove advantageous to both parties.

As the question now stands, it appears probable that the new delimitation of Ceuta will be insisted upon in addition to the demands to which you recommended the Moorish Government to accede on the 25th ultimo, and though this may not be quite fair to the Maroccan Government, I am of opinion, as Her Majesty's Government consider that the proposal might properly form a subject of negotiation, that the Sultan's Government would best consult the interests of the Maroccan Empire, and be acting most in accordance with the counsels hitherto given to them by Her Majesty's Government, if they did not permit the manner or the time in which the claim has been brought forward to prevent the consolidation of the amicable relations between Spain and Morocco which Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to promote with a view to the welfare of the Moroccan monarchy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

No. 225.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 431.)

My Lord, *Madrid, October* 7, 1859.

HAVING made M. Calderon Collantes acquainted with the contents of your Lordship's despatch No. 69 of the 22nd ultimo, instructing me to ask

the Spanish Government for a declaration in writing, that if in the event of war between Spain and Morocco, Tangier should be occupied by Spanish troops, they will be withdrawn immediately after the ratification of a Treaty of Peace, it was agreed between us that I should address to his Excellency the note of which I inclose a copy herewith for your Lordship's information; and I received this day from him an answer of which a copy and translation are inclosed, and which I trust may prove satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 225.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Sir, *Madrid, September* 27, 1859.

DURING the discussions which took place last winter between Spain and Morocco, respecting the claims of Spanish subjects upon the Sultan's Government, and the zone around Melilla, I did not fail to report to my Government the frequent assurances which I received from your Excellency, that the only object at that time of Her Catholic Majesty's Government was to secure due protection to Her Majesty's fortress, and to Her Majesty's subjects residing in or trading with Morocco, and that they had no intention whatever of making the questions at issue a pretext for territorial aggrandizement in Africa.

These assurances were entirely confirmed by the event, and I have been happy to learn, from the declaration contained in your Excellency's note of the 26th instant, and from the verbal explanations which you have afforded me, on repeated occasions since the new difficulty which has arisen with the Government of Morocco, that no change has taken place in the policy of the Spanish Government, and that they seek for no conquests in Africa, but only propose to obtain reparation for offences which have been offered to them by the Moors of Ceuta, and securities from the Government of the Sultan for that fortress, and Her Catholic Majesty's other possessions in Africa, which will effectually prevent a repetition of the conflicts which have taken place, and maintain hereafter the relations of Spain with the Moroccan Empire on a satisfactory and honourable footing.

The reports of my conversations with your Excellency will thus have already acquainted the Government of the Queen my Sovereign with the sentiments of moderation and justice, which animate Her Catholic Majesty's Government; but it would notwithstanding be a satisfaction to them, considering the interest which they take in the Empire of Morocco, and the importance which they attach to the commerce of Tangier with Her Majesty's possessions in the Mediterranean to learn from your Excellency that the great preparations at present making with a view to military operations in Africa, have not arisen from any change in the views of Her Catholic Majesty's Government, and do not indicate any intentions on their part to make conquests in Morocco or to occupy permanently any portion of the Sultan's territory.

Feeling assured that your Excellency will readily comply with the wish which I have the honour to express to you on this subject, I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 225.

Señor Collantes to Mr. Buchanan.

(Translation.)

Palace, October 6, 1859.

Sir,

I HAVE received the note which you had the goodness to address to me on the 27th of the month last past.

The Government of the Queen my Sovereign, while adopting the measures necessary to obtain, if requisite, by force of arms, the just reparation which they have demanded from the Moroccan Government, continue in their invariable intentions with regard to that country; intentions of which you are cognizant by means of the verbal statements which I spontaneously made to you last year with reference to the question of Melilla, and which have been confirmed by my subsequent notes to you, and by the circular which I addressed on the 24th of September to Her Majesty's Representatives at the Courts of Europe, with the contents of which Don Xavier de Isturiz will have acquainted Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Cabinet of Madrid, as you are aware, do not yield in this question to the impulse of a pre-existing desire for territorial aggrandizement, but are influenced alone by the sacred duty of defending their dignity and the honour of the nation.

They still perserve hopes that the conflict which has arisen from the unprovoked aggressions of which the fortress of Melilla has been the object, may terminate peacefully, but if their conciliatory desires should not be realized, they will endeavour to obtain by other means the punishment of the aggressors, the satisfaction which is due, and the conclusion of agreements which may tend to give efficacious material guarantees for preventing the repetition of similar outrages.

It is to these objects that military operations, should they commence, will be directed. In this point of view, it is easy to understand, knowing the intentions of the Government of the Queen, my Sovereign, that whatever diminution the active commerce which Great Britain maintains with Tangier may suffer in consequence of war, would be of a transitory character, since when once the Treaty of Peace, which should put an end to the hostilities between Spain and Morocco, should be ratified, and the questions now existing should be settled favourably, and therefore definitively, the Spanish Government, in the fulfilment of their intentions, would not continue in the occupation of that fortress, on the supposition that they should have found themselves obliged to establish themselves there, in order to secure the favourable issue of their operations.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) SATURNINO CALDERON COLLANTES.

No. 226.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 432. Confidential.)

Madrid, October 7, 1859.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 69 of the 22nd ultimo having been delivered to me on the night of the 26th by the messenger Grattan, I waited next day on Señor Calderon Collantes, and I thought I could not better execute your Lordship's instructions than by reading your despatch to him.

He expressed great satisfaction with its contents, repeating his former assurances that Spain had no views of conquest in Morocco, and saying, that Her Majesty's Government and the interests of Spain could now be reconciled in a manner which would be entirely satisfactory to him.

In support of the opinion expressed by your Lordship, that the hostile acts

of the Moors had not been entirely unprovoked, I communicated to his Excellency the information which had reached Her Majesty's Government on the subject, and was surprised to find him willing to admit that it might not be altogether unfounded. However, when I subsequently endeavoured to use this admission as an argument against himself, he modified it, by explaining that he only meant to acknowledge that the outbreak had been apparently unpremeditated.

As he was about to attend a Cabinet Council, he said he would submit my proposal immediately to his colleagues, and he requested me to communicate your Lordship's despatch to him for their information.

I said that I would willingly leave it with him, in order that his colleagues might be made thoroughly acquainted with the news of Her Majesty's Government, but as I supposed he would prefer to receive the communication, which I had made to him in a form to which he could conveniently reply, I had drawn up a short note to leave with him for that object, and having read to him a note, which has been since cancelled, but of which I enclose a copy for your Lordship's information, I placed it in his hands.

After three days had elapsed, which I considered sufficient time to reply, I inquired of the Under-Secretary of State whether the Government had decided upon the answer which they intended to give to my communication, and intimated a wish to see Señor Calderon Collantes on the subject.

I was put off, however, with excuses from day to day, and was told that Señor Collantes had been made aware of my wishes, that the note was ready, but had not been yet submitted to the Cabinet, and that the delay was occasioned by the call on his Excellency's time in the first days of the opening of the Cortes.

On the 4th instant, therefore, I went to the Foreign Office, with an official note in my pocket to demand an interview with his Excellency and an immediate answer to the communication I had made to him. I did not, however, deliver this note, as I was assured that his Excellency would see me on the following day, and when I afterwards met him at a "besamanos" at the palace, he appointed, in accordance with the above assurance, an hour for me to wait upon him, and informed me that the answer to my note of the 27th instant was ready and "approved."

During the preceding day, however, I had begun to have some apprehensions that the answer of the Spanish Government might not be quite satisfactory. The tone of the press had become extremely arrogant, and a feeling of irritation was general among the public against England. Marshal O'Donnell had also announced his intention of taking the command in person of the army destined for service in Africa, and had offered subordinate commands to other general officers of distinction. In fact everything out of doors appeared entirely inconsistent with the language held by Señor Calderon Collantes to myself a week previously; and the Under Secretary of State in his confidential conversations with me, began to speak of the proposal of Her Majesty's Government as imposing a humiliation on the Spanish Government.

I was not, therefore, much surprised when I was received by Señor Calderon Collantes on the 5th instant to find, on reading the draft of the answer he proposed addressing to me, that it contained nothing beyond a repetition of his verbal and general assurances that Her Catholic Majesty's Government, in the event of war, would abstain from the permanent occupation or conquest of any portion of Morocco, but that it was entirely silent as to not holding Tangiers as a security for any indemnity which might be demanded for the expenses of the war.

I therefore said that, as this note did not contain the declaration which I was instructed to obtain from His Catholic Majesty's Government, I could not accept it as satisfastory.

Señor Calderon Collantes then endeavoured to prove that it afforded every guarantee for the future which Her Majesty's Government could properly ask for, or which the Spanish Government could properly give; arguing at great length that Her Majesty's Government showed an offensive want of confidence in the assurances of the Spanish Government, and that it would be a humiliation for Spain, as the weaker power to accede to the demands which had been addressed to her.

I told him that the question was one of mere interest, in which there could

be no compromise of dignity on either side, and that his verbal assurances were worthless in a case of this kind, as neither his life nor his possession of power might extend beyond the day; that Her Majesty's Government had acted in this question with the greatest forbearance, had not addressed a word to the Spanish Government which could be construed into a threat, and were prepared to abstain from all interference with the operations of the Spanish army, in the event of war, on receiving a simple engagement from Her Catholic Majesty's Government that Tangier should not be occupied by Spanish troops, after the ratification of peace, as a security for any sum which Morocco might engage to pay to Spain for the expenses of the war.

Under these circumstances, I said, I could not enter into any discussion with him on irrelevant questions. My instructions were precise, and nothing short of an explicit answer to my note would satisfy me; and, perceiving that no more was to be attained by mere argument, I inquired whether I was to consider the document before me the only reply I was to expect, as, if so I should, to my regret, be obliged to deliver a note to his Excellency (with which I had thought it expedient to be provided for this emergency), which would place our relations with regard to the question on an entirely different footing.

Señor Calderon Collantes was evidently not quite prepared for this extremity; and though he held high language as to my being, of course, free to do what I thought best, or what might be prescribed by my instructions, he did not invite me to produce the threatened note, but concluded his observations by saying that the answer had not been yet submitted to the Cabinet, and that, though he himself could not propose any important alterations in it, his colleagues might, perhaps, think fit to render it more explicit.

After leaving his Excellency, I awaited on Señor Comyn, the Under Secretary of State, who was present during a part of my interview with him, and I said that I would tell him frankly that, according to my instructions, I should find it necessary, if I did not receive satisfactory explanations respecting Tangier, to declare that Her Majesty's Government would consider themselves free to adopt such measures as they might think requisite for the protection of British interests; and I said that, though I did not know the exact nature of Admiral Fanshawe's instructions, I believed that final orders had been forwarded to him, with reference to my communication here, and that it would be my duty to acquaint him with the answer which I expected to receive from Señor Calderon Collantes.

I said, however, that as Señor Collantes appeared to object to the manner in which he was called upon for explanations, I was willing to modify the terms of my note of the 27th instant; for, though I had been instructed to obtain from his Excellency such a declaration as Her Majesty's Government required, I did not believe they would attach importance to the form in which I applied for it; and I also wrote, in the course of the evening, two lines to his Excellency confirming what I had said to M. Comyn on the subject.

He therefore, requested me to call upon him yesterday, after the meeting of the Cabinet, when he stated that his chief difficulty in answering the note was not an unwillingness to give the assurances required, but a disinclination to give them at the apparent dictation of Her Majesty's Government. He said he had already given assurances which ought to have satisfied Her Majesty's Government, and that it would be considered by the nation a want of dignity on the part of the Government if they granted those which were now prescribed to them.

He was anxious, however, to give Her Majesty's Government every satisfaction they could wish for, and he hoped I would not object to make it easy for him to do so, and to substitute for my note one in which I should recapitulate the various assurances I had received from him, that the Spanish Government desired no conquests in Africa, and ask him to state, for the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government, that their policy continues to be unchanged, and that they will not occupy, permanently, in the event of war, any portion of Morocco; and he promised, that if I would address such a note to him, he would, in replying to it, make the declaration which Her Majesty's Government require. I trust that I was not departing from the spirit of your Lordship's instructions in consenting to this proposal, and in thus

facilitating to his Excellency compliance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, by enabling him to argue, if factionally accused of truckling to the power of Great Britain, that his declaration was merely a confirmation and development of the assurances which he had already tendered spontaneously to Her Majesty's Government. Señor C. Collantes then said, that he understood if I received the engagement I required that it would only refer to Tangier, and that the Spanish Government would not be precluded from holding temporarily some other port in Morocco as a guarantee for the expenses of the war, if they thought fit to do so.

To this I replied, that he had a copy of your Lordship's instructions to me in his possession, from which he could judge of the views of Her Majesty's Government, and I had certainly myself understood that while your Lordship protested against Spain making any conquests whatever in Morocco, you required that Tangier alone should be evacuated immediately after the ratification of a Treaty of Peace.

I lost no time, after leaving his Excellency, in sending him the amended note, of which a copy is inclosed in my despatch No. 431 of this date; and this morning, in order to prevent all further delay here, and also to ensure the messenger Grattan's arrival without detention on the frontier, I desired him to secure a place in the malle-poste, and I addressed to Señor Calderon Collantes the letter of which I inclose a copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Madrid, September 27, 1859.

Sir,

WITH reference to our late conversations and a verbal communication which I have had the honour of making to your Excellency this morning, on the subject of the differences which have unfortunately arisen between Her Catholic Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of Morocco, I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that I have been instructed by the Principal Secretary of State of the Queen my Sovereign to apply to Her Catholic Majesty's Government for a declaration, in writing, that should these differences end in war, and the troops of Her Catholic Majesty should in the course of hostilities occupy Tangier, their occupation of that place will be temporary, and will not extend beyond the ratification of a Treaty of Peace between Spain and Morocco.

Her Majesty's Government feel it necessary to require this declaration, because an occupation of Tangier till an indemnity be paid for the expenses of the war might become a permanent occupation, and such permanent occupation they consider would be inconsistent with the safety of Her Majesty's fortress of Gibraltar.

Your Excellency will, I have no doubt, readily acknowledge that while Her Majesty's Government are sincerely desirous of maintaining the most amicable relations with Spain, they are bound to provide for the safety of Her Majesty's possessions, and I feel assured you will have no hesitation in giving me a satisfactory answer to this communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 226.

Mr. Buchanan to Señor Collantes.

Mon cher M. Collantes, *Madrid, le 7 Octobre*, 1859.

JE regrette d'être obligé de prévenir votre Excellence que j'ai déjà dépassé le temps qu'on m'a accordé pour re-expédier le courrier de Cabinet qui a été mis à ma disposition pour porter à Londres la réponse que j'espère recevoir de votre Excellence à ma note du 27 Septembre, et que les circonstances exigent qu'il part aujourd'hui.

Pourtant à fin qu'il puisse rester jusqu'au dernier moment il laisse sa voiture par laquelle il aurait dû partir à midi, et vient d'engager une place dans le malle-poste du soir. Je me propose donc de passer au Département d'Etat à une heure après midi, quand je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien me permettre d'avoir l'honneur de m'aboucher avec elle pour donner suite à l'arrangement dont nous sommes convenus hier: et il serait ainsi à désirer que la communication que je m'attend à recevoir de votre Excellence me fût définitivement remise avant les 5 heures, afin que je puisse la faire traduire avant de l'expédier à Londres.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 227.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 12).

(No. 433.)
My Lord, *Madrid, October 7*, 1859.

HAVING heard that M. Calderon Collantes was to receive the French Ambassador to-day before the hour at which he had appointed me to wait upon him, I called upon M. Barrot, and after acquainting him with the acceptance by the Moorish Government, before the 6th instant, of the original Spanish ultimatum, I inquired whether he thought it would be just in the Spanish Government still to insist upon the conditions which they had latterly put forward for an increase of territory round Ceuta, and a right to erect works on the pasturage grounds ceded in 1845.

M. Barrot said that at first sight it would appear that Spain had no right to insist on these new demands as conditions of peace; but it was also to be considered that if the Moors had before the 1st of October, declared that they could not answer the Spanish ultimatum before that day, and asked for a new term, the Spanish Government were entitled to attach new conditions to that term, and all that had formerly passed became null and void.

I said, however, such an intention ought to have been clearly explained to the Moors, and that if it could be shown that the Sultan had not received these new conditions before he accepted the ultimatum his acceptance of it ought to be considered final. I therefore hoped that he would advise the Spanish Government not to persist in a course the justice of which was at least questionable, but to accept the Sultan's accession to the ultimatum, as a sufficient reparation for the past, and to bring forward the new propositions as were subjects for negotiation.

M. Barrot seemed inclined to do this, and assured me that during M. Mons' late visit to Biarritz, the Emperor and Count Walewski had recommended the Spanish Government to act with prudence and moderation, and more especially to pay due deference and respect to the peculiar interests which Her Majesty's Government had in the affairs of Morocco, advice which he was himself, he said, about to repeat to M. Collantes.

From what has however passed between myself and M. Collantes to-day, it is evident that any advice which M. Barrot may have given him respecting the

objectionable conditions, has been useless. He says the claim to erect works on the pasturage lands at Ceuta, was made before the ultimatum was delivered, and also included in it, and that he feels assured the demand for the increased rayon to the fortress will be granted, and that it is absolutely necessary in the interests of peace to make a settlement there, which will prevent new collisions, and the necessity of the Spanish Government keeping a large body of troops at Algeciras to resist or punish the acts of aggression committed by the Moors. He assured me, however, that if he saw any possibility of obtaining the Spanish demands by a few days delay, after the 15th, he would do everthing in his power to prevent the commencement of hostilities, as he felt deeply how much the true interests of the country would suffer from war, upwards of 450,000*l.* having been already spent in merely preparing for it.

I believe him to be sincerely desirous of peace, and to regret the rash and violent measures of Marshal O'Donnell during his absence, which raised an excitement in the country, the Opposition have done everything in their power to increase. An article in the "Espagna," a leading Moderate paper, declares that no satisfaction will or should satisfy the country short of the cession to Spain of the whole coast, from Tangier to Melilla. M. Calderon Collantes says, that if he had been at Madrid when the outbreak took place at Ceuta, he would have sent sufficient troops to Africa to punish the offenders, and have demanded satisfaction from Morocco without a parade of force, or fixing a term in which the satisfaction should be granted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. BUCHANAN.

No. 228.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 12, 1·27 P M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October 11, 4 P.M.*

THE Sierra of Bullones, the limit said to be asked for by Spain, appears to be, according to the map, about two and a half English miles to the westward of the present Spanish frontier.

Her Majesty's Government should be prepared for an immediate declaration of war, if Spanish claims are refused on the 15th.

I hear it is intended to land near Tangier, and occupy that place and Tetuan.

I expect interview this evening with Foreign Minister, when I shall place in his hands a memorandum containing the substance of your Lordship's conversation of the 26th ultimo with Spanish Ambassador, and shall hint that the consequences will be most serious if Spain endeavours to include a position of political importance in her lines, or if she were to declare war to obtain it.

I shall also tell Foreign Minister that I was mistaken in supposing that Hay was instructed to support new demand, and I shall acquaint him with your Lordship's opinion as to the expediency of the question being left for negotiation, though I have no hope of inducing him to adopt it.

No. 229.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October .)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October 11, 1859.*

PRESIDENT of the Council has just declared in the Congress that the 15th instant is absolutely the last day granted to Morocco for answering the Spanish demands.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 230.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 13.)

Madrid, October 12, 1859.

(Telegraphic.)

A COMMUNICATION dated yesterday, from Hay, states that he believes Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has orders to await till the 15th, on board a ship of war, Sultan's answer, and that hostilities will commence if reply is unfavourable. Minister believes it will be favourable, and by secret arrangement with Hay, in pursuance of his advice, he will accept all demands in Sultan's name, if His Majesty's orders have not arrived by 15th. Hay suggests that reasonable time should be allowed for execution of Sultan's engagements. He had received my telegram of the 10th instant, of which a copy is in your Lordship's possession. I did not see Spanish Foreign Minister last night, and therefore have sent him officially a memorandum of the substance of your Lordship's No. 78 of the 26th ultimo, in writing, this day, explaining the views of Her Majesty's Government about boundary of Ceuta. He has confidentially given me reason to hope that no hostilities will take place for some days after the 15th, should the question not be settled on that day.

No. 231.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 13, 5 A.M.)

Madrid, October 12, 10·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

HAY states that my telegram of the 10th reached him last night. No cross-fire of rifled cannon between territory now ceded at Ceuta and Tarifa can command Straits, but if Spain conquers territory opposite Tarifa, called Alcassar, the distance between those two points is only nine miles. Moorish Minister has not received Sultan's answer about new demand of the 15th October, but has power to settle all demands. He wrote yesterday to Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to say all the demands are acceded to, and to ask when he wishes to carry them into execution. I hope all excuse for commencing hostilities is now removed.

No. 232.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, October 13, 1859.

(Telegraphic.)

PRESS upon the Spanish Government that as Moorish Government have acceded to the ultimatum at first sent in, or, at all events, as we and the Moors understood it, the Spaniards would be acting in a most unjustifiable manner if they began hostilities before the Emperor of Morocco had had time to consider and answer the new demand for a rayon round Ceuta, and strongly urge Spanish Government to give time for negotiation on this point.

Desire Mr. Hay strongly to advise Moorish Government to give way on this point.

Send him the following figures (see No. 233.)

No. 233.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

Foreign Office, October 13, 1859.

(Telegraphic.)

STRONGLY advise Moorish Government to give way on new demand for a rayon round Ceuta. Say that the mere extent of ground asked for is in itself utterly insignificant as a portion of the Moorish Empire, and that the possession of it could not give the Spaniards any real additional means of attacking Morocco, if they should be at any time inclined to do so; while, on the other hand, the Spanish possession of this bit of ground might, by keeping the neighbouring tribes further away from Ceuta, prevent many small occasions of difference which, whenever they happen, inevitably tend to create embarrassing questions between Spain and Morocco.

No. 234.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 14, 10·34 A.M.)

Madrid, October 13, 1859, 11 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE requested Hay to inform Admiral that eighty rifled guns have been sent to Tarifa.

Instructions have been sent to Spanish Chargé d'Affaires to require written engagement to execute demands. I hear they may cause new difficulty.

No. 235.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Tangier, September 30, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a telegram I this day addressed, in cypher, to Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, on the receipt of a despatch from his Excellency, dated the 25th instant, inclosing a copy of his despatch to your Lordship, No. 411 of the same date.

Mr. Buchanan and I appear to have taken the same view with respect to the expediency of the Spanish Government not bringing forward fresh conditions regarding a cession of territory at Ceuta, or the admission of the right of the Spaniards to build fortresses on the neutral pasturage ground ceded to Spain in 1845, but that the Spanish Government might, if it thought proper, after re-establishment of friendly relations, endeavour, by an amicable discussion, to attain the object they have in view, especially if they can prove satisfactorily to this Government that their aim is solely to place Ceuta in an efficient state of defence from the attack of any naval Power, and not to facilitate aggressions or offensive operations against the Moors. In the latter case, if your Lordship directed me, I might use my good offices with this Government.

Mr. Buchanan was quite right, when discussing the question with M. Collantes, who had said the proposed fortifications would prove most advantageous as a means of preventing new collisions, to observe that he thought "it would be only to change the position which would be exposed to fire from without." I know the ground at Ceuta. The garrisons of advanced forts would be much more exposed to be harassed by the Moors—if the latter entertained unfriendly feelings against the Spaniards—than at present, when the whole garrison is ensconced behind walls and fortifications, totally impregnable by any Power like that of Morocco.

I am now disposed to infer, both from the language of the Spanish Minister, and from the knowledge of the fact that, during fifteen years, perfect harmony had existed between the Spaniards of Ceuta and their neighbours the Augerites, that the erection of the building as a guard-house, beyond the established line of fortifications, was a mere trap or stratagem resorted to by the Governor of Ceuta to bring about a conflict and hostilities, so as to enable the Spanish

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Government to have a grievance against Morocco, in order, finally, to carry out their project of building forts, mounted with rifled cannon, on the neutral ground, to provide against an attack on the town from a foreign naval Power (not Morocco), which might land a force for that purpose; but it is not just that the Spanish Government should now put forward such claims as a condition of peace. Neither do I feel myself justified in supporting such pretensions at the present moment, without a positive instruction from your Lordship to that purport; for it would produce the very worst effect on the mind of the new Sultan. The confidence His Shereefian Majesty may know his father placed in my counsels would be shaken, and, indeed, I fear lost, when it was found that, notwithstanding His Majesty had followed British counsels, and was about to take a most unpopular step (at a moment when his own power was hardly established over the wild tribes of this country) to satisfy the Spanish Government, fresh and unjustifiable demands had been raised at the last moment, and were then backed by the Agent of Great Britain.

If I was to communicate now to Khateeb even the suspicion of such demands being put forward, and he reported my language to the Sultan, I will not conceal from your Lordship that I fear His Majesty would refuse even to accede to the terms of the ultimatum, and thus put himself in the wrong. My apprehension now is, that some intimation to the Moorish Court will be given, through another channel, of the aim of the Spanish Government, and thus thwart the steps I have already taken. I think it my duty, however, to state distinctly to your Lordship that my humble opinion is, if the Spaniards make the concession of territory at Angera, or the building of forts on the neutral ground, a *sine qua non* of peace, and that even if I support such demands, the Sultan will not accede to them; though, perhaps, with prudence, patience, and friendly counsels, if your Lordship approve the project of the Spaniards, the Sultan might finally accede, at some later moment, to a friendly proposition of that kind, especially if the Spanish Government were disposed to admit, on their part, of some advantageous arrangement in other matters which might be beneficial to the Sultan, without prejudicing Spanish interest. What the concession might be, could be previously arranged with the Moorish Government.

I trust, my Lord, considering all the circumstances of the case, your Lordship will approve of my abstaining from taking any active step to forward this strange and unexpected proposition of the Spanish Government, and as there will not be time to reply, by writing, to this communication, and to my despatch No. 14 of the 28th, before the 15th proximo, the last day of the term granted by Spain, that your Lordship will be pleased to give me your instructions by telegraph.

Though M. Blanco chose to declare that the language he held to me on the 27th instant did not in any way emanate from the instructions of his Government, I think it will be found my report of his conversation contains a clearer exposition of the views of the Spanish Government than even the language of M. Collantes to Mr. Buchanan on the same subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure in No. 235.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, September* 30, 1859.

TELEGRAM of the 27th reached me after despatch of mine of 28th. I am glad to find that your language to Minister, as reported in your Excellency's despatch of 25th September, and mine to Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, coincide. Chargé d'Affaires' language to me was more explicit.

No collision has occurred for fifteen years at Ceuta, until Spaniards produced one by their acts, but Spain wants territory and to raise forts on the pasturage ground contrary to Treaty stipulations. After erection collision with forts would not be prevented more than before, if Moors were unfriendly.

If I report fresh claims to Sultan, he will not concede ultimatum. I should thus be playing into the hands of Spaniards by putting Moors into the wrong.

Let peace be restored, and then let Spaniards try to obtain by negotiation what they ought never to claim by right. I could not ask now for such a concession from Sultan, without instructions, as my influence would then fall to zero.

After peace, if instructed, I would always be disposed to assist Spaniards in obtaining by friendly negotiation that which might be beneficial to them, without prejudice to the Moors.

I think, with Spain, our Representative ought finally to reside at Sultan's Court. I have said so before.

Forward this to Foreign Office.

No. 236.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Tangier, October* 2, 1859.

A LETTER from the Sultan was received by the Governor of Tangier this day, announcing that His Majesty had chastised the rebel tribe, which inhabits the mountains of Beni Hassan, which had for many years resisted the authority of the late Sultan.

The letter was read aloud publicly in the Chief Mosque by the Governor; and I am told that His Majesty especially mentions in his letter that friendly relations should be maintained by the Moors with all Europeans.

One of the Spanish steamers of war now in this Bay saluted on this occasion the accession of Sidi Mohamed to the Throne, with twenty-one guns.

The Governor has, at my request, sent a public crier to-day to proclaim that the Kabyles are not to bring their guns and arms when they visit Tangier and this neighbourhood; and he has chastised severely some wild monntaineers who had insulted a party of Jews when taking a walk on the beach of Tangier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 237.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 22.)

My Lord, *Tangier, October* 5, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches No. 11 of the 24th, and No. 13 of the 26th ultimo.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb arrived here on the evening of the 3rd instant. I had an interview with him early the following morning, and he communicated to me confidentially a copy of the inclosed letter from M. Blanco, which he had just received. I told him that the further term mentioned therein had been obtained through the intercession of Her Majesty's Government, but that I hoped the Sultan would send him orders to accede to the terms of the original ultimatum before the 6th instant, the day the term previously fixed by the Spanish Government expires.

I communicated to him such passages of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 11 and 13, which, I thought, might produce a strong impression on his mind, by shewing that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of affording its support, if Spain entered upon hostilities against this country, and I let him understand that an assurance had even been given to that effect to the Spanish Government.

Khateeb replied, that had he refused to accede to the counsels I had offered on my late visit to Tetuan, and to accept, without demur, the Spanish ultimatum, or that the Sultan did not follow the disinterested and friendly counsels of Great Britain, he would admit that the Moorish Government could not expect any support; but that he was very much surprised and afflicted to learn that the British Government, contrary to the policy it had pursued for so long a time, should abandon Morocco at such a moment, to be exposed to the attack of a

foreign Power, when the Sultan and his Government had declared they were ready to do all that Great Britain might advise them, as consistent with their national honour, and the integrity of the Sultan's dominions.

To these remarks I made no reply, as I did not feel authorized, without further instructions from your Lordship, to venture to modify the warning I had given.

Khateeb dwelt on the injustice of the pretensions of the new demand of the Spanish Government, as noted in M. Blanco's letter, and which was not included in the original ultimatum. He said that, in 1845, the old lines established in 1799 were restored to Ceuta, and the boundary of the pasturage-ground was marked, Great Britain being the mediator; and that now the Spanish Government appeared to ignore that arrangement, and ask for the demarkation of a new boundary, including the high hills in the neighbourhood. He remarked that, under any circumstances, these fresh demands were most unfair, and such as, he thought, the Sultan could never accede to. He added, moreover, that henceforward the Sultan would never believe that an ultimatum was an ultimatum; and that he dare not, before he received the answer to the letter he had sent from Tetuan, on the 26th ultimo, venture to transmit to His Majesty further demands, as the Sultan would suppose he had deceived him.

I suggested that, if Spain desired to build forts on the pasturage-ground, it would be rather to defend herself against attacks from the sea than to erect batteries intended as either works of defence or offence against Morocco, and therefore I thought, perhaps, after a friendly discussion and explanation, some arrangement might be come to.

Khateeb replied, he doubted whether the Sultan and people of Morocco would ever admit of such encroachments on the Moorish territory; "but, be that as it may," he added, "M. Blanco only gives us till the 15th instant, and admits apparently of no discussion, and puts the demand forward as if it had been contained in the ultimatum," which he (Khateeb) declares it was not.

Before I took leave, I repeated to Khateeb the advice I had offered at Tetuan: that, now the Sultan's authority is acknowledged at the principal cities, ports, and districts of Morocco, His Majesty take immediate steps to chastise the Chief and his followers, who were guilty of committing the late outrages on the Algerine frontier.

Late in the evening I received a message from Khateeb, requesting me to call on him. He informed me that M. Blanco had had an interview with him, and had pressed verbally the new demands. Khateeb had replied, as he had done to me in the morning, that, until he received the Sultan's answer, which he daily expected to the orignal ultimatum, he dare not make known to His Majesty that fresh demands were being put forward, even before the term for the ultimatum had expired. M. Blanco had told him that the French and British Governments had entirely approved of the conduct of the Spanish Government. In fact, he held to Khateeb the language which, I find, has been inserted in the "Gibraltar Chronicle" of the 3rd October, herewith inclosed, reporting the telegraphic despatch of the Spanish Ambassador in London to his Government. Khateeb told Mr. Blanco he knew not what the British and Spanish Governments might have arranged between them, but he felt persuaded that all European Governments would acknowledge that the Sultan could not be expected to do more than accede to the terms of the ultimatum which had been presented within the specified term.

M. Blanco complained of Khateeb's giving me early information of what was passing with reference to the present discussion between Spain and Morocco, and said that my reports regarding the intentions of the Moorish Government on Spanish affairs, preceding his own, had a very bad effect at Madrid. As this jealous feeling may really exist at Madrid, I shall take an early opportunity to report to Her Majesty's Minister at that Court M. Blanco's language, so that his Excellency may be on his guard in his communications with the Spanish Ministers.

I urged Khateeb to write in such terms to the Sultan as might induce him to be prepared to make concessions, even to the new and unexpected demands of Spain. I told him that the Spanish people were pushing on their Government to commence hostilities; and though I admitted the Spaniards had acted rather strangely in pressing, at the last moment, such important concession, yet I thought it would be better that the Sultan should give way, than enter upon a

disastrous and bloody war, which might lead to internal revolt, and unforeseen complications.

The Moorish Minister was very dejected, and appeared quite at a loss what step to take; and I must avow, also, I do not see my way sufficiently, nor have I such implicit confidence in the probity of the Spanish Government to feel myself authorized to take any more active steps to further the objects they declare they have solely in view.

With reference to the authority which your Lordship is pleased to give me, to proceed, if necessary, to the Moorish Court, in order that, by a personal conference with the Sultan, my representations might have greater weight and influence, I would not hesitate in setting out for the Court, even at the present moment, when the roads are still infested by hordes of robbers and disorderly tribes, and the life of an European would be placed in the greatest jeopardy, were I to receive instructions from your Lordship to declare to this Government that the new Spanish demands ought to be acceded to, and were the Spanish Government to give Her Majesty's Government a positive assurance that hostilities would not, under any circumstances, be commenced till my return, as, otherwise, the journey would be a needless one, exposing my own life, and those of my companions, as I expect the greatest exasperation will be felt throughout Morocco against the Spaniards, and Christians in general, if the war is commenced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 237.

Don Juan Blanco to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) *October* 3, 1859.

THE Government of Her Majesty the Queen has conceded what your Excellency asked in your letter of the 16th of Safar (which corresponds with the 15th of September), and has agreed to prolong the second term granted to you through my means, in a despatch of the 12th ultimo. However, the present prolongation will indispensably complete the term, and there is no hope that another period will be granted. The prolongation will not be for more than the ten days, and will terminate on the 15th of the present month. Within this period the Court of Madrid expects a final and satisfactory reply from your Sultan to our just demands, which are now pending, on account of the circumstances of the times. We hope that there will then be given a proof of the friendship between each party, and that there will be no motive for breaking it.

Your Excellency must not think there is any hope of obtaining an additional term after this, nor deceive yourself with such an idea, for such a thing is impossible, as our Government is not prepared to listen to your excuses in this affair; nor will it consent, for the important reason that it does not wish its honour to be overlooked in the eyes of nations, whilst great importance is attached to the public insult done to the Spanish flag by the Kabyles of the mountains under the jurisdiction of your master the Sultan. All this, you must understand, will not allow our Government to take into consideration any further propositions. Finally, your Excellency ought to point out to your Lord the Sultan, that all depends on his putting an end to the disturbances which have taken place in the aforesaid territory, and which were caused by miserable and disobedient delinquents, who disturb the peace by their wicked deeds, and thus destroy good harmony between the two Governments.

The suspicions which, as your Excellency states in your letter to us, you entertain against the Governor of Ceuta, arise from wrong information, and have no foundation or existence whatever, and the said Governor has stated the real truth. On the contrary, he has shown patience, and suffered, for many days, the outrages of his neighbours, the mountaineers. It is they who have been disobedient to their Lord the Sultan, by acting in opposition to all international law, and destroying, on the territory of the Spanish Government, the buildings and stores which served as shelter to our guards of soldiers, as well as the Royal mark (column) in front of the Castle, which was situated between the territorial

limits of both parties and another column. Without perceiving their weakness or very limited power, they came repeatedly to assault the walls of the fortress, till your Excellency obliged them to retire from their insolent attacks. From all your own statements it is proved that they had no right to act as they did, and that justice was on the part of the Governor of Ceuta, who has acted well, and who had overwhelming right to act in the manner he has done.

Under these circumstances, upon you rests the responsibility of avoiding the enormous evils which might result from the proceedings of the disobedient fanatics (subjects of your master the Sultan), who gathered together in great numbers to attack the Spanish fortress, and thus infringed again the existing Treaties between the two nations. In order to avoid a repetition of the acts which have taken place on this territory, a repetition which might originate in future serious consequences, and as the Treaties which are at present in force admit of doubts, and give motives for questioning their signification, respecting the space of ground belonging to Ceuta, we are obliged to point out clearly the pretensions of the Spanish Government, that the limits of the said city may once more be marked out, including the high places, that is to say, the neighbouring hills, for the better defence of the place. This is also indispensable for the tightening and strengthening of the bonds of friendship which unite the two nations. It is also necessary to be prepared to settle and arrange amicably the affairs of Melilla, as well as the affairs which Mulai Abderrahman (the peace of God be with him!) arranged with regard to the said affair; and further, to arrange what we required of your Excellency, respecting the past misconduct of the Augera people, who are disobedient, fanatical, and barbarous, as if they were Reefians.

All that is hereinbefore expressed cannot have effect between the two parties unless a written and formal document be drawn up, declaring that a Convention shall be concluded between us, conformably with the foregoing terms, and satisfactory to my August Sovereign.

If, on the 15th of October, or within the term which Her Majesty the Queen, with that generosity which contrasts so much with the ill-treatment we have been subjected to from your people, has granted to you, your Lord the Sultan does not give to the Government of Her Majesty a satisfactory reply to all our demands—demands which will admit of neither retractation nor modification—we shall no longer put up with what we have suffered, but insist that our pretensions be immediately and completely enforced, for it is an affair which we can no longer allow to remain in its present state.

Peace. (Signed) J. BLANCO DEL VALLE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 237.

Extract from the "Gibraltar Chronicle" of October 3, 1859.

THE most important piece of intelligence in the Madrid papers of the 28th ultimo, received since our last, is a telegraphic despatch of the preceding day from London, transmitted by the Spanish Ambassador in that capital, announcing that the British Government had manifested to him, and requested him to acquaint that of Her Catholic Majesty, that they considered Spain had an indisputable right to obtain from the Emperor of Morocco the redress she may think most convenient for the offences received; and, if necessary, to occupy, even though temporarily, Tangier, or any other place on the African coast that may be most convenient to attain their ends.

The British Cabinet also adds that instructions were sent to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Tangier directing him to impress on the mind of the Moroccan Government that, in this question, it ought not to rely on the support of Great Britain, who has judged of the affairs of Africa with that rectitude which redounds in so conclusive a declaration.

No. 238.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Tangier, October* 5, 1859.

THE couriers whom Seid Mohamed Khateeb dispatched to the Sultan immediately after my interview with him at Tetuan, on the 26th ultimo, returned this morning at an early hour.

They brought a letter from the Sultan, of which the inclosed is a translation.

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires had an interview with the Moorish Minister soon after the receipt of the Sultan's letter.

Khateeb tells me he did not inform M. Blanco that His Majesty had acceded to the demands of the Spanish ultimatum out of deference to British counsels, as I had warned him against wounding the susceptibility of my colleague, or unnecessarily increasing his jealousy of my influence.

M. Blanco asked Khateeb not to communicate to him the Sultan's acceptance of the Spanish demands until he had referred to the Moorish Court the new claims which he put forward, yesterday, and which, he insisted, must be acceded to, or hostilities will be entered upon after the 15th instant.

I recommended Khateeb, nevertheless, to lose no time, whatever M. Blanco may have advised, in obeying the Sultan's commands, and communicate to M. Blanco the fact of His Majesty's having acceded to the terms of the original ultimatum, before the expiration of the first term fixed (*i.e.*, the 6th of October), and before the commencement of the new term granted to the Moorish Government by M. Blanco's letter of the 3rd instant.

Khateeb followed my advice, and I have the honour to inclose herewith a translation of the letter he has since addressed to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

I made no remark to Khateeb upon the Sultan's letter, nor shall I address any communication to this Government on the subject (unless any unforeseen event occurs obliging me to do so), until I receive your Lordship's instructions by telegraph or by despatch.

I am happy to add that Seid Mohamed Khateeb has also shown me a letter from the Sultan, inclosing others from Moorish officers on the frontier, reporting the late inroads effected into the French territory by a Moorish tribe under the command of a man named Mohamed Ben Abdallah.

His Majesty expresses his extreme regret that this outrage should have been committed, and promises that he will do all in his power to discover the guilty "ruffians," as he calls them, and chastise them severely. His Majesty gives an assurance of his earnest desire to maintain the most friendly relations with France, and to respect her Algerine territory, and expresses a hope that no further conflicts will take place on the frontier, in consequence of these deplorable occurrences. He directs his Minister to communicate to the French Chargé d'Affaires the substance of his letter, and Khateeb tells me he will do so to-day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 238.

The Sultan of Morocco to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual preamble.) 3 *Raben*, 1276. (*September* 29, 1859.)

WE have received your letter acquainting us with the language held to you by the English Chargé d'Affaires regarding the Spanish question, and we have comprehended all that you submitted and explained to us. Do not fail to tell the Chargé d'Affaires to write to his Government that we are fully persuaded of their friendship, and that they desire the welfare of these dominions, and that they would never wish us to accept improper conditions. We have, therefore, acceded to all they recommend without investigating the proceedings of the Spaniards. We do, therefore, concede the said demands of the Spaniards,

confiding that the British Government will give their attention to the question, if the Spaniards bring forward any further pretensions than those they have mentioned, or should they seek to bring about discussion after this arrangement. We accede to the counsels of the English, even though we have not as yet had an opportunity of consulting with the chief men and counsellors of our dominions, for we are still on our march. In such grave matters it is usual to have a consultation; but the well-known friendship of the English has caused us to act at once, as they recommend.

Peace.

Inclosure 2 in No. 238.

Seid Mohamed Khateeb to Don Juan Blanco.

(Translation.) *October* 5, 1859.

WE received this morning a letter from our Lord the Sultan, sealed with his Royal signet, replying to the letter you had transmitted us containing the four demands of the ultimatum of your Government, which we transmitted to the Sultan immediately on receiving from His Majesty a letter confirming us in our present office, and our Lord orders us to accede to the said demands, for His Majesty desires to continue on friendly and peaceful relations with you, neither can he allow that those relations should be disturbed by the disorderly acts of the Kabyles or others. We thank God that the Sultan's consent to your demands has arrived this day, before the expiration of the term you granted in your letter of last month, and before the new term mentioned in your letter of yesterday had commenced, and which concludes on the 15th October.

I expect soon the troops from our Lord to carry out his orders in Augera, for, as you know, the troops at Tangier would not venture to chastise the Augerites.

Peace. (Signed) SEID MOHAMED KHATEEB.

No. 239.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Tangier, October* 5, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith, copies of the telegrams transmitted, in cypher, by Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid to myself, and from me to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 239.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 3, 1859, 3·30 P.M.

I UNDERSTAND that the Spanish Government will endeavour to introduce a demand for increased territory at Ceuta into their extension of term.

I have got no official answer yet, and therefore it is probably intended not to answer till after the 6th.

I shall maintain that unconditional confidential answer precedes such pretension, but it may be of the utmost importance that the Sultan's Minister should acquaint him to accede to original demands before the 6th.

Inclosure 2 in No. 239.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, October* 4, 1859, 10 P.M.

I RECEIVED the telegram of yesterday, to-night. Have you received the telegrams of September 30 and to-day?

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires visited Moorish Minister to-day. I have since seen the latter.

Chargé d'Affaires demanded that Sultan cede to Spain right of building forts at Ceuta, on pasturage-ground (*vide* Article XV of old Treaty with Morocco, and Convention of 1845). That ground was ceded as neutral, for pasturage.

Minister replied, this demand was not in ultimatum sent to the Sultan; that answer will come in two or three days; that he cannot put forward fresh demand, as Sultan might then refuse original ultimatum; that, after reparation demanded has been given, he would refer to Sultan any pretensions which Spain had to bring forward.

Chargé d'Affaires told Minister England and France approve of demands, and will not support Sulton.

I told Minister not to expect any support from Great Britain, and therefore to cede all he could.

His Excellency said, Sultan would not cede new demand, and read me a letter from His Majesty, telling him to act up to Treaty, and to prevent discussion, but not submit to humiliation.

Send this to Foreign Office, and ask for instructions, to be sent me by telegraph, whether his Lordship approves of new claim, and wishes me to take any further step.

British influence will fall when Sultan discovers we support Spain in new pretensions.

I foresee war, if demand be persisted in, and full time for negotiation be not granted.

Inclosure 3 in No. 239.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, October* 5, 1859.

SULTAN'S letter arrived this day, acceding to original ultimatum. His Majesty says, he accedes out of deference to British counsels, but relies on England if other pretensions are put forward.

Spanish Chargé d'Affaires asked Minister not to communicate to me any news until he had reported it, as it had a bad effect at Madrid.

Your Excellency will know best what to do for future.

Spanish Chargé d'Affaires asked Minister not to communicate to him reply of Sultan till new demand was acceded to; but Minister has communicated it.

Minister sends new demand to Sultan, but has no hope of favourable reply before new term.

Send this on to Foreign Office.

No. 240.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 34.)

My Lord, *Tangier, October* 7, 1859.

THE Moorish Minister communicated to me, yesterday morning, a letter which he had just received from the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy and translation. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires acknowledged therein the receipt of the Minister's letter, making known to him that the Sultan had acceded to the ultimatum, but puts forward his interpretation of the thirdand fourth demands in the Spanish ultimatum,

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

contained in M. Blanco's letter of the 5th ultimo, and insists that the Moorish Government should accept the construction which his Government gives to the terms of those demands, before the 15th instant.

M. Blanco insists that the word "campo" includes all the old lines and the pasturage-ground, and does not take into consideration at all, the fact that Article XV of the Treaty of 1799, between Spain and Morocco, is expressed as follows:—

"Los limites del campo y extension del terreno para el pasto del ganado de aquella plaza." (The boundaries of the territory of Ceuta, and the extent of land for the pasturage of the cattle of that garrison.)

This shows there are two distinct spaces of ground, each of which has its respective appellation in the original Treaty; viz., the "campo," and the "terreno para el pasto."

In the first ultimatum the sole demand was to build in the "campo." In the Arabic version, moreover, of the ultimatum, signed by M. Blanco, and which was sent to and accepted by the Sultan, it is even still clearer; for though "campo," in Spanish, with reference to the terms of the Treaty, may be said by Spaniards to mean any extent of territory, in Arabic the words are "hadood" (lines), and no mention is made of the expression in the Treaty for the pasturage-ground.

In sending to your Lordship a portion of the Convention of 1845, in my despatch No. 14 of the 28th ultimo, I omitted to transmit, as I now do, an extract and transiation of Article I, by which it will be seen that the territory then restored to Spain, through British mediation, was based upon the terms of Article XV of the Treaty between Spain and Morocco of 1799.

My conviction is, that the demand of Spain to build fortifications on the pasturage-ground was an after-thought to the ultimatum. The language held to Mr. Buchanan by Marshal O'Donnell and M. Collantes, in a conversation his Excellency had with those Ministers on the 24th ultimo, as reported to your Lordship in his Excellency's despatch No. 411 of the 25th ultimo, will, I think, confirm this view. M. Collantes did not then insist on the right, in consequence of the wording of the ultimatum, but on the argument that the garrison of Ceuta requires it, in order to ensure the place from attack, and asks Mr. Buchanan to recommend me "to support the wishes of the Spanish Government."

Had M. Blanco inserted in clear and precise terms from the first, as he ought to have done, the words "campo" and "terreno del pasto," the Sultan and his Government would not have been misled, and I should probably (taking into consideration the exigencies of the case) have recommended, during my late visit to Tetuan, that even this encroachment on the rights established by Treaty should be acceded to. The Sultan will, however, now, even if he finally decides upon giving way, be greatly irritated, and look upon the proceeding as an unworthy trick.

I am sorry to say it is not the first time, as will be found on a reference to past correspondence, that M. Blanco has taken advantage of imposing his own construction on apparently ambiguous terms. On one late important occasion, during the negotiation for the demarkation of the Melilla lines, he actually insisted on interpreting an Arabic word to suit his own convenience, in defiance of dictionary and grammar.

At Khateeb's request yesterday, I called on him and had a very long interview, in which I endeavoured to impress on his mind the necessity of giving way, whatever he might think of Spanish proceedings. He told me that he had promised Blanco that he would send his letter to the Sultan, but that he (Khateeb) dared not ask His Majesty to yield, for His Majesty would suppose it was he, and not M. Blanco, who had deceived him. In fact he appeared to be in great perplexity, and begged me to write to him a letter, or allow him to use my name in advising the Sultan to grant this further concession. I told him the British Government could have no interest in opposing the Spanish Government in fortifying its garrison of Ceuta, and, therefore, would be pleased if the Sultan would give way; but that, under the peculiar circumstances of the question, and as I expected instructions from your Lordship, I would wait till the evening before I took any further step.

As I had to return a visit of the Spanish Vice-Consul, I called at the Spanish Mission, and there saw M. Blanco. I had a long and amicable discussion with

him on the question at issue. My argument was, "If the present demand is included in the ultimatum, which has been accepted, without observation, by the Sultan before the first term had expired, why do you raise a doubt about it, putting forward comments upon the vagueness of your own expressions? If you admit that they are vague, and that the Sultan, from the very explicit manner in which the nature and character of the two territories are described in the Treaty, has supposed you only meant to ask for what you had put on paper, why not give time for explanation and negotiation? If you do so, I engage, as far as my advice can have any weight, to assist you. Let it be considered the ultimatum is accepted, and let it be so published to the world, and give six or seven days more, after the 15th October, for necessary explanations to convince the Sultan of the expediency and prudence of admitting the demand."

M. Blanco said he could not grant to the Moorish Government a single day beyond the 15th, but added that when the time arrived, if there was any hope of a favourable answer, he would tell me, in confidence, he might allow the time to run on for three or four days.

M. Blanco communicated to me a copy of the letter he had addressed to the Moorish Minister on the 5th of September, of which I inclose a copy and translation. It is more explicit than Khateeb's letter to me of the 16th ultimo. In the careless method, so usual in this country, of transacting business, he had sent the original to the Sultan without keeping a copy. Although I had not been before made acquainted with the exact terms of that letter, the word "campo," as will be seen, is the only one employed in it to express the territory upon which it is demanded that the proposed fortifications may be permitted to be erected.

Subsequently, in the evening, I received by Her Majesty's ship "Redpole," a telegram from Mr. Buchanan, of which the inclosed is a copy. Its terms led me to take a vigorous step with this Government, and urge an immediate acquiescence with the new demand. I returned to Khateeb, and, after a protracted interview, obtained his consent to dispatch, with all haste, a messenger to the Court, urging His Majesty to accede at once to the new demand.

Khateeb repeatedly asked whether any fresh demand would be put forward after this is acceded to. I told him I could only say M. Blanco assured me that it was the ultimate ultimatum, but that if a Spanish soldier crosses the Straits, to commence hostilities, a large indemnity would be demanded for the expenses of the war.

Khateeb has also, at my instance, addressed a letter to M. Blanco, stating that he transmits his letter to the Court, explaining the misunderstanding, and pointing out to M. Blanco that the terms of the ultimatum had been the cause of an erroneous conception. He adds that, as the ultimatum has been accepted, and as there is only a question about the words, he hopes the 15th instant will not be strictly adhered to, as the last day for an answer from the Court.

In accordance with the Moorish Minister's wish, I drew up this morning the inclosed note, and have requested that it be forwarded to the Court to-day by a special messenger.

The arrival of these messengers, one after another, at the Court will, I hope, prevent any vacillation on the part of the Sultan; and I trust that, on or about the 15th, all that has, as yet, been asked for will be acceded to.

The language I hold to the Minister regarding the Spanish demand is, I confess, dictated rather by the exigencies of the moment, than by a conviction in my own mind as to the rights of the case.

I dispatched yesterday, in the morning, a telegram to Mr. Buchanan, of which the inclosed is a copy.

This message was sent before I received his telegram, which is also herewith transmitted.

I trust, my Lord, that whatever may be the result of the efforts I have made in the cause of peace, and all I have done to prevent the Spanish Government having any just pretext for commencing hostilities against Morocco, your Lordship will be pleased to approve of my conduct, more especially as, from the language of some of my foreign colleagues, it has been supposed I was not authorized in taking the active part I have done in counselling this Government to accede to the Spanish demands. Indeed, one of my colleagues distinctly informed me this morning that it appeared to be the general belief I was acting

contrary to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, and that my past conduct had been disapproved.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S., 3 P.M.—The Minister has just sent to express his satisfaction at the terms of my note to him of this date, as it supports the language he had employed in his letter of yesterday to His Majesty. He dispatches it by a messenger in an hour's time to the Court. If an answer is not received before the 15th, I hope two or three extra days will be granted; for, notwithstanding what M. Blanco has told me, he sent a message to Khateeb, during my interview with that Minister last night, to the effect that a telegram had just reached him, declaring that not one day beyond the 15th October will be granted.

J. H. D. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 240.

Don Juan Blanco to Seid Mahomed Khateeb.

Tánger, a 5 de Octubre, 1859.

VEO con satisfacion en vuestra nota de este dia, que el Rey vuestro Amo os manda ceder á las justas reclamaciones del Gabinete de Madrid, bien claramente espresadas en mi nota del 5.

Mas como no me fijais aproximadamente sequiera el tiempo en que han di verificarse, y os desentendeis en punto á las esplicaciones que os hacia en mi nota de ayer, respecto de la declaracion que debeis acerca del derecho que asiste al Gobierno de la Reyna mi Señora para construir obras y levantar fortificaciones en el terreno que legitimamente le corresponde, voy en breves palabras, para no dar lugar á que llegue el dia 15 de este mes, último del plazo concedido, sin que hayais obtenido de vuestro Monarca la autorizacion necesaria, á manifestaros que para satisfacer cumplidamente en este parte á mi Gobierno, debeis declarar de la manera mas esplicita:—

"Que la Reyna de España, como legitima Duena y Señora de los terrenos comprendidos en toda su estension dentro de la linea que divide el campo Español del Marroqui, tien un derecho perfecto, indisputable, á hacer en todo el cuanto juzgue conveniente á la seguridad de la plaza de Ceuta, y que para dar mayor solemnidad y firmeza á la espresada declaracion se hará en el término mas breve un Tratado semejante al celebrado últimamente respecto de Melilla."

Podrá esceptuarse de este la parte relativa al cañon de á 24, por no permitirlo la naturaleza del terreno.

Lo que os propongo no es una innovacion. Fijaos bien en las condiciones de mi referida nota del 5.

En la terza se dice "en el campo de Ceuta," esto es dentro de la linea divisoria entre dicha plaza y el territorio Marroqui; y en la quarta, "que se adoptarán las medidas convenientes para que no se repitan tales desmanes." Una de esas medidas es la celebracion del Tratado á que me refiero, en el cual se espresaran con la debida claridad vuestros derechos y los nuestros, y que considero de absoluta necesidad y conveniencia para asegurar la paz y buena armonia entre los Moros de Augera y la mencionada fortaleza.

El tiempo vuela, y solo de diez dias podeis disponer.

Y la paz.

El Encargado del Negocios y Consul-General de Su Magestad Catolica,
(Firmado) J. BLANCO DEL VALLE.

(Translation.)

Tangier, October 5, 1859.

I SEE, with satisfaction, by your note of this day, that the King, your master, orders you to accede to the just demands of the Cabinet of Madrid, demands which are very clearly expressed in my note of the 5th.

As, however, you do not, even approximately, fix the time in which they are to be verified, and as you feign ignorance of the explanations I gave you in

my note of yesterday, with regard to the declaration you ought to make respecting the right which the Government of the Queen, my Sovereign has to construct works and raise fortifications on the ground that legitimately belongs to it, I will—in order that there may be no excuse for the 15th day of this month (the last one of the term granted) to arrive without your having obtained from your Monarch the required authorisation (to act in this matter)—call your attention, in a few words, to the fact that you ought to declare, in the most explicit manner:—

"That the Queen of Spain, as possessor and mistress of the territory which is comprised, in all its extent, within the boundary line that separates the Spanish ground* from the Moorish, has a perfect and undoubted right to do with it whatsoever she may deem convenient for the security of the fortress of Ceuta; and that, in order to give greater solemnity and stability to the declaration in question, a Treaty similar to that which was lately concluded with regard to Melilla shall be drawn out in the shortest time possible."

From this (the said Treaty) may be excepted that part which has reference to the 24-pounder cannon, as the nature of the ground would not allow of such a stipulation.

What I propose to you is not an innovation. Keep strictly to the term of my before-mentioned note of the 5th.

In the third (paragraph of that note) there is the phrase, "in the territory* of Ceuta;" that is to say, within the boundary-line which separates the said fortress from the Moorish territory. And, in the 4th, it is specified that the "measures necessary for preventing a repetition of such disorders shall be adopted." One of these measures is the conclusion of the Treaty to which I refer, and in which shall be recorded, with appropriate clearness, your rights and ours; and this Treaty I consider absolutely necessary and convenient for assuring the maintenance of peace and harmony between the Moors of Augera and of the aforesaid fortress.

The time flies; only ten days remain to you.

Peace.

The Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General of Her Catholic Majesty,
(Signed) J. BLANCO DEL VALLE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 240.

Extract from Article I of Convention of 1845, *between Spain and Morocco, respecting Ceuta.*

(Translation.)

"THE territorial limits of Ceuta shall be restored to the state in which they were in ancient times, and shall be in conformity with Article XV of the existing Treaty of Peace."

This stipulation was drawn up and concluded, in its full extent, on the 7th of last October (*i. e*, of 1844), the 23rd of Ramadan, 1260, as will be found stated in the said Treaty existing between Her Majesty the Queen of Spain and the Moorish Sultan.

Inclosure 3 in No. 240.

Don Juan Blanco to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

5 *de Setiembre de* 1859.

EL ultraje inferido al pabellon Español por las hordas salvages que pueblan la Provincia de Augera, limitrofe á la plaza de Ceuta, objeto de sus inmotivadas y recientes agresiones, es de naturaleza tal, que ningun Gobierno que tenga conciencia de su honra puede tolerar.

El de la Reina mi augusta Soberana está resuelto á obtener la debida reparacion y tan cumplida, como lo exigen la magnitud de la ofensa y el honor de la altiva nacio á cuyo frente se halla.

Sobradas contemplaciones ha guardado, fiado en las protestas de amistad y

* In Spanish text "campo."

en las seguridades que, en nombre de vuestro Monarca, me habeis tantas veces dado, de que "las plazas Españolas enclavadas en vuestros territorios serian respetadas, y castigados severamente los que las hostilizasen."

No os haré el agravio de poner en duda la sinceridad y lealtad de vuestras palabras e intenciones; pero si lo fueron, los hechos han venido á demostrar que el Rey vuestro amo carece de la fuerza y del poder necesarios para hacerse respetar y obedecer de sus vasallos.

Fijad, por un momento, vuestra atencion en los ataques que tan repetidamente han dirijido los Moros del Reef á las fortalezas de Melilla, Alhucemas, y el Peñon; llevadla despues á Ceuta, durante tantos dias hostilizada por las Kabilas á ella vecinas, y decid despues, si tamaños atentados no han de tener término, y si han de continuar siempre cubiertos con el manto de la impunidad.

El Gobierno de la Reina esta resuelto, sabedlo bien, á que se renueven, para lo cual exige, en desagravio y como correctivo, el mas rigoroso castigo.

Si Su Magestad el Sultan se considera impotente para ello, decidlo prontamente, y los ejércitos Españoles, penetrando en vuestras tierras, haran sentir á esas tribus barbaras, oprobio de los tiempos que alcanzamos, todo el peso de su indignacion y arrojo. Pero si no lo es; si se cree aun con los medios necesarios para reprimirlas y castigarlas, es preciso, absolutamente preciso, que le mas antes posibles, se apresure á satisfacer las justas exigencias del Gabinete de Madrid.

Estas son:

1. Que las armas Españolas sean repuestas y saludadas por las tropas del Sultan, en el mismo sitio donde fueron echadas por tierra.

2. Que los principales agresores sean conducidos al campo de Ceuta, para que á presencia de su guarnicion y vecindario, sean severamente castigados.

3. La declaracion oficial del derecho perfecto que asiste al Gvbierno de la Reina, para levantar, en el campo de dicha plaza, las fortificaciones que juzgue necesarias para la defensa y seguridad de ella.

4. La adopcion de las medidas que os indiqué en nuestra ultima conferencia, á fin de evitar la repeticion de los desmanes que han venido á turbar la paz y buena armonia que entre ambas naciones reinaba.

Diez dias os doy de tiempo para resolveros.

Trascurridos que sean, sin que esta mi demanda haya sido cumplidamente satisfecha, me retiraré de este pais, con los subditos todos de la Reina mi Señora.

Ya sabeis lo que esto significa.

Y paz.

El Encargado de Negocios y Consul-General de Su Magestad Catolica,
(Firmado) J. BLANCO DEL VALLE.

(Translation.)

September 5, 1859.

THE outrage committed on the Spanish flag by the wild tribes who inhabit the Province of Augera in the vicinity of the fortress of Ceuta, which is the subject of their uncalled for and recent aggressions, is of such a nature that no Government that has any idea of its honour can put up with it.

The Government of the Queen, my August Sovereign, is determined to obtain the due and complete reparation which the magnitude of the offence, and the honour of the great nation which has been so insulted, demand.

It has contemplated too long passing events, confiding in the protestations of friendship, and the guarantee which, in the name of your Monarch, you have so often given to me, "that the Spanish garrisons situated in your territory would be respected, and that those who war against them should be severely punished."

I will not wrong you by questioning the sincerity and frankness of your words and intentions; but, be your words and intentions ever so frank and sincere, facts have demonstrated that the King your master wants the force and power necessary for causing himself to be respected and obeyed by his own vassals.

Fix, for one moment, your attention on the attacks which the Moors of Reef have so often directed against the fortresses of Melilla, Alhucemas, and Peñon; carry it then down to Ceuta, which has for so many days been the object of hostile attacks from the Kabyles of her neighbourhood, and tell me if there

is to be no end to assaults so important, and if the latter are to continue for ever covered with the cloak of impunity.

The Government of the Queen is resolved, be well assured of it, that such proceedings shall not be renewed, and for this end demands, as a satisfaction and correction, the most rigorous punishment of the offenders.

If His Majesty the Sultan does not consider himself sufficiently powerful for the task, say so at once, and the Spanish armies, penetrating into your dominions, will make these barbarous tribes, the disgrace of the times in which we live, feel all the weight of their indignation and intrepidity. But, if such is not the case; if he (the Sultan) deems that he has still the means requisite for repressing and punishing the acts of which I complain, it is necessary—absolutely necessary—that he should hasten to afford satisfaction within the shortest time possible, to the just demands of the Cabinet of Madrid. These (demands) are:—

1. That the arms of Spain shall be replaced, and saluted by the troops of the Sultan, on the same spot where they were thrown down.

2. That the principal aggressors shall be led to the "campo" of Ceuta, in order that they may be severely punished in the presence of the garrison and its neighbourhood.

3. The formal declaration of the full right which the Government of the Queen has to raise, on the "campo" of the said garrison, the fortifications which it may deem necessary for its defence and security.

4. The adoption of the measures which I indicated to you at our last conference, for preventing a repetition of the disorders which have occurred to disturb the peace and harmony which existed between both nations.

Ten days I give to you to come to a decision (regarding the above demands). At the expiration of this term, if my demand shall not have been fully satisfied, I will withdraw myself from this country, with the subjects of the Queen my Mistress.

Peace.

The Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General of Her Catholic Majesty,
(Signed) J. BLANCO DEL VALLE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 240.

Mr. Buchanan to Mr. D. Hay.

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 6, 1859, 2·55 A.M.

YOUR messages have all arrived, two of October 4 inclusive.

I have been authorized to resort to instruct you to recommend Moorish Government to accept a proposal to negotiate an extension of Ceuta's territory, if Spanish Government do not make the demand a condition of peace. I have failed to obtain this compromise, but I think that war is inevitable, unless Spanish demand is granted; and, I believe, its acceptance would settle the question for many years to come.

Public opinion here is much stirred, ex(pecting?) the Government may depend on arrangement.

In case of war, President of Council goes to Africa with 35,000 men.

Inclosure 5 in No. 240.

Mr. D. Hay to Seid Mohamed Khateeb.

(Translation.)

(After the usual compliments.) *Tangier, October* 7, 1859.

I HAVE learnt, with the greatest satisfaction, that His Majesty the Sultan, taking into consideration the friendly and disinterested counsels which had been offered by me, in the name of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, on my late visit to Tetuan, has accepted the ultimatum presented to you by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires on the 5th of last month.

I am persuaded this prudent and conciliatory act of His Majesty will be fully appreciated by the British Government, and that it will be accepted by

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

them as a strong proof of His Majesty's friendship. It is, moreover, the most dignified and politic course His Majesty could pursue, under existing circumstances, and tends to substantiate the general and prevailing opinion that His Majesty will follow the peaceful and prudent steps of his late august Sire, Mulai Abderrahman.

There has occurred some discrepancy regarding the term "hadadats," "campo," in the ultimatum; whether it included the ground ceded for pasturage in 1845, or solely the old lines. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has declared that the word "campo," in Spanish, includes both, which does not appear to have been understood in the Arabic version. The Spanish Government, moreover, declares it cannot accept the ultimatum as granted, except the right of building on all the ground be acknowledged, for, after the attacks made on their fortress by the Augerites, they must ensure the fortress against further aggression.

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires does not ask for extension of the lines of Ceuta, but solely that their right of building on all the said ground be acknowledged; for if it be not acknowledged, he says that, on the 15th of this month (that is, in eight days) war will be declared, and, if hostilities are once commenced, other and most serious demands would be put forward.

Inasmuch as the ground in question belongs to the Spaniards, though originally intended for other purposes, and inasmuch as any fortifications that may be built on that ground will not be injurious to the interests of Morocco, especially as the Spaniards ask for no more territory, but merely that a Convention be made by which it will be fixed that the Moorish guards shall be troops of the Sultan (and not the people of Augera), and that a proper space shall be left between the two lines, upon which neither party should encroach, to prevent future conflicts, I am persuaded that His Majesty, in his wisdom and desire to prevent the dreadful calamity which must ensue if war is commenced, will give immediate orders that this demand be admitted.

It is also necessary that a Convention should be signed, containing clear and precise stipulations regarding the territory, so as to prevent future misunderstanding and misinterpretation respecting the rights of both parties. I have been directed by Her Majesty's Government to urge that this arrangement should be accepted at once, for they feel convinced that His Majesty the Sultan's interests will not, in any way, suffer any material injury thereby, and that, by a prompt and amicable adjustment of all existing differences with Spain, His Majesty will ensure the peace and welfare of his subjects, and the integrity of His Majesty's dominions.

I pray you to send this letter to the Court by express courier, and urge that a favourable reply be sent before the 15th October. Lose no time.

Inclosure 6 in No. 240.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Tangier, October 6, 1859.

(Telegraphic.)

SPANISH Chargé d'Affaires has now addressed a letter to Minister in reply to his acceding to ultimatum, and puts forward demand of Spain to erect whatever she pleases on the pasturage-ground marked in 1845. He only grants till the 15th instant.

I see no hope of any arrangement by Sultan within such a term. I must have instructions what to do about this new ultimatum. Is it the last? Telegraph this to Foreign Office, and for instructions by telegraph.

Inclosure 7 in No. 240.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Tangier, October 6, 1859, 11 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE received your telegram of to-day. I had a long interview with Spanish Chargé d'Affaires. I asked that sufficient time be given to use persuasion with the Sultan, to obtain His Majesty's consent to new demand to build fortifications on pasturage ground, not mentioned in first ultimatum. He said telegram from his Government to-day will not allow one day beyond 15th.

Ask Spanish Government to grant a few days more, and as our Government instructs me, through your Excellency, to recommend Sultan to accept new demand, I have, after four hours' interview with Minister, persuaded him to write to the Sultan this night in terms that may induce a favourable answer.

As ultimatum, according to Sultan's understanding of it, is acceded to, it would be unreasonable not to grant sufficient time to explain further demand. I hope it is last, if conceded to.

No. 241.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received October* 14.)

(Private.)

Tangier, October 4, 1859.

(Extract.)

LAST night I received Lord J. Russell's despatches to No. 16 inclusive. I have not time to answer them by steamer just about to go to Gibraltar, but will do so to-morrow, and dot down just now very rapidly all I think regarding what is passing, and conduct of Spaniards.

Last night the Moorish Minister arrived. This morning I saw him early. When I was there he received a letter from Blanco, telling him term had been prolonged till 15th October, and no more.

The letter was, as usual, written in obscure and almost unintelligible Arabic, but it appears to me Blanco says that his Government requires an extension of territory at Ceuta, and right of building forts on heights or pasturage-ground. Khateeb got pale when he read this, and turned round to me, and said, "Is this just, is this honest, to present an ultimatum, and grant a term for it to be acted to, and then to put forward further and impossible pretensions?" Khateeb said Sultan would never dare to concede territory at Augera at the present moment. He complained bitterly of Spanish bad faith.

I warned Khateeb against refusing to admit, in consequence of additional pretensions, the first ultimatum; that he would be otherwise playing the Spanish game, who would have an excuse for breaking off relations. I advised him, when Blanco called on him to-day, not to refuse point-blank these pretensions about building forts on heights, but say that if peaceful relations are now restored, the Moorish Government would not refuse to discuss what would be beneficial to Spain, without being prejudicial to Morocco. Indeed, I may tell you, I think, if Spain makes it a *sine quâ non* now, with regard to future friendly relations with Morocco, and Lord J. Russell instruct me, I think I could induce this Government, with a little time (*i.e.*, several months) and patience, to admit of such alteration in territory near Ceuta; and I have already thought of some concessions Moors are anxious to obtain from Spaniards, which would in no way be injurions to interests of latter.

As to Sultan ceding territory, and altering existing Treaty stipulations arranged by Great Britain as mediator in 1845, I am almost certain His Majesty would prefer war.

The conduct of Spain appears to me to be unjust. An ultimatum is presented. A term is granted for its execution. Term is prolonged in consequence of there being no Government to treat with, and before that term expires or ultimatum has been refused, Spaniards bring forward fresh pretensions stretching out the ultimatum like caoutchouc to suit their own fancies. It was a penultimatum, a new feature in diplomacy.

I am really at a loss how to act. I feel like a man who tries to make up a quarrel between two men calling themselves gentlemen, but one turns out to be a mere swindler, who asks for terms of satisfaction, which, when granted, he says are not enough, but that he wants a pecuniary satisfaction, or a gift from his adversary.

I really felt ashamed to-day in Khateeb's presence, for I felt that the Moorish Government throughout this affair has acted with good faith, whilst Spain, the Christian Government, has been playing a double game, and I have to a great extent backed her.

If Tangier is occupied by the Spaniards, or any other foreign Power, and no term is fixed for evacuation, can Her Majesty's Government, or any one, foretell how long Sidi Mahomed would continue Sultan? Can we even count upon there being a Government to deal with in Morocco for a year—for years? The Spaniards once in, and fortifying themselves, can we foresee that no complications will arise which, like the French, after taking Algiers, will enable them to remain? Will not Spain feel that holding this side of the Straits, and Ceuta, that if England quarrels with Spain Gibraltar cannot exist? Will not other Powers see that also? Let rather any other Moorish port be taken or destroyed; but not Tangier, which Nelson declared "must remain in the hands of the Moors or become English," if we wished to retain our naval supremacy.

Taking the most favourable view of the case; suppose Spain takes Tangier, and retains it; after a month's occupation, and after receiving from this Government all it asks for, I feel confident England's voice will be small henceforward in Morocco. All confidence in us would be lost. Our prestige would be gone: and the Moor would find his best and sole policy would be to creep round the protectorate of France or Spain, as Turkey did with Russia before 1853.

P.S.—I inclose a copy of the telegram I have just addressed to Mr. Buchanan. I shall not relax my efforts in the cause of peace. I have repeated distinctly to Khateeb that Morocco must not expect any aid or support from England. The Spanish Government appears to think its conquests will be bloodless, if once the 30,000 men assembled at Algiers cross the Heights. I expect a long and bloody war that may last for years, and that Spain will rue the day it was ever commenced. The Moors have degenerated from ancient times; but there are at least 600,000 men in Morocco who bear arms, and have strong patriotic feelings.

This may catch homeward-bound packet. There will be time to send me a telegram before the 15th October. Steamer starts, so I must finish.

Inclosure in No. 241.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Buchanan.

Tangier, October 4, 1859.

(Telegraphic.)

MOORISH Minister has arrived. I have seen him.

Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has addressed a letter about extension of Ceuta limits and forts on heights. Minister tells me this was not mentioned in ultimatum, ought not to be demanded, and could not be granted. He thinks Sultan will concede at once first ultimatum. Is it right to put forward fresh demands for territory? I fear I could never persuade the Moorish Government to yield now; but hereafter, when peace is made, it might be discussed and arranged.

Forward this to Foreign Office.

No. 242.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 14.)

(Private.)

Tangier, October 5, 1859.

My dear Hammond,

I SEND a telegram to-day to Mr. Buchanan, reporting that Sultan has acceded to ultimatum before expiration of term of 6th October. I have forwarded also to the Admiral a despatch, under flying-seal, to Lord John Russell, in which full information is given regarding the Sultan's language upon this occasion, and another sealed despatch to Foreign Office, reporting Blanco's and Khateeb's language.

As I consider it is of the greatest importance that Her Majesty's Government should receive full and authentic information of what has taken place before the 15th October, when I expect, if Spanish Government does not alter its intentions, relations will be broken off, I have asked Admiral, should there be no packet or merchant-steamer bound direct to England, to-morrow or the

day after, to despatch a messenger by a British Government steamer, or by a merchant-steamer if one be going, to Alicante, and thence messenger will go on by rail to Madrid.

Without instructions regarding the views of our Government respecting strange conduct of Spanish Government in putting forward new demands at the last moment for extension of territory and right of building batteries on neutral ground, I am really at a loss what to do, though I counsel, as you will see, moderation, and, if possible, concession. It is pretty certain the Sultan will hereafter turn a deaf ear to my counsels, when he discovers that we can't help him out of his troubles, even when he readily bows to our recommendations, without even, as he declares, consulting his Divan. Henceforward, the English name and influence will, I fear, be at a low ebb.

Khateeb desponds. Article in "Gibraltar Chronicle" has been spouted in his ears by many friends and enemies. I could only reply to his queries by saying I believed it to be the truth.

He asked what Morocco gained by being moderate, pacific, and submissive to English counsels. I replied that, "as long as the Sultan and his Government kept good faith and acted in a manner to satisfy the world they desired to maintain friendly relations with all foreign Governments, he might depend upon it that God and man would approve." I dare say no more.

I confess the future looks very black, and I hardly dare tell all I think, for I am not at all comfortable on account of what I wrote to you yesterday, but you have known me long enough to be assured that my sole aim and desire is to serve my masters and country well.

I hope if Tangier is finally to be taken by the Spaniards, the latter may be warned to cause their troops to respect the houses of the foreign Representatives here. I am not afraid of the Moorish population pillaging, if the Kabyles are not let into the town, but I fear Spaniards would. All the property I have nigh in the world is in my house. I shall stay here to the last, till ordered to quit. As to journey to Fez, it would be very dangerous to attempt it for two months or so. I should not mind risking to have my throat cut if our Government had a positive assurance what the Spaniards wanted, and that when once granted, peace would be made; but I have less faith in the Don even than the Moor.

Were it not for the complications that might arise, and the apprehensions I have that, if a Moorish town is occupied by a Christian Power, no Government will be found to treat with, and that anarchy will reign throughout Morocco, I should like to see the Spaniards, after all their boasting, commence their old feuds with the Moors. In the end (not the first shock) I suspect the Spaniard will be the first to cry, "Hold, enough." He will get more kicks than halfpence. The Don should remember what France has passed through in Algeria.

My French colleague told another Consul that he knew his Government wished success to the Spaniards, and would not object to their occupying permanently Tangier, or other ports in Morocco. He trumpeted forth the fact of England having finally acceded to the French views of this question.

A straw will show which way the wind blows.

I remain, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 243.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 14.)

(Private.)

Tangier, October 7, 1859.

My dear Hammond,

BY my long despatch of this date you will learn all that has been done within the last twenty-four hours to try and extricate the Moors from their present difficulties, in which I think it will be admitted the Spaniards have played, to say the least, a shabby game. My fear now is, some other demand will be put forward even before the 15th, or some pretext for commencing hostilities.

As I say in my despatch, I hope my conduct will be approved; for I am told it is given out by jealous folks, my conduct has been disapproved by Lord John Russell.

Blanco is very friendly, but, as you may suppose, after what has passed, I put not the slightest confidence in the man.

He told me yesterday that, as soon as all their differences are settled, he goes to the Moorish Court, and that his Government will raise him to the rank of Minister.

The French Chargé d'Affaires, it is supposed, will also go to Fez to congratulate new Sultan on his accession to the throne.

I hope Lord John Russell will think proper to thank new Sultan for following British counsels; it may have a good effect another time. We must try and get the new Sultan to introduce some reforms. It is reported he is abolishing several abuses in the shape of taxes and the monopoiy of tobacco and pipes.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 244.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 25.)

Foreign Office, October 14, 1859.

Sir,

YOU are instructed to advise the Moorish Government in the strongest manner to give way on the point of the new boundary for Ceuta. You are directed to say that the mere extent of ground asked for, is in itself utterly insignificant as a portion of the Empire of Morocco, and that the possession of it would not give Spain any real additional means of attacking Morocco if she should at any time be inclined to do so. On the other hand, the Spanish possession of this ground might, by keeping the neighbouring tribes further away from Ceuta, prevent many small occasions of difference which, whenever they happen, inevitably tend to create embarrassing questions between Spain and Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 245.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 102.)

Foreign Office, October 14, 1859.

Sir.

THE messenger Grattan arrived at this office on the morning of the 12th instant, and delivered your despatches to No. 436 of the 7th instant inclusive.

Among these despatches was that marked No. 431 of the 7th instant, inclosing the reply of the Spanish Government to the demand which you were instructed to address to it in regard to the evacuation of Tangier, in the event of that place being occupied by the Spanish forces as a measure of coercion against Morocco.

That answer, as well as the general course of policy which the Spanish Government appears disposed to pursue in Morocco, will be duly considered by Her Majesty's confidential servants, and I shall convey to you, by an early opportunity, instructions for your future guidance in these matters.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 246.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 103.)

Foreign Office, October 14, 1859.

Sir,

THE conduct of the Spanish Government, in respect to their ultimatum to Morocco, appears to Her Majesty's Government wanting in moderation and in fairness to the Sultan.

The occurrences at Ceuta have taken place during the last illness of the late Sultan, and the first agitated period of the accession of the present Sovereign.

In the ultimatum first presented, the third condition of securities for the future safety of Ceuta was not developed, and when there was no time left to write to the Sultan to obtain an answer to the first ultimatum, the condition, before left vague, was explained to mean a cession of territory adjoining the fortress of Ceuta.

Setting aside any question of the reasonableness of this demand, it is obvious that fresh time, dating from the 27th or 28th of September, should have been granted to enable the Sultan to examine, weigh, and decide upon this fresh demand.

Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, of opinion that Spain would be acting in a most unjustifiable manner if she were to begin hostilities before the Emperor should have had sufficient time to deliberate on this new proposal. You will, therefore, strongly urge the Spanish Government, even at the last moment, to give time for negotiation on this point. It is probable that if time is given, the Spanish ultimatum will be acceded to.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 247.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 15, 3 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, October 14, 1859, 6 P.M.

I HAVE just received the following figures from Mr. Hay, dated Tangier, October 12, 10·30 A.M.:—

"Notwithstanding the acceptance of all Spanish demands, it is said that the Chargé d'Affaires continues to make preparations to leave.

"I fear Spain is bent upon war, whatever concessions the Sultan may make.

"Steps should be taken to put an end to so unjust a proceeding, and that at any rate they be not allowed to take Tangier, the gate of the Straits, and upon which Gibraltar depends.

"Communicate this to Lord John Russell."

No. 248.

Lord J. Russell to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

My Lords,

Foreign Office, October 15, 1859.

THE accounts which Her Majesty's Government have received from Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid and from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, of the present state of the discussions between the Spanish and Moorish Governments, give reason to apprehend that a Spanish expedition may shortly proceed to the coasts of Morocco with instructions to effect a landing, and to commence hostilities against the Moors.

Under these circumstances, I am to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that Vice-Admiral Fanshawe should be instructed to make such a disposition of the ships under his orders as will provide for the protection of the persons and property of British subjects, as well at places which may be attacked by the Spanish forces as at other places where apprehensions may be entertained for their safety, in consequence of the excitement which will, doubtless, be produced throughout the whole country by the news of a Spanish invasion.

Vice-Admiral Fanshawe should be directed to place himself in communication with the Spanish naval and military Commanders, and to request them to give him such timely notice of the intention to attack any particular place on the Moorish coast, as may admit of measures being taken to embark British subjects and their property; with the understanding, of course, that no prejudice should result to the Spanish operations from this act of courtesy, or any warning

given to the Moors of the approach of the Spanish expedition other than they themselves derive from the departure of British residents.

I have to add that, although Vice-Admiral Fanshawe's duty will be to provide, in the first instance, for the protection of British subjects and property, he will be authorized, in case of need, to extend the same degree of protection to the subjects of all Christian Powers, as well as to other Christian and Jewish inhabitants of Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 249.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 28.)
Foreign Office, October 15, 1859.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, the accompanying copies of correspondence with Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, respecting the difference between Spain and Morocco.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 250.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 30.)
Foreign Office, October 15, 1859.

Sir,

YOUR despatches from No. 18 to No. 33, both inclusive, the last of the 7th October, were received late yesterday evening, and will be laid before the Queen.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the able and judicious course which you have pursued in urging the Moorish Government to make the concessions required by the Spanish Government, as the sole means of averting war between Spain and Morocco.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 251.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 31.)
Foreign Office, October 15, 1859.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT, for your information, a copy of a letter which, by the Queen's commands, I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, stating the instructions to be given to Vice-Admiral Fanshawe as to his proceedings in the event of an attack by the Spanish forces on the territory of Morocco.†

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 252.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(No. 32.)
Foreign Office, October 15, 1859.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,‡ reporting the explanation given to

* Nos. 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 245, and 246.
† No. 248.
‡ See Appendix, No. 21.

him by Count Walewski of the presence of a French squadron in the Bay of Algeciras.

The French Ambassador, who has been with me this afternoon, has repeated to me the assurance that the French squadron was merely sent for the protection of French subjects in case of need.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 253.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 110.)
Foreign Office, October 15, 1859.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the note addressed to you by Señor Collantes on the 6th of October, of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch No. 431 of the following day, in reply to the demand for explanations which you were instructed by my despatch No. 69 of the 22nd of September to require of him respecting the intentions of the Spanish Government in the event of the occupation of Tangier by the Spanish forces.

You were instructed to apply to the Spanish Government for a declaration, in writing, that if the Spanish troops should, in the course of hostilities, occupy Tangier, that occupation would be temporary, and would not extend beyond the ratification of a Treaty of Peace between Spain and Morocco; and in your note to Señor Collantes of the 27th of September you said that it would be a satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to learn that the military preparations of the Spanish Government did not indicate any intentions on their part to make conquests in Morocco, or to occupy permanently any portion of the Sultan's territory.

Señor Collantes, in his reply of the 6th of October, states that when once the Treaty of Peace which should put an end to the hostilities between Spain and Morocco should be ratified, the questions now existing being settled favourably, and therefore definitively, the Spanish Government, in fulfilment of their intentions, would not continue in the occupation of that fortress (Tangier) in the supposition that they should have found themselves obliged to establish themselves there in order to secure the favourable issue of their operations.

You will state to M. Collantes that Her Majesty's Government accept with pleasure this assurance, as conveying the declaration which, by my despatch No. 69 of the 22nd of September, you were instructed to ask for.

You will further state to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire that there may be no change of possession on the Moorish coast of the Straits. The importance they attach to this object cannot be overrated; and it would be impossible for them, or indeed for any other maritime Power, to see with indifference the permanent occupation by Spain of such a position on that coast as would enable her to impede the passage of the Straits to ships frequenting the Mediterranean for commercial or any other purposes.

You will read this despatch to Señor Collantes, and furnish his Excellency with a copy of it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 254.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 15, 11·20 P.M.)

Madrid, October 15, 1859, 4·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

SPANISH Chargé d'Affaires has arrived at Algeciras; the Foreign Minister declares he does not know why, as he had received a report from him, that Moorish Government had accepted principle of increased rayon at Ceuta. Whatever may be the motive of his departure from Tangier, he will, I understand, be sent back. Government will not commence hostilities, but keep

question open; leaving ample time for discussion of boundary question under its European aspect. They propose that Spanish and Moorish Commissioners should be named for settling it; and the Foreign Minister assures me there has been no intention to seek undue influence in the Straits. I have told him that if the new boundary would afford a cross-fire between territory in Spain and Africa, no engagement, however solemn, would induce Her Majesty's Government or Europe to consent to it.

No. 255.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 16, 12·6 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, October* 14, 1859, 10 A.M.

REMOVAL of difficulty yesterday in consequence of demand of Spain for new delimitation, including Aidhee's Convent, to Ceuta for its defence, and threat to embark and commence war.

After much trouble I persuaded the Moorish Minister to cede all.

I hope this is the last demand.

No. 256.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 16, 5·15 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 15, 1859, 11·30 P.M.

I HAVE just received these figures from Mr. Hay, dated Tangier, October 13, 8 P.M.:—

"The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has sent in note demanding extension of territory at Ceuta to high ground ( ), beyond lines, such as may be necessary for the defence and convenience of that garrison, and stating that, if this be not granted, he will embark, and war commence. The Moorish Minister was in great perplexity, and it was not until I told him that I would not conceal from the Sultan that he was solely to blame for not giving way, that he consented to reply this evening, acceding to the demand.

"I received your telegram of the 12th after the Minister's reply had been given.

"The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires goes to Algeciras to communicate with his Government by telegraph. I hope this is he last demand. Telegraph ('s) approbation.

"Do not communicate this to the Spanish Government until the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires shall have had time to do so. The latter says our preceding him with information would cause displeasure to his Government.

"*Tangier, October* 14.

"The above telegram has been drawn up a second time in consequence of the loss of the original by the capsizing of a boat."

No. 257.

Mr. D. Hay to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 16, 4 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, October* 15, 1859, 10 A.M.

YOUR Lordship will learn, by my telegram of yesterday, I had persuaded Moorish Minister to cede all that the Spanish Minister demands before I received your Lordship's telegram of the 13th.

All quiet here. The Minister waits for troops from the Court to chastise Augerites.

News from Oran that French troops will march upon Moorish town Oochda, destroy it, and then withdraw. If true, I fear a conflict with the Sultan's troops, and complications. I shall advise the Moorish Minister that the French army be not opposed by the Snltan's troops, but to withdraw.

I doubt, however, whether the Sultan could follow this advice if one of His Majesty's towns is attacked.

No. 258.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 17, 7 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 16, 1859, *midnight.*

I HAVE received following telegram from Mr. Hay, dated Tangier, 15th October, 1·30 P.M.—

"Information just reached me that the Spanish Government intend to ask for an extension of territory of several miles into the district of Anea; and that they no longer ask for rayon for the defence of the town, but for a district, or ten miles of mountainous country. If this be true, war is certain; and even if all the ports of Morocco are taken and held by Spain, Moorish population would resist the cession of land demanded till the last. It is clear that the Spanish Government desire war. I declare that no counsel, or any command instead, would ever persuade the Sultan, or even the Minister, to yield to such a demand. If this takes place the Sultan would be dethroned. War is certain if Spain insists on this conquest. Telegraph to Foreign Office."

A Ministerial paper this evening mentions two leagues from the walls as the amount of territory asked for; and states that a very short delay will be given for the decision of the Moorish Government. France will, I fear, support any pretension which does not give power over navigation in Straits.

If Her Majesty's Government do not consider the claim of sufficient importance to be resisted by force, remonstrances will only create enmity towards England here.

I hope Foreign Minister's promises to me will be kept, though it seems doubtful, from Hay's telegram.

No. 259.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 17, 1859.

IS it true, as Hay reports, that a new demand has been made of an extension of territory of two Spanish leagues, or eight or ten miles? Such new boundary would give Spain the command of the passage of the Straits, and Her Majesty's Government could not consent to it. We expect promise of Spanish Minister of ample time for discussion of boundary question under its European aspect, reported in your telegram of 15th October, to be kept.

No. 260.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 17.)

(No. 444.) *Madrid, October* 12, 1859.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, the copy and translation of a report published in the "Gazette" of this morning, of the declaration by Marshal O'Donnell yesterday in the Congress of Deputies, that war would be declared against Morocco, if a favourable answer to the demands of Spain were not received from the Sultan's Government before the 15th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 260.

Extract from the "Gaceta d'España" of October 12, 1859

El Señor Presidente del Consejo de Ministros.—EL Gobierno debe, sin embargo, contestar á la insinuacion de su Señoria. ¿Cree su Señoria que el Gobierno, en caso de ir á Africa, va á hacer una calaverada? Si la guerra es necesaria, es preciso llevar los medios de vencer. No hemos sido siempre felices en Africa, y es necesario llevar allá todos los medios que pueden asegurar la victoria; sobre todo es preciso llevar la justicia de la causa. Nosotros no vamos á conquistar, vamos á vengar agravios: claro está que, si triunfamos, procuraremos sacar las justas ventajas á que tengamos derecho por nuestros triunfos. Por lo demas, el Gobierno ha pedido inmediatamente la satisfaccion. Entre un agravio y la guerra, aun entre los individuos particulares, hay siempre un plazo de negociaciones. El plazo improrogable concedido á Marruecos espira el 15. Si para ese dia no hemos recibido satisfaccion, se retirará nuestro Representante en Tánger, y se declarará la guerra.

(Translation.)

The President of the Council.—THE Government must, nevertheless, reply to the insinuation of the honourable member. Does he suppose that the Government, in case of going to Africa, are going to commit an act of folly? If war is requisite, it is necessary to take the means of conquering. We have not always been fortunate in Africa, and it is necessary to carry there all the means which can secure victory: above all, it is necessary to take with us the justice of our cause. We are not going to conquer, we are going to avenge injuries: it is clear that if we triumph we shall endeavour to obtain the just advantages to which our triumphs will give us a right. For the rest, the Government asked for satisfaction immediately. Between an offence and war, even among private individuals, there is always a term for negotiations. The final, unalterable term granted to Morocco expires on the 15th. If on that day we have not received satisfaction, our Representative in Tangier will withdraw, and war will be declared.

No. 261.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 17, 5 P.M.)

Madrid, October 17, 1859, 12·15 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE sent a confidential letter to Foreign Minister, expressing my endeavours to convince that Her Majesty's Government will consider the acquisition by Spain of ten miles of territory, near Ceuta, not as mere extension of the rayon of that fortress to secure it against insult, but as a conquest which might be injurious to the interests of England, and which cannot be justified after the assurances and explanations received from Spanish Government.

I have thought it right to state this before any declaration is made on the subject in the Cortes. One is expected to-day.

No. 262.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 17, 6·50 P.M.)

Madrid, October 17, 1859, 2·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

FORTY-EIGHT hours referred to in telegram just sent, count from the 15th instant.

No. 263.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 17, 7 P.M.)

Madrid, October 17, 1859, 2·55 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I AM told that war will be declared if Moorish Government do not accept, in forty-eight hours, Spanish interpretation of extension of territory to be ceded.

I shall not be able to find Minister to ask explanations of this report, which seems well-founded; but I trust Her Majesty's Government will send me instructions as to the language I am to hold in case it should be true.

I must, however, repeat my conviction, that if Spanish Chargé d'Affaires has broken off relations with Moorish Government, nothing will arrest Her Catholic Majesty's Government but an intimation on the part of that of Her Majesty's that the proposed conquest will be opposed by force.

No. 264.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 17, 9·30 P.M.)

Madrid, October 17, 1859, 6·50 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

MARSHAL O'DONNELL has just stated in the Senate that Spain has received from Morocco the satisfaction necessary for her honour, but that some explanations under negotiation are still required as to the guarantees for the future. He trusted, therefore, that war would be averted.

No. 265.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 17, 11·40 P.M.)

Madrid, October 17, 1859, 9 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE "Epoca" reports that M. Collantes stated in the Congress to-day that Morocco had granted the satisfaction required for the honour of Spain, and had recognized the principle that she was entirely (entitled?) to securities for the future.

With respect to these securities, the Government had required further explanations, which he expected to receive in a very short time, and upon them peace or war will depend.

Marshal O'Donnell is reported by the same paper to have said, in making a similar statement to the Senate, that if the guarantees for the future are not granted in the short time allowed for the purpose, and in the terms in which they have been asked for, there will be war.

No. 266.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 18, 5 A.M.)

Madrid, October 18, 1859, 1 A.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE written confidential letter to Foreign Minister (?) embodying views of Her Majesty's Government, communicated to me by the telegram of to-day, and I have recounted his promise respecting territory.

The line asked for is the Sierra (Apes' Hill) of Bullones, referred to in my telegram of the 11th instant, but my estimate, from a map, of the territory it inclosed, was (wrong?). Hay's version is the right one.*

I could not see the Foreign Minister to-day, and the Under-Secretary of State's explanations as to what had been really asked for were not clear.

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* *i.e.*, a district of ten miles of mountainous country which would comprise the whole of Apes Hill.—E. H.

No. 267.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, October 18, 1859.

(Telegraphic.)

ASCERTAIN and report where the Spanish troops destined for Morocco are stationed, where it is proposed that they should embark, what means of transport have been provided for them, and in what time the Spanish Government expects to be able to land the whole force, with horses, guns, and baggage in Morocco.

No. 268.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 115.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1859.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government have learnt, with equal surprise and concern, that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty have demanded of the Sultan of Morocco an extension of territory reaching from eight to ten miles beyond Ceuta, and comprising a part at least of the Sierra de Bullones, with the adjacent coast. Her Majesty's Government have been further informed that a very short term is allowed for the Sultan of Morocco to give a categorical answer to this demand.

Her Majesty's Government cannot but reflect with pain on the communication of this peremptory summons to the Sultan to give up a considerable portion of his territory.

From the first day of their disputes till nearly the last, the Spanish Government have declared that the redress of wrongs, and not conquest, was the object of their armaments. Such was the language of the President of the Council, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to you as the organ of Great Britain; such was the language held by Señor Isturiz to me: such was, finally, the declaration made in the Cortes on the 11th of the present month by the President of the Council: "We are not going to conquer—we are going to avenge injuries."

So long as this was the apparent object, Her Majesty, although her good offices were not formally accepted by Spain, used those good offices to obtain from Morocco the concession of all reasonable, and some demands which appeared to us questionable. Reparation for the honour of Spain in the form required by her Agent was freely conceded by Morocco. A right to fortify on land which, according to the statement of the British Consul-General, had been granted to the garrison of Ceuta only as pasture-land, was yielded. Even an extension of the rayon of the fortress, which was properly a subject for European negotiation, was, in principle, conceded.

It was then that, almost on the last day, Spain demanded a surrender of territory, extending eight or ten miles beyond the fortress, and allowed, it is said, forty-eight hours for acquiescence or rejection.

This demand has entirely changed the nature of the question. The territory demanded would embrace points on the coast by which, taken together with the possession of the opposite coast, the navigation of the Straits would be commanded.

No sailing vessel can reckon on passing the Straits in one direction, at least by the middle of the channel; she must, unless in very peculiar circumstances, keep near one coast or the other.

So long as three Powers — Spain, Morocco, and Great Britain—divide among them the commanding points on the Straits, no danger to the freedom of the navigation exists. But when one Power alone has the possession of commanding points on both coasts, that Power can close the Straits, and forbid access to, or egress from, the Mediterranean Sea.

I need not point out how great an interest all maritime Powers have in preventing the success of such a project as that which Spain is said now to entertain; Great Britain especially, taking into view her commerce in the East, her possessions in the Mediterranean, and her passage to India through Egypt,

feels called upon to defend those interests to the utmost. She cannot, therefore, consent to the proposed aggrandizement.

Spain, on the other hand, has no essential interest in maintaining this demand. It does not concern her honour, which Morocco is ready to satisfy in the way she herself has prescribed. It does not concern the security of Ceuta, which a rayon of two or three miles would provide for in the most complete manner. It is a peremptory demand, put forward at the last moment, in contradiction to the promise of Señor Collantes that ample time should be given for the discussion of this matter of European propositions. This ample time and fair consideration of the question we now ask.

You are desired to give a copy of this despatch to Señor Collantes, and to say, that no hostilities ought to commence till the Spanish demand has been fully examined.

We expect an immediate answer to the present despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 269.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 116.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1859.

Sir,

THE intelligence which Her Majesty's Government received from you subsequently to the date of my despatch No. 110 of the 15th instant, induced me to arrest at Bayonne the progress of the messenger Webster, in order that Her Majesty's Government might deliberately consider the course which they should pursue under the unexpected change of circumstances which had occurred, and which might render it inexpedient to make any such communication to the Spanish Government as was prescribed to you in my above-mentioned despatch.

Her Majesty's Government have, however, determined to let that despatch go forward; but they wish to leave to your discretion to communicate it, or not, to the Spanish Government.

I am glad to take this opportunity of stating to you that Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate your zealous endeavours to restrain the Spanish Government from pursuing the unjustifiable course in regard to Morocco upon which they seem bent, and also the promptitude which you have shown in keeping them informed of the various phases which the question has so unexpectedly been made to assume.

The despatch I forward to you this day may, at the time of its arrival, be rendered inappropriate by the settlement of the dispute with Morocco; or that dispute may be, in your opinion, on the point of adjustment: in that or any similar case, I leave it to your discretion to take the most judicious course.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 270.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 18, 10·20 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, October 18, 1859, 3 P.M.

I HAVE just received the following telegram from Mr. Hay, dated Tangier, October 17, 7 A.M.:—

"The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires returned last night, and presented a note to the Moorish Minister demanding cession of territory from Ceuta to Sierra Bullones. In case of refusal, hostilities will commence at once. The Minister does not know where last point mentioned is; but if it be where he supposes, the territory demanded includes Apes' Hill, or about ten miles of district.

"The Minister says he cannot accede to such a demand, and to that effect will reply and protest.

"The Spanish Government ought to allow, at least, ten days for the

Christians here and at the outports to embark and take away their property. I received your telegram of the 15th.

"The Spanish Government has, I think, misled your Excellency, for the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires asserts that war will be declared if a favourable answer be not given before noon to-day."

No. 271.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 19, 3 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October 18, 1859, 5·45 P.M.*

A LETTER just received from the Foreign Minister states, if the Moors accept the basis proposed by Spain for a new boundary, the Commissioners will examine the inconveniences which it may offer, and will not pretend to anything which may be contrary to the legitimate interests of any other Power; but his Excellency denies having spoken to me on Saturday of any ample discussion on a simple question which does not affect Europe. He says the Sierra of Bullones would not include the amount of territory supposed, and that fortifications on it could not cross fire with Tarifa.

I am told at the Foreign Office that the new boundary would add only two and a-half to three English miles to the Spanish territory; but the map may deceive on this point in a mountainous country. The Admiralty charts will show whether batteries between (Bullones ?) and the European coast could cross fire.

No. 272.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 19, 1859.*

ASK the Spanish Minister precisely how far from Ceuta the new boundary would extend; whether from the fortress or the town of Ceuta, or from the alleged Spanish territory? State the number of miles and the names of the points on the coast to which the proposed new territory would extend.

No. 273.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 19, 1·35 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October 19, 1859, 3·40 A.M.*

A FEW thousand men are now in Ceuta. A camp is formed at Algeciras, and another at Cadiz, containing together about 30,000 men, from which ports, and Tarifa, the force will embark, where it is said by the Government that the necessary means of transport are prepared. Large supplies of ammunition and provisions have been stored at these ports and in Ceuta. Twenty thousand tents are said by the newspapers to be ready. Marshal O'Donnell has declared his intention of leaving Madrid almost immediately after declaration of war.

Officers speak of the passage of the Strait being effected in a few hours, if the weather is fine, but they fear the operation would prove difficult and tedious in bad weather. An officer stated to-day that eighty brass rifled guns had been sent to Tarifa.

Marshal O'Donnell informed me, some days ago, that a battering-train was embarked at Cadiz. I am told that only one regiment of Cavalry will accompany the army at first. Marshal O'Donnell hopes to return in six weeks, after having taken Tangier and Tetuan.

Such are the rumours here, and it would be difficult to gain more precise information, though I shall endeavour to do so.

Six steamers were bought last summer in England for transport. This Government had already several others; and the British Admiral mentions, in a letter to-day, Spanish squadron at Algeciras, as if vessels there could move

the army. I understand that time for Moorish answer will not expire before to-morrow ar next day.

No. 274.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 19, 1859, 5 30 P.M.*

DECLINE to give Moorish Minister any further advice without instructions.

No. 275.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. D. Hay.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 19, 1859.*

HER Majesty's Minister at Madrid is informed at the Spanish Foreign Office that the new boundary would add only from two and a-half to three English miles to the Spanish territory. Endeavour to learn what is the exact boundary proposed.

No. 276.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 19, 9 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October 19, 1859, 3·30 P.M.*

I LEARN this day, that 43,200 men, including Artillery, Engineers, and 2,000 Cavalry, are at Ceuta, at the southern outposts, or on the march for them, some being at Malaga. Besides Marshal O'Donnell, this force will be under the orders of two Lieutenant-Generals and eight Major-Generals. Three days should suffice for the Commander-in-chief's journey by Alicante to Algeciras. Transports are said to be capable of carrying from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and it is hoped that the army may be crossed in twenty-four hours. I expect, however, further information on this point. I have come from the Foreign Office, where they profess to have had no information, and represent line as interrupted.

No. 277.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Hay.

(Private.) *Foreign Office, October 19, 1859.*

My dear Hay,

IT is very unfortunate we cannot get precise information as to what the Spaniards really require in the way of territorial concession at Ceuta. What is the point on the sea coast to which their demand extends, and how far is that point from the present extreme limit of the pasturage ground?

Does the demand comprise what is marked in the Admiralty Chart as Moorish Castle, and, if so, how far beyond it does the proposed line extend? Pray ascertain this exactly if you can, and let us know by telegraph.

We send you all we have got from Madrid, and everything of importance written to Madrid. The last despatches to Buchanan will probably reach him on Saturday night or Sunday morning at the latest.

We have nothing from France. What is Castillon's language? and how far have you reason to suppose that the French are abetting the Spanish demand?

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 278.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 20, 5·15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October 20, 1859, 4·30 A.M.*

I HAVE just received the following figures from Mr. Hay, dated Tangier, October 18, 5 P.M.:—

"Moorish Minister has replied to Spanish Chargé d'Affaires' ultimatum of yesterday. He holds to what he had promised, but cannot grant extension of territory now demanded. He says he will explain the matter to Sultan, but requires time to do so. Chargé d'Affaires has not yet given an answer to the Moorish Minister's communication.

"Another Plenipotentiary from the Sultan has arrived, to settle Spanish demands, and assures me that neither he nor the Sultan can, without creating a revolt in the country, admit new demand. New demand is in direct violation of assurances made to me by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires when urging Moorish Government to agree to cession of Height near Ceuta.

"Relations have not been yet broken off.*

"Spanish and French subjects, and others, are embarking.

"Send this to Foreign Office."

No. 279.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 20, 1859.*

IT is not a question of cross fire with Tarifa, nor a question only of cross fire. If a cross fire is to be established, it will be from the Spanish coast to the eastward of Tarifa, and from the Moorish coast to the westward of Ceuta.

But a cross fire is not necessary to command the passage. The current sets in to the Mediterranean, in the midst of the Straits; on each side is dead water, by which, on one side or the other, the ships coming out must steer. In either case they will be under any batteries which may be constructed on either coast.

No. 280.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 20, 1859.*

STATE to the Spanish Government that Her Majesty's Government require an immediate and definite answer to the questions respecting the new boundary demanded at Ceuta, which you were instructed by my telegram of October 19 to put to him.

No. 281.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 20.)

(Private.) *Tangier, October 10, 1859.*

My dear Hammond,

I HAVE made Khateeb send off couriers every day to travel day and night with letters repeating to the Sultan, "concede, concede." This has an excellent effect upon the Morocco Court, as I known by experience. Khateeb assures me that he considers "it is ninety-nine to one" the Sultan gives way.

Yesterday Blanco told one of my colleagues he was satisfied all would be arranged. Last night a Spanish steamer arrived, and Blanco is said to have become negro; and when asked the state of affairs by a friend, said he had received information which caused him to apprehend very serious complications

* Figures not clear here.

and that the horizon looked black. The news had come from the north, and not from the south.

Khateeb sent to me yesterday to say, in great confidence, that Viscount Castellon had called on him and made known to him the arrival of five ships of the line at Algeciras, and that another squadron was expected in these waters from Brest. For the first time Castellon opened his lips on Spanish affairs to this Government. He told Khateeb that the Spaniards had a perfect right to make the demand they had put forward. Khateeb says he simply replied, All will be arranged satisfactorily. Khateeb remarked to my interpreter it was rather odd Castellon should express his opinion on the affair when there was no longer time to communicate with the Morocco Court before the 15th.

Castellon declared to Khateeb that France had no grievance against Morocco, and that the sole cause of the visit of the French squadron was the fact of there being a British squadron in these waters.

I have asked the Admiral to send over here a frigate or corvette before the 15th: for should the Spaniards break off relations, we may have trouble, more especially as on the 17th or 18th the Moorish Feast of the Circumcision is celebrated, and it is usual for thousands of armed Kabyles to visit the town. I have recommended the Pasha to try and prevent an assembly of wild fellows, and to post guards at the gates to stop armed men from entering the town on that day.

You will be surprised at my having to take so active a part; but the fact is, though the Moorish Government is very well disposed, it would go to sleep unless we rouse them up to their duty.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—I am just told by a colleague that Blanco felt disposed to embark yesterday, why, I don't know; and that he declares he shall embark on the 15th. I don't understand why or wherefore. Khateeb repeats that he expects a favourable answer. I shall see him this evening and learn the truth. I fear the Don is not true to his word.

J. H. D. H.

No. 282.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 20.)

(Private.) *Tangier, October 11, 1859.*

My dear Hammond,

AS I told you I should, in my letter of yesterday, I called on Khateeb. I asked him if anything had passed between him and Blanco to have caused the latter to show such dissatisfaction about the state of the negotiation as to talk of embarking. Khateeb replied he had not seen Blanco, or communicated with him, since the 6th instant; and that, far from fearing the Sultan would not comply with his and my recommendations, he had received late letters from the Court which convinced him (though the Sultan ignored the new demand) that His Majesty was disposed to follow the advice which was offered by the British Government, whatsoever it might be.

Castellon called on me yesterday; he told me he had heard also that Blanco was much dissatisfied in consequence of tidings he had received from Madrid, and that he talked of embarking. Castellon, though he avowed he could not comprehend the reason why M. Blanco was dissatisfied, looked himself very "joyeux." I suppose, as he is to be left in charge of the Spanish Mission, he expects to be rewarded by the Cross of Isabella Catherina.

I have thought it right to let Mr. Buchanan know of this new vagary of Blanco; for my Interpreter, who is a brother of the Spanish Interpreter, informs me the latter told him confidentially that Blanco will embark, and await, on board a Government steamer, the reply of the Sultan. I have said all along that the Spaniards do not want peace, and that I fear the more the Sultan concedes, the more they will demand, or find some plan, or discover some offence, and break off relations. It is the old story of the wolf and the lamb. When a quarrel is to be picked, an excuse will be found.

In some of the Spanish papers I see that the Spanish Government not only

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

expects the ultimatum will be accepted, but also all the demands acted upon before the 15th. If this is the intention of the Spanish Government, it is most unfair. How can the Sultan go through the form of replacing boundary-stones, flogging Augerites, fixing neutral ground, &c., before he even hears that the Spaniards will renew friendly relations with him? It would be madness for him to punish the warlike tribes of Augerites before he felt assured there would be no hostilities; he would be cutting his own throat.

If the Spaniards desire peace, I am sure the Moorish Government will fulfil their engagements honestly "à la lettre" as far the Ceuta question is concerned. In the Reef, they may have more difficulty, for they have not the same power of control.

This evening, I am told an Aide-de-camp of General O'Donnell, a crude Castellan, has arrived. I suppose he comes to take military observations. You remember I told you, months ago, O'Donnell would take the command of the army if war began in Morocco.

I received, to-day, Lord John Russell's telegram of the 9th. It came addressed to the Governor, but he sent it on, as he said he concluded it was for me. I suppose it is the corrected telegram sent to me on the 6th. I had already forestalled, as you will have learnt, by my telegrams to Mr. Buchanan, his Lordship's instructions. Alas, I fear it is no use my giving prudent counsels, or that the Moor follows them, when the Spaniards have made up their mind to find some excuse for a quarrel.

Khateeb showed me also a letter, in confidence, from the Vizier Seid Mohamed Sefar (who is still in power), informing Khateeb that the Sultan is disposed to remove the prohibition on the exportation of wool for one year, as an experiment; but that before this restriction is taken off, Khateeb must come to an understanding with all the Agents of foreign Governments at Tangier, that they direct their merchants to desist from the abusive system of giving protection to natives. Khateeb told me that Castellon, in his interview, had again urged him to remove the prohibition on the exportation of wool, as that article was much required for the clothing of the French troops. Castellon added, without Khateeb speaking of protection, "I know all about your objections to the present system of protection; when the order comes from the Sultan respecting the removal of the prohibition send for me, and we will soon settle in a satisfactory manner about the protection of natives." Castellon, until now, had been the chief supporter of the protective system; so this is a proof his Government has given him instructions to make at least some modifications.

Castellon also took that opportunity of declaring that the French Government desired to maintain the integrity of the Moorish dominions; that if the disorderly Arab tribes on the frontier attacked their troops, the French would chastise them without raising any dispute with the Moorish Government, as long as the latter did not support the rebels; and he repeated that France would make no conquest in Morocco.

This is the first time a French Agent in Morocco has made use of such language. It is a further proof that the French Government has paid attention to the representations lately made to it by Lord John Russell.

This is all very satisfactory if Spain is really not halloed in by the French, and that the Spaniards are not the cat's-paw to take the chestnuts from the fire. "Qui vivra verra."

I begin to despair of peace, even though I am confident the Sultan will bow to all demands.

I do not put in an official despatch Castellon's language to Khateeb about the wool, protection, &c., for Khateeb begged me to keep it most secret, as the French would be much irritated if they thought I knew what had passed, or had been told that the prohibition on wool would be removed, before Castellon heard of it. I have even recommended Khateeb to send the official notice first to Castellon, and arrange with him about protection. He must, of course, however, communicate with the other foreign Agents without delay, and make known the removal of the prohibition in that article of commerce.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 283.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 21, 5 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 20, 1859, 7 P.M.

I SENT substance of your Lordship's queries in a confidential letter to the Minister, and he has just put unsigned written answers into my hands.

They state that nearly six miles from the actual limits of the place will be required to reach the heights which command the Kabyles, so as to prevent attacks on the place. A sufficient coast-line will be required to prevent territory being flanked, but without occupying any military coast position.

It was verbally explained to me that the plain meant the actual lines of the fortress, and I brought away a Memorandum, acknowledged by the Under-Secretary of State to be correct. Foreign Minister explained he could not name the points included in a line yet to be defined, but that any point on the coast which could be objected to as dangerous to the navigation would be avoided.

Having procured a marine chart I went again to the Foreign Office, and demonstrated to the Under-Secretary of State the impossibility of at all extending the territory without obtaining the command of the Strait. He carried the chart to the Foreign Minister, upon whom it has evidently produced a great effect. I was asked to leave it. There will be a Council to-night, at which the question will be considered, as well as that of the Moorish answer.

Orders have been sent to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires not to leave; but it is feared they will arrive too late, and there is a disposition, I think, to await result of reference to the Sultan. On the other hand, the temper of the army is much excited, and the position of the Government, however the affair may end, deplorable.

I venture to suggest that your Lordship should authorize me immediately to protest officially against the extension of territory without previous concert with Europe, unless I should have an assurance that the idea was abandoned. Such a protest, if delivered before Government can declare war, which they may possibly do to-morrow, might prevent it.

A General has stated that Government possess means to move the whole force in twenty-four hours. This assertion may, however, be doubted. Artillery will consist of 54 rifled field-guns, and guns.

No. 284.

Mr. Buchanan to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 21, 7·29 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, October* 20, 1859, 11·45 P.M.

I HAVE written to the Foreign Minister, mentioning the receipt of further pressing instructions from your Lordship, and stating that as the answers given to-day to your Lordship cannot possibly satisfy Her Majesty's Government, and as the question would assume a most serious aspect if Spain declared war to force Morocco to cede territory which they could not hold without compromising the freedom of the Straits, I hope he will be prepared to-day to state that the Spanish Government have adopted the decision required by the circumstances, as, if he is not, I shall address an official note to him on the subject. I hope for an answer in the meantime from your Lordship to my telegram of this evening.

The Foreign Minister complained to-day that his instructions had been misunderstood by the Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier, as they were intended to have kept the question open until the excitement in Spain had calmed down so as to admit of a moderate arrangement.

The Foreign Minister has answered that the Cabinet will meet in the morning, and that he will send for me as soon as it rises.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 285.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, October 21, 1859.

(Telegraphic.)

STATE officially to the Spanish Government that we have used earnestly and successfully our influence in Morocco, to obtain for Spain redress for her injured honour, and security for her fortress of Ceuta, and that British and European interests require that Spain should be content with these concessions. That Spain ought not to seek the possession of territory, her possession of which would not be compatible with the security of other nations interested in the navigation of the Mediterranean. That time ought to be allowed, both in order that this question may be impartially examined, and also that the Sultan, who is at a distance, may be made fully aware of the extent of the last demands of Spain. That you are instructed formally to ask the Spanish Government to grant time before a declaration of war.

Appendix.

No. 1.

Secret Memorandum.

WHATEVER may be the conduct of the Moorish Government, or of the wild tribes under its rule on the Algerine frontier; whatever may be the declared intentions or policy of the Imperial Government at Paris, my conviction is, that when the Arab and Berber tribes of Algeria have been brought more completely under French control, we may expect to hear at any time that the military authorities in Algiers will discover some excellent reasons for the sudden invasion of Morocco, and that the cities of Fez, Mequinez, or the town of Tafilet, where the Sultan is supposed to have a large treasure, will be attacked and taken possession of. I do not expect that any previous formal declaration of war will take place; but I expect that the first news we shall have, overland, of an invasion, will be that a French army has crossed the frontier. No doubt, excellent and apparently very plausible reasons will be given for hostilities, and as we have no Political or Consular Agent resident at the Sultan's Court, or in the interior, who could keep us informed of what may have taken place, the British Government will probably be told, if it uses its good offices in behalf of the Moorish Government, that we have been deceived, and that negotiations for obtaining reparation for the real or imaginary offence to the Algerine authorities would be useless.

It is my opinion that if the French invade Morocco they will, for the first six months, have entire success, driving all before them, as the Moors would probably at first endeavour to fight in masses; but I do not think that the French will find it expedient or convenient to retire from the Moorish territory, even after the most brilliant victory, without taking possession of some portion of the Moorish territory, which may be either an inland town or a port, and which they would probably then declare they would continue to hold until the expenses of the war are paid, or certain conditions fulfilled.

It is for an emergency of this kind I think the British Government should be prepared.

That the French should take possession of any portion of the Moorish territory would always be a serious matter for consideration; but that the French should occupy Tangier, one of the gates of the Straits of Gibraltar, would involve, in my opinion, as serious a question as the occupation of the Dardanelles by the Russians; for if Tangier were held by the French, its fine mole (which the English blew up) rebuilt, and the town fortified, the importance of Gibraltar in a military or even commercial point of view would be considerably lessened, and the cost of maintaining it would be ten-fold; whilst, if Spain and France were ever united against Great Britain, we could then hardly continue to hold that fortress.

To avoid, if possible, such an untoward event, it is my opinion that the day we heard a French army had entered Morocco, the Agent of the British Government at Tangier ought to have authority to send to the Admiral at Malta, or Senior Naval Officer at Lisbon, and request that a large naval force be immediately sent to Tangier Bay, and there to remain; and that the officer in command, as well as the Chargé d'Affaires, have orders to protest against the town of Tangier being taken possession of by the French, whilst, if it were heard that the French succeeded in an attack on Fez, and had occupied that city, or that a disposition was subsequently shown to continue to hold that or any other portion

F.O. 97/
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

of the Moorish territory, the English should then at once occupy, temporarily, Tangier. This I should probably be able to arrange, without bloodshed, and with the goodwill of the Government, or at any rate of the inhabitants: 1,000 troops, 500 Artillerymen, and 200 Cavalry, would keep the town and country ten miles around in order. This, I feel persuaded, could be done even with a smaller force, if the Moorish population were well treated.

The British Government could explain to the Moorish Government and other foreign Governments that the occupation of Tangier was not to be permanent, and that the place would be given up when the French force retired; but that that the fact of a portion of Morocco being occupied by a foreign Power, compelled the British Government to take this step, and, under any circumstances, it was necessary to insure the provisioning of our garrison at Gibraltar. It is a well-known fact that Nelson had given his opinion that Tangier must remain in the hands of the Moors, or be in the possession of the British, unless we are to assume the position of a second-rate Power in the Mediterranean.

If some determination is not come to, beforehand, with reference to this subject, the day may arrive when we shall be taken by surprise; and whilst the British Government may he discussing what is to be done, we shall find, when too late, that the French have established themselves in the Straits, and would not be inclined to abandon their position unless we were prepared to embark again in a disastrous and terrible war, as in 1814 and 1815.

With reference to that passage in the Memorandum, where I state that the British might take possession of the town without bloodshed, I have to say, in confirmation of this supposition, that on more than one occasion I have had propositions to deliver up the town to a British force, to which the principal inhabitants of Tangier had secretly declared they would readily agree. The Moorish flag, Kadi, and some of the authorities could be allowed to remain *in statu quo*. In such an emergency, I think I could ensure the Local Government being conducted quietly.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Richmond, August 12, 1857.

No. 2.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received April* 19.)

(Private and Confidential.)

Tangier, April 7, 1858.

My dear Hammond,

WHEN I was in England last year, I had some conversation with Lord Clarendon regarding the ambitious views of France in this country, and I put into the hands of his Lordship a Memorandum marked Secret, and dated the 12th August, submitting my opinions and suggestions. Lord Clarendon did not express, at the time, dissent from my views, but told me what I had said would be taken into consideration by Her Majesty's Government; since then I have heard nothing further on the subject. When Lord Malmesbury may have a leisure moment, I wish you would put my crude Memorandum into his Lordship's hands; for my humble conviction is that, in this quarter, ere long we are likely to have trouble, and must either make up our mind to let the French have their own way, and consequently become masters of the Straits, which the occupation of Tangier would ensure, or our Government ought to have their Agent here, and the Admiral in the Mediterranean and Lisbon, provided with secret instructions as to the course to be pursued in case of the occupation of a city, or portion of the Moorish territory, or an attempt to occupy Tangier.

It may be thought I am an alarmist, or, perhaps, the British Government have reliable assurances from the French Emperor; but, on the other hand, I am convinced that events may, and will, take place in Morocco, which will appear to justify the French in committing an aggression on the Moorish territory (whatever assurances they may now give), and that, unless the British Government have matured their plans beforehand, and have given secret instructions to their Agents and officers in the Mediterranean how to act in such an emergency, we, that is, the Admiral, Governor of Gibraltar, and Chargé d'Affaires in

Morocco, will probably be all at cross-purposes, and awaiting instructions whilst the French are acting; and when our instructions come, we shall have probably to deal with a *fait accompli*, such as the occupation of Tangier, or other point on this coast, and then I doubt of negotiations sufficing to turn the French out.

French officers, Diplomatic, Consular, Military, and Naval, do not make a secret of the intentions of their Government, and avow they only await the complete subjugation of the Algerine tribes, which I believe to be almost effected, and time and opportunity.

I was shown the other day a letter from a French officer who has friends high in office at Paris, in which he says, "I think it likely we shall take Tangier," though he does not say when.

Now, the event which is likely to bring about French interference in the affairs of Morocco, and an aggression on the Moroccan territory, is the death of the present Sultan, which may happen at any moment, as the man is nigh eighty years of age.

Various competitors for the Throne will probably appear, and the whole country will be thrown into a state of revolution and civil war. The French will probably back with money, and with the arms of their Algerine tribes, one of the aspirers, and, on the other hand, I think it is not improbable that some Prince seeking for popularity may declare a holy war against the French.

Putting the Sultan's death aside, a quarrel can be picked by the Algerine authorities, at any moment, with the frontier tribes of Morocco, and who is to say whether the French are in the right or the wrong? Should Government leave me in the dark as to the course I am to pursue, in case the French invaded the Moorish territory, I wish to tell you what I should think it my duty to do. At the same time that I reported the invasion to Her Majesty's Government, I should send an express to the Admiral in the Mediterranean, and recommend that the fleet proceed forthwith to Gibraltar, and that two steamers be sent to Tangier to protect British life and property, and enable me to communicate with the Admiral on the Moorish coast.

If a French squadron or fleet was expected at Tangier, I should urge that the British fleet come at once to this bay. If the French declared it was their intention to attack the town, I should take upon myself to declare that the British Government would never consent that Tangier should be even temporarily occupied by any foreign Power, and I should urge the Admiral to join with me in a protest against any attempt of the kind, though the bombardment might be admitted.

If news reached us that the French had taken possession of any point on the coast, or were occupying the city of Fez or Meknas, I should immediately recommend that we garrisoned Tangier, declaring, however, to the Agents of all other nations here, that we did so solely to secure the provisioning of our garrison of Gibraltar, and would restore the place to the Moors, as soon as hostilities had ceased between France and Morocco, and the integrity of the Moorish territory was re-established. I would be responsible that the Moors would let us occupy the town quietly.

Now that I have told you frankly my views, I hope that Lord Malmesbury, if he thinks I should be acting rashly by taking the course I propose, will give me a hint to that effect. I full well know and acknowledge the paramount importance of maintaining our present friendly relations with France, but when it came to the question whether we are to let the French become masters of the Straits, or go to war, I should say the latter evil was to be preferred, if we were prepared to resist their aggressions.

I have just asked for leave of absence from Lord Malmesbury, for though Lord Clarendon granted me leave before I left England, it was only by word of mouth. I don't think I shall visit London, except it be for a few days, unless I was told to present myself at the Foreign Office.

The Austrian Minister wrote to me, the other day, in my capacity as Acting Agent-General for Austria, directing me to inquire whether any Austrian vessel had been captured in Reef in the end of last year, as he had received information from Paris that an Austrian vessel had been captured by the Reefians. In the French newspapers, also, a paragraph had been inserted, stating that an Austrian and a Portuguese vessel had been captured by pirates on the Reef coast. I sent a messenger to Reef with a letter, to my friend the Chief Alhadary, and am happy to say the report of the captured vessels turns out to be a

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

canard. The Reefians have been very quiet since they were compelled by the Sultan to pay an indemnity for the British vessel plundered in 1856.

I suppose we shall soon hear what Government has decided upon relative to Consular establishments. Though there has been an increase in the expense of the Consular establishments in Morocco, whilst the amount of trade, as contrasted with that of other countries, is small, yet it should be borne in mind that in countries like Morocco, without efficient Consuls to protect British traders, we could have no commerce at all; moreover, the duties of a Consul in a barbarous country are far more important than in a civilized country, where the law is generally sufficient to protect a British subject, without the interference of the Consul.

The salaried Vice-Consuls sent to the ports of this country, even though superintending an insignificant and embryo trade, are also acting as pioneers for civilising this fine country, which must, sooner or later, from its position and productions, occupy the minds of European statesmen as much as Turkey and Egypt have hitherto done, and, like those countries, I fear become a bone of contention.

It is a long time since I have troubled you with any of my political fancies, but as Lord Clarendon told me never to hesitate in submitting to Government my views regarding this country, I hope Lord Malmesbury, if you show his Lordship this letter, will be equally indulgent.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOMD HAY.

P.S.—I suppose the original of my secret memorandum, of the 12th August, exists at the Foreign Office; if not, I can send a copy.

J. H. D. H.

No. 3.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. D. Hay.

(Secret and Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 6, 1858.

MR. HAMMOND has laid before me your private and confidential letter of the 7th April, in which you allude to the possibility of an attempt being made by the French Government to obtain a footing in Morocco, and state the course which, in the absence of instructions, you should be prepared to take in such a contingency.

I have to state to you on this matter that if a French fleet or army were to threaten Tangier, you should protest, officially, against its occupation by a French force; and if Her Majesty's Government, in such a state of things, should themselves think proper to occupy Tangier, you would prepare the Moorish Government for such a step on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and give that Government such explanations and assurances on the subject as as you propose.

Admiral Lord Lyons has received orders in conformity with the suggestions which you offer in your letter, but I need not tell you that it is indispensable that no suspicion should be shown by you that such a measure as that to which you allude is likely to be resorted by the French Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 4.

Mr. D. Hay to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received June 3.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Tangier, May* 19, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch marked Secret and Confidential, of the 6th instant, instructing me how to act in the event of a French fleet or army threatening Tangier.

I shall be careful to bear in mind also the caution given me by your Lordship, "that it is indispensable no suspicion should be shown by me that such a measure is likely to be resorted to by the French Government."

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

No. 5.

Earl Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 2.)

No. 1,279.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 30, 1858.

I HAVE inquired of Count Walewski whether any communication has been made to him by the Spanish Government respecting a purported expedition against the Reef pirates, reminding his Excellency that when your Lordship was last in office, a common understanding in regard to the punishment of these lawless people had been established between the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Spain, and that the Emperor of Morocco had since taken measures himself to bring the Reefians to order, and that their conduct had of late years been less reprehensible.

Count Walewski assured me that he had heard nothing whatever of the expedition to which I alluded, but he said that the position of Spain, in regard to Morocco, was very peculiar, in consequence of her possessing some forts on the coast. To a general observation which I made that it would be better, the necessity arising, that the three Powers should continue their united action upon the Moorish Government, rather than that one should proceed to extremities, which might produce further complications, his Excellency expressed in as general terms his assent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 6.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(Received November 3.)

(Private.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, October* 20, 1858.

I HAVE to thank you for your letter of the 30th ultimo, regarding Perry and his associates. My comments on his last memorial had already been transmitted.

I am informed confidentially by a British merchant at Mogador, that copies of the different memorials, and an account of all that has passed, have been given by one of Perry's associates to the French Consul at Mogador, who has transmitted them to Castellon. Moreover, the French Consul at Mogador, M. Guys, has been concocting with Perry some stories about us here, and the correspondence was transmitted to Mr. Dalgleish, with a request that they should be transmitted to the Foreign Office.

I care not for such intrigues, as my conduct will bear the strictest scrutiny; but I dare say Mr. Dalgleish does not trouble Lord Malmesbury with Mr. Perry's private communications, for Mr. Dalgleish has sent word to me, through a mutual friend, "that he regrets extremely to have been compelled in his position of M.P., to have been the channel through which Perry's misrepresentations had been made, as he knew the man to be a low fellow, and that his statements were unworthy of credence."

I have no doubt, from the information I have received from Mogador, the French were backing Perry in his attacks on me, in the hope that I should have been turned out or recalled.

With reference to the despatch of Lord Cowley, reporting a conversation he had with Count Walewski about the Reef and the projected invasion of the Spaniards, I am much surprised to learn that the French Minister should have assured Lord Cowley "he had heard nothing whatever of the expedition;" for putting aside the information I have given of what is passing in Reef,

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Mr. Buchanan has told Lord Malmesbury that the projected invasion was occupying the attention of the Spanish Government, and was a subject of much comment in the Spanish newspapers.

I can understand, however, that it would be the policy of the French to let the Spaniards cut their own throats by attempting the invasion, for it would establish a convenient precedent for their own, *i. e*, French, projects hereafter; or that by allowing Spain to involve herself in hostilities with the Reefians, which would ultimately lead to a war between Spain and Morocco, there would probably arise a favourable opening for France to extend her frontier westward.

I have always imagined that the French will carry out their ambitious views in Morocco, when Spain may have a serious difference with Morocco or with England. The invasion of Morocco by Bugeaud in 1844, took place when there was a rupture between Spain and Morocco.

The French would be greatly facilitated in their operations against Morocco, if they had the Spanish ports opposite this coast, and the Spanish-African garrisons open to their vessels and troops. If Spain united with Great Britain in making representations to France against any invasion of Morocco (should the French Government entertain such a project) I think their united action upon such a subject would always have great weight with the French Government, from the position which Spain occupies, as the neighbour of Morocco.

I am well aware that the French Government is always ready to give assurances to our Government that they have no intention of invading Morocco, but I should never believe them, or they would long ago have pursued a different policy in Morocco. Moreover, as I have told you before, I have received information from a very good source, that the French Government only awaits a good opportunity (perhaps the death of the Sultan) to invade Morocco, and seize, by a *coup de main*, upon the principal ports of the Empire. This language has been held by persons high in office to an intimate friend of mine, who is not an Englishman, and whose name I cannot betray.

Whilst I write this private letter, Khateeb has sent word to say that he is anxious to have an interview with me the day after to-morrow, when the present Moorish feast has passed, as he has received letters from the Sultan "regarding the claim of the 2,000 dollars, and the differences between the Spaniards and Reefians, and that the Sultan tells him to follow my advice—arrange all matters amicably." I hope this may be the case, though the message of a Moor is always very plausible, and is not to be taken *à la lettre*.

Since I last wrote to Lord Malmesbury upon the subject of Reef, I have had a long conversation with my new Spanish colleague, and he has assured me he perfectly coincides with the view I have taken about the gross impolicy of Spain invading the Reef, and that it would be a most dangerous precedent, and might lead to the most serious complications, which ultimately might most materially affect the interests of Spain.

Don Juan Blanco is a Diputado, and, therefore, will go to Madrid, to sit at the Cortes. He is a great friend of O'Donnell's, and promises to do his best to make the General understand the true interests of Spain in Morocco. As far as I could understand from his language, the O'Donnell Ministry hoped to gain popularity by the invasion of Reef. Under any circumstances the expedition must be put off till the month of March.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

P.S.—As there has been a great press of business latterly in our office, and as I have been too unwell to do much work myself, I detained my brother, the Vice-Consul at Tetuan, here, till the 19th instant, to assist me.

J. H. D. H.

No. 7.

Mr. D. Hay to Mr. Hammond.—(*Received December* 9.)

(Private.)

My dear Hammond, *Tangier, November* 27, 1858.

WHEN the Spanish squadron arrived, I wrote to Captain Warden, the senior naval officer at Gibraltar, and told him I thought it would be desirable

that one of Her Majesty's ships now at Gibraltar should pay Tangier a visit, and thus enable me to communicate speedily through Gibraltar, or Cadiz, any matter of interest which might occur.

Captain Warden, with his usual alacrity and attention to my behests, sent me the gun-boat "Lapwing," Commander O'Reilly. A French steamer, the "Coligny," also arrived about the same time.

Yesterday the Spanish squadron left this bay, and, I believe, have gone to Algeciras, where, as far as I can learn, they will remain till all pending matters about the Reef are settled.

No fresh demand, as Khateeb informs me, was put forward by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires since the arrival of the squadron. I conclude, therefore, he is awaiting further instructions from Madrid. I wrote yesterday to Lord Malmesbury to report the departure of the Spanish squadron, and sent my despatch under flying seal, viâ Madrid, with a private letter to Mr. Buchanan, containing all the information I had to impart, and which I thought might be desirable he should possess; but as the despatch may be some days *en route*, I add these private lines to you.

Khateeb informs me the Spaniards followed in the wake of the Frenchman about the flag, and asked him to hoist the Moorish flag in honour of the birth-day of the Prince of Asturias; Khateeb gave the same reply to Don Juan as he had to Castellon. The Spaniards did not press the matter further, but intimated they would not hoist the Spanish flag on the Moorish festal days. Though I have done my best, and as yet without success, to persuade Khateeb to get an order from the Sultan to introduce this innovation about the flags, I think my colleagues were very silly to have raised the question. There appears to me to be a great difference between a Diplomatic or Consular Officer hoisting his flag to join in celebrating the festal days of the nation to which he is accredited, and that the Government or local authorities should be expected to return their friendly demonstration on all the festal days of all the Sovereigns of the foreign Representatives who may happen to reside in their territory.

Henceforward neither the Spanish nor French Consuls will hoist their flags in honour of the Sultan or his family. The Moorish authorities won't care a pin; but when the inhabitants of Tangier observe the omission, and see the British and other flags flying as usual, they will conclude, and say, that the Spaniards and French are their enemies, and the British and other nations their friends. I do not think any other point will be gained by this move.

It is reported to-day at Tangier that the Reefians have sent back the Spaniards they had taken prisoners to Melilla.

It was my intention to have dispatched "Lapwing" yesterday to Gibraltar, but the weather has become so boisterous, all communication with the vessels in our bay has been stopped; and, I am sorry to add, one of the "Lapwing's" boats, in attempting to go on board, was capsized, and one man was drowned.

An old acquaintance of mine, Vansittart yclept, who has been spending some months in the South of Spain, and has come over to give us a hale, asked me to-day whether I had heard that some proposition had been made for the transfer of Ceuta to the French Government. I scouted the very idea, and said that I thought the Spanish people would hang the Minister who even entertained such a proposition. He surprised me, however, by assuring me that the information was given to him confidentially by a party worthy of credence in Spain, and that the plea given for the Spanish Government listening to such a proposition was, the expense of keeping up the garrison of Ceuta.

I think it possible the French may have, on some occasion, felt the pulse of the Spaniards on such a topic, but I do not believe it could or would be entertained for a moment; but Vansittart is a sensible man, and, as far as I can learn, received his information from a party high in office in the Spanish service. So I mention it to you *en passant*, attaching no importance to the information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 8.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(Private.)

My dear Lord Cowley, *Foreign Office, August* 19, 1859.

THERE are same matters of great public importance which I wish you would treat confidentially with Walewski before he goes to Biarritz.

One refers to the state of Morocco, and the probable death of the Emperor. I have desired Mr. Drummond Hay to go to Paris, and speak to you on this subject. He tells me that the heir to the Crown, though a just and honest man, is very unpopular, and may probably be set aside. It strikes me that we ought to be in the same boat with the French upon this subject. At least, I presume they do not want conquest, or to take Tangier, which we could not allow. But we ought to recognize the same heir, subject of course to events over which we cannot pretend to have any control. In former days both Thiers and Guizot readily admitted our interest in the preservation of Moorish independence.

Another subject which is disquieting is the state of the Principalities.

I send you, for your information, a private letter of Mr. Green on this subject.

With respect to the maintenance of Couza's authority, the privileges of the monasteries, and even the maintenance of a free constitution, I do not know that we need greatly trouble ourselves. But the privileges of the Consuls, as described in our Capitulations with Turkey, cannot be given up without admitting the virtual independence--nay, the actual and formal independence of the Principalities.

But this is an European concern, and I do not wish to act in it separately. If the other Great Powers think that fresh arrangements for the Principalities can be substituted with advantage for present stipulations, we shall be ready to consider their propositions.

Another matter requiring much consideration is the increase of the Slave Trade. But Sir F. Rogers is going to Paris with a proposition on this subject, in pursuance of the former negotiation, which may enable us more clearly to define the position of our two Governments. What I have already said is enough for the ten days which remain before M. Walewski goes to Biarritz.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 9.

Memorandum of Observations which Mr. J. H. Drummond Hay was desirous of making verbally to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, relative to the Secret Memorandum he drew up and presented to Lord Clarendon on the 12th August, 1857, regarding the danger of France taking possession of Tangier by a *coup de main*, and the course Mr. Drummond Hay had to suggest should be pursued to impede such an event; to the private letter he addressed Mr. Hammond on the same subject on the 7th April, 1858; and to the reply Mr. Drummond Hay received from Lord Malmesbury, marked Secret and Confidential, of the 6th May, 1858.

THE Sultan of Morocco is said to be now upwards of eighty years of age: his death may, therefore, be expected at no remote period. The discontented state of the Moorish population, and the unpopularity of the Sultan's eldest son, the Viceroy Sidi Mohamed, are strong grounds for apprehending that, on the present Sultan's death, a state of revolution and anarchy will prevail throughout Morocco; and that amongst the various competitors for the succession to the throne, fanatical Princes will come forward, who, in order to strengthen their claims upon the goodwill of the Mohamedans, will proclaim a holy war against the French in Algeria, or, at any rate, invade the Algerine frontier; but be that as it may, if France is not engaged at such a moment in war with other Powers, my conviction is she will gladly take advantage of the slightest pretext (creating even, perhaps, an imaginary grievance) to march a French army upon Fez or Meknas, and take possession of one of these capitals

and the large treasures which are supposed to be deposited in the Sultan's palaces. It is as I have said, the Sultan's death, which I am inclined to believe the French are awaiting to carry out any ambitious views they may have in Morocco; and I have little doubt some well-devised plan has been formed,* which, if carried out in the manner I apprehend, would certainly most seriously affect British interests both at Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean. In order to check or thwart the execution of any scheme which might strike at the vital interests of British navigation and commerce in the Mediterranean, it has occurred to me the Government of Great Britain should also impart any preconcerted plans they may have formed, to the Admirals in the Mediterranean or Lisbon, to the Governor of Gibraltar, and to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco; so that these officers, if a *coup de main* on Tangier was even attempted, and there was not time to refer to Her Majesty's Government for instructions, might be prepared to act with decision and unanimity.

The march of a French army upon the Moorish capital, and the capture of a treasure of two or three millions sterling, would perhaps be of small importance, and would not call for any immediate action on the part of the British Government, if the conflict could end there, and the French army was again to withdraw within the Algerine frontier; but I do not suppose that is, or will be, the chief aim of France in attacking Morocco, when she is prepared for such an expedition. It is Tangier that France covets; it is by the capture of that little town, from which Gibraltar is provisioned—the port whence, during the Peninsular war, our fleets and armies received large supplies—France is aware she would strike a severe blow at the British naval power in the Mediterranean.

If the French held Tangier, it would be easy for them to stop also all important supplies to Gibraltar from other ports, and parts of the northern coast of Morocco, especially if the Spaniards who occupy Ceuta (in case of a war between Great Britain and France) were disposed to join the lattter Power,† and stop the supplies from the Moorish coast near Ceuta and the Spanish mainland. The port of Tetuan is too insecure for shipping, with certain winds, and the western Moorish ports are too far off to ensure the provisioning of Her Majesty's garrison, unless Great Britain was complete mistress of the seas; whilst no Moorish force could ever retake Tangier if 2,000 Europeans garrisoned its ancient walls on the land-side, and it would require a strong fleet to destroy its numerous batteries towards the sea, if served by French artillerymen.

When the French march upon Fez, no doubt very plausible, and perhaps justifiable, grounds, will be shown for the invasion; and whilst the army is rapidly marching towards the Moorish capital, a fleet of war-ships and transports will probably be dispatched to Tangier, with orders to seize the town by a *coup de main*. France, if then, as now, the faithful ally of Great Britain, would no doubt plead the necessity of this movement as a diversion to prevent its army being overwhelmed by the hordes of the interior, and satisfactory assurances might perhaps be given that every facility would be afforded for provisioning Gibraltar from Algeria, or even the Moorish mainland, and that French troops would retire when the Moorish Government made peace, and tranquillity was restored; but history has shown what these assurances are worth, especially when the French know right well, and hardly make a secret of it, that, by the possession of Tangier, they would have the entire command of the southern shores of the Straits, and that it would be by their sufferance, and as long as they chose to keep the peace, that Gibraltar could be provisioned.

I should also remark that Tangier is capable of being made much stronger than it is at present, and if the mole the English destroyed when they abandoned the town in the time of Charles II was rebuilt, the port would be capable of affording shelter to a considerable naval force. In my humble opinion it is at outposts like Egypt and Morocco where France will strike when she desires to attack or to weaken the power of Great Britain, and by thus cutting the arteries through which and along which the life-blood of our commerce in the Mediterranean and our colonies is conveyed, paralyze the whole system of the British Empire. An attack on Egypt would, doubtless, have the appearance of

* I do not say this altogether without data, but from information which has been confidentially given me.—J. H. D. H.

† The knowledge that Gibraltar must finally fall from a want of provisions, and the offer of French aid to restore that fortress, might induce the Spanish Government to overlook the danger of having a French colony on the other side of the Straits.—J. H. D. H.

a more hostile proceeding towards Great Britain than an attack on Morocco; but the French Government knows also that the former act would be more likely to arouse the animosity of the British public and bring on a conflict, and on that account alone I do not suppose it is so much to be apprehended as an attack upon Morocco, a country which has hardly been noticed by politicians, and the importance of which, from its geographical position, fertility, and resources, is almost unknown to the British public; whilst other foreign Governments would not be opposed to see the Mahometans, who now occupy that fine country-driven out by a civilized people: but the French Government must be, and is, no doubt, aware that when the southern coast of the Straits is under French dominion, our communication with India by Egypt could be cut off, or at any rate rendered very precarious. Frenchmen in general, I speak especially of public men, make no secret of the ultimate views of their Government, and more than one of my French colleagues have observed, when I have intimated that the occupation of Tangier, or other Moorish port, would be a *casus belli* with Great Britain, "Le Parlement Anglais est trop sage de permettre vos Ministres de faire la guerre pour sauver un pays barbare de la civilisation Française: on criera chez vous comme à la prise d'Alger, et voilà tout."

In Lord Malmesbury's secret and confidential despatch of the 6th May, 1858, I am authorized to protest against the occupation by France, or any other Power, of Tangier, and also when affairs assumed a threatening aspect, and there was danger of such a contingency, to prepare the Moorish Government for the garrisoning of Tangier by a British force, if Her Majesty's Government found it convenient to carry such a project into execution.

Now, I may be permitted to observe that if a French force arrived at Tangier with orders to take the town, my protest would not be of the slightest service, unless a British force was at hand, and that the Commander had instructions to prevent the occupation of the town; for, from the manner in which the present French Government acts, I hardly suppose time for a reference to the British Government or for deliberation would be allowed. The question is, then, what can be done, and how can we prevent a surprise?

I would suggest that in case of the Sultan's death, and a revolution in Morocco, or that the French declare, at any time, war against Morocco, or that a French army march upon Fez, or a fleet be sent to the Morocco waters, that the Admiral at Malta be authorized, without waiting for instructions from Her Majesty's Government, to dispatch a large naval force to Gibraltar, with orders to proceed to, and to protect Tangier from occupation.

If the French army or fleet was to occupy any other town or port of Morocco than Tangier, or that the French army was marching upon Tangier from the interior, I would, in such an emergency, suggest that the town of Tangier be occupied at once by a British force sent from Gibraltar, as I suggested in my Memorandum of August 1857, and that formal and satisfactory assurances should be simultaneously given to the Moorish Government and the foreign Representatives in Morocco, that Tangier was occupied by a British force solely to secure the provisioning of Her Majesty's garrison, and not with any intention of acting hostilely towards France, and that the occupation would cease the day the French forces were withdrawn into Algeria, and peace concluded with France and Morocco. I have been told by military men that a force of 1,000 men and 500 artillerymen would be sufficient to garrison the small town, and could easily be conveyed over within twenty-four hours, by the vessels of war, which, latterly, have usually been stationed at Gibraltar.*

I am conscious that such active and energetic measures might ultimately produce a war between Great Britain and France, but I feel also that half measures, in opposition to the schemes of the French, who, no doubt, have also preconcerted plans, and will be prepared to carry them out with decision and energy, would only irritate that Power without preventing or warding off the blow which she might attempt to inflict on British interests. No man is more thoroughly convinced than myself of the importance of maintaining friendly relations with France; I beg, therefore, to add, I only suggest decisive action, when, and after, we have the strongest ground for apprehending the French are about to make a move in Morocco, which might permanently injure British interests, and that no warning had been given to the British Government, or satisfactory assurances as to their final intentions.

* Two frigates and a gun-boat.

I have observed in the report of parliamentary proceedings that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to establish an electric telegraph by sea between England and Gibraltar. If this project is carried into execution, a branch-line extended to the house I dwell in at Tangier, which is the property of the British Government, and which is about thirty miles distant from Gibraltar, might prove of the greatest service, not only for transmitting notices regarding the provisioning of Her Majesty's garrison or fleet, in case of war, but also for giving information of vessels of war or of squadrons appearing on the western entrance of the Straits, or on the Atlantic when lying behind Cape Spartel, which could not be viewed from Gibraltar, but can easily be seen from my house, or from the heights near Tangier; vessels entering the Straits on the western side towards the evening, or leaving on that side in the early morn, are sometimes viewed from Tangier, when they have passed the Rock unseen. Information regarding the movements of vessels and squadrons might be of vital importance at critical moments both in England and Gibraltar.

The telegraph would enable also the British Agent to put himself in immediate communication with Her Majesty's Government regarding any current events of importance alluded to in this Memorandum, and thus enable Her Majesty's Government to guide his conduct, and take immediate steps to ward off the danger of the occupation of Tangier by France or other foreign Power.

In case of such a great calamity ever occurring as a war between Great Britain and France, and the British influence and name continue to be paramount in Morocco, it is unnecessary for me to point out the important part even the weak Power of Morocco might take as the ally of Great Britain, considering the relative position of Morocco to the French colony of Algeria and the ports of Morocco on the Straits and Atlantic.

(Signed) J. H. DRUMMOND HAY.

Richmond, August 15, 1859.

No. 10.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 265.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1859.

THE accounts which have reached Her Majesty's Government give reason to apprehend that the Emperor of Morocco, who is of a very advanced age, is at the present time seriously ill. His death would probably be followed by a contest for the succession, and consequently by a state of things in Morocco which would be injurious to the commercial interests, if not to the safety of the subjects, of all countries having intercourse with it.

It would not conduce to the safety of the passage into the Mediterranean if a civil war were raging on the African coast. Such a state of things would very soon lead to a renewal of piracy, which, while it remained unsuppressed, would do much mischief to commerce, but which would scarcely be put an end to without much loss of life on the part of the maritime Powers.

Again, a civil war in that quarter would prove very inconvenient to Great Britain, not only as interfering with a commerce which is now increasing, but as placing in jeopardy the means of supplying the garrison and town of Gibraltar with articles of daily consumption, which at present are to a considerable extent drawn by the inhabitants from the African coast.

Neither could it be a matter of unconcern to France to have a civil war on the frontier of Algeria. The fact of such a war, partaking as it doubtless would very much of a religious character, in the immediate neighbourhood of the French possessions in Africa, could not fail to produce an uneasy feeling among the native tribes subject to French dominion, and thereby to force the French Government to take measures, however inconvenient or expensive, to provide against any insurrectionary and fanatical movement in Algeria.

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that the Government of the Emperor adopt the views of the Bourbon and Orleans dynasties which immediately preceded it, and entertain no desire or intention to enlarge the French possessions in Africa at the expense of the Empire of Morocco. That question was in former years incidentally raised between England and France, and the

assurances which the British Government received on the subject were quite satisfactory. For although disclaiming then, as now, any desire to appropriate to itself any portion of Morocco, and aiming at nothing more than the peaceable maintenance of the Moorish rule on the other side of the Straits, the British Government had felt it due to the good understanding which then, as now, it was their most anxious wish to maintain with the Government of France, frankly and openly to declare, as they have again done lately to Spain, that any occupation of the coast of Morocco by a foreign Power could not be viewed otherwise than in a very serious light to Great Britain, and could scarcely fail to lead to evils of great magnitude.

Such being the interests of various countries in the tranquility of Morocco, and the occurrence of an event calculated to disturb that tranquillity being, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, imminent, they are desirous of coming to a timely understanding with the French Government as to the course which should be pursued by the two Governments, in case of the death of the Emperor of Morocco.

Her Majesty's Government consider that it would tend very much to prevent confusion in Morocco, if the Agents of both Governments at Tangier were instructed jointly to declare, on the Emperor's death becoming known at that place, that neither Government would interfere in behalf of any aspirant to the Throne; that it was their mutual desire that the succession should pass according to the law of the country; but that, in any case, they would respect the independence and territorial integrity of Morocco within the limits which now separate it from other countries, and would only interfere, and then in concert, to put a stop to anarchy, which might imperil the safety of their subjects, or the lives of the Christian and Jewish population on the coasts; and that such interference on their part would cease, and every force which they might employ to restore order be withdrawn, as soon as the object which had induced them to have recourse to it was accomplished.

Your Excellency will take an early opportunity of conversing with Count Walewski on this matter, and you may, if you think proper, give him a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 11.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1859, 9 A.M.

THE Emperor of Morocco is dead. Tell Hay. See to what the French do.

No. 12.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 502.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 9, 1859.

I WAS with Count Walewski yesterday when his Excellency received the news of the death of the Emperor of Morocco. I took occasion to call his Excellency's attention to the complications which might arise in consequence, and I begged him to take into his immediate consideration the observations contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 265 of the 20th ultimo, relating to this subject, of which, as your Lordship is aware, I gave his Excellency, confidentially, a copy.

I thought it right, without compromising Her Majesty's Government in any way, to let his Excellency see that events might lead to the necessity of occupying Tangier temporarily, and I said that it was highly desirable that the two Governments should come to some understanding upon the subject, for the question of Tangier was one of such vital importance to British interests that

Her Majesty's Government might be obliged to act alone, if the French Government delayed to examine and discuss it with them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 13.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 516.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 15, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, herewith, a despatch which has been addressed to me by Colonel Claremont, on the subject of the troubles on the frontiers of Algeria and Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Colonel Claremont to Earl Cowley.

My Lord, *Paris, September* 15, 1859.

I HAD a conversation yesterday, at the Ministère de la Guerre, on the subject of the troubles which have just taken place on the frontiers of Algeria and Morocco; and was told that the French troops had been very successful in repelling the inroad which was made upon them. It appears that they even took the Sonala of the Chief of the tribe.

On my asking whether they contemplated pursuing their advantage, they answered that a few additional battalions might perhaps be sent in that direction to assist in keeping the peace, but that they had to deal with wild marauding tribes, who did not acknowledge any authority, and that it was difficult to make anybody responsible for their misconduct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. CLAREMONT.

No. 14.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 529.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 16, 1859.

I HAVE in vain endeavoured to elicit any declaration or opinion from Count Walewski respecting the present state of affairs in Morocco. To all the questions which I ask, his Excellency professes complete ignorance; and it is evident that either he takes no interest whatever in Moorish affairs, which can hardly be credited, or that he does not choose to commit himself by any expression of opinion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 15.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 536.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 18, 1859.

COUNT WALEWSKI reverted yesterday, of his own accord, to the contents of your Lordship's despatch No. 265 of the 20th ultimo, relating to

the state of affairs in Morocco, of which I gave his Excellency a copy, as your Lordship is aware, under the discretionary powers entrusted to me.

Count Walewski said that he was about to despatch to Count Persigny an answer to it. The Imperial Government, his Excellency stated, were not prepared to make any declaration through their Agent at Tangier of the nature suggested by your Lordship, but he could assure me that the Imperial Government harboured no other intention than that of maintaining order on their frontier; that they had no thoughts of aggrandizement by appropriating any part of the Morocco territory; and that if circumstances should arise, rendering interference in Morocco necessary, the French Government would be ready to consult with Her Majesty's Government on the measures to be taken.

I asked Count Walewski whether a report which had reached me was true, that the French Government was more inclined to favour another claimant to the Crown of Morocco than the eldest son of the late Emperor, who, it appeared, had been proclaimed in the capital and adjacent territory; and his Excellency assured me that there was no foundation for such a report.

I considered Count Walewski's language as satisfactory, but it will be better that your Lordship should base your opinion on the despatch which his Excellency is about to address to M. de Persigny. It is probable that the declaration which he has made to me is one of the results of M. de Chasseloup Laubat's visit to Biarritz.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 16.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 545.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 19, 1859.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a despatch from Colonel Claremont of this day's date, recording the opinions of several French officers on the recent events in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Colonel Claremont to Earl Cowley.

My Lord, *Paris, September 19, 1859.*

I HAVE conversed lately with several French officers of great local experience on the subject of the recent events in Morocco. They all think that the present Emperor being a great fanatic, he may proclaim the Djehal, or holy war, against them, which will give them a great deal of trouble on the frontier, but they do not seem to apprehend that it will extend further. They say it would be madness to attempt the conquest of the country; that it is very mountainous, and that the people are very warlike; so that even if they had a man like Marshal Bugeaud, to whom alone they attribute the final pacification of Algeria, such a serious task might demand an army of 200,000 men, and extend over a long period of years.

I have, &c,
(Signed) R. CLAREMONT.

No. 17.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 341.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 22, 1859.*

BARON MALARET called at the Foreign Office this morning, and read to Mr. Hammond in my absence a despatch from Count Walewski, dated the 19th instant, in which, with reference to the communication which your Excellency had made to him, as reported in your despatch No. 536 of the 10th instant, respecting Morocco, the French Minister says that the Government of the Emperor has no intention of interfering with the question of succession in Morocco, which it wished should pass according to the law of the country; that it did not contemplate any measures, except such as might be necessary for the protection of the French frontier, or for the security, in case of need, of the lives of the Christians and Jewish residents on the coast; that it had no wish for any alteration in the existing state of territorial possession in Morocco; and that if any circumstance called for the interference of foreign Powers, the French Government was prepared to concert with that of Her Majesty as to the measures which should be taken.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 18.

Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley.

(No. 347.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 24, 1859.*

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch No. 536 of the 18th instant, I have to instruct you to express to Count Walewski the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the assurances given to you by his Excellency that the French Government have no intention of appropriating any part of the territory of Morocco; and that, if any circumstances should arise, rendering interference in that country necessary, they would be ready to consult with Her Majesty's Government in the measures to be taken.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 19.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 590.)

My Lord, *Biarritz, October 5, 1859.*

I HAVE inquired of Count Walewski whether the Spanish Government has made any communication to the Imperial Government relative to the questions pending between Spain and Morocco, and if so, what is the opinion of the Imperial Government upon them, and what advice he has given to the Government of Spain.

Count Walewski replied, that the Spanish Ambassador, M. Mon, had been here; that he had made a general statement respecting the differences which had arisen between his Government and that of Morocco; that he had entered at some length into the communications which had passed upon the subject between the British and Spanish Governments; and that he had complained of the demand made by Mr. Buchanan for a written assurance that the Spanish Government had no intention of occupying permanently any part of the territory of Morocco, after M. Isturiz had officially declared to your Lordship that no such intention existed; a demand with which M. Mon and his Government could not with any regard to their dignity comply.

Count Walewski stated himself to have replied to M. Mon as follows:—That the French Government had had too many causes of complaint against the Reefians not to wish success to the Spanish arms if Spain should be engaged in a

conflict with those wild hordes, and that France could not gainsay the right of Spain to ask for, and enforce if necessary, satisfaction from the Moorish Government, if she had legitimate cause of complaint. With regard to the demand made by Mr. Buchanan, if the Spanish Government thought it incompatible with their dignity to give the required assurance in writing, they might, perhaps, find some other way of satisfying Her Majesty's Government that they had no intention of attempting any conquest in Morocco.

There was considerable hesitation in Count Walewski's manner in giving me this information; and I have no doubt that he has encouraged the warlike propensities of the Spanish Government more than he has admitted to me.

His Excellency did not attempt to conceal the opinion which he entertained that the Spanish Government was right in refusing the written assurance which had been asked of them by Mr. Buchanan, and that Her Majesty's Government ought to have been satisfied by the verbal assurance given both at Madrid and by the Spanish Minister in London.

I said that Her Majesty's Government did not impugn the right of the Spanish Government to obtain, by all the means in their power, whatever legitimate satisfaction was due to them from the Government of Morocco, and that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tangiers had been instructed to support the just claims of Spain. There were, however, considerable doubts whether all the claims made by Spain were founded on justice or not. But be this as it might, Her Majesty's Government were obliged to look to the safety of the Queen's possessions. The supplies for Gibraltar were drawn from the coast of Morocco; and Her Majesty's Government could not see with indifference any part of that coast, and more particularly Tangier, in the permanent possession of any Power which might, in an unfriendly moment, stop the supply of provisions necessary to the alimentation of that town and fortress. If, therefore, the Spanish Government had any notions of conquest on the coast, or, indeed, of the temporary occupation of Tangiers, which by reason of the conditions attached to it might become permanent, they might find themselves involved in difficulties with Her Majesty's Government, of which Her Majesty's Government had warned them in an amicable spirit.

Count Walewski said that he quite understood the necessities of Her Majesty's Government in this respect; and he took the opportunity of again disavowing any intention on the part of France, of increasing her dominions in that quarter.

Circumstances had occurred, he added, since last he had spoken to me on this subject, which would necessitate the chastisement of certain tribes on the Algerine frontier of Morocco; but the chastisement given, the French troops employed would retire within their own frontier.

His Excellency promised me further details on this head, as soon as he should arrive in Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 20.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* 12, 12·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October* 12, 1859, 11 A.M.

SATISFACTORY assurances from French Government respecting advice they have given, and will continue to give, at Madrid, with respect to question of Morocco.

Will urge Spanish Government, by telegraph, to leave frontier question for future amicable discussion.

French fleet is only sent to protect French subjects in case of necessity.

No. 21.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(*Received October* .)

(No. 625.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 12, 1859.

COUNT WALEWSKI having, on his return from Biarritz, gone to his country place, and it being uncertain what day he would be in Paris, I went, yesterday, to see him, with the intention of speaking to him on the reports which had reached me, that the French Government was encouraging that of Spain to undertake hostilities against Morocco, and had counselled the further demand which Spain had made on Morocco for a fresh delineation of the frontier which separates Spanish ground from Morocco, after Morocco had accepted the first ultimatum of Spain.

Count Walewski declared that so little had he counselled any fresh demand, he was not aware one had been made. I then recounted to his Excellency what had passed.

I stated that Her Majesty's Government had used what influence they possessed with the Moorish Government to obtain for Spain the satisfaction to which she was entitled; and that they were far from saying that some modification of the actual arrangement might not be made with advantage, and with a view of preventing future conflicts, and they were prepared to recommend the Moorish Government to entertain the question in a friendly spirit. But Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier having reported that it was not likely that the consent of the Sultan of Morocco to this fresh demand could be obtained by the 15th instant, the day on which the Spanish Government insisted on having it, they were anxious that the latter should be satisfied in the first instance with the obtainment of their just demands, and that the question of the frontier should be reserved for future discusssion. If, then, as Count Walewski assured me, there was no desire on the part of the Imperial Government to see hostilities commence between Spain and Morocco, it might be useful if he would instruct the French Ambassador at Madrid to hold the sa melanguage as Her Majesty's Envoy, and to urge the Spanish Government not to include the immediate modification of the frontier among the points on which peace or war with Morocco was to depend.

Count Walewski promised without hesitation to instruct M. Barrot in the sense I had suggested to him.

I then said that although I felt that I had no right to put any question to him respecting the orders given to the French squadron sent to the coast of Morocco, yet that it would give me great satisfaction if he would authorize me to assure Her Majesty's Government that there was no intention on the part of France to take an actual part in support of Spain should hostilities unfortunately ensue.

His Excellency replied that if I had not mentioned the matter to him, he should, of his own accord, have volunteered the declaration that the French squadron was simply sent for the protection of French subjects in case passing events should lead to the necessity of giving such protection. The French Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier had reported that the presence of some French ships might prevent an outbreak on the part of the Moors against foreigners, and the Emperor, on learning this at Biarritz, had sent orders to Toulon to dispatch to the coast of Morocco whatever ships might be available, without any knowledge of what the number might be. There was no intention whatever of assisting Spain.

I hope that I shall have done right in taking the step which I have recounted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

END